

IOB Terms of Reference

Climate diplomacy 2018-2021

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Campaigning for Change

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Policy and Operations Evaluation Department
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Abbreviations and acronyms

BHOS	Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation
CD	Climate diplomacy
COP	Conference of Parties
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDE	Directie Duurzame Economische ontwikkeling, or Department for Sustainable Economic development
DFCD	Dutch Fund for Climate and Development
DGIS	Directorate-General or Director-General for International Cooperation
DIE	Department Integration of Europe, i.e. the EU department
EU	European Union
EUR	Euro
EZK	(Ministry of) Economic Affairs and Climate
GCA	Global Centre on Adaptation
GHGE	greenhouse gas emissions
I&W	(Ministry of) Infrastructure and Water
IGG	Inclusive Green Growth department
IOB	Policy and Operations Evaluation Department
KL	Climate section
LNV	(Ministry of) Agriculture, Nature and Food
MDB	Multilateral development Bank(s)
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NDC	Nationally determined contributions
NDCP	Nationally determined contributions Partnership
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PR	Periodic Review
RPE	Regulations for Periodic Evaluations
RVO	Dutch Enterprise Agency
TOC	Theory of change, or theories of change
TOR	Terms of reference
UN	United Nations
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
USD	United States dollar
QCA	Qualitative Comparative Analysis

1 Introduction

1.1. Background

Climate change has been an important topic for the Dutch ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and for development cooperation in particular. Since 2015, when the Paris climate agreement was adopted, there has been a renewed momentum for Dutch domestic and international ambitions and commitments, and increased public support and demand for climate action. The urgency of the need to integrate climate considerations into all policy and to translate commitments into action has become increasingly clear.

This evaluation concerns climate diplomacy, a relatively new policy priority. In particular it will focus on a bilateral lobby campaign led by the IGG climate diplomacy team in the period 2018-2022. The goal of this campaign was to raise non-EU countries' climate ambitions in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and their long-term strategies. This evaluation will look at the results of this campaign, how effective was it and why?

The new Dutch cabinet decided on the bilateral lobby campaign in response to a request by the UN Secretary-General to take up a leadership role in promoting an increase in other countries' climate ambitions, in particular their mitigation targets. These ambitions, which all Parties to the Paris Agreement needed to formulate in NDCs, needed to be raised in the run-up to the 26th Conference of Parties (COP26) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), planned for fall 2020. To lead this campaign, a dedicated team with extra staff was set up at the Inclusive Green Growth department of the MFA (IGG), which liaised with and coordinated efforts of other departments (EZK, LNV, I&W). The lobby was directed at a couple of dozen countries and involved Dutch embassies, ministers and other high-level representatives. It made use of bilateral meetings as well as multilateral events. The bilateral approach was a conspicuous and new aspect of Dutch climate diplomacy, as Dutch climate diplomacy until then had mainly consisted of multilateral negotiations (i.e. at MDB's, COPs of the UNFCCC and in the EU).

The goal of this research is mainly to learn from the climate campaign to inform new policy. Now is an opportune time to draw lessons for future climate diplomacy and other lobby campaigns at the MFA. First, the COP26 is over, which provides a reference point for measuring impact. Second, with the start of a new cabinet and a new Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, there is momentum for policy change. Third, IGG is planning to draft an international climate strategy which can be informed by some preliminary findings of this evaluation. And finally, the climate diplomacy team is looking for a new and clearly defined purpose and mandate towards the next COPs and the UN Global Stocktake. The team was initially set up for two years, but is moving towards a more permanent status, with a focus on mitigation and implementation.

1.2. Positioning among other (IOB) studies

In 2021, both climate change and policy coherence were identified as topics for the Strategic Evaluation Agenda of DGIS/IGG. This resulted in the planning of two periodic reviews, one on Dutch climate policy for development in the period 2016-2021, and one on policy coherence in Dutch development cooperation in the fields of water, food security and climate change. Taken together, they will cover the requirements of the Dutch Government's Arrangement on Periodic Evaluation (RPE), providing an assessment of the policies and activities covered by BHOS budget article 2.

This evaluation on climate diplomacy is a building block for the periodic review on Dutch climate policy for development. Other building blocks for the periodic review are a finished IOB study on climate finance¹ and a planned study on climate change adaptation (expected spring 2023).

¹ IOB (2021) Climate Finance evaluation report: Funding commitments in transition, May 2021.

Together they will result in a synthesis report including findings on the effectiveness, relevance and coherence of international climate policy. The two periodic reviews - on climate policy and on coherence - will feed into one another. There will be some overlap as the review on policy coherence will also look at climate relevant activities and policy. The country case studies carried out for the coherence review will also cover Dutch climate interventions in those countries, including climate diplomacy.

It is worth noting that at least two other evaluations on Dutch climate policy are ongoing. First, an IOB study on the Dutch contribution to EU policy is planning to include a case study on climate-related files. And secondly, an interdepartmental periodic review of Dutch domestic climate policy, excluding foreign policy, led by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate, will be finalised in 2024. The IOB research team will stay informed on these ongoing evaluations and the two IOB research teams (the one on climate diplomacy and the one on the EU) will look for synergies between their evaluations. Together, the three ongoing evaluations will present a complementary set of reviews, although not a full assessment of the wide range of Dutch climate diplomacy.

1.3. Measuring climate diplomacy

Climate diplomacy can be considered a form of policy advocacy, or policy influencing.

Text box 1: Key concepts

Climate diplomacy is used here to indicate prioritising climate action with partners worldwide in diplomatic dialogues, public diplomacy and external policy instruments (based on climate-diplomacy.org). In the Dutch campaign, it was ultimately aimed at decision makers of the targeted countries.

As part of the Dutch climate campaign, sometimes **public diplomacy** was used, which is the "means by which a sovereign country communicates with publics in other countries aimed at informing and influencing audiences overseas for the purpose of promoting the national interest and advancing its foreign policy goals.".. (based on uscpublicdiplomacy.org). The Dutch MFA uses the term also to indicate informing and influencing the Dutch general public.

Advocacy is defined here as "the act of pleading for or against a cause, as well as supporting or recommending a position, [...] a point of view or a course of action."² It is used here as an overarching category consisting of all kinds of influencing strategies such as diplomacy, lobbying, information dissemination, mobilising public pressure and generating media attention. In this study, policy advocacy is interchangeable with the term **policy influencing**.

See annex B for more information on these and other key concepts used in this document.

Literature on lobby and advocacy trajectories offer various types of analytical frameworks for analysing advocacy effectiveness. A framework for measuring climate diplomacy can be made by focusing on four interrelated elements, namely, (1) capacities for advocacy, (2) the advocacy process (3) advocacy strategies, and (4) results of these strategies.³ These elements will inform the research questions, and will guide the data gathering-, analysis- and reporting-phases. Also they provide a useful structure for reconstructing the policy theory.

