



Field study in the context of the evaluation of Dutch development cooperation in the Palestinian Territories 2008-2014

Final report

Client: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Rotterdam, 12 October 2015



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List of abbreviations

A2J:	Access to Justice and Strengthening the Rule of Law
AGO:	Attorney General's Office
APF:	Asia Pacific Forum of Human Rights institutions
AWG:	Advocacy Working Group
BDC:	Boycott and Disinvestment Campaign
CCC:	Anti-Corruption Court
CDSF:	Community Development Stability Fund
CfW:	Cash for Work
COAP:	Company of Organic Agriculture in Palestine
COGAT:	Coordination Office for Government Activities in the Territories
CSO:	Civil Society Organisation
CSP:	Civil Servants and Pensioners (programme)
DFID:	Department for International Development
DFS:	Direct Financial Support
DIOS:	Department of Internal Oversight
E&Y:	Ernst & Young
EA:	Emergency Appeals
ECHO:	European Commission Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection
EMSRP II:	Emergency Municipal Services Rehabilitation Project II
EUPOL COPPS:	EU Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support
EUREP:	The Office of the European Union Representative in West Bank and Gaza Strip, UNRWA
FAO:	Food and Agricultural Organisation
GDP:	Gross Domestic Product
GHDG:	Good Humanitarian Donorship Group
GNP:	Gross National Product
HCT:	Humanitarian Country Team
HJC:	High Judicial Council
HR:	Human Rights
HR/GG:	Human Rights / Good Governance
HTF:	Humanitarian Task Force
HVC:	High Value Crops
ICC:	International Coordinating Committee of Human Rights Institution
ICHR:	Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights
ICRC:	International Committee of the Red Cross
IHL:	International Humanitarian Law
IHRL:	International Human Rights Law
IMG:	International Management Group
IOB:	Policy Operations and Evaluation Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
IPM:	Integrated Pest Management
JSIC:	Justice and Security Implementation Committee
LACS:	Local Aid Coordination Secretariat
LGBT:	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender
LWRM:	Land & Water Resource Management
MASPs:	Multi-Annual Strategic Plan

MDLF:	Municipal Development Lending Fund
MoA:	Ministry of Agriculture
MoJ:	Ministry of Justice
MoSA:	Ministry of Social Affairs
NDC:	NGO Development Committee
NGO:	Non-Governmental Organisation
NRO:	Netherlands Representative Office
OCHA:	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
OHCHR:	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OPT:	Occupied Palestinian Territories
OQR:	Office of the Quartet Representative
PA:	Palestinian Authority
PACC:	Palestinian Anti-Corruption Commission
PARC:	Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees
PBA:	Palestinian Bar Association
PCBS:	Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
PCHRO:	Palestinian Council for Human Rights Organisations
PCP:	Palestinian Civil Police
PCS:	Palestinian Consultative Staff for Developing NGOs
PEGASE:	Mécanisme Palestino-Européen de Gestion de l'Aide Socio-Economique
PFM:	Public Finance Management
PHROC:	Palestinian Human Rights Organisations Council
PLC:	Palestinian Legislative Council
PMP:	Palestinian Maintenance Fund (PMP)
PNA:	Palestinian National Authority
PNDP:	Palestinian National Development Plan
PP:	Public Prosecution
PRDP:	Palestinian National Reform Development Plan
PSF:	Palestinian Security Forces
PWC:	Price Waterhouse Coopers
QMS:	Quality management system
SME:	Small and Medium Enterprise
SWG:	Sector Working Group
ToR:	Terms of Reference
UAWC:	Union of Agricultural Work Committees
UMAS:	UXO clearance and awareness
UN:	United Nations
UNCTAD:	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDAF:	Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP:	United Nations Development Programme
UNOCHA:	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNOPS:	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNRWA:	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UXO:	Unexploded Ordnance
WCLAC:	Women's Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling
WAFAC:	Women and Family Affairs Centre
WB:	World Bank
WFP:	World Food Programme

1 Introduction

With contract n. IOB 2015/17, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Policy Operations and Evaluation Department (IOB) has entrusted Ecorys to conduct a Field study in the context of the evaluation of the Dutch development cooperation with the Palestinian Territories 2008-2014.

The field study had the following objectives:

- To gain insight into relevance, effectiveness, coherence and sustainability of the bilateral development programme of the Netherlands in the Palestinian Territories from 2008 until mid-2014;
- To gain insight into relevance, effectiveness, coherence and sustainability of a selection of bilateral projects supported by the Netherlands in the Palestinian Territories from 2008 until mid-2014 in the sectors of economic reconstruction, governance (security, rule of law and budget support), human rights and humanitarian aid;
- To gain insight into the factors that influenced the relevance, effectiveness, coherence and sustainability of the programme and the projects;
- To learn from the experiences concerning the influence of the political context, policy making processes and patterns of cooperation of the programme and the projects.

The field study focused on the bilateral programme and paid attention to links between the bilateral activities and multilateral/private initiatives. Since the political context in which the development programme is being implemented is extremely important, in the field study this context was taken into account as well.

Subject of the field study were 34 projects implemented by 9 different organisations in the following sectors: economic reconstruction (agriculture/food security), governance (security/rule of law/budget support), human rights and humanitarian aid.

The list of projects is provided in the following table.

Table 1 List of selected projects for the field study

Project title	Implementing Agency	Expenditure (in € million)***	Years of expenditure
<i>Economic Reconstruction</i>			
Improving Livelihood in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Land Development II and III)	PARC	12,64	2007-2012
Enhancing Palestinian Farmers Preparedness for Exports (EurepGap) & Improving farmer's capabilities in production of export crops (GlobalGap)	PARC	5,93	2007-2012
Installation of container scanner for the border posts in the Palestinian territories – Jordan & Installation of container scanner for control products from Gaza to Israel at border crossing Kerem Shalom/Karm Abu Salem *	UNOPS	5,05	2012-2013
High Value Crops**	FAO	3.15	2013-2014
Gaza Buffer Zone**	FAO	0.37	2012-2013
<i>Governance (security, rule of law & budget support)</i>			
PÉGASE DFS	EC	41,1	2008-2014

Project title	Implementing Agency	Expenditure (in € million) ^{***}	Years of expenditure
EUPOL COPPS Programme Fund & PCP Programme Fund	UNOPS	6,75	2009-2013
Strengthening the Rule of Law and Access to Justice for the Palestinian People	UNDP	3,38	2010-2013
MDLF - Community Development Stability Fund	MDLF	5,00	2008 - 2009
MDLF – Emergency Municipal Services Rehabilitation Project II (EMSRP II)	MDLF	3,29	2007-2009
<i>Human Rights</i>			
Human Rights-Good Governance Secretariat I & II	NDC	4,12	2008-2014
Core Support to The Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR)	ICHR	2,23	2008-2016
<i>Humanitarian aid</i>			
UNRWA Core Support (Emergency Appeals)	UNRWA	25,85	2008-2014 (except 2013)

(*) Originally classified under "Security".

(**) Not evaluated in the field study because already under assessment by NRO

(***) Source: Terms of Reference for the Field Study, Table 2.

The central evaluation questions of the field study (ToR, p. 8) were as follows:

I. Programme evaluation all sectors: To what extent has the programme of economic reconstruction, governance, budget support, human rights and humanitarian aid in the Palestinian Territories in the period from 2008 until mid-2014 been relevant, effective, sustainable and coherent in terms of contributions to the development of a viable Palestinian economy, a functioning Palestinian state, the improvement of the human rights situation of the Palestinian population and the relief of needs of the Palestinian refugees?

II. Project evaluations sector economic reconstruction (agriculture, food security): To what extent have the selected projects of the economic reconstruction programme in the Palestinian Territories in the period from 2008 until mid-2014 been relevant, effective and sustainable in terms of contributions to the development of a viable Palestinian economy?

III. Project evaluations sector governance (security, rule of law): To what extent have the selected projects of the governance programme in the Palestinian Territories in the period from 2008 until mid-2014 been relevant, effective and sustainable in terms of contributions to the development of a functioning Palestinian state?

IV. Evaluation of (targeted) budget support: To what extent has the targeted budget support i.e. funds meant for payment of salaries and pensions of (retired) civil servants of the Palestinian Authority from 2008 until mid-2014 been spent in line with the intentions?

V. Project evaluations sector human rights: To what extent have the selected projects of the human rights programme in the Palestinian Territories in the period between 2008 until mid-2014 been relevant, effective and sustainable in terms of contributions to the improvement of the human rights situation of the Palestinian population?

VI. Project evaluations sector humanitarian aid: To what extent have the selected projects of the humanitarian aid programme in the Palestinian Territories in the period from 2008 until mid-2014 been relevant, effective and sustainable in terms of contributions to the relief of the needs of the Palestinian population.

Based on these evaluation questions and on the evaluation matrix of the overall evaluation, the field study team has elaborated a more detailed evaluation matrix, which is presented in Annex 1.

The study was conducted between 26 May and 10 September, with a field mission on 6 - 10th July and 19 July – 13 August. Data collection included a desk review of project and programme documents; interviews and focus groups with implementing partners of sampled projects as well as successor projects to those; other active donors in the sectors (Spain, Japan; Sweden, Switzerland, and ECHO; UK, EUREP); donor coordination mechanism LACS secretariat; Ministries of Agriculture, Finance, Justice, Local government, Social affairs; Attorney General Office; High Judicial Council; Office of the Quartet; UN agencies (OCHA, OHCHR); Palestinian Council of Human Rights NGOs; as well as beneficiary CSOs of the HR/GG secretariat and Access to Justice and Strengthening the Rule of Law project.

In total 68 meetings and interviews with 46 organisations were conducted (see detailed list of consulted people in Annex 2). Additionally, a validation workshop was conducted with the interviewed stakeholders at the end of the field mission. The key draft findings were discussed and validated during this meeting.

This report is structured around the evaluation questions. Questions II to VI related to sectors are answered in chapters 2 to 5 (question IV, related to budget support, is addressed in chapter 3 with question III related to security and rule of law projects), while question I, related to the whole programme, is answered in chapter 6. Annex I provides the field study evaluation matrix; Annex II lists the persons consulted during the fieldwork, and Annex III contains the project fiches compiled in the initial desk review of project documents¹.

¹ The desk review was conducted by Suzanne Tossings.

2 Economic reconstruction

2.1 Context

Economic growth in the Occupied Palestinian Territory declined from an average of about 11 per cent in 2010 and 2011 to a mere 1.5 per cent in 2013, the lowest rate of growth since 2006, well below that of population growth.² Growth continues to be mostly confined to sectors whose output in terms of goods or services are not traded internationally, mainly services and residential construction. Restrictions in movement of persons and goods and closures constrain trade possibilities; tight control of Israel permits and tax regulations aggravate the situation. In 2013, 60.4% of trade was with Israel. 76% of trade flows were imports while only 24% were exports.³ The services sector accounts for two thirds of GDP, while the share of the agricultural sector has declined by 72% since 1994, standing today at just around 4–5% of GDP. The contribution of the light manufacturing sector is also negligible, accounting for just 4% of GDP and 4% employment, despite the proximity to large markets, favourable bilateral trade agreements and a relatively well-educated labour force. The concentration of economic activity in the services and construction sectors is unhealthy because of the limited room for further expansion, as they are less dynamic than the agricultural and manufacturing sectors and are characterized by limited capacity for job creation and technological innovation.⁴

The majority of Palestinian private sector consists of SMEs; while a small number of large companies supported by the Palestinian Authority (PA) have played over the years an important role in limiting deterioration of employment possibility. Access to electricity is a top constraint for business in Gaza, while water shortages (an average of nearly four per month) are a more prominent constraint in the West Bank.

Despite its decreased relative weight, the agricultural sector in Palestine plays an important role in improving the well-being and livelihood of Palestinians. The production of agricultural goods supports the population's sustenance needs and fuels Palestine's export economy.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_the_Palestinian_territories_-_cite_note-CERP_Memo-13 Palestinian agriculture suffers from numerous problems, blockades to export of produce and import of necessary inputs, widespread confiscation of land for nature reserves as well as Israeli military and settler attacks, confiscation and destruction of wells, and physical barriers within the West Bank.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_the_Palestinian_territories_-_cite_note-National_Land_Bans-14 Due to the occupation and settlement construction, the Palestinian economy lost access to 40 percent of the West Bank, 82% of its groundwater and more than two-thirds of its grazing land. The Palestinian cultivated areas shrank by 30% from 1965 to 1994.⁵ Because the root of the conflict is with land, the disputes between Israel and Palestine are well-manifested in the agricultural and water sector of Palestine.

In the Gaza Strip, despite more consumption goods, animal feed and construction materials, namely for international projects, coming through the official crossings, the private productive sector remains at a standstill. With only one official commercial crossing operational, the Kerem Abu Salem in Rafah, the 1.8 million people in Gaza are especially vulnerable to fluctuations in prices of

² UNCTAD, Report on UNCTAD assistance to the Palestinian people: Developments in the economy of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/tdb61d3_en.pdf.

³ UNCTAD, [Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.](#), op. cit.

⁴ UNCTAD, op. cit.

⁵ Emergency Water and Sanitation/Hygiene (EWASH), Fact Sheet 14, 2013; and Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, "Palestine in Figures 2012", March 2013.

