

## Recap of Climate Justice Community of Practice Session:

# Integration of Climate Adaptation by the Dutch Development Cooperation Sector

**When:** December 19, 15 – 17:30 CET

**What:** Physical meeting, Partos offices, Amsterdam

### 1. Introduction

In this session, we were privileged to have Jelmer Kamstra (Senior Policy Researcher - IOB), Rosa van Driel (Advocacy Officer - Care) and Raquel Hädrich Silva (PhD Candidate - TU Delft), who shed light on various aspects related to the integration of climate change adaptation in Dutch development cooperation programmes.

Main learning questions were:

- How is climate change integrated in water and food security programmes funded by the Netherlands and how have these reduced risks for people vulnerable to the effects of climate change?
- Is reported adaptation finance accurate, and does this genuinely contribute to climate adaptation? What can we learn from the global discussions in COP28 and beyond? What is the role of the private sector (aid and trade/blended finance)
- What are social justice implications of Dutch climate adaptation programmes and what are examples on the ground?

**First, Jelmer Kamstra** (IOB) provided insights about climate change integration in water and food security programmes funded by the Netherlands, based on the IOB evaluation (titled *Climate smart and Future Proof*), launched in December 2023. The evaluation used a case study design that combined fieldwork in Bangladesh and Mozambique with a systematic review of 19 water and food security programmes in both countries. All these programmes have a Rio marker on climate change adaptation of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and are reported by the Netherlands as climate-relevant disbursements to the UNFCCC.

The report concludes that climate change adaptation is not structurally integrated in advance into water and food security programmes, and it is largely unknown to what extent adaptation measures have reduced the risks of climate change for vulnerable target groups. IOB also finds that there is limited inclusion of marginalised groups, but there is often good cooperation with governments.

The evaluation makes several sharp recommendations (see report link below). Regarding climate finance, the last recommendation mentions that an ambitious climate policy requires additional resources. Labelling existing development programmes (of ODA budget) as climate-relevant is not enough to meet additional needs.

- Read this [report, titled Climate smart and Future proof, here](#).
- Find the [presentation used by Jelmer here](#).

**Second, Rosa van Driel (CARE)** presented the state of affairs of climate finance and the way it is reported upon by developed countries. She highlighted that in 2021 on average the biggest portion comes from public funding through multilateral channels, a large chunk comes through bilateral public finance, and around 10% through mobilized private finance. For the Netherlands it is 50% public, 50% mobilized private, so that is very different from the global average. The balance between mitigation and adaptation has not worked out so far. With more than 50% going to mitigation, around 25% to adaptation, and 11% cross cutting.

In 2021, developed countries agreed to double their adaptation finance from 2019 levels by 2025, i.e. \$40.6bn based on OECD data. However, adaptation finance dropped from \$28,6 bn to \$24,6 bn. Doubling of adaptation finance so far seems far out of sight. Additionally, Oxfam (in its Climate Finance Shadow report, see link below) concluded that in 2020 the real value of financial support specifically aimed at climate action was around \$21bn to \$24.5bn (and not the 83.3bn reported). 93% of the climate finance reported by wealthy countries between 2011 and 2020 was taken directly from development aid (Care, 2023). The outcomes of COP28 are not promising for urgent, must and additional climate adaptation finance.

- Find the [presentation used by Rosa here](#).
- The presentation mentions several interesting resources:
  - o [Oxfam Climate Finance Shadow Report 2023](#)
  - o [Care 2021 report: Climate Adaptation Finance: fact or fiction?](#)
  - o [Care 2023 report: Seeing Double, Decoding the additionality of climate finance](#)

**Last, Raquel Hädrich Silva** presented concrete insights and examples based on her research on social justice implications of the Dutch Water as Leverage project, implemented by RVO (Netherlands enterprise agency). This programme invites internationally operating multidisciplinary teams to develop innovative, bankable and implementable design proposals for addressing water crises in urban areas.

She highlights three forms of injustices. First, there is distributive injustice because of an over-focus on bankability and building a business case. Second, the protagonists are Dutch private actors instead of local actors (recognition injustice), with little insight in local situations and complexities. Third, designs only make it into implementation if they don't question the mechanisms that generate injustice (procedural injustice).

- Find the [presentation used by Raquel here](#).

### Highlights from the open discussion

- Several questions came to the fore related to the complexity of integrating CCA into development. The discussion started off with a question on what it means to have a 'good' vulnerability and exposure assessment. This relates to the first step of the Climate Lens, a lens that functions as a guiding tool to assess the process of integrating CCA (see the report for further information on what the three steps entail). Exposure and vulnerability should be seen as two distinct elements, where vulnerability assessments should focus on what 'capacities target groups or systems have and/or lack to absorb, adapt and/or transform to cope with changing climatic conditions'. Exposure is about 'the extent to which people,

systems, livelihoods and assets are located in places and settings that could be adversely affected by climate change' (IOB, 2023). To assess this in a 'good' way, is largely dependent on available databases (existing climate change scenarios) that shine light on the actual risks related to changing climate conditions and the actual fieldwork done to assess the current situation where the development programme is to be implemented.

- How to deal with the fact that CCA is seemingly an 'add-on' for poverty and inequality work, thereby instead of increasing the pool of resources (i.e. funding), replacing resources that are potentially also enabling the capacity to adapt to climate change. This reveals the complexity of how to count something as a climate adaptation measure. For instance, being able to shift from relying on farming, and diversifying economic options for young entrepreneurs is potentially a way to adapt too. So, the discussion on whether 'development is the best adaptation'. Whether this is the case is also dependent on the definition one holds for adaptation. The IOB report uses the IPCC definition of adaptation: 'Adaptation is defined, in human systems, as the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects in order to moderate harm or take advantage of beneficial opportunities. In natural systems, adaptation is the process of adjustment to actual climate and its effects; human intervention may facilitate this.' (IPCC, 2022, p. 5)
- Scalability of LLA: Many CCA measure are context specific, so a relevant question is how to scale principles and values instead of CCA measures per se. Especially when considering the 'justice' element, making sure development programmes that try to address the causes of exposure and/or vulnerability are locally led requires an institutionalisation of LLA principles and proper involvement of national government so impact could be sustainable, something that also comes back in the IOB report. Another way of looking at scaling is focussing on collaboration with local, regional or national governments to enable local decision-making.
- Related to this, research conducted by Kamstra (2020) was mentioned about the shift from a managerial to a social transformative perspective of the Dialogue & Dissent framework. An observation made in this research is: 'as D&D focussed on strengthening the voice of marginalised groups, legitimacy derived from representation and mobilisation were important. Without information and support from in-country CSOs with clear constituencies, international or Dutch CSOs would have less legitimacy to advocate SDG issues at international fora'. [The research paper can be found here.](#)
- A final point raised related to the overfocus on themes for projects (related to climate adaptation and other) which are defined first and which we take to a certain target group, versus first focussing on the target groups and taking their wishes and needs as point of departure. A reflection on this was that local municipalities are often reluctant to engage in projects (e.g. though working with Invest International), since they do not want to get further indebted.