² Hopkins (1992, p. 32)

³ This analytical model is derived and adapted from: Kamstra (2017), Dialogue and Dissent Theory of Change 2.0 - Supporting civil society's political role, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, The Hague. In its original form, it presents a framework for measuring civil society advocacy. However, similar steps and analytical categories apply for governmental advocacy (diplomacy), hence it can be applied here. This model may be slightly adapted for the evaluation of climate diplomacy for the bilateral campaign (which was primarily government-to-government).

Advocacy capacities

To be able to implement advocacy strategies, a team or an organisation needs specific capacities. If the chosen strategies are well aligned with the capacities and mandate of the organisation, the chances of success increase. Therefore it is key to first get a sense of the capacities and mandate of the organisation when looking into advocacy effectiveness. Scientific literature mentions several capacities which are important for advocacy effectiveness (see table 1). This research will analyse the capacities and mandate of the IGG climate diplomacy team, and the actors in the network they mobilised.

Table 1. Effective advocacy: enabling factors, capacities and organisational requirements

Enabling factors	Capacities	Organisational requirements
Credible claim	Produce evidence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In-house research skills - Relations with knowledge institutes - Ability to commission and critique research
Credible organisation	Inspire trust among power holders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ability to cultivate a good reputation - Track record - Integrity - Capable leadership
Clear stakeholder engagement strategy	Analyse the political arena	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ability to conduct stakeholder and institutional analyses - Access to information - Knowledge of relevant laws, policies and treaties
Clear communication strategy	Produce tailored messages	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ability to frame, target and time messages - Understanding of communication channels - Relations with media
Coalition of likeminded organisations	Work collectively	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Willingness to work together - Ability to maintain external relations - Awareness of one's added value and complementarity to others
Personal relationships with power holders	Build rapport with power holders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ability to find common ground - Ability to analyse power holders' personal and institutional interests - Proximity to power holders
Flexible strategy	Adapt to on-going changes in the context	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Organisational structures, procedures and culture which accommodate flexibility - Ability to detect and act upon relevant changes in the context - Ability to reflect upon validity of tactics

Source: Elbers & Kamstra (2020): How does organisational capacity contribute to advocacy effectiveness? Taking sTOCK of existing evidence, Development in Practice, p.3, DOI: 10.1080/09614524.2020.1779664

Advocacy process

The advocacy process can be divided in three broad phases: *activation*, *mobilisation* and *political participation* (J. Sidel, 2002). As advocacy processes are erratic in nature, these phases are overlapping and non-linear. The activation phase concerns the recruitment and activation of individuals, for instance by informing them. The mobilisation phase refers to the process of aggregation and sense-making. In this phase, individual concerns are translated into collective action. A crucial step in this process is the mobilisation of resources necessary for collective action, such as time, money, labour (including volunteers), facilities, networks, legitimacy, and information (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; J. R. Sidel, 1991). Another important step in mobilisation is framing, the process of creating a shared conception of the reality that advocacy addresses (Jenkins, 2006; Keck & Sikkink, 2014; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). Through the process of 'frame alignment' various claims are aligned to create a shared interpretation of problems and their solution (Snow & Benford, 1988). Finally, the political participation phase translates these aggregated resources and framed messages into action (J. Sidel, 2002, p. 7).

Advocacy strategies

Advocacy strategies can take many shapes or forms, and be directed at many different actors. Four aspects of advocacy strategies are relevant for this research, as they influence advocacy effectiveness. First, the type of message is important. A distinction can be made between *evidence-based* advocacy claims and *interest* or *value-based* claims (Start & Hovland, 2004). Does climate diplomacy use scientific arguments or does it appeal to values and or interests? And how is this message tailored to the receiver?

Secondly, it is important to look at who is voicing the message. Does it come from Dutch government officials, or from supported domestic groups? They both have a very different mandate and legitimacy which can influence effectiveness.

Thirdly, who is targeted? A distinction is often made between *government-centred* advocacy and *society-centred* advocacy (Jenkins, 2006; Reid, 2000). Government-centred advocacy can be targeted at the administrative, judicial, and/or legislative branches of government, while *society-centred* advocacy can target a wide array of societal actors. For instance, it can target community organisations for awareness raising or mobilisation, it can target media outlets for public education and influencing public opinion, it can target companies to change their practices, and it can target universities to influence their research agenda's (Jenkins, 2006; Minkoff et al., 2008; Mosley, 2009; Reid, 2000).

Fourthly, it is important to look at the tactics that are being employed. A common distinction is the one between *non-confrontational* and *confrontational* advocacy strategies (i.e.: Chereni, 2015; Jenkins, 2006; Keck & Sikkink, 2014; Minkoff et al., 2008; Mosley, 2009; Reid, 2000; J. Saidel, 2002; Start & Hovland, 2004). *Non-confrontational* advocacy tries to achieve change through cooperation and persuasion. Confrontational strategies try to achieve change through putting immediate pressure on decision makers, for instance through demonstrations. Many confrontational tactics require mobilisation of large groups for a prolonged period to build up such pressure. Activation of individuals and commitment to coalition building are therefore prerequisites for this kind of advocacy (Minkoff et al., 2008; J. Saidel, 2002). A partly overlapping distinction is the one between *insider* and *outsider* tactics (Barrett, van Wessel, & Hilhorst, 2016; Dalrymple & Boylan, 2013; Mosley, 2009; Start & Hovland, 2004). Insider tactics refer to the situation where advocates have direct access to decision-makers. Insider tactics are often non-confrontational to safeguard this privileged access (Kamstra & Knippenberg, 2014). Conversely, outsiders that lack direct access to decision makers need to focus their efforts elsewhere to draw attention. This indirect approach is "generally intended to raise concern about the problem among the general public and to help shape solutions that are considered desirable" (Mosley, 2009, p. 440). Outsider tactics can be both non-confrontational and confrontational. While climate diplomacy by the Dutch government is likely to be non-confrontational and might benefit from insider access, it also has the option of supporting CSOs for building up pressure through outsider tactics.

Results of advocacy strategies

There are five ascending types of impact, namely *agenda setting*, *discursive change*, *procedural change*, *policy change* and finally *behaviour change* (Keck & Sikkink, 2014, p. 25). While the goal of the bilateral climate campaign was to raise countries' NDCs (policy change) and in the longer term their behaviour, it is important to also focus on the preceding types of impact that the Dutch climate campaign might have achieved. Meaningful policy and behaviour change are more likely when agenda setting, discursive change and procedural change have already occurred. *Agenda setting* is about awareness raising and getting your issues on the political agenda. *Discursive change* refers to the process of framing, and means that advocacy targets start adopting your terminology, rhetoric and framing of an issue. *Procedural change* refers to influence on institutional procedures, for instance by changing the way in which decisions are being made, by opening up new spaces for dialogue or by gaining a seat at the table.