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food and fuel, as well as to any sudden, prolonged closure. Additionally, a continuation of power cuts, unreliable access to raw materials through the official crossing, and the insignificant relaxation of restrictions on exports of agricultural products (vegetables, legumes and herbs) create major obstacles for jumpstarting the productive economy. Furthermore, the disconnect between the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the continued fiscal crisis of the Palestinian Authority have provided limited space to a vibrant and resilient Palestinian economic sector. The economic fabric, particularly in Gaza is becoming at risk of being permanently damaged.

In 2013 the food insecurity rates were 57% and 19% for the Gaza Strip and West Bank respectively⁶Food insecurity is slightly higher for refugees in the West Bank, while it is slightly lower for refugees in the Gaza Strip due to extensive assistance. Most of food insecurity is not due to lack of food availability in the market but to inaccessibility because of lack of income.⁷Unemployment and food insecurity go hand in hand.

2.2 Brief description of the Dutch support to economic reconstruction

Since 2004, the Netherlands has supported Palestinian farmers contributing towards acceptable life conditions on the one hand and towards peace building on the other hand. The Netherlands wished to contribute to a situation in which the Palestinian people have access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food, while Palestinian farmers, including smallholders, have the capacity to compete with their products in national and international markets.

During the evaluation period, in the area of economic reconstruction the Netherlands funded 12 projects. These projects supported the reclamation and rehabilitation of land, the provision of water infrastructure, the subsidisation of inputs and the production of cash crops. Support to the establishment of financial institutions was also provided. Certain projects focused on Gaza, in particular one aimed at supporting livelihood in the Buffer Zone where also Bedouin households live in extremely precarious conditions. The main partner for the implementation between 2008 (and before) and 2012 was the Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees (PARC), a national NGO. Since 2012 FAO and Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC) took up the role of main partners.

A total of about 49 million Euro⁸ was spent in the economic reconstruction sector, representing 25% of the aid provided in 2008-2014. Out of the 23 funded interventions in this sector, 8 were sampled for the evaluation:

- The two Improving Livelihood in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Land Development II and III) projects, which enabled farmers to improve their access to natural resources through rehabilitating agricultural roads, introducing water harvesting techniques and land development. The interventions of this programme were founded on a community-based approach, focusing on large geographical areas. The Netherlands provided funding for rehabilitation and infrastructure works while farmers committed themselves to follow up with productive activities on their land;
- The Enhancing Palestinian Farmers Preparedness for Exports - EurepGap (2008-2009) and the Improving farmer's capabilities in production of export crops - Global Gap (2009-2013) projects, aimed at enhancing the Palestinian farmer's preparedness for exports and improving the

⁶ PCBS, FAO, UNRWA and WFP, Annual food security survey of, June 2014.

⁷ Browne, S. J. Holt, P. Laban, T. Al Qatta and L. Succi, 2013. Household Economy Assessment (HEA), Livelihood Baseline Report; Occupied Palestine Territory: Gaza Strip. Oxfam Italia and FEG Consulting; ECHO, East Jerusalem.

⁸ The projects concerning the provision of container scanners were classified under "security" in the terms of reference, but because they have more significance in relation to economic reconstruction efforts, they are discussed in the present chapter.

capacities of beneficiaries by forming a national certification team to meet the Global Gap standard requirements. Farmers in West Bank and Gaza were trained to become Global GAP certified, enabling them to compete on the international market. The programme also explored ways to reduce water consumption in the production of fruits and vegetables, particularly in water-scarce Gaza, through methodologies including the diversification of crops and more water efficient production techniques;

- In order to reduce obstacles to trade and increase the competitiveness of Palestinian products, in 2013 the Netherlands donated to the PA two container scanners for the Allenby Bridge (West Bank – Jordan) and Kerem Abu Salem (Gaza – Israel) border crossings which will allow for the containerisation of Palestinian trade;
- The High Value Crops Project, building upon the Global Gap and Cash Crops projects, aimed at ensuring that the Palestinian farmers in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including smallholders, have the capacity to sustainably compete with their products at national and international markets through an improved production chain and improved capacity of all stakeholders involved in the production chain. This project is ongoing;
- The Gaza Buffer Zone project, focusing at 150 farmers and their families in the Bedouin Village (Umm al-Nasser), located in Beit Lahia governorate in the northern part of Gaza, which lies in the immediate vicinity of the security barrier separating the Gaza Strip from Israeli territory. The objective of this project was to provide this community with improved access to and use of land and water resources in the Buffer Zone by rehabilitating 300 *dunam* of land next to their village and to use this area for food production.

Following the Terms of Reference, the High Value Crops project and the Gaza Buffer Zone project were *not* investigated in the present field study because these projects are already being assessed directly by the Netherlands Representative Office (NRO). Reference is made to these projects in this chapter whenever the sources of information referred to them and in the context of sustainability.

As a result, the 6 actually studied projects (Land development II and III; EurepGap; Global Gap; and the two container scanners projects) comprise 48,3% of all sector funding and a 26% share of the total number of projects.⁹

2.3 Relevance

2.3.1 *Relevance to the needs of the Palestinian people*

The projects implemented in the agricultural sector were found to be responsive to the needs of the Palestinian people, and consistent with the Palestinian National Development Plans. Desk research on project documents showed that community needs were identified in the planning phase of the program. In addition the needs of the targeted groups and communities had been described in a baseline study that was conducted by an independent consulting firm at the request of the implementing partners before the start of the assessed projects.¹⁰ The baseline report was thorough and covered socio-economic data, existing projects and training needs. Programme objectives remained consistent during the programme implementation. However, some targeted localities were disconnected from the programme especially in Gaza due to the Israeli attack (Cast lead War) in 2007. In all programme documents and deliverables, the objectives and expected results were described and activities were derived from the Log frame matrix structure. One aspect

⁹ These numbers are based on data given in Annex 1 of the ToR, however own calculations were made based on the restructuring the division of projects under sectors.

¹⁰ P. Wyemenga et al., Opportunities in agriculture and fisheries in Northern West Bank and Gaza, Study commissioned by NRO to Ecorys, January 2006 (http://www.lacs.ps/documentsShow.aspx?ATT_ID=760).

that was perhaps missing was a conflict analysis. Finally, the programme can also be considered a continuation of previous strategic plans of the government of the Netherlands (2007-2009) which indicated that land development was one of the priorities.¹¹

In the second part of the evaluation period, more emphasis was put on Area C of the West Bank (the area under Israeli military and administrative control). The importance of land development activities performed in Area C is related to the fact that this area represents a major potential for the further development of the Palestinian economy¹², yet one that is strongly impeded by access and movement restrictions.

Furthermore, all interventions were aligned with the developmental priorities of the Palestinian Authority which were presented in the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP) 2008-2010, namely objectives 2 and 3 pertaining to the agricultural sector. When the National Agricultural Strategy "A shared vision" (2011-2013) was finalised, the scope of the programme continued to link with almost all of the seven strategic objectives listed in the PA strategy, particularly objectives 1-5, and met the goals set for the sector by Palestinian civil society organisations.

Also the activities around the provision of container scanners appear relevant to Palestinian needs. The National Development Plan 2011-2013 states as one of the economic sector strategic objectives to "promote economic integration and access to external markets". One of the policy priorities within this strategic objective is to "invest in national infrastructure networks, including trade infrastructure at our borders, to ensure the free flow of goods and services internally and between Palestine and international trading partners." The container scanners contribute to this priority as they increase opportunities for the allowance of export of goods across the border while addressing at the same time Israel's security concerns. Container scanners were repeatedly requested to donors by the Palestinian Authority.

2.3.2 *Relevance to the intermediate goals*

The programs implemented in the economic reconstruction sector were relevant to the achievement of a viable Palestinian economy as they addressed some of the related objectives identified in the MASP: "Access to and availability and use of land and water for food production" for Land Development II and III and "Access to markets for farmers", "competitiveness of agricultural products" and "good marketability of horticultural products" for EurepGap/Global Gap. "Institutional capacity of the government for service delivery in the agricultural sector" was a somehow less prominent objective, as most extension services were provided through a non-governmental organisation in the mentioned project. A capacity building component for MoA staff was present, but without clear linkages to the other activities.

"No impediments to movement and access for agricultural goods and farmers" was the underlying objective of the provision of container scanners to enhance the throughput capacity of the border posts Allenby Bridge and Kerem Shalom/Kerem Abu Salem. Increased transport of goods from and to the Palestinian territories is expected to further enhance economic growth.

¹¹ The Netherlands Representative Office (NRO) conducted, in 2005, an exploratory study called 'Opportunities in agriculture and fisheries in Northern West Bank and Gaza'. That study provided an overview and a needs assessment of the agricultural sector, which offered the basis for the selection of areas for economic development interventions. ECORYS, 'Opportunities in agriculture and fisheries in Northern West Bank and Gaza – an exploratory study', 2005.

¹² The World Bank estimated that Irrigating this unexploited area as well as accessing additional range and forest land could deliver an additional USD 704 million in value added to the Palestinian economy – equivalent to 7 percent of 2011 GDP. The World Bank, "West Bank and Gaza. Area C and the Future of the Palestinian Economy" October 2, 2013, p. viii.

2.3.3 Consistency with the Dutch sector development policy

The funded projects were also in line with the Dutch policy for the economic development sector in various respects such as the use of the bilateral channel and the emphasis on public-private cooperation (although the public side, represented by the MoA, had a secondary role). Use was also made of Dutch knowledge and expertise regarding agricultural crops, especially in the EurepGap/Global Gap projects. This aspect has been recently strengthened for instance by inviting a mission from Wageningen University for the design of the successor of the High Value Crops project. Water is also one of the top sectors of Dutch expertise. In designing the projects, there was a drive towards innovation; for instance, by promoting the shift from land reclamation/rehabilitation support based on subsidising individual farmers towards supporting communal infrastructure as a way to maximise benefits through raising the value of land for everyone; but also by introducing new agricultural practices that meet international standards for high quality products like strawberries, cluster and cherry tomato, bell pepper in different colours; or recently, by promoting the adoption of high value crops so far not cultivated in Palestine. More complex is to assess whether a full-fledged innovation strategy was put in place also including how to spread the benefits of innovation to the majority of farmers; such a strategy is not clearly developed in the projects' design.

The project concerning the container scanners is also consistent with the Dutch policy. The objective of the Netherlands in the Middle East Peace Process is to stimulate both parties to return to the negotiating table in order to establish a two state solution, resulting in a safe, internationally recognised Jewish state for Israel, as well as an independent, democratic and viable Palestinian state. The container scanners in principle contribute to these objectives because they 1) establish trust between the parties; and 2) the Palestinian Authority is supported in developing a viable economy.

2.3.4 Adequacy of project deployed activities to the solution of the identified problems in the sector

It was a conclusion of the final assessment of the EurepGap project¹³ that the marketing strategy was insufficiently developed. To improve the marketing component the implementing partners with the NRO established and further strengthened contacts with several, more specialised partners. "Sinokrot/Palestine Gardens" (an agro-industrial company that concentrated on agricultural production and marketing) had been involved in the preparatory phase of the project. Paltrade, the National Trade Development Organisation aimed to increase export of Palestinian trade, as well as Intajuna/ HoloL centre (an initiative to improve awareness among Palestinians about high quality production from their own 'soil') were also involved as partners. However, the price that Sinokrot offered to farmers for exporting their produce was too low for them to consider this as a more profitable alternative to selling the produce on the national market in the West Bank.

The donation of the container scanners has been planned as a technical solution that would respond to the need to increase economic activities in Gaza while safeguarding Israel's security. However the scanners per se are not sufficient to achieve a speeding up of the crossing of trucks at the border and to increase export from Gaza. This requires changes in the procedures related to security checks and the conditions of the infrastructures around border crossings and an easing of restrictions to trade. Some activities were undertaken in cooperation with the OQR to negotiate improvement of conditions at borders crossings. Yet this was not clearly part of an intervention logic integrating the equipment and the action on the processes; the project results were formulated mainly in relation to the procurement and delivery of the piece of equipment.

¹³ Activity Rating Document– Eurepgap I.

2.4 Effectiveness

2.4.1 Delivery of project activities and outputs

The implementation of agricultural projects was overall satisfactory. The desk review of all programme documents shows that targets for activities and outputs were met and in many cases exceeded.

In Land Development II, the irrigation improvements included collective irrigation networks and construction of cement pools and home garden development (cisterns for agro and domestic purposes, installing or irrigation networks). The activity rating produced by the NRO after the completion of the report mentions that 9 of the 10 sub-projects were completed successfully.¹⁴ In total 143,000 working days involving 14,000 workers over the entire life span of the programme were performed, thereby also generating some (temporary) employment, although contractors used more machinery working hours (55,585 hours) than originally scheduled (50,000 hours). The successful completion of activities under Land Development II should not divert attention from the fact that the components of the programme to be implemented in Gaza Strip could not be implemented as envisaged due to the Israeli military incursion (Operation Cast Lead). The consortium implementing partners compensated this by deploying more activities in the West Bank.¹⁵

The Land Development Programme III exceeded the targets for planned activities and outputs. Positive variances were recorded in quantified indicators and activities were completed within the specified programme duration of three years. The implementing partners managed to reclaim and rehabilitate 5,676 *dunam* of agricultural land, built around 250,000 m² of stone terraces, planned 160,000 fruit tree seedlings, established 250 home gardens with an equal number of cisterns, rehabilitated 6 ground water wells, constructed and rehabilitated 25 earth ponds and 100 cement pools, installed 53 kms of communal irrigation networks with 10 reservoirs of 300-1000 cubic meter capacity and opened 109 kms of agricultural roads. The MoA provided extension and technical support to beneficiaries. In addition, all programme partners and farmer beneficiaries received training and benefited from capacity building activities.¹⁶ Also for what concerns EurepGap and GlobalGap activities and outputs were successfully delivered.

The EurepGap project targeted 198 farmers and growers in 13 villages within 4 districts in the West Bank in addition to 4 districts in the Gaza Strip. In the two years of project activity, the capacities of 20 agronomists (staff) were built at the technical, administrative and communication level. Moreover, their inspection and certification skills were enhanced. About 345 farmers received information about the GLOBALGAP concept and gained experience in good agricultural practices. They learned how to apply safety and health international standards to Palestinian farming and how to apply the IPM (integrated pest management) which limits the use of chemical pesticides and fertilizers. A QMS (quality management system) was established at the 15 targeted cooperatives.

The Global Gap project continued the activities of the previous project. All planned activities were conducted, with the number of outputs sometimes changing from the planned targets each year (sometimes lower, more often higher).¹⁷ Training of additional Quality Control Officers and Extension Staff materialised, in addition to training more directly oriented to farmers. The system for

¹⁴ Activity Rating Document – RAM Land Development 2 (16445), 2009.

¹⁵ Ibidem.

¹⁶ Agricultural Development Association (PARC), "Improving livelihood in the Occupied Palestinian Territories – West Bank & Gaza: Final Report", 2009; and Agricultural Development Association (PARC), "Improving livelihood in the Occupied Palestinian Territories – West Bank: Final Progress Report", 2012.

¹⁷ See table 4b) Summary of the achieved Outputs in the Final Report of the Improving Farmers Capabilities in Production of Export Crops project.

the traceability of products as well as the quality management system were further developed (including capacity-building for farmers and further development of the database). Internal and external inspections to monitor farmers' progress were conducted. More specialised private sector partners were included in the programme; like "Sinokrot/Palestine Gardens" (an agro-industrial company that concentrates on agricultural production and marketing); Paltrade, the National Trade Development Organisation which aimed to increase export of Palestinian trade, as well as Intajuna (an initiative to improve awareness among Palestinians about high quality production from their own 'soil'). However, the accreditation of the Palestinian certification body, the Company of Organic Agriculture in Palestine (COAP) that should be able to offer certification services at competitive rates and provide help to further institutionalise the Global Gap-system in the Palestinian Territories was not fully accomplished during the project time span.¹⁸

The implementation of activities related to the provision of container scanners was not equally smooth. The activities undertaken by UNOPS for the installation of a container scanner to control products from Gaza to Israel at border crossing Kerem Shalom/Karm Abu Salem were all completed. The implementation lasted between 23 January 2013 and 30 April 2014 (handover of the equipment and maintenance plan); however the equipment installation and the training on equipment operations were already completed on 1 December 2013. No major issues or challenges were faced during the construction and good cooperation and exchange of information between main project stakeholders was maintained throughout all stages of the procurement process. There were slight delays in providing the necessary training, which did not affect the overall completion date of the project. The project experienced however delays in the actual operation of the scanner – see next section on the achievement of results.

The installation of the other container scanner at Allenby Bridge border crossing with Jordan suffered from various delays and is not yet completed. The procurement and award of the contract were completed between September 2012 and December 2012. However the construction is still on hold due to the delays in the building of the infrastructure at the border by Government of Israel. The completion of the scanner installation is foreseen for September 2016. In the meantime, as a temporary solution a mobile scanner will be installed on the Jordanian side of the border.

2.4.2 Achievement of project expected outcomes and results

Land Development II

Within the framework of Improving livelihood in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, the programme promoted agricultural development for farmers as a mean of raising household incomes and ensure future food security in the face of a steadily increasing population. The overall results achieved under Land Development II are summarised in the following points:

- *Increment of availability for water for domestic purposes in the targeted locations.* The capacity to harvest water was limited due to poor rainfall - only 29% of the targeted 95,000 m³ (27,233 m³) were harvested over the entire programme period. However, water losses in the targeted irrigation systems were reduced by 23%, which was more than double the targeted reduction of 10% in water losses set in the programme document. 30% of total inhabitants in the targeted locations obtained access to drinking water, 10% more than the target of 20%;
- *Increment of family income from agricultural marginal land in the targeted locations.* Through the reclamation and rehabilitation of agricultural land (opening/rehabilitation of agricultural roads, construction of cisterns for agriculture purposes and comprehensive reclamation of mountainous land, etc.) the cultivated total area in the targeted locations increased from 0.3% to 5% by the end of the programme period;

¹⁸ Agricultural Development Association (PARC), "Improving Farmers Capabilities in Production of Export Crops: Final Report", 2012.

- *Improvement of know-how and skills of the target groups in the targeted locations and the staff of the implementing organisations.* The training courses, demonstrations, extension visits, workshops and publications implemented achieved continuous follow up support among the farmers;
- *Job creation (additional result formulated by NRO).* Despite the 143,000 working days benefiting 14,000 workers, increment of permanent jobs was limited.

Land Development III

Likewise, the goal of the Land Development III programme was to contribute to the improvement of access to food for vulnerable populations in rural areas of the West Bank through working on achieving the specific objective, i.e. the protection and improvement of access to natural resources in the targeted locations of rural areas in the West Bank. Attainment of the specific objectives was dependent on reaching the following results: (1) increasing agricultural land areas in the targeted locations, (2) increasing the quantity and efficiency in utilising water for agricultural purposes, (3) improving know-how and skills of the target groups in the targeted locations, and (4) improving extension services. Planned targets were exceeded: the area of cultivated land reached 1.8% while the target was 1.5%; regarding irrigated land, the share was increased to 47% compared to 22% in the prior programme (Land Development II), while the amount of agricultural produce increased by 15%; water saved from losses in irrigation networks, ground water wells and earth ponds reached 14.6% compared to the planned results of 10%; beneficiaries were using the cisterns they received efficiently, and cisterns were 98% filled with harvested rain water. A review showed that the vast majority of the farmers – 65% — used cistern water for both domestic and irrigation use, and 11% used them for irrigation use, while only 21% of farmers used the cisterns for domestic use only (3% declared they did not use them at all). Hence, the relevance of water interventions for agricultural activities was high. Also, the farmer beneficiary know-how and skills were improved through training and field visits made by extension officers/agents and external trainers. Furthermore, the programme contributed to improving the organisation of farmers into cooperatives and non-formal groups.

Eurep Gap - Enhancing Palestinian Farmers Preparedness' Exports in the West Bank & Gaza Strip

The following results were achieved by the project:

- *Improve Palestinian knowledge and capacity to educate farmers to meet international standards of quality production in order to assure their position in the international markets:* Farmer's capacities in terms of producing high quality crops in an environmentally and consumer friendly manner were indeed increased and higher quantities of products could be harvested, which enhanced food security and (albeit modestly) increased their income. Farmers became committed to the instructions of the extension officers; they became aware of the general safety rules. As a result a number of 168 growers in West Bank and 87 growers in Gaza achieved the GLOBALGAP certificate during the two year interval; they became capable of exporting their products. New products such as cherry tomatoes and colored bell peppers were introduced in their farms. The quality of products in the market increased due to applying the GLOBALGAP standards;
- *Build the institutional capacity of the Palestinian agricultural sector to conduct training and extensions services for farmers to meet European standards:* The 20 agronomists of the project (staff) became capable to train the farmers, give them extension and make internal inspection and auditing to their farms, products, and documents. The wider impact at the level of the Ministry of Agriculture extension service is not clearly proven. The COAP completed part of its accreditation process during the life of the project. Staff training and certification were prepared, the QMS system was developed and used, internal structures were put in place, awaiting the visit of the accreditation body and external auditor. During the same process, 3 employees from

COAP were certified as internal inspectors and auditors for Global Gap, 1 employee was certified as internal inspector for organic agricultural products and 1 employee was certified as external inspector;

- *Maintain direct Israeli and international interest in exports from Gaza, which allows for mobilising a broad coalition of Palestinian, Israeli and international stakeholders that lobby in favour of opening (border) crossings with Gaza:* The Dutch government and other players in the international community, as well as the Israeli private sector, who were involved in the marketing process (Agrexco) lobbied to improve the situation of border crossings.

Global Gap - Improving farmer's capabilities in production of export crops

This programme was a follow-up activity to the Eurep Gap program, with a greater focus on increasing the profitability of Palestinian-made agricultural products as a first and foremost aim to improve livelihood standards for targeted farmers' communities. The expected results of the project were not measured by indicators covering the outcome level. From interviews it appears that the introduction of new varieties of tomatoes, in the West Bank, allowed farmers to increase the profitability of their business. For example, farmers from one cooperative reported that replacing traditional tomato varieties with cluster tomatoes allowed them to increase their sales by selling at a higher price per kilo, which widely compensated the slightly lower produce per *dunam* of this variety. Consumers on the local market would be willing to pay more for cluster tomatoes because, for instance, they can be more easily distributed among household members.¹⁹ However the project report also shows that the result regarding the "Creation of new marketing opportunities for the farmers: 50% of the produced products will be marketed under the Global Gap trademark", was not met, mostly due to export restrictions but also a number of logistical obstacles (lack of cold chain, depletion of produce at border crossings). In detail:

- From Gaza, between 400 and 500 tons of strawberries were exported each year; in addition, in 2010-2011 6 tons of cherry tomatoes were exported that became 75 tons in 2011-2012; and 7 tons of coloured peppers that became 44 tons in 2011-2012. In both seasons, the permission for exporting vegetables was given in March when the local market prices for vegetables were higher than the export offered prices, which reduced the exported quantities;
- In the West Bank, even more limited quantities of produce were exported as the average local market prices for several crops were higher than the offered price provided by the exporting company. The West Bank cooperatives exported 38 tons of cluster tomatoes in 2010 that became 78 tons in 2010-2011; as well as 6 tons of cherry tomatoes in 2010-2011 which became 60 tons in 2011-2012.

Container scanners

The objective of donating container scanners to the Palestinian Authorities (but operated by Israeli border forces) was to speed up border controls and thereby increase the capacity of the border crossings. This expected outcome has not yet been achieved; in fact, the border controls have not been speeded up for export of agricultural produce out of Gaza from the Kerem Shalom border crossing, as procedures at the time of the field study mission were the same that were in place before the installation of the scanners, according to both NRO, farmers and other external informants. The Israeli authorities have not found opportune to change these procedures so far mentioning security concerns.

2.4.3 Contribution towards sector strategic goals

Looking at the MASP 2008-2011, the projects in the economic reconstruction sector clearly contributed to achieving the strategic goal for the sector "Prevention of permanent damage to the agro-economic sector structure of Gaza and West Bank". More limited results were achieved

¹⁹ Interview with cooperative.

towards the other goals: "Improved access to financial services for cooperatives, farmers and agribusinesses" and "Preservation and expansion of export opportunities".

Some contributions were made also towards the strategic goals of the MASP 2012-2015, "Sustainable food production for the population" and "Access to markets for farmers", although many challenges remain towards a real attainment of these objectives in the Palestinian territories.

The sector results fiche compiled by NRO illustrate, for sustainable food production, a progress in the volume of vegetable crop production in metric tons through NRO funded projects from 20,500 in 2013 to 34,400 in 2014, however this is lower than the baseline in 2012 (50,117 tons). The hectares of land used for agricultural production through NRO funded programs remained stable from 357,6 Ha to 366.6 Ha for the High Value Crops and Gaza Buffer Zone projects (plus 8.12 Ha LWRM project); they were though 3,927 ha in 2012. Only the number of permanent workers in the agricultural sector through NRO funded programs has seen a clear increase from 1,180 in 2012 to 4,284 in the HVC, Gaza Buffer Zone projects, plus 3169 in LWRM²⁰ in 2014. These indicators are merely quantitative and of difficult interpretation if one considers the different strategies and activities of the more recent projects, more focused on qualitative improvements and value-chain.

The availability of food per se is not an issue in the Palestinian territories, and food insecurity is mostly related to lack of income. By providing temporary and permanent jobs for the unemployed through development of agricultural land in disengaged areas the purchasing power of a number of households was increased. Food production by rural families in the targeted villages increased and the quality of the food improved - this was achieved through the development of home gardens and the training that was provided.

Moreover, an important aspect of food insecurity in the Palestinian territory is the dependency on imports from Israel and other countries. One reason for the prevalence of imported goods is the lack of trust by Palestinian consumers toward local agricultural crops. By increasing the quality of these crops, the Global Gap and EurepGap projects addressed an important precondition for a greater consumption of local products. However, the access side of food security – ensuring availability of good quality products at affordable prices – was not equally addressed by the projects that were mostly focusing on production.

Access to markets was fostered in various ways. Palestinian farmers increased their capacity to compete with their products on the national and international markets due to the introduction of the EurepGap and Global Gap standards resulting in more products of internationally accepted quality. The establishment and rehabilitation of packing houses enabled the farmers to better preserve and maintain higher quality products that can reach the local and international market end users without damage.