2 Policy on climate diplomacy

2.1. Policy development

Low priority until 2018

Up and until late 2018, climate diplomacy was not an explicit priority in foreign policy. The DGIS Theory of Change (TOC) on climate of November 2018⁴ for instance refers to diplomacy just once. Before 2018, climate diplomacy was mainly understood to be part of multilateral negotiations in the context of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It was primarily a task assigned to the climate envoy and the delegation to the Conferences of Parties of the UNFCCC. Despite the low priority, a Climate Envoy⁵, has been in place since 2009, suggesting that climate diplomacy was needed and acknowledged. Such envoys have been working for the ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as for the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment (before 2018), and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate (2018 and onwards). The function became a full-time position around 2013. Besides this main element of climate diplomacy, other forms of climate diplomacy also existed, notably negotiations on domestic climate policy in the EU, and negotiations on climate policy of multilateral banks, funds and programmes.

Intensified climate diplomacy from 2018 onwards

From around 2018, the Dutch cabinet intensified climate diplomacy following a request by the Secretary-General of the UN that the Netherlands become a leader in the field of climate change. It was requested that the Netherlands would stimulate other countries to become more ambitious in their climate targets and policies. In line with the government agreement at the time, which highlighted climate issues, Prime Minister Rutte agreed to take up this role.⁶ He decided on the form of a temporary lobby campaign.⁷ The key objective of this campaign was increasing the ambitions of non-EU countries in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), with a focus on mitigation targets.⁸ This should result in a successful COP26 in Glasgow, where updated or new NDCs would have to be presented.⁹ To this end, a small climate diplomacy team was created within the IGG climate section, part of the Directorate General for International Cooperation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IGG KL, part of DGIS in the MFA). It was the newest and most conspicuous instrument of Dutch international climate diplomacy, announced with some clamour to parliament and all Dutch embassies. The IGG climate diplomacy team got its mandate from the Ministerial Council, which agreed to setting up a cabinet-wide campaign and the development of an action plan on 28 September 2018. The Council for European Affairs (REA) agreed to the plan on 31 October (this action plan is reflected in annex C). In December 2018, a letter explaining the mandate and objectives of the climate campaign team was sent to Parliament and the campaign team was installed with a kick-off event.

2.2 Policy aims of the lobby campaign

According to the mandate given to the campaign, the objective was influencing countries' climate ambitions with a view to achieving: an increase in the level of ambition in Nationally Determined

⁴ See *TOCs Development Cooperation*, MFA 2018:

<https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/publicaties/2018/11/08/theory-of-change-ontwikkelingssamenwerking>

⁵ Formerly known as Climate Ambassador

⁶ Critics have pointed out that the Netherlands accepted this role of leader, even though its domestic actions on reducing GHGE had not yet achieved the previous cabinets' ambitions, suggesting a lack of policy coherence. This might affect legitimacy of the Netherlands as an advocate for more ambitious plans of other countries. Some IGG staff responded that the Netherlands currently has very ambitious targets and is catching up in its performance. Also the Netherlands provides substantial sums of climate finance for developing countries (around EUR 2 billion between 2016-2019) adding to its credibility.

⁷ Based on the example of the lobby for Dutch membership of the UN Security Council.

⁸ A parallel strand of the campaign, the so-called EU track, was aimed at adoption of an EU-wide objectives of 55% emission reduction in 2030 and climate neutrality ("net zero target") in 2050. This was led by DIE and the Permanent Representation at the EU.

⁹ For the COP26, Parties were requested to submit new or updated NDCs; 130 of them did so, in 96 NDCs: see [unfccc.org Full NDC Synthesis Report: Some Progress, but Still a Big Concern | UNFCCC](https://unfccc.org/Full_NDC_Synthesis_Report:_Some_Progress,_but_Still_a_Big_Concern) and the NDC Synthesis report of 17 September 2021.

Contributions (NDCs); global ratification of the Paris climate agreement; agreement on climate ambitions by all economic sectors; long-term climate strategies to be submitted by as many countries as possible (non-EU countries); and boosting the climate adaptation agenda worldwide.¹⁰ To address these objectives, the lobby campaign consisted of five strands, which built and expanded on the climate diplomacy that was present before 2018.

1. Multilateral efforts to increase climate ambitions and create international pressure (UNFCCC, led by the Ministry of EZK).
2. A temporary bilateral lobby campaign to raise NDCs of non-EU countries, mainly directed at the biggest emitters (led by the IGG core campaign team).
3. A sectoral campaign with a focus on energy, circular economy and transport (led by the ministries of I&W and LNV).
4. Efforts at the Multilateral Development Banks to increase climate ambitions (mainly led by the IGG energy cluster and DMM).
5. A lobby at the EU for more ambitious mitigation targets (led by DIE, the MFA's European department).¹¹

This study focuses on strand 2, the bilateral lobby campaign, as this formed the core of the campaign and represented the bulk of the work for the IGG climate diplomacy campaign team which had been newly created for this task. The other strands of the campaign have been in existence for almost a dozen years, and were led by actors outside the climate campaign team and even outside of IGG and the MFA. They will be incorporated from the perspective of the bilateral campaign, as instruments or routes that the climate campaign team could use to achieve its goals. For instance, alliances, declarations and statements in the context of multilateral events and the COPs were used to encourage countries to commit to more ambitious targets. Box 2 below provides a short description of each of the strands.

Text box 2: The five strands of the lobby campaign

¹⁰ Source: Action plan, mandating the CD campaign (agreed to by the Council for External Affairs 31 October 2018), annexed through a hyperlink in a message by IGG to all MFA posts of 10 December 2018 ("Klimaat - Uw inzet gevraagd voor klimaatcampagne kabinet Rutte-III").

¹¹ This track the so-called EU track or track 2, was a parallel strand of the campaign, aimed at adoption of an EU-wide objectives of 55% emission reduction in 2030 and climate neutrality ("net zero target") in 2050. This was led by DEIE and the Permanent representation at the EU.

1. Multilateral campaign: In multilateral fora and meetings, such as the COP UNFCCC, the NDC Partnership (NDCP) and coalitions for climate adaptation, the campaign's objectives were to raise global ambitions, support NDCs of developing countries and to enhance the visibility of the Netherlands internationally. This was carried out primarily by the relevant delegations, instructed by the departments responsible for the relevant fora: the Ministry for Economic Affairs when it comes to UNFCCC; the IGG climate team file holder when it comes to the NDCP; and the file holders for adaptation at the MFA/IGG and at the Ministry of Infrastructure & Water when it comes to adaptation.
2. Bilateral campaign: This was the main focus of the IGG climate campaign team. The key objective of the bilateral campaign was increasing the ambitions of other countries in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) of non-EU countries, with a focus on mitigation targets. This should result in a successful COP26 in Glasgow, where updated or new NDCs would have to be presented. This strand will be further elaborated below.
3. Sectoral approach: other departments have been accountable for climate diplomacy in their fields of responsibility, e.g. the Ministry for Infrastructure and water deals with (water-related) adaptation, air- and marine transport as well as the transition to a circular economy. The latter two are mentioned in the 2018 plan of action for the climate diplomacy campaign, but policy in these fields did not constitute new policy.
4. Multilateral development banks: Dutch interventions, led by the MFA/IGG's energy section, promoted climate ambitions in the MDB's policies, in particular in the World Bank Group. This was part of the 2018 action plan for the CD campaign, but did not constitute new policy, renewable energy having been an objective in Dutch policy since around 2008.
5. EU lobby: the climate campaign consisted of a specific lobby effort to adopt EU-wide targets as follows: - 55% GHGE reduction in 2030 and a long-term strategy with zero CO2 emissions in 2050. This effort was led by the MFA's European Integration department (DIE), and executed in part by the Permanent Representation to the
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Additional topics that the bilateral and multilateral campaign took up in the research period were:

- promoting finance for climate adaptation, lobbying donor countries;
- promoting green recovery support packages from the COVID-19 pandemic.