Parallel to this the NRO remained committed during the projects to maintain political pressure on Israel, in close coordination and cooperation with other international actors, to reduce barriers to movement and access in order to facilitate exports. The achievements included an increase of the value of the exported High Value Crops from NRO funded programmes from 6 million in 2013 to 17,63 million in 2014. As a context figure, the value of Palestinian agricultural exports raised from 162 million in 2011 to 181,2 million in 2014 (PCBS).²¹

²⁰ Land and Water Resource Management for Agricultural Development in the West Bank, implemented by UAWC; see <http://uawc-pal.org/articleen.aspx?ano=807>.

²¹ NRO Food security sector fiche 2014.

Although not primarily addressed by the sampled projects, there were some contributions also towards the strategic goals “People fulfil their needs for water” and “More effective water governance”. The construction of cisterns for agricultural purposes and the reduction of water losses through reparation of the leakages helped farmers to efficiently use irrigation water by improving water management and enabled the cultivation of larger surface areas, contributing to the increase of agricultural sector competitiveness. By adding the marketisation component, it was aimed to more solidly link farmers and their products to markets thereby adding an economic incentive to keep on producing Global Gap certified produce, however this component did not have the same success as the improvement of the product for the reasons that will be explained in section 2.4.6.

2.4.4 *Unintended effects*

Both the land development and EurepGap/Global Gap projects provided financial support and input subsidies to farmers and cooperatives. This is normal and necessary when experimenting with innovations and given the constrained situation of Palestinian farmers. However this also fuelled some dependency and expectation on continued subsidisation that made it difficult to start a phasing-out strategy under the successor High Value Crops project.

Community contribution is a good developmental policy to ensure commitment and partnership. This contribution was overachieved - it exceeded the 25% level to 33% level in some cases. Yet, many farmers, especially those who had invested in packing houses, believe that their investment was not cost efficient because some packing houses lack processing lines for certain crops or they find that the capacity is insufficient. The processing lines are focused on the new crops to be introduced while farmers are more concerned with the processing of already produced crops.

2.4.5 *Fiduciary mechanisms*

Based on the available documentation (project appraisal documents, progress and final reports of Land Development and EurepGap/Global Gap; evaluation report of Land development; financial audit of Global Gap), the field study team did not find any irregularities reported in the management of the projects, and it appears that activities were implemented with minimal over spending or budget reallocation. According to the review process, only in the Land Development II project there was an 11% deviation from the programme budget due to the Israeli Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. This was communicated directly to NRO who decided with the implementing partners to shift activities to the West Bank. Other objectives and activities remained unchanged.

2.4.6 *Explanatory factors*

The Israeli occupation hindered the implementation of the economic reconstruction projects in various ways. During the Land Development II and III projects, there were multiple episodes of confiscation of equipment and stopping orders that hampered the activities and required an intervention by NRO. Moreover, and especially since 2013, NRO requested implementing agencies FAO and UAWC to choose projects in the proximity of (designated) Israeli settlements and border areas. In fact, one of the purposes of land reclamation projects is to act preventively against settler interference over Palestinian agricultural activities. The implementing agencies as well as NRO needed to coordinate with Israeli authorities for access and movement, request for permits and sometimes confiscation of machineries. The LWRM programme that succeeded the Land Development II and III projects faced many challenges since it started in July 2013. The agricultural

roads interventions in Area C faced stopping orders and machines confiscations which impacted the progress of the program.²²

The restrictions to movement and access of goods and people were a major impediment to the full achievement of the economic development goals of the Dutch program. The need to go through an Israeli exporting company limited the marketing possibilities of the Global Gap and EurepGap projects (a Palestinian based organisation is now being set up, but this requires skills and capacities that do not appear easily available in the cooperative movement; while the local partner subcontracted, Mount Green Olives, does not appear able to cover the whole spectrum of needs of project beneficiaries). Moreover, the marketability of the products is affected by the complicated border procedures that causes the produce to remain under the sun for long time and arrive in part depleted in the destination markets. To address the issue, the Netherlands funded the purchase of scanners which would allow for the containerisation of Palestinian trade. However, as already mentioned the procedures at the borders have not changed yet, keeping all the logistical obstacles in place. Negotiations are under way with the Office of the Quartet and COGAT to improve some of these conditions.

The institutional weaknesses on the Palestinian side also affected the projects to some extent. Many of the farmers met during field visits complained that they were dissatisfied with extension services offered by the Ministry of Agriculture. This matter had been brought by them to the attention of the implementing consortium, who decided to enroll 35 MoA extension officers into capacity building and enhancement training courses. Besides, during the implementation of the program, some extension officers were provided with transportation cost reimbursement in order to motivate them to provide better quality service. The investments in MoA extension were significant; however, the fruits of these investments did not appear obvious on the ground with beneficiaries as they did not feel the extension officers had visited them regularly and effectively. Implementing partners found this activity not useful for the future and to be stopped. Some interviewees claimed that the reason could be the unclear role of the MoA as a member in the consortium and the lack of a nominated programme coordinator or members to the steering committee of the programme. Moreover, the top management of the Ministry but also some extension officers who were enrolled in the programme did not like the arrangement of having public sector staff working under the supervision of an NGO like PARC.

A number of impediments also came from the West-Bank – Gaza political divide. In view of the situation in Gaza (de facto Hamas government since 2007) and the decision of the donor community to shrink aid assistance and support to Gaza because of the Hamas government, the project activities in this part of the Palestinian Territories were differently designed from those of West Bank. Instead of an intensification and a more market-oriented approach, the Gaza part of the programme aimed to maintain the results achieved during 2007-2009 (land reclamation and development, and Global Gap-related procedures). Extension services offered to farmers by the PARC NGO, although modest, continued to keep their interest, knowledge and capacity on Global Gap methods and requirements. However, investing in the certification process and infrastructural/logistical enhancement was cancelled or postponed until the export opportunities would improve.

Another factor hindering the success of the Global Gap Project was the *Tuta Absoluta* pest. In this respect, it must be recalled that agricultural insurance systems ensuring compensation for farmers and cooperatives in cases of natural or man-made disasters and plagues are virtually non-existent in the Palestinian Territories. There are a few active insurance private companies covering a wide range of insurance types but they are affordable only to well-off farmers. Several proposals and

²² NRO Food security sector fiche 2014.

were made in the last few years on agricultural insurance, and the topic was included in various agricultural sector strategy documents as a policy priority, but with no concrete outcome.²³

On the positive side of key success factors, the firm commitment and sense of responsibility of the partners contributed to reach targets within the projects' duration. The implementing partners encountered various risks and showed ability to mitigate them. The flexibility in management plans and having alternatives helped face the challenges encountered. Furthermore, the periodic meetings contributed to enhance institutional capacity and learning from practice for all partners involved. The team observed the common language in semi-structured interviews with programme staff, which showed impact of the learning process and sharing of experiences.

The relationship, commitment and support provided by NRO to the implementation of the projects was another key success factor recognised by implementing partners and beneficiaries unanimously. The continuous follow up and scheduled meetings of the consortium enabled timely sharing of information on obstacles and appropriate responses. This was mainly witnessed in the interventions made by NRO whenever restrictions or confiscation orders were issued by the Israeli authorities²⁴. Without NRO immediate intervention, such hindrances would have more negatively affected implementation.

2.5 Sustainability

The investments made in human resources and capacity of individuals and cooperatives alike (capacity building, training, extension service, targeted demonstrations and the extension model of rain fed agriculture and water harvesting, etc.) contributed to the sustainability of results. The involvement of farmers was promoted as much as possible in the projects' implementation by requiring an own contribution and by limiting the coverage of fees for Global Gap certification to the start-up period. The focus on agricultural infrastructure that is well known for its durability and long lasting; organising and strengthening farmers' cooperatives; building farmers' capacity to run cooperatives as a business entity; involving local communities in implementation gave beneficiaries a feeling of ownership and commitment. In some cases observed during field visits and reported in focus group discussions, farmers increased their financial contribution. For instance, they realised the benefits and cost efficiency of utilising bigger cement pools than what was indicated earlier in the project.

In the EurepGap/Global Gap projects, the training, study tours and extension services enhanced the know-how and skills of the target group, promoting lasting behavioral changes with regard to international standards and best practices. Many of the farmers met by the field study team confirmed that they are continuing with the Global Gap certification even after the programme has terminated. They see the need, importance and benefit of producing high quality products in the value chain and for food security. Even with regard to export, some farmers have already created links and contacts with other exporting outlets. Moreover, the sustainability of the project results was enhanced as strong emphasis was put on strengthening the technical capacity in the Palestinian Territories. By investing in agronomists that can undertake EurepGap training it was ensured that there will be a permanent capacity to train farmers to meet international standards, even after the project phases out.

²³ State of Palestine Ministry of Agriculture, "National Agriculture Sector Strategy: Resilience and Development", 2014-2016; and State of Palestine Ministry of Agriculture, "Palestine National Plan 2011-2013: Agriculture Sector Strategy".

²⁴ See for instance correspondence between NRO and COGAT regarding destruction of land reclaimed with NRO funding in Jourish village on 10 September 2012, demolition of a cistern in Al Khader (Betlehem) on 17 July 2012 and demolition orders of project-funded cisterns in Sair, Hebron, and Beit El received in July-August 2012.

Despite a general sense of ownership of project results by beneficiaries, the field study team also collected some signs of disengagement and concern, probably amplified by the high expectations and intensive level of assistance received in the previous years. The High Value Crops project aimed at gradually reducing and focusing the subsidisation of farmers' activities and embraced a stronger value-chain approach by supporting demonstration of highly profitable crops that are not yet cultivated in Palestine. Yet most of the farmers cooperatives met during field visits were not happy with the way the new project was being implemented on the ground. This was not only related to the phasing out of the subsidies but also to other aspects of implementation (e.g. supplying of packing houses, equipment). The cooperatives met were not involved in demonstrations of new crops. Moreover, they had the impression of having less of a say in the project implementation, of being treated more as mere beneficiaries than as partners. In part, they could not understand the division of responsibility between FAO and UAWC and based on the contact with UAWC project staff the perception was that all decisions were made far from the field by the international agency. There was also diffidence towards the choice of centralising the financial services in one partner the interviewed cooperatives did not have contact with, and skepticism towards the ability of the partner chosen for organising export efforts. The cooperatives still had the ambition to put in place an own export company, although interviews with NRO clarified that the process of establishing this company was advancing very slowly.

As the High Value Crops project was not part of the selection of projects assessed in the field study, the details of farmers' complaints could not be further investigated. However, the limited commitment of beneficiaries from a number of cooperatives to the ongoing projects represents a risk for sustainability of Dutch-funded agricultural interventions.

The structural cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture is a general sustainability factor for interventions as it ensures that results will be consolidated in the context of building a Palestinian State. The second part of the evaluation period witnessed an intensification of such cooperation, also due to the involvement of FAO, the main advisor to the MoA, in the implementation of the High Value Crops project. The existence of a national strategy for the agricultural sector²⁵ provides better guidance to the efforts conducted in several projects for long time uncoordinated. However, Interviews with partners and other donors also evidenced a number of concerns regarding the current capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture to deliver extension services. There were diverging opinions regarding whether the Ministry should have a direct implementation role or limit itself to provide policy coordination leaving to NGOs the delivery of extension services. The prevailing view is that it should have mostly a coordination role, which leaves open the possibility of the actual organisation of the services under a sustainable and financially viable model that is not totally donor-dependent. A weak point for sustainability exemplifying the difficulties in involving the MoA was the delay in institutionalising a Global Gap certification body within the Ministry.

Finally, it is impossible to disregard that a still missing factor of sustainability for any economic intervention is the removal of barriers to access and movement of goods to and from the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinian agriculture sector is expected to generate better momentum if Israeli restrictions are lifted and open market strategies adopted. Additionally, in Gaza, the past years wars have created a situation of permanent uncertainty that discourages any long-term investment on the part of the farmers and this represents a clear threat to sustainability of agricultural interventions. It will take a long time and much stronger signs of opening by Israel to re-establish trust.

²⁵ State of Palestine Ministry of Agriculture, "National Agriculture Sector Strategy: Resilience and Development", 2014-2016; and State of Palestine Ministry of Agriculture, "Palestine National Plan 2011-2013: Agriculture Sector Strategy".

2.6 Role of the Netherlands and coherence

2.6.1 Donor coordination and coherence of donor approaches

Even if not formally in charge of the coordination of donors in the agricultural sector, the Netherlands has a recognised leading role in it, both in supporting land reclamation and rehabilitation activities to the benefit of the lower end segment of the farmers, and in promoting value-chain approaches for the more advanced and specialised agricultural businesses. The Netherlands has been a key partner for the Office of the Quartet's Representative's initiative to foster economic development in the Palestinian territories through coordinated consultation with the Israeli and the Palestinian authorities. The balanced political position of the Netherlands in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has been an advantage in this endeavour. Nevertheless the ongoing negotiations with Israel COGAT on political and developmental levels progress slowly and will require even more pressure in order to fully achieve the objectives of containerisation of export of agricultural produce.

Generally speaking, the sector is characterised by bilateral projects where each donor applies its own strategic choice. Examples of dilemmas that see donors taking different paths are the emphasis on livelihood support or value chain approaches; the extent to which farmers are subsidised; the choices regarding implementing partners (e.g. FAO and/or national NGOs). The national agricultural strategy of the PA is quite comprehensive and does not indicate clear priorities in this respect. Donor coordination in the sector exists and comprises of a formal forum for information exchange (the LACS SWG) and more informal mechanisms. There are regular contacts between NRO and other major donors as well as FAO. Although they cannot be qualified in terms of harmonisation, these contacts at least avoid gross duplications and establish some cooperation on the ground.

2.6.2 Internal coherence of Dutch policy

The use of policy dialogue to enhance results of development interventions is a characteristic of the Dutch approach to the sector that was clearly present in the aid to Palestinian Territories during the evaluation period. This can be seen by the interventions of the Dutch government to request Israel to allow trade from Gaza to the West Bank on the occasion of the (cancelled) inauguration of the container scanner at Kerem Shalom²⁶ and the other subsequent interventions related to the scanners.²⁷ The Netherlands used its good relations with both Israel and Palestine to facilitate the implementation of the projects while keeping faith to its foreign policy position. At the same time, the Netherlands remained consistent with the joint EU member States position not only by generally supporting the two-state solution but for instance trying to refocus its most recent programme on Area C. The working of the NRO does not seem to suggest a separation between the political activity and the development programme, and there is awareness of the political goal of the assistance. A broader assessment of the coherence of Dutch development and diplomatic activity was however beyond the scope of this field study which focused on specific projects.

2.6.3 Gender mainstreaming

Land development projects provided attention to the promotion of the involvement of women in activities and some of them were especially targeted to women (e.g. home gardens development).

²⁶ DutchNews.nl, "Security scanner row disrupts Dutch Prime Minister's Israel visit", December 8, 2013: http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2013/12/security_scanner_row_disrupts/.

²⁷ Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "New scanner will boost Gaza exports", July 15, 2015: <https://www.government.nl/government/contents/members-of-cabinet/bert-koenders/news/2015/07/15/new-scanner-will-boost-gaza-exports>.

Yet the approach appears more consistent with the idea of women as vulnerable group in the context of the “social” orientation of this project, rather than characterised by gender awareness. The obstacles to participation for women and relations within the households were not addressed. All partner organisations tried to highlight and foster the role of women in programme related issues, like water management, and their significant role in educating their kids at home, through conducting the training courses, workshops and in the produced training materials. Women’s participation in local committees was one of the measures pursued by all partners. In addition, the selection criteria and scoring system were designed in such a way to give women the priority in the different activities of this program. According to the evaluation report, programme records showed an overwhelming percentage of male direct beneficiaries - 89%, as usually in communities like the Palestinian ones as property belongs to men. In the field survey sample interviewed women comprised 15% of the sample. However, in training activities women’s participation was higher (30%). Home garden activities were 95% directed toward women beneficiaries. In local committees women represented 22% of total number of local committee members, while in the programme staff women they represented the 27%.

The gender aspect was not taken into account in the EurepGap / Global Gap projects. In the successor High Value Crops project, this was a point of attention and led to including among the beneficiaries a number of women’s cooperatives. Moreover, one of the partners, Asala, is a Palestinian businesswomen association. The impact of their inclusion cannot yet be appreciated though, and the team recorded on the contrary signs of lack of knowledge of and connection with this organisation among some farmers’ cooperatives.

2.7 Conclusions and recommendations

The strength of the Dutch support to economic reconstruction in the Palestinian territories lies in the fact that it represented a long term investment that yielded results at various points of the value chain. Land development II and III helped farmers improve their livelihood through land reclamation. The more organised farmers learned to produce good quality horticultural products that meet the international standards. Efforts were made to expose the farmers and cooperatives to export opportunities and further grow their business, although these efforts succeeded only to a limited extent due to various circumstances. There was a continuity of partners and beneficiaries that was useful to induce long-term behavioural changes. This continuity was interrupted in 2013 when NRO decided to tender out the project and the FAO-UAWC consortium was awarded the contract; although there were other benefits; e.g. the involvement of FAO ensured better links with MoA.

The main weakness was the heavy dependence of the support on the Israeli policies for the success of some of the projects related to export. Agricultural marketing and export are affected directly by the Israeli occupation and the measures taken or imposed by the occupation. The fact that Palestinians have no control over the entry points and do not have direct access to international markets in addition to restrictions on the internal movement, causes serious negative impacts and effects. This was anticipated but nonetheless limited what the projects could achieve under their span of control.

Overall, the Dutch support to economic reconstruction helped preserve the further deterioration of the socioeconomic fabric; however, it cannot be concluded that it gave a substantial contribution to building a viable Palestinian economy. The viability of a Palestinian economy depends in large part by the fulfilment of conditions such as geographical contiguity, territorial sovereignty over land and resources (including Area C), capable transport infrastructures, unrestricted movement of goods

and labour between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and between the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the outside world, and ultimately peace and security as a precondition for long-term investments. As long as these conditions won't be met the goal of a viable economy will remain far.

The following recommendations can be provided:

- The Dutch-supported efforts to reduce restrictions to the movement and access of agricultural goods (including through the provision of container scanners) remain important. However, as the benefits of these activities have not materialised that in minimal part, it is necessary that negotiations with Israel to ensure the containerisation of transport and the improvement of logistical conditions at border crossings are brought to a success and more stringent agreements with Israel should be made to this purpose.
- The review of the economic reconstruction/ food security programme and the other learning moments have allowed to learn lessons and to adjust the focus. This can be seen for instance in the shift from export to national production, from individual farmer support to communal infrastructure support. While this represents a sign of flexibility and demonstrates the learning attitude of the programme, due attention needs to be paid to the management of the transitions between approaches, in order to avoid misunderstandings and disaffection of end beneficiaries who remain the key factor in the success of any development intervention.
- The programme should look at the sustainability of the result of its capacity building efforts, notably to the extension system that the country is going to adopt. Whether run by the MoA or based on the work of non-governmental organisation, it should be made sure that the training for the adoption of innovations (either best farming practices or new agricultural crops) actually results in the dissemination among a larger number of farmers by active and effective extension officers, using also the expertise of FAO and other partners on the best extension methodologies.

3 Governance

3.1 Context

Governance-related interventions are carried out in a very complex political and institutional environment, characterised by a number of challenges, often related to the major binding constraints – the Israeli occupation and the weaknesses at the Palestinian side:

- *Lack of functioning representative structures:* The representative body of the Palestinian population living in the Occupied Palestinian Territories is the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) established in the wake of the Oslo Accords. It has 132 members and is in principle elected every 4 years. Last elections were in January 2006 and were won by Hamas. There is no clear date for the next elections to take place. The PLC has been unable to meet and govern since 2007 due to the imprisonment of a significant proportion of its membership and the lack of a quorum. In theory, the Prime Minister with his/her Cabinet of Ministers, the Executive Body of the PA, is bound by the PLC for major decision making on policy and strategy for affairs that relate to the Palestinian Territories. In 2005 a separate Prime Minister Office was created. From an institutional point of view the PA institutions have no electoral legal basis today, as the Presidential term has expired in 2010 or 2011 while also the PLC's term is expired and no new elections have been held since 2006;
- *Multi-layered legal system:* The legal system is made up of layers established over the years including Ottoman laws, British Mandate laws and emergency regulations, Sharia (for family and personal status laws), Jordanian laws in the West Bank and Egyptian administrative orders and court decision influence in Gaza. This is furthermore superseded and overridden by Israeli civil and military orders under the occupation. An integrated legal framework is lacking.²⁸ PA laws revolving around investment and private sector development are more developed also due to donor assistance. Another important area is civil law, but family law is under ecclesiastical courts. Despite some reforms Muslim family law is still very gender biased²⁹;
- *Justice sector institutions trusted, but several challenges persist:* According to a 2012 survey by UNDP, the overwhelming majority of Palestinian households believe that rule of law institutions are legitimate and choose to use them to resolve all manner of disputes. 91.7% choose to call the police when in danger; 71% consider that courts are the only legitimate institutions through which to resolve disputes; 63.3% are confident that they would receive prompt police assistance; 51.2% are confident that they could solve a civil dispute fairly through the courts; and 47.7% are satisfied that the public prosecution maintains dignity and human freedom. NGOs are most trusted to provide legal aid services. Along with police, NGOs top the 'trust table' by which justice and security institutions are ranked. There are however several challenges still to be addressed: Survey data reveal a troubling gap between women's and men's access to justice³⁰; formal justice is perceived to be too slow and this is a reason for avoiding the formal justice system³¹. Moreover, Palestinians are more satisfied with justice and security institutions' technical performance than their integrity (the Sharia courts being

²⁸ World Bank, "A Palestinian State in Two Years: Institutions for Economic Revival", Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, September 2009.

²⁹ Mir-Hosseini, Z., "Towards Gender Equality: Muslim Family Laws and the Shari 'ah." Wanted: Equality and Justice in the Muslim Family, 2009

³⁰ Even though Palestinian women's rights are more often violated in civil cases, 24% fewer women than men are party to civil cases.

³¹ 50.2% of households cited 'court cases take too long' as a reason for not resolving cases in court.

considered the most integer). Access to legal assistance is inadequate, adversely affecting perceptions of justice and the integrity of security institutions³²;

- *Security institutions between public mistrust and public appreciation*: The PA security service makes up the government's largest department, at about 45 percent of its work force, and consumes 27% of the annual budget. Security forces have helped reduce crime and inspired greater public confidence in the PA according to a World Bank report of 2009; however other reports show that security forces lose the trust of local communities when they are seen as enforcing the illegal Israeli occupation.³³ For example, Palestinian security forces (PSF) can only move in Area C, and to some extent in Area B, in full coordination with the Israeli military forces. Despite the full civilian and military control bestowed on the PSF in Area A, when the Israeli military enter these areas to arrest or detain, the PSF are withdrawn to their barracks. Civilian police is looked upon more positively by the population.³⁴;
- *Public finance management under development*: Corruption was a significant issue during the Arafat period, while in the Abu Mazen and Fayyad era there was a significant commitment to make finances more transparent. However, lack of functioning PLC and consolidation of power in the Office of the President has negative effects on governance and accountability of the PFM system. A review of public finance management systems in 2013 by the World Bank and other donors highlighted some progress by the PA in indicators related to comprehensiveness and transparency, control and audit, and some indicators related to accounting and reporting.³⁵ Tax administration and procurement procedures have improved. However, there were systemic weaknesses in budget preparation, execution, and accounting/reporting, such as budget credibility and predictability, policy-based and multiyear budgeting.

3.2 Brief description of the Dutch support to governance

In the area of governance the Netherlands supported projects in the security and justice sectors. This also included the payment of salaries of justice institutions staff through the PEGASE mechanism. Moreover, limited contribution to local government projects was provided.

A total of about 83 million Euros were invested in 43 disbursements (project numbers) in this sector, representing 43% of the aid provided in 2008-2014.³⁶

Projects supported civil society organisations as well as justice institutions, with focus on public prosecution. Better access to justice was promoted by fostering legal aid services. Anti-corruption civil society initiatives were also supported. The Palestinian civil police received support in terms of both infrastructures and capacity building including on oversight and accountability issues. The PLO Negotiations Department received funding as well. Implementing partners included UN agencies (UNOPS, UNDP), the EU, NGOs, Palestinian institutions like Ministry of Finance and Palestinian Civil Police.

Out of the funded interventions in this sector, 15 projects (in terms of project numbers) were sampled for the field study. However, two of them (related to the provision of containers scanners)

³² UNDP, "Public Perceptions of Palestinian Justice and Security Institutions", March 2012.

³³ Sabrien and Tartir, "Subcontracting Repression in the West Bank and Gaza", Al Shabakah, the Palestinian Policy Network, November 2014.

³⁴ UNDP, "Public Perceptions of Palestinian Justice and Security Institutions", March 2012.

³⁵ World Bank, "West Bank and Gaza Public Expenditure & Financial Accountability (PEFA); Public Financial Management Performance Report (Report No: AUS3141), 2013 : www.worldbank.org/ps.

³⁶ Overall ToR Evaluation Palestinian Territories 2008-2014, p. 17.

have been included in the assessment of economic reconstructions in this report, where it fits better (chapter 2).

The 13 remaining sampled projects comprise of 72% of sector funding and 30,2 % of all projects. These 13 projects are:

- Strengthening the Rule of Law and Access to Justice for the Palestinian People (A2J), funded by the Netherlands as well as Canada, Sweden, Japan, Luxembourg and UNDP and implemented by UNDP, in two phases: 2008-2011 and 2012-2015 (2 projects);
- Programme Fund to support the development of the Palestinian Civil Police (PCP), where specific projects, implemented by UNOPS, the EUPOL COPPS mission and the Palestinian Civil Police were funded by the Netherlands as sole donor, in 2009-2010 and 2011-2013 (2 projects);
- Community Development Stability Fund (CDSF) funded only by the Netherlands and implemented by the Municipal Development Lending Fund (MDLF) in 2008-2010 (1 project);
- Emergency Municipal Services Rehabilitation Project II (EMSRP II), funded by the Netherlands as well as Germany, Sweden, Denmark, the World Bank, also implemented by MDLF in 2007-2011 (1 project);
- Dutch contribution to the Direct Financial Support programme funded through the PEGASE (Mécanisme Palestino-Européen de Gestion de l'Aide Socio-Economique) mechanism, earmarked to the payment of salaries in the justice sector, and implemented by the Delegation of the European Commission in Jerusalem (7 projects, one for every year).