2.3 Reconstructed policy theory of the bilateral lobby campaign

A reconstructed policy theory provides an overview of the main instruments and recourses of the bilateral campaign, and how they should lead to achieving the main goal of raising other countries' NDCs. Figure 1 (see next page) provides a first draft of the set-up of the bilateral lobby campaign based on the information that is currently available. It combines elements of unpublished TOCs that were drafted by the IGG climate campaign team in 2019 and 2022, of other policy documents,¹² of preliminary interviews with IGG staff, and of the analytical framework as presented in paragraph 1.3. Throughout the research, this policy theory will be adapted and updated, resulting in an overview of the lobby trajectory that was actually implemented by the IGG climate campaign team. Following the logic of the reconstructed policy theory, this paragraph elaborates the climate diplomacy team, the activation and mobilisation of relevant actors and networks, and a short overview of the type of advocacy strategies they can implement, and the outcomes and impact this can generate.

¹² Sources: DGIS Theories of Change on climate, water and food security, November 2018 (see bibliography in annex) as well as IGG internal TOC on climate diplomacy (of early 2019, shared with IOB in late 2019) and IGG internal draft TOC on climate for 2022 (shared with IOB on 21 December 2021).


Climate diplomacy team at IGG

From late 2018 up and until now, the IGG climate diplomacy team consisted of around 7.5 staff. A core team of three policy officers and a team leader are responsible for the bilateral campaign (strand 2). The other staff are described as a secondary layer, which consists of policy officers within and beyond the climate section of IGG, dealing with adaptation, energy, forests UNFCCC negotiations and other multilateral fora (strand 1, 4 and 5). The core team was originally appointed for two years and basically all related positions were renewed when their original assignments finished.¹³ As part of the MFA and IGG, the team used many of the available financial and non-financial instruments of the MFA and of the Netherlands Enterprise Agency (RVO). It also had access to some own funds to support climate diplomacy, for instance about 20,000 euros for engaging and supporting youth groups to give them a voice and enable them to promote more ambitious climate commitments by their governments.¹⁴ In this research the capacities and resources (i.e. funding) of the core team will be further mapped, considering the capacities mentioned in paragraph 1.3. Also the cooperation between the core team and the secondary layer will be further researched, from the perspective of how this contributed to the bilateral campaign.

¹³ Plan of action climate diplomacy team (Fall 2018) and contacts with IGG policymakers in late 2021 and early 2022; see also table in annex B.

¹⁴ Source: interview with and e-mail message by a member of the IGG campaign team, December 2021.

Figure 1: Reconstructed policy theory of the bilateral lobby campaign¹⁵



Activation of relevant networks and actors

The bilateral campaign mainly invested in creating a network of actors within the MFA. Besides activating IGG staff, a lot of effort was put into activating embassies, the climate envoy, Ministers, directors-general, and other high ranking officials from various departments. Embassies were asked to assist with the campaign in a general instruction, with regular follow-up instructions up and until 2021. Although a wide range of embassies were reached with this instruction, the campaign team decided to employ a more active approach towards embassies in non-EU countries with the biggest greenhouse gas emissions (GHGE), including all G20 countries. In these countries the biggest impact can be made if mitigation ambitions in their NDCs are raised (see Box 3 on country selection).

¹⁵ This Theory of Change will be refined and improved throughout the study. Boxes need not necessarily be read from top to bottom, since some elements may recur: e.g. the CD team conducted a global stakeholder and context analysis when it was first set up (in 2018-2019), feeding into the shared messages and into the information for the mobilised networks; and country specific analyses were probably done at later stages.

Less effort was put into the activation of the interdepartmental taskforce on climate diplomacy, although it was a helpful platform for identifying opportunities to promote climate related action and ambitions in meetings by high-level representatives from several ministries with non-EU countries.¹⁶ The IGG climate experts, including the climate diplomacy team, continued the ongoing work in the international networks of the UNFCCC and EU, but these efforts were led by the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate and the EU department at the MFA, respectively - i.e. not by the IGG CD team. And finally, support for domestic actors in target countries was another means of giving voice to stakeholders promoting climate ambitions.

The research will focus most on the MFA network, as this is most tangible, but will also consider the role of the other actors identified in the TOC. Especially the domestic groups represent an additional avenue for climate diplomacy in target countries.

Text box 3: Selection of focus countries for the campaign

In 2019, the campaign team used the following criteria to select around 45 non-EU countries to lobby: they belonged to the group of largest CO2 emitters among non-European countries; they were G20 members and/or were regionally important players, which makes them influential and their climate (mitigation) ambitions important. The list became more focussed along the way, around 2020, when the IGG team identified around 20 priority countries which were divided into two groups. One group which the Netherlands would actively approach, taking the initiative and lobbying the authorities, and one group which would only be engaged if the occasion arose. The underlying idea was that a more focused effort would have the biggest impact. The priority countries were targeted to various degrees with efforts to promote an increase in their climate ambitions, with an emphasis on climate mitigation - GHG emissions reduction - targets.

Mobilisation of relevant actors and networks

In late 2018, IGG informed embassies that a structured international lobby would be set up, making use of all of the available instruments and asking all ministers and senior officials to voice clear climate messages. In March 2019, the campaign team asked embassies to identify opportunities for influencing national climate ambitions with a view to increasing (mitigation) targets; as well as to conduct a dialogue with 'their' government and to report on risks, opportunities and progress. Ministers and directors-general from various departments were requested on a regular basis to voice messages in international meetings on behalf of the campaign. In practice the team's activities consisted in large part of designing and disseminating messages for Dutch representatives. The team identified opportunities for messaging - such as high-level events and outgoing and incoming bilateral visits. The team was often approached with requests by embassies and policymakers to provide information and speaking notes for such occasions.

For consistent messaging and to facilitate actions by embassies, the team developed a climate diplomacy toolkit, hosted by RVO through its website NL Branding, which was shared with all embassies and updated on a regular basis.¹⁷ This toolkit contains model messages, Q&As, background information, pictures and videos provided through the RVO website NL Brand.¹⁸ Besides this toolkit, the RVO staff also assists embassies in promoting energy transition, mitigation and adaptation action more broadly. In this process of framing and frame alignment (see paragraph 1.3), the team attempted to create a shared conception of the problem and how this should be addressed. The research will look into the type, quality and usefulness of these

¹⁶ Under the coordination of the IGG climate diplomacy team, an interdepartmental task force on climate diplomacy was formed, which mainly serves the purposes of exchanging information on current activities. It was formally chaired by the Minister for BHOS, as coordinating minister for international environmental and climate policy. In practice the taskforce is chaired by the IGG climate diplomacy team. Focal points from the different departments participate in this taskforce. It meets once every two weeks to discuss climate mitigation and once every two weeks to discuss climate adaptation.

¹⁷ See RVO's website "NL Brand": <https://toolkit.nlplatform.com/tools/non-branded-tools-government-employees-only/climate> (for civil servants only).

¹⁸ NL Brand is a platform that contains several thematic toolkits for public diplomacy, including this one on climate change

messages and support, and whether they helped to create a shared frame and to mobilise the targeted actors.

Implementation of advocacy strategies

The actual implementation of advocacy strategies forms the main part of the research. Many different routes are available to try to persuade and/or pressure target countries to raise their NDCs (see paragraph 1.3). The main idea was that embassies start diplomatic talks with the government of their country, backed by visits from high ranking officials. At the same time or separately, Dutch representatives could offer incentives through financial and or technical assistance. This could be done through one of the various policy instruments available, such as partnerships with Dutch companies, support from climate funds such as the Energy Transition Fund (ETF), or technical assistance by RVO. Besides government to government dialogue, the climate campaign also facilitated the inclusion of others in climate discussions. It supported networks of NGO's and youth organisations in the Netherlands who liaised with their counterparts in the targeted countries; and these organisations each lobbied their own governments.

A lobby through international networks such as the UNFCCC and the EU was yet another avenue to try and raise climate ambitions in targeted countries. For instance, the EU or groups of likeminded countries including the Netherlands lobbied countries to sign political declarations to phase out coal and to reduce methane emissions. In this context, coalitions such as the NDCP and Powering Past Coal Alliance will also be examined to the extent they contributed to the results of the campaign. Our research will look into all these various strategies that have been employed by the various actors, and will also assess the quality of these strategies. Were they well chosen, well targeted, flexible, in line with the capacities of the network, and tailored to the context in which they were implemented?

Outcomes and impact

The main goal of the lobby campaign is to raise the NDCs of targeted countries. This is a result at the outcome level (policy change), actual implementation of these NDCs (behaviour change) would be a result at the impact level. This research does not consider the impact level as that was not the main focus of the lobby campaign, and also because the actual implementation of the updated NDCs would take more time. Raising ambitions in NDCs of targeted countries is already a high ambition for a relatively small and temporary campaign, therefore it is important to also focus on the intermediate outcomes (agenda setting, framing, procedural change) which might have been achieved in order to measure success of the campaign.

3 Evaluation objectives, questions and scope

3.1. Objectives

The research pursues the following objectives:

1. Knowledge generation: determining to what extent the bilateral climate campaign led by IGG was successful in increasing non-EU countries' ambitions and explaining why this is the case;
2. Accountability & learning: informing Parliament, the government and policymakers on the results of the campaign, and provide them with lessons and recommendations for future climate diplomacy as well as other lobby campaigns.

3.2. Evaluation questions

Based on the research objective, the central research question is:

To what extent did the bilateral Dutch climate diplomacy campaign achieve its objectives, and what explains this?

Several sub-questions, which follow the logic of the reconstructed policy theory, need to be answered to provide an answer to this central research question.

1. What was the Dutch policy for climate diplomacy and how has it developed over time?

The policy reconstruction in this TOR, including the reconstructed policy theory, will be further elaborated in the research. The focus lies on the vision, strategy, and targets for the bilateral climate campaign. This question also addresses OECD-DAC criterion of policy coherence, i.e. to what extent the climate campaign was in line with Dutch international climate policy (internal NL), and with other actors such as other donors and/or targeted countries (external).

2. What capacities and resources did the climate campaign team have at its disposal, and to what extent were they sufficient to implement the mandate of the team?

As the bilateral climate campaign was largely coordinated by the core team, it is important to get a sense of the capacities and resources this team had at its disposal. The types of capacities mentioned in 1.3 serve as a reference point. By mapping capacities and resources it becomes possible to see whether the means match the mandate, the ambition, strategies and objectives of the team. In addition, the cooperation between the core team and the secondary layer will be further researched, from the perspective of how this contributed to the bilateral campaign.

3. What networks and actors were mobilised, how was this done, how successful was this and why?

This question addresses the activation and mobilisation phase of the campaign. These phases form the basis of the actual advocacy work. Therefore it is important to see what efforts the team put into creating, strengthening and mobilising the network which was used for the advocacy efforts. This question also addresses the aspects of framing and frame alignment, by looking into the type, quality and usefulness of communication and messages (i.e. the toolbox), and whether they helped to create a shared frame and to mobilise the targeted actors.

4. What strategies were implemented, and what was the quality of these strategies?

The research will look into the various strategies that have been employed by the various actors, and will also assess the quality of these strategies. Were they well chosen, well targeted, flexible, in line with the capacities of the network, and tailored to the context in which they were implemented? This question will also shed some light on the OECD-DAC criterion of relevance, i.e. whether interventions were relevant for target groups. This is especially the case for the cooperative strategies which offer financial or technical support to targeted countries.

5a. How effective was the campaign in bringing about change in target countries and why?

Besides looking at the question of whether the ambitions in NDCs were raised in targeted countries due to the campaign, this question will also look into the preliminary stages of advocacy impact (agenda setting, framing, procedural change) to capture intermediate successes that might have been achieved along the way. Also, context is of the utmost importance here to assess the quality of the advocacy trajectory. Only looking at goal achievement will sometimes not provide a correct picture of the advocacy process implemented, nor will it fully cover the question of effectiveness (attribution, contribution and side effects). For instance, a badly implemented campaign can achieve all its goals if the government decided to raise their NDCs due to some other factor, or vice versa. This also relates to the element of policy coherence, as the effectiveness of climate diplomacy might be affected by (in)coherencies with other Dutch policies.

5b. What were the most important factors for a successful campaign, including diplomatic instruments and financial ones?

In this context, we will describe the diplomatic instruments that have been deployed and consider whether the range of instruments has been used effectively. We will examine which diplomatic and financial instruments were useful or decisive elements (determinants) for success, and to what extent the mix of various diplomatic and financial instruments have been deployed effectively.

3.3. Scope of the evaluation

The previous paragraphs delineated the scope of this research, here follows a short summary:

- This study focuses on the bilateral climate diplomacy campaign (strand 2).
- The other strands of the lobby campaign (1, 3, 4 and 5) will be incorporated from the perspective of the bilateral campaign, as instruments or routes that the climate campaign team can use to achieve its goals.
- The research covers the period from 2018 until 2021, the years in which the campaign was implemented.
- Two country cases targeted by the bilateral climate diplomacy campaign will be selected. At least one of them will be a developing country, since the periodic review of climate policy that this study feeds into, focuses on development cooperation. Selection criteria will be explained in the methodology below.