3.3 Relevance

3.3.1 *Relevance to the needs of the Palestinian people*

In general, it is possible to conclude that the projects in the field of security and justice responded to pressing needs of the Palestinian people and were aligned with PNDPs.

The Access to Justice and Strengthening the Rule of Law (A2J) programme responded to the need for better and more accessible justice services, and the contribution to the payment of salaries of the justice sector through PEGASE was also geared to achieve this purpose.

That this was a need area is confirmed by the results of public opinion surveys revealing that, in 2005, only 26% of citizens showed high levels of trust in the formal court justice system and, in 2009, almost half of respondents considered lack of public trust as significantly undermining the pursuit of justice.³⁷ Moreover, the support addressed aspects of the justice system that had received so far little attention by the donor community. Whilst the prior response of donors had been mostly in terms of infrastructures and capacity building of staff, the legal aid component A2J was the first programme to address comprehensively both "supply" and "demand" for justice services. On the supply side, it targeted the Ministry of Justice which had been the least supported judicial institution to date.

The choice of supporting the Palestinian Civil Police was also relevant to Palestinian needs. The EUPOL COPPS Programme Fund was meant to help the PCP reach its objectives of maintaining safety and security for all citizens, reducing crime and the fear of crime, and securing public confidence in the rule of law and the police. It also addressed physical needs of the PCP including vehicles, communications equipment, office equipment, and infrastructure repair.³⁸

³⁷ UNDP/PAPP, "Supporting the Rule of Law and Access to Justice for Palestinian People, Project document", 2009, p. 8.

³⁸ Activity Appraisal Document EUPOL COPPS Programme fund, p.2.

Support to both the justice system and the Palestinian civil police was consistent with the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan 2008-2010 and even more clearly with the 2011-2013 National Development plan.

Regarding the former, the A2J project contributed for instance to “implement a legal information system” by supporting the extension to the Attorney General Office of the use of the MIZAN II database. As to the 2011-2013 Plan, the project contributed to “Implement targeted initiatives to ensure equitable access to justice for all citizens, including provision of legal aid (...)”. Also the objective of a “comprehensive review of Palestine’s body of laws and begin implementing a unification plan to ensure modernisation and consistency of legislation” was addressed e.g. through legislation-drafting activities.

Likewise, the PCP programme fund was meant to help the PCP reach its objectives under the PRDP 2008-2010 and the Police development Strategy 2010-2012 that directly relates to the security sector strategy of the PA as part of the NDP 2011-2013.

Besides PA plans, some of the projects funded in the justice and security sector also responded to goals set by Palestinian civil society organisations. In light of the limited provision of legal aid services for the low-income population by the PA, several NGOs (e.g. JLAC, Al-Haq, the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling) offer such services since several years.³⁹ The Palestinian Bar Association in Gaza had already pursued the delivery of legal aid services to the population and the A2J project gave the opportunity to provide these services more systematically, in cooperation with a network of local NGOs called AWN.

Projects were based on needs analyses to a variable extent – more extensively in the justice than in the security projects (e.g. the A2J legal aid component was based on a mapping of legal aid provision by the PA).

Under the rule of law sector program, the Dutch development cooperation also funded two projects aimed at supporting municipalities, implemented through the Municipal Development and Lending Fund. The objectives of these projects were: to consolidate stability and to improve living conditions at the local level through quick impact socio-economic development projects in areas affected by emergency conditions (CDSF); mitigating further deterioration in the delivery of essential municipal services and create temporary job opportunities at the local level (EMSRPII). The motivation behind Dutch support for these two projects seems to have been mainly political (contribute to stabilisation of the concerned areas under the Palestinian Authority); there were no clear links with a local (government) development support strategy also because local government was not a sector of focus of the Netherlands, nor became such after the end of these projects (e.g. the Netherlands did not join the Municipal Development Programme where some of the approaches started in EMSRPII were consolidated). In any case, these projects appear to have been relevant to local needs.

3.3.2 *Relevance to the intermediate goals*

The intermediate goal pursued by the governance sector projects is a functioning Palestinian State. The objectives of the sampled projects appear consistent with this goal.

The A2J programme focused on the gradual preparation for a State of Palestine in the future, as envisaged in the Programme of the Thirteenth Government titled Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State, whilst, to some extent, making an attempt to offer immediate solutions to unfair and unjust situations. Specifically, the project addressed one of the main challenges to the

³⁹ Buttu D., “Mapping Study Legal Aid Services Provided by the Palestinian Authority”, UNDP, 2011

building of a Palestinian State, the separation between the justice systems of Gaza and the West Bank. It did so by including a specific component on Gaza and by rolling out the programme in both territories.

The two objectives of supporting the Palestinian Civil Police - establishing standard operating procedures and making the human resources administration more accountable - were relevant to two of the criteria indicated in the MASPs for a functioning Palestinian State: "Transparency and accountability instruments adopted by the government" and "Criminal justice and security establishment accountable to Palestinian public". The existence of a well organised and accountable PCP is crucial for the establishment of the PA throughout the territory of its competence; therefore the intervention appears highly relevant to the intermediate goal.

By supporting local municipalities in delivering services, the projects pursued the objective of "a capable and responsive government" which is also one of the identified criteria for a functioning Palestinian State. However, it has to be noted that municipalities existed before the establishment of the PA and would probably continue to exist without it. They are distinct from the PA and sometimes in competition with it for fiscal revenues. Therefore, support to municipalities is not per se automatically conducive to the establishment of a Palestinian State. In any case, the political stability objective of these projects was clearly linked to the intermediate goal as it aimed to support the establishment of the PA in certain unstable areas.

3.3.3 *Consistency with the Dutch sector development policy*

The supported interventions appear incorporating key elements of the Dutch sector policy for governance. The requirement for budget support to be earmarked for specific sectors was clearly met in the case of PEGASE, where the justice sector was chosen. Capacity building was also performed e.g. within the judicial institutions and the police. There was greater attention to rule of law, justice and security in the later period of the evaluation following Dutch sector policy trends. There was also some attention to democratisation, good governance in the first period and constant attention to anticorruption, although this is better reflected in other projects than the ones chosen as a sample, and in the human rights projects.⁴⁰

3.3.4 *Adequacy of project deployed activities to the solution of the identified problems in the sector*

Whilst the objectives of the projects were generally relevant, the types of activities chosen to address these objectives were not always such. In some cases this was due to the limitations of a merely technical approach in circumstances where political will was also necessary to sort out the outstanding issues.

In the A2J programme the legal aid activities appear adequate to address the identified needs, although scaling up would be needed to achieve significant impact. The technical cooperation between planning units of the three judicial institutions on the contrary was not sufficient to address the problem of the competition between these institutions. It is a shared opinion of interviewees that this should be solved at a higher political level. Likewise, a number of pieces of legislation were drafted to address human rights issues as part of project activities, but not signed off. Given the absence of an active PLC and the fact that sign-off depends on the President, the advocacy and lobbying strategy to have such legislation approved could have received more attention.

In other cases the activities do not appear completely relevant because the identification of the interventions followed the requests of particular instances of the PA instead of applying clear and

⁴⁰ Human Rights/Good governance secretariat, see section 4.3.3.

objective criteria. For example, the choice of the specific infrastructural interventions to be funded under support to the PCP was based on priorities suggested by the District Coordination Offices, according to the implementing partner. It does not appear clear why for instance in Nablus the refurbishment works for the juvenile police unit were quite limited in scope, for budget reasons according to the local police (e.g. a zinc ceiling was provided, insufficient to ensure isolation during the winter), while in the same police station two large rooms underwent extensive renovation to provide a multifunctional hall that is used by staff as canteen and training room. Also, the choice of building a new police station in Beit Leid was questioned by some interviewees given the limited access of the PCP to the surrounding area, and indeed a value-for-money assessment on this station is under way. A study mapping the access by the PCP to the various areas of the West Bank was conducted in 2012 by the OQR, and would provide a better basis for the selection of such type of interventions because it can help establishing where police stations need to be located to cover the whole territory.⁴¹

In the MDLF projects, the infrastructural Interventions were chosen based on the strategic plans of the municipalities with some community consultation. Whilst interventions like paving roads or repairing water tanks appear consistent with the quick impact purpose, one of them, the Hebron Central Parking, appears clearly too ambitious: this complex structure required three times the Dutch financial contribution and was only finalised in 2014 by a different local government than the one which had to be supported – see Effectiveness section.

3.4 Effectiveness

3.4.1 Delivery of project activities and outputs

In general, projects delivered the vast majority of the planned activities and outputs.

The Access to Justice programme funded the provision of free legal aid services in over 26,962 cases across the OPT. Legal awareness sessions were provided to 78,007 people, focusing especially on assistance to women. UNDP supported the development of a 200+ female lawyers' network within the Palestinian Bar Association (West Bank). UNDP seconded experts served as embedded technical advisors within the MoJ, the HJC and the AGO. Planning and project management units were established in these institutions. UNDP staff was engaged with the creation of a number of substantive laws, including a new draft Palestinian Penal Code. UNDP commissioned a legislative review examining Palestinian law from a women's rights perspective and set up a gender unit in the MoJ. In Gaza, a total of 767 lawyers benefited from the specialised training packages provided by the PBA through the programme. The PBA further helped build the legal capacity of community members, by providing 425 free training hours to informal justice figures, journalists/media activists, and other male and female professionals. UNDP also supported the PCBS in its efforts to collect data on the justice and security sector: a UNDP Public Perceptions Survey including the "Justice Sector Satisfaction Index" was delivered, obtaining responses from 6700 households.⁴² The administration of justice in the OPT was digitalised through the adoption of a user-friendly electronic case file management system (MIZAN2) and by supporting the upgrade of the Al-Muqtafi website, a database storing around 17,000 pieces of Palestinian legislation, case law, judicial precedents and legal opinions. The MIZAN database in particular seems frequently used for managing workload and producing statistics and adds an element of transparency to the system as all documents are uploaded in case files.

⁴¹ Office of the Quartet Representative (OQR), "Report for the Meeting of the Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee on Action in Support of Palestinian State-Building", 27 May 2015, Brussels - See more at: <http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/DCA80249053CD09085257E4D00503B81#sthash.i9g1LfgF.dpuf>.

⁴² UNDP Rule of Law & Access to Justice Programme in the OPT, "End of Programme Report", November 2014.

Still in the justice sector, a contribution to the payment of salaries of civil servants was provided through the PEGASE mechanism. Every project number had a separate independent audit report, showing that the money was transferred and including a CD-ROM with the list of names to whom it was transferred. No irregularities were noted – thus the expected output was delivered and the payments were made according to intentions, respecting the various criteria set by donors in order to avoid payments to officers appearing in sanction lists and other categories.⁴³

Also for the support to the Palestinian Civil Police the vast majority of planned outputs were delivered, mostly on time. There was a high level of satisfaction and confidence from the recipients, the partners and delivery agency that the quality and scope of the outputs had met expectations. These included refurbishment, procurement, trainings and institutional development of several administrative departments of the police (Human resources, Guarding and Protection, District Coordination Offices, Juvenile Police Unit, Radio Maintenance/information technology administration, Operation and patrolling). One of the sub-projects had a two year delay because it required planning clearances from the Israeli Coordination Office for Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT). The HR institutional development activity was delayed due to challenges of reaching consensus between the various administrations involved on the planning, coordination, scope and deliverables; however all deliverables were eventually completed.⁴⁴ Some delays were also generated by internal PCP coordination, and unclear divisions or responsibilities between UNOPS - EUPOL COPPS.⁴⁵

The MDLF projects delivered their outputs as well. The CSDF completed all its sub-projects, the main key physical achievements being: 25 km roads construction and rehabilitation, 3 km water networks rehabilitation and expansion, 1500 sq. m of central parking constructed. However, the Hebron central parking was inaugurated only in 2014: the financial situation of the PA (expected to co-fund the project) delayed the implementation; a solution was found by the new local administration through provision of municipal resources and rental of spaces to shops. The weak capacity of municipalities related to procurement procedures, preparations of bidding documents and procurement plans are mentioned as challenges to the implementation.

Under the EMSRPII significant repair and improvements were made to roads, solid waste services, electricity services, water supply networks, and public facilities; 167,000 person-days of employment were created against a target of 140,000. All the 654 subprojects approved under the Dutch Fund were completed.⁴⁶ In Gaza, restrictions to access of basic materials and fuels and the 2008 war slowed down implementation, requiring an extension of the project duration.

3.4.2 *Achievement of project expected outcomes and results*

Reporting on the achievement of project outcomes is not easy. It was recognised by interviewees that until 2012 neither the donors, nor the implementing partners paid much attention to results frameworks and baselines. The interest for these aspects developed over time.

The A2J programme lacked an initial baseline (a part from a mapping of the legal aid provision), but UNDP started a number of data collection activities in 2012 (e.g. the already mentioned survey on public perceptions of justice and security institutions, and a Review of Palestinian Justice and

⁴³ Business and Strategies Europe Consortium, "External Evaluation of PEGASE 2008-2011 for West Bank and Gaza: Final Report", EC, p. 16.

⁴⁴ UNOPS, "Final Narrative Report for the Government of the Netherlands, Multi Sector Support Programme for the Palestinian Civil Police", Reporting period 1 January 2012 – 31 December 2013; December 2014.

⁴⁵ Interview with implementing partner.