4. Methods and limitations

4.1. Research design and methodology

This evaluation uses a case study approach for answering the research questions. A case study approach is suitable for studying complex processes holistically in their natural context. The bilateral lobby campaign is such a complex process, which can only be fully understood when it is studied in relation to the context in which it has been implemented, both with the MFA, and in the targeted countries. As a case study also propagates a holistic approach, the bilateral lobby campaign will serve as the unit of analysis for this study. The multilateral lobby will be studied in as far as it contributed to the bilateral campaign i.e. raising countries' national climate ambitions. All elements that will be studied should thus contribute to understanding the campaign as a whole: to understand how it was implemented, what results it delivered and why. The research strategy is to follow the logic of the reconstructed policy theory, and map the different aspects or phases of the bilateral campaign accordingly. In doing so, it will identify and check underlying assumptions of this policy theory, resulting in a picture of how the campaign was actually implemented and why this was the case. The logic of the policy theory will be mapped in two phases: (phase 1) focusing on the overall campaign; (phase 2) focusing on the implementation in two case countries (selection to be determined). Both phases will inform and build on each other.

Phase 1: Mapping the overall campaign

The research will start with mapping the capacities of the team, and how they were used, the (capacities of) networks and actors they worked with, the strategies they used to identify, activate and mobilise these actors (including communication/framing/toolbox, etc.), and what type of advocacy strategies these networks and actors implemented. This will provide data for answering research questions 1 through 4. Phase 1 takes a wide approach, with the goal of getting a broad sense of how the campaign was designed and implemented. This phase will use interviews, document analysis and a survey as data gathering techniques. It will start with interviewing current and former members of the core team, and through these interviews identify relevant respondents for the next round of interviews (snowball sampling) which will focus on all the actors with whom the core team interacted, thereby mapping the network. Interviews will also be used to identify relevant documentation which explain the policy and its implementation.

The goal of the survey will be to provide extra data for research question 3, by focusing on the mobilisation of Dutch embassies and representations. It addresses questions such as the following: Was the campaign team successful in mobilising the embassies of the targeted countries? Were the embassies aware of the campaign and its messaging? Did they play an active part? Was the Climate Envoy or were other high-level Dutch representatives involved? The survey will be conducted among staff of Dutch embassies and representations, covering at least the approximately 45 countries targeted in the campaign since 2019.

Phase 2: Mapping the implementation of the campaign

The second phase of the research will focus on the implementation of advocacy strategies and their result (research questions 4 and 5). This phase will build on the findings of phase 1, and contextualise them by looking at concrete efforts in in two case countries. Besides following (and questioning) the logic of the policy theory (bottom-up), this phase will also incorporate process tracing in the sense that the research will look backwards (top-down) to assess the influence of the Dutch bilateral campaign on the raised (mitigation) ambitions in NDCs. It will identify events or achievements, that may have been influenced by the Netherlands, and actively try to seek proof of such achievements and for rivaling explanations. This approach avoids bias and can be used to distinguish the Dutch influence from that of others. Instead of using a wide approach, this phase of the research narrows the focus down to two country cases to see how the campaign was implemented in the targeted countries, how effective it was in reaching its goals and why.

Phase 2A: Use Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to identify most interesting cases

Through a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) of the NDCs of 10-50 targeted countries as well as of the Dutch effort in each of them, we will try and identify patterns between Dutch efforts, context and other factors, and results. IOB intends to hire a consultant to help and apply the appropriate methodologies for this QCA analysis, and for the next phase of process tracing in two country cases (see phase 2B below).

The results of the QCA will help us select case study countries. Two countries will be selected - and at least one of them will be a developing country. Although the QCA should provide more robust selection criteria, preliminary ideas include the following:

- one country where the campaign was very active,¹⁹ and one where it was not;
- two countries where the campaign was active, of which one with clear results and one without clear results;
- two countries where the campaign was active, but having used very different approaches;
- two countries that are different in nature e.g. one developed and one developing country, one 'fence-sitter' and one 'spoiler', according to the CD team's classification.

Box 4 presents the results of preliminary research on these selection criteria, which will be complemented by the QCA analysis.

Box 4. Countries where the campaign was very active

The following countries all seem to have had active Dutch embassies, willing to undertake climate diplomacy. The first three are presented as 'good practice' in the climate diplomacy toolkit on RVO's NL Brand website:

[South Africa](#), a developing country which is a big emitter. Youth were supported by the Dutch MFA to lobby national climate policy deliberations. The Dutch climate envoy visited South Africa;

[Vietnam](#), a country where the Netherlands combines aid & trade and also combines efforts in the water and agricultural sector with climate diplomacy. Also, the EU has cooperated on climate diplomacy there.

[Israel](#), where the embassy engaged with Dutch companies, supported youth representatives and facilitated a high-level dialogue.²⁰

[South Korea](#), where the Netherlands conducted a bilateral lobby and participated in the P4G conference, aiming at convincing Korea to phase out coal.

[Japan](#), where the embassy is very active, having 'greened' the economic section so that it deals with inclusive green growth and focuses on diplomacy to phase out coal.

[China](#), which in 2021 announced a cap on its GHG emissions and committed to phasing out coal plants, although it is expected to be difficult to attribute related results to Dutch diplomacy.

Other countries to consider: youth groups were also supported in Bangladesh, Chile, Mexico and Uganda. And the Dutch climate envoy visited Mexico as well as South Africa.

Phase 2B: Process tracing for determining effectiveness

We will use process tracing to evaluate the Dutch contribution to the observed changes in national ambitions, as presented for example in an NDC, a long term strategy, or another documented intermediate result. Over a timeline of about two years, the various events and potential Dutch influences will be mapped on a calendar. Hypotheses about Dutch influence and alternative hypotheses will be tested with various types of evidence.

4.2. Data gathering and sources

The holistic approach of the case study entails that many different types of data gathering techniques and sources of data will be used in this research. Data gathering techniques that will

¹⁹ I.e. where the embassies responded actively, where high ranking officials visited, where the campaign team focused a lot of time and energy, and where multiple routes and strategies were implemented.

²⁰ Source: Climate diplomacy toolkit, good practice Climate Diplomacy Approach Israel (accessible for civil servants through RVO platform NL Branding /4 Pleio).

be used are interviews, document review and a survey. They will complement each other by providing different perspectives on the campaign. Also, many different types of respondents will be included: respondents active in the campaign, targets of the campaign and external experts. Through these different techniques and different sources, it will be possible to triangulate findings, strengthening the validity of the research. Table 2 below provides an evaluation matrix, linking the research questions to the proposed methodology, data gathering techniques and data sources.

Table 2: Evaluation matrix

Research question	Research methodology	Data gathering techniques and sources
1. What was the Dutch policy for climate diplomacy and how has it developed over time?	Case study / phase 1	Interviews - Policy officers MFA (mainly IGG) Document review - TOCs, policy briefs, letters to parliament, etcetera
2. What capacities and resources did the climate campaign team have at its disposal, and to what extent were they sufficient to implement the mandate of the team?	Case study / phase 1	Interviews - Policy officers MFA (mainly IGG) Document review - TOCs, policy briefs, letters to parliament, etcetera
3. What networks and actors were mobilised, how was this done, how successful was this and why?	Case study / phase 1	Interviews - Policy officers MFA, embassy staff, climate envoy & other high ranking MFA officials - Interdepartmental network - International networks (UNFCCC, EU) Document review - Messages, toolbox, instructions to embassies, etcetera, by the core campaign team Survey - To the embassies in the 45 non-EU countries that were first identified, possibly to a smaller or larger group (to be decided)
4. What strategies were implemented, and what was the quality of these strategies?	Case study / phase 1 (& phase 2)	Interviews - Policy officers MFA, embassy staff, climate envoy & other high ranking MFA officials - Interdepartmental network - International networks (UNFCCC, EU) - Domestic actors in the targeted countries (i.e. youth groups, NGOs, government officials) - External experts Document review - Documents relating to implementation of strategies, i.e. instructions, media items, official statements, etcetera.
5. How effective was the campaign in bringing about change	Case study / phase 2 (QCA,	Interviews - Policy officers MFA, embassy staff, climate envoy & other high ranking MFA officials

in target countries and why?	country cases & elements of process tracing)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interdepartmental network - International networks (UNFCCC, EU) - Domestic actors in the targeted countries (i.e. youth groups, NGOs, government officials, embassies) - External experts <p>Document review</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Documents relating to possible impact of the campaign in the targeted country, i.e. statements of domestic actors (government, NGOs), media items, and national policy documents (climate policy, NDCs, mitigation targets, etc.) <p>Qualitative Comparative Analysis- Scoring factors of success in raising (NDC) ambitions in 10-50 countries (t.b.d.)</p> <p>Process tracing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Two country case studies and / or a thematic case study (t.b.d.)
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4.3. Limitations and challenges

The main limitation of this research is the way in which it tackles the question of effectiveness. While research questions 1 through 4 will be quite representative for the campaign as a whole, this is not the case for research question 5. This question focuses on the effectiveness of the campaign in terms of raising (mitigation) ambitions in NDCs, and all the intermediate steps (agenda setting, framing and procedural change). For this part, only a subset of two country cases will be examined. It will therefore not provide a picture on the effectiveness of the whole campaign. However, by strategically selecting two countries - one where a big and one where a small effort was made - it will be possible to get a sense of the effectiveness of the approach, and probably provide explanations for why this is the case.

Attribution provides a real challenge and we will rather look for contribution, because:

- The Netherlands was only one among many actors trying to influence these NDCs and sometimes acted in the context of EU external diplomacy.
- We expect targeted countries to be unwilling to acknowledge the influence of a small and Western country, and might have objections to "neo-colonial" campaigns.²¹
- The influence of the Netherlands is difficult to separate from that of the rest of the EU, coalitions of likeminded and other countries with which the Dutch team cooperated, such as Germany and New Zealand.

Because IOB is part of the MFA, some respondents from the target countries may feel reluctant to criticise Dutch diplomatic efforts in the knowledge that the IOB interviewers are part of the same ministry as the officials being evaluated. Other possible challenges include access to stakeholders who have been targeted by the campaign, such as foreign governments and youth groups. We will explain to potential respondents that IOB is independent and that their input will be rendered anonymous.

Finally, we will take into account the COVID-19 pandemic, which is likely to have hindered effective networking with targeted countries and other stakeholders.

²¹ On the other hand, countries that received substantial new support from donors in the context of COP26 might not object to claims of Dutch contributions to their climate ambitions.

4.4. Ethical considerations

There is a moral aspect to the campaign. (Former) developing countries which are among the priority countries to be targeted might have objections to attempts to influence them, possibly perceived as "neo-colonial" campaigns. One IGG respondent suggested that if IOB approaches representatives of such countries in the context of this evaluation, they will be alerted to the fact that Dutch diplomats have tried to influence them, possibly causing a negative response and affecting the chances of future diplomatic efforts in this field.

By taking the top-to-bottom approach in these countries and/or by gathering more objective and quantitative information instead of asking targeted government officials, this risk can be partly mitigated, as the research is taking a more open approach as to how the updated NDCs came about, looking for Dutch influence, but not assuming it.

5. Planning and risk analysis

5.1. Planning

An internal (IOB) group ("klankbordgroep" or KBG) will meet approximately every six weeks to discuss progress. The reference group will contribute to quality assurance at the start - in the phase of drafting this TOR - and end of the evaluation - to discuss the draft report. The evaluation foresees the planning as presented in the table below.

Table 1: Planning

Element	Date
First meeting KBG	January 2022
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Second meeting KBG • First meeting reference group 	March 2022
Approval TOR	April 2022
Survey conducted and results analysed	May 2022
Reconstructed TOC	May 2022
Delivery chapter on countries 1 and 2	June 2022
Delivery of draft final report	July 2022
Third meeting KBG	July 2022
Third meeting reference group	July/September 2022
Final report presented to Minister and publication online	December 2022

5.2. Products

This evaluation expects to deliver the following products:

Table 2: Products

Product	Language
Final report in PDF	English
Executive summary	Dutch and English
IOB website results pages	Dutch and English
Webinar / discussion with policy makers	Dutch or English

5.3. Risks

For this evaluation the following risks are taken into account:

Table 3: Risks

Description	Impact	Likelihood	Mitigation	Risk after mitigation
Insignificant response survey	Small or medium	Medium	Send survey to a large response group and send reminders	Small

Reluctance to share all information with IOB	Medium	Small at IGG, medium at embassies and recipients of lobby	Obtain written information mainly through IGG, public / MFA documents, and the interdepartmental website Find willing interlocutors with the help of IGG and cooperative embassies	Small
Refusal by partner countries' representatives to hold interviews	Big	Medium	Approach only willing spokespersons who are suggested by Dutch representatives	Medium
Delays	Medium	Medium	Deploy extra IOB staff for this study or hire a consultant	Medium

6. Organisation

6.1. Research team

The evaluation will be executed by the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. IOB operates independent of the policy directorates and has an independent position within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The research team consists of the following people:

Table 4: Research team

Name	Role
Marit van Zomeren	Project leader, contact person (1/2 time)
Pim de Beer	Fellow researcher (1/10 time t.b.d.)
Ferko Bodnar	Methodology, consistency with coherence study (1/4 time)
Jelmer Kamstra	Advice on methodology and data analysis (1/5 time t.b.d.)