⁴⁶ Municipal Development and Lending Fund, EMSRPII – Dutch Fund Completion Report, 27 May 2009.

Security Sector Data conducted in 2012 with PCBS.⁴⁷). There is not yet a second wave of these surveys enabling to measure the progress achieved.

As far as PEGASE is concerned, according to the 2011 evaluation report: “The programme is very well coordinated and managed by EUREP/DFS. Monitoring of inputs and outputs is excellent. However, there is a need for more and regular monitoring and reporting of outcomes, effectiveness and impact to member states and other donors, especially concerning the longer term policy reform activities and development assets which DFS has sponsored or created.”⁴⁸ A result-oriented monitoring framework is being developed that should help linking financial support to the reform of the PA. The justice sector was not addressed in the pilot version of the framework, but should be included next year.

For the support to the PCP, expected outcomes were not clearly defined at the onset, according to the evaluation.⁴⁹

For the sector as a whole, the Justice sector strategy provides now a number of indicators, that however have not yet been measured. The NRO has its own indicators for the justice sector, measured in 2012 and 2013 against a baseline in 2011.

Within these limitations, it is possible to discuss the achievement of the expected outcomes by the Dutch funded projects based on the existing evaluations and the interviews held with implementing partners, beneficiaries and other external informants.

Access to justice and Strengthening the Rule of Law

Capacity of rule of law institutions strengthened - According to the evaluation report, the relationship among the key justice institutions and between those institutions and the public has been improved “dramatically”. A deficiency of the programme was the limited coverage due to the existence of parallel institutions in the Gaza Strip.

Access to justice at local and grassroots level enhanced - Still according to the evaluation report, UNDP’s interventions in the sector since 2010 have shifted the debate and resulted in greater coherence amongst key justice institutions with regard to free legal aid; an enhanced capacity of the MOJ in this regard; and increased coverage by CSOs, the Bar Association and law schools to end-beneficiaries. The claim that the quality of legal services was improved and its sustainability increased, as contributions were made toward the inculcation of Pro Bono culture across the legal profession, was not completely confirmed by the interviews conducted by the field study team with the Palestinian Bar Association (PBA) in the West Bank. PBA officers in fact highlighted persisting difficulties in having lawyers working pro bono.

Gender and juvenile justice improved – The evaluation report does not provide evidence of the achievement of this outcome but just mentions a number of policy and legislative as well as technical contributions by UNDP to the MoJ. A variety of units and departments within the MoJ were assessed at the end of the project as better aligned to the PA’s Gender-Based Violence Strategy as a result of the work of the embedded gender and juvenile justice expert. The only result related to beneficiaries is that UNDP helped women who have divorced their husbands to secure financial maintenance through its support for the Palestinian Maintenance Fund (PMP). Furthermore UNDP supported juvenile detainees via the CSI, and rendered technical assistance directly to the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Dar Al-Amal Juvenile Rehabilitation Centre in

⁴⁷ PCBS-UNDP, “A Review of Palestinian Justice and Security Sector Data”, August 2013.

⁴⁸ B&S Europe, External Evaluation of PEGASE 2008-2011 for West Bank and Gaza, European Commission, 2011, p10.

⁴⁹ Mansell P., “Final Evaluation for the Netherlands funded Projects of the Palestinian Civil Police”, UNOPS, 12 April 2014.

Ramallah. Activities in favour of women and youth were also carried out by the AWN network in Gaza. By training the first female *muqtar* (informal mediator) a contribution was made to gender-sensitive conflict resolution in Gaza.

Rule of law in the Gaza Strip initiated - According to the evaluation report, UNDP can be credited with introducing the concepts of legal aid and clinical legal education in Gaza. The UNDP-supported network of legal aid providers ("AWN" network) is functioning in a well-coordinated manner and provides legal aid to thousands of Gazans - the overwhelming majority of whom are women. A number of CSOs have engaged in strategic advocacy campaigns that have impacted municipal governance and service delivery and increased rights for women and youth. The PBA with UNDP support has also bridged the gap between the informal and formal justice sector in its trainings and outreach to community leaders. UNDP's efforts are also paying dividends in the shari'a courts which have become more efficient and protective of women's rights (i.e. such as inheritance) as a result. Satisfaction with the quality of legal assistance services is now higher in the Gaza Strip than anywhere else in the OPT, the evaluation concludes. The field visits of the Evaluation Team to Gaza confirmed these results, with the AWN organisations able to mention several examples of such impacts.

Confidence building among stakeholders promoted - According to the evaluation report, UNDP has significantly increased confidence and networking among CSOs via the Civil Society Initiative. Although the project is not the only networking forum for rule of law and human rights NGOs in Palestine, the field study confirms that the project gave a major contribution at least in Gaza. UNDP has also improved measurements and strategies for improving public confidence in justice service providers, for instance with the already mentioned perception survey.

PEGASE

The Civil Servants and Pensioners (CSP) programme (of which the Dutch contribution to the payment of salaries of the justice sector is part) evidently succeeded in achieving its intended objective of enabling the PA to pay salaries to civil servants on a regular basis and thus ensure the provision of basic services to the population. The pressure on the PA's budget was in this sense decreased by the program. Furthermore the CSP allowed the PA to maintain a direct connection with Gaza. Moreover, the PEGASE complementary interventions to direct financial support developed in the last years contributed to the revision of legal and regulatory frameworks and to institution building at sector level. However the 2011-2013 evaluation added that "interventions should be linked to a performance framework and should inform the policy dialogue in their respective sectors, ensuring adherence to the PA policy reform's priorities and coordination with other donors' interventions".⁵⁰

Support to the PCP

The projects in support to the Palestinian Civil Police achieved the best results in the IT area. The in-sourcing of the radio system by developing internal capabilities allowed for considerable savings with respect to the previous arrangement with an external contractor. The developed police database appears a useful tool to track and follow-up incidents and to produce related statistics. The Vehicle tracking system was not yet used at the time of the project final evaluation but will be starting from the autumn 2015, according to the IT department.

One of the ambitions of the support was to improve the application of women's and children's rights by establishing juvenile police units in terms of both capabilities and capacity. In this respect, one

⁵⁰ EPRD, "Evaluation of the Palestinian-European Socio-Economic Management Assistance Mechanism/ Mécanisme Palestino Européen de Gestion de l'Aide Socio-économique (PEGASE) Programmes of Support to the Recurrent Costs of the Palestinian Authority (2011-2013)", Final Report, March 2015, p.21.

can note the limited impact of the small-scale refurbishment interventions undertaken to this purpose in the Dutch-funded projects. These are largely insufficient to achieve the uniform application of human rights standards (e.g. detention centres, juveniles). For instance, in Nablus the head of the Family Protection Unit was well aware of the international standards regarding the space that each detainee has right to, but admitted that many times these standards are not met in practice. She also mentioned that one female detainee had to be sheltered in the female staff's room due to the lack of a free detention cell. Moreover in Bethlehem the field study team noted that the rooms assigned to the juvenile unit and refurbished with the Dutch support were no longer used by the juvenile unit but by a different unit, due to the internal reorganisation following the merging of the family protection and juvenile units.

MDLF

The objectives of the projects implemented via MDLF were to consolidate stability and to improve living conditions at the local level (CDSF); to mitigate further deterioration in the delivery of essential municipal services and to create temporary job opportunities at the local level (EMSRPII). In Jenin, the stabilisation purpose was achieved through a wider set of interventions performed in the area, including the MDLF ones, and the population could benefit from a number of improvements to road and water infrastructures. The job-creation was temporary and does not appear to have substantially strengthened the municipality nor generated permanent employment, according to the local authorities.

In Hebron, the stabilisation objective was missed at the time of the implementation, given that the central parking was completed only many years after the project closure and on the initiative of the Hamas local government administration which took over in the meantime, deciding to use municipal resources for the completion together with the rental of spaces to shopkeepers. However the parking is now a model facility ensuring more ordered accommodation of collective taxis from the neighbouring towns and better control over licenses and taxi drivers by the municipality.

In Gaza, the EMSRPII project allowed municipalities to continue to exist under the severe conditions created by the war (particularly the 2008 war), indicating the achievement of the stabilisation outcome. However, such stabilisation appears extremely precarious in light of the subsequent developments in Gaza.

3.4.3 Contribution towards sector strategic goals

The results for the security and rule of law sector were measured by NRO on a number of indicators starting from 2012 (against a baseline of 2011). The indicators reflect the limited availability of national data sources but are nonetheless an important first attempt at gauging progress. Changes in the indicator value indicate progress over one or two years and are therefore of limited use to detect long term progress. They are however described below.

In Result Area 1 – Human Security, country level outcome indicators do not show significant changes over the last few years regarding the extent to which security sector institutions and the security sector as a whole provide services that serve the needs of (various social groups within) society. The satisfaction score of the population towards the PCP was 2.71 in 2011, 2.61 in 2012 and 2.68 in 2013 – no substantial change. The number of complaints against the PCS did not decrease either: they were equal to 348 in 2011, 394 in 2012 and 364 in 2013 related to the West Bank; however the number of complaints also depends on the level of awareness of complainants and is therefore an ambiguous indicator. Finally, the incidence of complaints for torture against security forces rose from 214 in 2011 to 306 in 2012 to 497 in 2013. This trend is considered

negative and attributed by the ICHR to a decrease in political oversight over security agencies owing to difficult Hamas-Fatah relations.⁵¹

Indicators show however some progress regarding the planned result of “developing a functioning and coherent security sector”: a new strategic plan 2014-2016 exists since 2014. PCP have been paid a full salary (also thanks to the Dutch contribution to PEGASE) on a 12 monthly basis in 2013 while they were so only for 8 months in 2012 with 5 delayed months. Moreover, the number of female police staff increased from 270 to 290 between 2012 and 2013 (this is seen also as a result of the secondment of a Dutch gender expert to the PCP).

The indicators show some progress also on the accountability side (results question: “to what extent are separate security sector institutions and the security sector as a whole internally and externally accountable for their performance?”), mostly limited to the Palestinian Civil Police. An Inspector general of the Ministry of Interior has been appointed to investigate complaints against SF/PCP, which represent a precondition for better compliance/oversight. The confidence in the PCP by women and lower age groups has increased between 2012 and 2013. These results are attributed to the (also in part Dutch-funded) activities of the civil society organisations to increase accountability of the security agencies. However it is also known that the PCP has the best image among security agencies, while other security agencies have a lower score and display the worrying growing trend of torture complaints that was mentioned earlier.

In **Result area 2 - Effective Rule of Law**, the results of the public perceptions survey and the number of complaints to ICHR are the indicators used to assess “the extent to which justice sector institutions and the justice sector as a whole (including traditional/religious justice systems) provide services that serve the needs of (various social groups within) society”. A small progress is noted from 2012 to 2013 in both the overall satisfaction of the population with the performance of the sector (from 2.55 to 2.61) and the confidence of women in the justice system (from 3.08 to 3.10). The number of complaints against the High Judicial Council decreased from 28 to 5 but those against the public prosecution increased from 45 to 47.

The indicators concerning progress in developing “a functioning justice system that operates as a system” show mixed results. Clearly defined mandates and scope of responsibilities for the three judicial institutions: Ministry of Justice, judiciary and public prosecution do not exist yet. On the other hand, a new strategic plan 2014-2016 for the entire Justice sector with a clear results framework exists.

Finally, the indicators measuring “the extent to which separate justice sector institutions and the justice sector as a whole are internally and externally accountable for their performance” show modest progress. A complaints registration and follow up mechanism within MoJ, High Judicial Council (HJC) and Attorney General's Office (AGO) exists for the first time since 2013. However, the PA has not yet published a formal and substantive reply to the annual report of the Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR). At the same time, the number of cases referred by the Anti-Corruption Commission (PACC) to Public Prosecution (PP) decreased from 35 to 25 between 2012 and 2013, while those referred by PP to Anti-Corruption Court (CCC) decreased from 26 to 19 and those convicted by CCC were 8 in both years. It is difficult to base any conclusions on this data which may indicate both increased corruption and increased prosecution of cases. The existence of such cases is in part to be attributed to the fact that legislation to protect corruption whistle blowers is in place and respected.

⁵¹ ICHR, “The Status of Human Rights in Palestine: 19th Annual report”, January 1- December 31 2013.

3.4.4 Unintended effects

During the field study the evaluation team did not come across relevant unintended effects of the projects, specifically effects affecting the conflict or the living conditions of the population.

The A2J programme was very broad in its scope and objectives and there is hardly any effect of it that cannot be linked to planned goals. The programme operates across the Palestinian internal divide. The programme management has shown good awareness of the potential negative impact of measures in the justice sector that could compromise the reconciliation process, for instance has made sure that the points of view of both West Bank and Gaza staff of judicial institutions are taken into account in the discussions over the reunification process.

No specific unanticipated effects were found for PEGASE and for the support to the PCP. In the case of one of the MDLF projects, the Community Development Stability Fund (CDSF), one could argue if the co-funding of the Hebron central parking had the unintended effect to contribute to the success of the Hamas local administration which took over the project after that the Fatah local administration and the PA failed to find sufficient funding to finish the construction of the facility. The original purpose was in fact to stabilise the local governments under the PA. However the unintended positive consequence is to have now an advanced facility in place for the city of Hebron that also allows better management of local public taxi services by the municipality thanks to an electronic database to which the magnetic cards whereby taxi drivers enter and exit the parking are linked.