6.2. Internal peer review

Inter-collegial quality control will be done by the following members of the IOB staff:

Table 5: Peer review group

Name
Rob van Poelje, Chair
Bas Limonard
Rafaela Feddes
Kirsten Lucas

6.3. Reference group

The evaluation is supervised by a reference group consisting of the following members:

Table 6: members of the reference group

Name	Position/organisation	Role in reference group
Rob van Poelje	Cluster manager development cooperation, MFA: IOB	Chair
Carel de Groot	IGG	Representative policy directorate
Leonie van der Stijl	IGG	Representative policy directorate
Anne Eva Thiadens	FEZ	Representative of MFA's financial department
Rob van den Berg	i.a. King's College, London	External expert (sustainable development)
Gerardo van Halsema	Wageningen University & Research	External expert (food security/sustainable agriculture)
Maarten van Aalst	ICRC Climate Centre	External expert on climate
Carolien Klein Haarhuis	IRF, Ministry of Finance	Representative Min. Finance

Annex A Bibliography

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Annex B - Key concepts

Climate diplomacy is the use of diplomatic tools to support the ambition and functioning of the international climate change regime and to attenuate the negative impacts climate change risks pose. Climate diplomacy means "prioritising climate action with partners worldwide in diplomatic dialogues, public diplomacy and external policy instruments".²²

In the context of this evaluation, the work of IGG's climate diplomacy team, the work of the Climate Envoy (or climate ambassador), as well as the lobby work in multilateral fora and in the context of the European Union (EU) are all considered climate diplomacy.

Climate diplomacy is most often associated with the negotiations in the context of the Conference of Parties (COP) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Negotiations on EU domestic climate policy can also be described as climate diplomacy. The current evaluation will focus on bilateral lobby activities rather than the climate negotiations in the context of EU and UNFCCC.

The **climate diplomacy campaign** that this evaluation will study got its mandate from cabinet in Fall 2018 and came up to speed in the first half of 2019. A climate campaign team at IGG encouraged other countries to increase their climate ambitions, with an emphasis on mitigation targets, in bilateral and multilateral contexts. Notably, IGG requested all embassies to maintain a dialogue with the national authorities on their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) and to report on opportunities and risks to increase the climate ambitions in their countries.

Climate change adaptation means adjusting ecological, social or economic systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli and their effects; these can be changes in processes, practices and structures (source: UNFCCC). In Dutch development cooperation, adaptation is often carried out through projects and programmes promoting climate smart agriculture and through projects in the water management sector. In the context of this evaluation, we will look especially at the diplomacy directed at increasing climate finance and climate action for adaptation.

Climate change mitigation refers to efforts to reduce or prevent emissions of greenhouse gases; more specifically to reduce the amount of emissions released into the atmosphere and to reduce the concentration of carbon dioxide (CO₂, also reflected as greenhouse gas emissions, GHGE) by promoting renewable energy and enhancing sinks (e.g. through forests). In the context of this evaluation of climate diplomacy, we will look mostly at efforts to increase non-EU countries' ambitions in the field of mitigation, enhancing targets around reducing GHGE.

Nationally determined contributions (NDCs) are documents containing countries' intended post-2020 climate actions. NDCs are plans including policy objectives, in the context of the UNFCCC. Parties to the Paris agreement (COP21, 2015) committed to pursuing domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of such contributions. These plans often also include climate adaptation measures. Around COP26, held in November 2021, almost all Parties had submitted updated NDCs, with thirteen parties having submitted new ones.

Advocacy is used as an overarching category comprising of "a broad set of strategies such as lobbying, litigation, and information dissemination, as well as protest and other forms of political disruption" (Minkoff, Aisenbrey, & Agnone, 2008, p. 531). A frequently cited definition broadly defines advocacy as "any attempt to influence the decisions of any institutional elite on behalf of a collective interest" (Jenkins, 1987, p. 297). A more applied definition comes from Hopkins

²² Definition from [What is Climate Diplomacy? | Climate-Diplomacy](https://climate-diplomacy.org/what-climate-diplomacy) <https://climate-diplomacy.org/what-climate-diplomacy>. This site adds: "Furthermore, climate diplomacy entails using the issue of climate change for furthering other foreign policy objectives" and: "Climate diplomacy also means prioritising climate action with partners worldwide – in diplomatic dialogues, public diplomacy and external policy instruments".

(1992, p. 32), who states that advocacy refers to “the act of pleading for or against a cause, as well as supporting or recommending a position, [...] a point of view or a course of action”. In both definitions advocacy is about either promoting or resisting change, while Jenkin’s definition adds the importance of the collective nature of advocacy as opposed to advocacy for (organisational) selfinterest. These definitions are cited from Kamstra (2017), *Dialogue and Dissent Theory of Change 2.0 - Supporting civil society’s political role*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, The Hague.

The way it is used in this research, policy advocacy could be replaced by the term **policy influencing**. The OECD (LEED) has described policy influencing as “influencing the content of policy or the process through which policy is made, i.e. the relationships between partnerships and policy makers”.

Diplomacy is largely used in this document to indicate “the profession, activity, or skill of managing international relations, typically by a country’s representatives abroad” (source: Oxford Dictionary, online). In this case, the country is the Netherlands and the diplomacy was also conducted by MFA staff based in The Hague.

Public diplomacy. There is not a generally agreed definition of public diplomacy according to the IOB evaluation²³ on the topic of 2016. In 1965, Edmund Gullion described it as follows, according to that IOB report: “*Public diplomacy [...] deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the processes of intercultural communications. (...). Central to public diplomacy is the transnational flow of information and ideas*”. The website uscpublicdiplomacy.org describes it as “the transparent means by which a sovereign country communicates with publics in other countries aimed at informing and influencing audiences overseas for the purpose of promoting the national interest and advancing its foreign policy goals”, however IOB notes that it is not always transparent. The Dutch MFA (notably its communications department) also uses the term to indicate advocacy and information to increase support for foreign or development policy among the general Dutch audience.

²³ [Beleidsdoorlichting Publieksdiplomatie | Rapport | Directie Internationaal Onderzoek en Beleidsevaluatie \(IOB\) \(iob-evaluatie.nl\)](#)

Annex C - Table on the interdepartmental "project climate campaign"

This tabel was included in the action plan for the climate campaign in Fall 2018, as agreed to by cabinet and shared with parliament.

Project climate campaign					
- 1 project leader					
	multilateral	bilateral	sectors	multilateral development banks	EU
objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> raise global ambitions support NDCs of developing countries visibility NL internationally 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> global ratification Paris agreement countries' ambitions in NDCs raised long-term strategies 	climate [action] contributions by all sectors	ambitious policy MDBs	- 55% GHGE reduction in 2030 - long-term strategy w/ zero emissions in 2050
instruments	climate summit; NDCP; UNFCCC COP; CAA summit; GCA etc.	bilateral visits; speaking notes; embassies (cooperation); lower governments and business; public support; public diplomacy toolkit; back office	air- and marine transport; transition to circular economy	policies MDBs	efforts in Council meetings, Commission working programme; bilaterals w/ Members
staff	3.5	3	[at other ministries]	[IGG staff working on renewable energy]	[DIE department]
staff total at IGG	7.5				