3.4.5 Fiduciary mechanisms

There was sufficient attention by the NRO and desk staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Minbuza) to fiduciary risks. These risks were generally taken into account in project appraisals. As a general approach to the issue, the implementation of the programs in this sector was entrusted to international organisations (UNDP, UNOPS, WB, EU) that were known for their good control systems. No irregularities were reported in project documents or by interviewees.

In the A2J programme appraisal document, it is stressed that UNDP is known for its anti-corruption policy through several policy instruments. UNDP has developed various policy instruments to counter corruption: Ethics and Code of Conduct trainings module for all employees, as well as the establishment of the Ethics Office. Furthermore it has a financial disclosure policy and a legal framework for addressing non-compliance with ethical and professional standards.

Fiduciary mechanisms were often mentioned in the PEGASE-related documents, both in the appraisal phase and in the evaluation, as would be expected in a setting in which such large sums of money are transferred. Extensive audits were undertaken every year, and no irregularity of expenditures was mentioned. According to the evaluation report: "the quality control of inputs exercised by EUREP/DFS and its partners, PWC, E&Y, and the International Management Group (IMG) throughout the DFS programme is of an extremely high efficiency and quality. Eligibility of claims and applicants is verified, delivery of materials is quality controlled, and payments are made directly to the intended beneficiary and are verified ex-post".⁵² One indirect sign of the reliability of PEGASE's audit system is the fact that other donors (e.g. UK) are exploring the possibility to join the mechanism.⁵³

⁵² B & S Europe, "External Evaluation of PEGASE 2008-2011 for West Bank and Gaza: Final Report", European Commission, n. d., p. 10.

⁵³ Interview with DFID officer.

In the support to PCP, corruption was mentioned as a risk in the activity appraisal document of the NRO, however the risk is assessed as acceptable due to the reputation of UNOPS.

Appraisal documents of MDLF projects refer to corruption as a potential risk, however both see the risk as acceptable as the World Bank plays a large influential role in the management of MDLF, and the World Bank has extensive fiduciary mechanisms in place. In the appraisal for EMSPRII project,⁵⁴ it appears that NRO commissioned Ernst and Young an assessment of MDLF prior to engage in the support. Overall assessment was that MDLF had met the minimum requirements of the NRO. However a list of recommendations was drafted by Ernst & Young. NRO committed to work closely with the MDLF to implement these recommendations.

3.4.6 Explanatory factors

The projects encountered a number of challenges stemming from the main binding constraints – the Israeli occupation and the weaknesses on the PA side – as well as other factors. These challenges explain at least in part some of the difficulties in the implementation.

The Israeli occupation represented a source of challenges for several projects. The A2J project was affected, especially in its legal aid components. Many Israeli laws which apply to Palestinians are not in conformity with international human rights standards, such as the Israeli military orders that are applicable in the West Bank including East Jerusalem. The impact of legal assistance under Palestinian jurisdictions differed considerably when compared to legal assistance to cases brought under Israeli law. Under the latter, the prospects of securing justice for Palestinians were slim, especially when civil court cases are treated by Israeli military courts.⁵⁵ In the projects supporting the PCP the requirement of Israeli permits represented an obstacle. According to the 2014 final evaluation, COGAT (Israeli authorities) delayed the approval of the construction works for the Beit Leid police station. Finally, the restriction on movement of people and goods prevented the entrance of basic materials into Gaza after the 2008 war and this affected the implementation of the MDLF project in the strip.

Likewise, the Hamas-Fatah divide and other weaknesses in the Palestinian field affected negatively some of the projects. The final report of the A2J programme concludes that “An unavoidable deficiency of the programme’s work to support institutions lays in their limited coverage due to the existence of parallel institutions in the Gaza Strip established by the de facto authorities. As the reconciliation process did not progress during the life of the programme, support for unification of the core justice institutions unfortunately could not be progressed.”⁵⁶

Some of the legislative activity conducted under the programme did not lead to approved laws due to the lack of presidential sign-off. The Juvenile Justice Law for instance has been awaiting approval by Presidential Decree since late 2012. The delay in endorsing the law according to the final project report can be explained by the cabinet change in June 2013 as well as insufficient advocacy and pressure on relevant stakeholders.⁵⁷ Also, the difficulties with the setup of the national consensus government may have contributed to exacerbate the rivalry between the three main judicial institutions (MoJ, HJC and AGO), since a former Fatah minister of justice has become Chief Justice while a Hamas minister has taken his place – however this has been explained also as a personality conflict. Finally, it should be mentioned that a number of high profile corruption

⁵⁴ 15570 BEMO EMSPRII, p. 11.

⁵⁵ Almost all cases heard by Israeli military courts (99.74%) resulted in convictions. The military appeals courts also overwhelmingly sided with Israeli army prosecutors, with (67%) of appeals filed by the state accepted, versus only (33%) filed by the defence (UNDP, “Rule of Law & Access to Justice Programme in the OPT, End of Programme Report”, November 2014, p. 39.).

⁵⁶ Ibidem, p. 37.

⁵⁷ Ibidem., p. 50.

cases concerning administrative personnel in the HJC and various line ministries as well as six judges, shook public confidence in the institutions, thereby undermining the purpose of the project of restoring such confidence.⁵⁸

Sometimes, the weak capacity and bad financial situation of the PA played a negative role. This is indeed not entire responsibility of the PA given that Israel contributes by refusing to transfer tax revenues. Despite the PEGASE contribution, in some cases salaries of civil servants were not fully paid and on time. The lack of coordination between departments of the Palestinian Civil Police was at the origin of delays in the execution of some interventions. The financial crisis of the PA prevented the plans to co-fund the Hebron central parking to materialise. The approval of the list of sub-projects from the related parties in particular the Prime Minister's Office took more time than expected and caused delay of the MDLF – CDSF project.⁵⁹

Apart from the two abovementioned main binding constraints (Israeli occupation and weaknesses on the Palestinian side), other factors created challenges to the implementation of the projects. The patriarchal nature of the Palestinian society is mentioned as an obstacle for establishing equal access to justice, especially for women. Some obstacles also came from the ineffective relationships between implementing agencies. An unclear division of responsibilities between UNOPS and EUPOL COPPS was at the origin of some hurdles in the execution of the PCP project. Finally, one practical obstacle was the continuous fluctuation and decrease in value of dollar, that resulted in the increase of prices of many construction materials, in the EMSRP II.⁶⁰

As far as success factors are concerned, for A2J the involvement of motivated and competent civil society organisations seem to have made a difference. Beneficiary involvement through community consultations was important for the achievements of MDLF and PCP projects. A strong and committed programme management in both West Bank and Gaza was also mentioned as important to the achievement of the programme results.

The Netherlands followed the implementation of the various projects bilaterally, in the donor coordination meetings for the A2J project and in the Justice Sector Working Group (where it has a coordinating role) and the Security sector working group. In the UNDP donor group NRO participated attentively in donor meetings with interventions requiring more details on budgets, stressing the importance of careful preparation of activities (e.g. an international conference on the rule of law) and sometimes recommending caution in the civil society organisations selection process to ensure balance and respect of political sensitivities. This had a general positive influence on coordination of sector projects.

3.5 Sustainability

Both the PA and civil society organisations in Palestine are heavily dependent on donor support for their functioning and this is also the case for the beneficiaries of the projects funded by the Netherlands in the governance sector.

Overall, none of the projects appears to be sustainable in the sense of being able to have its results sustained without continued international funding. Besides financial sustainability which is clearly problematic, also the institutional sustainability encounters a number of challenges, together with some positive signs.

⁵⁸ UNDP, "Rule of Law & Access to Justice Programme in the oPT: End of Programme Report", November 2014, p. 15.

⁵⁹ MDLF, "Completion Report of the Community Stability and Development Fund – Dutch Fund", October 2010.

⁶⁰ MDLF, "Completion Report of EMRSPII Dutch Fund", November 2009.

The A2J programme shows a few more signs of sustainability than the other projects. One of this is the decision by the MoJ to recruit on a permanent basis some of the staff that was seconded under the UNDP project. Another one is the existence of civil society organisations, especially in Gaza, that show determination and motivation to continue providing their legal aid services even in the gap between projects.⁶¹ On the other hand, the sustainability of the component of the programme that supports the three judicial institutions seems not warranted as long as there is no clarity on their mandate. Furthermore, the lack of a functioning legislative body and the current law approval procedure through presidential decree does not provide an adequate framework for the development of a consistent body of legislation. The risk is that draft laws remain unapproved for a long time, especially in areas that are not considered a priority.

The direct financial support through PEGASE mechanism cannot be considered a permanent sustainable solution to the financial needs of the PA. Yet the EU and the other contributing Member States do not see any reasonable alternative if the option of the two state solution is to be kept alive. Donors, and Netherlands among them, do not want to “pull the plug” and there is no sign that the support will not be provided in the years to come. However, there is an increasing effort to link the support to the improvement of the performance of the PA including its ability to collect taxes. At the same time, no progress is noted in donors’ action to induce Israel to adopt a more cooperative approach regarding clearance revenues, one of the recommendations of the Court of Auditors’ to PEGASE.⁶²

The sustainability of the refurbishment and building interventions conducted under the PCP project is highly questionable given that, according to all donors, operation and maintenance is a huge challenge for the PCP. The capacity building interventions conducted via EUPOL COPPS might have more long term results and may indeed be also the most appropriate to ensure better operation and maintenance. In general, it appears that the sustainability of results achieved by supporting the PCP and the security sector will depend on the ability of the Mol to coordinate and strategise the support received from the various donors. An important factor for the sustainability of the PCP will be better movement and access conditions through Area A and B of the West Bank and some access to East Jerusalem and Gaza. If the police was able to more easily travel between cities, there would be the need for fewer local police stations.⁶³

As far as MDLF projects are concerned, these were mostly emergency projects without great ambitions of long-lasting impact. Some “methodological” impacts could be noted in the fact that the Municipal Development Programme has incorporated some of the elements tested during the EMPSPRII and applied them more systematically in the subsequent years. MDLF has developed a system whereby the municipalities are encouraged to take progressively greater responsibilities in the management of infrastructure works based on a ranking system which acknowledges their improved performance. This is a good approach to ensure capacity building and sustainability. However as long as the fiscal relations between Israel, the PA and the municipalities remain a challenge, and as long as national policy-making on local government is not prioritised⁶⁴, there is no clear sustainability of these local government projects. Ultimately, the merely technical approach of MDLF is insufficient to overcome difficulties raising from the political economy of local government actors.

⁶¹ Focus group with A2J funded organisations during field visit in Gaza.

⁶² European Court of Auditors, “EUROPEAN UNION DIRECT FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY”, Special Report n. 14, European Union, 2013, p. 34.

⁶³ Interview with OQR officer.

⁶⁴ Interview with MOLG official.

3.6 Role of the Netherlands and coherence

3.6.1 Donor coordination and coherence of donor approaches

The Netherlands is co-chair of the Justice Sector Working Group within LACS and is part of the Security Sector Working Group. In this capacity the Netherlands played an important role in coordinating donor harmonisation and alignment efforts with the PA. This entailed, among other things: matching the Project list for PRDP's Justice Now Programme with planned and ongoing donor activities⁶⁵; organising the Berlin Conference on Security and Rule of Law in Palestine on 24 June 2008⁶⁶ and preparing a concept note for a follow-up conference to be supported together with the UK.⁶⁷; activating a Justice and Security Implementation Committee (JSIC) to promote a sector-wide approach to justice and security donor coordination (in this context, the Netherlands contributed to a capacity needs assessment of the General Prosecution in 2008⁶⁸). Another important function was facilitating the dialogue between donors and the PA on the national strategies, especially the Justice and Rule of Law National Strategy 2011-2013.⁶⁹ And the new Justice and Rule of Law Sector Strategy 2014 – 2016. This was drafted by the PA and discussed in the SWG in 2014; Netherlands provided strategic guidance and technical assistance for the development of the Strategy⁷⁰. Furthermore, in 2012 attention was raised by the Netherlands to monitoring and evaluation by the justice institutions. As lead donor, the Netherlands was also responsible for the updating of the EU Justice sector fiche in the context of the joint programming effort the EU is making to harmonise Member States' programming.

Other examples of how the Netherlands played a pivotal role in policy dialogue with the PA are as follows:

In 2009 the Netherlands together with other donors sent a letter to President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Dr. Salam Fayyad expressing a number of concerns regarding the judiciary institutions. This was followed up by the Office of the President with a review committee; the Netherlands and other donors wrote again to inquire about the outcomes of this committee. This initiative was received with some irritation by the HJC and the General Prosecution and was defended by the Netherlands as legitimate donor initiative in the SWG.⁷¹ The donors were subsequently informed that the President endorsed all recommendations of the review committee and ordered Cabinet to implement them. The donors continued to follow-up particularly on issues related to trials of civilians conducted by military courts, a subject raised also by the ICHR in its reports.

In June 2012, the Netherlands proposed the establishment of a technical committee, consisting of governmental, judicial, academic and civil society experts from both the West Bank and Gaza, supported by the international community, in order to review the 2002 Judicial Authority Law, also taking into account the 2005 draft law. Such a committee of technical experts would work under the leadership of a Higher Palestinian Council on Justice with the aim to clarify roles and responsibilities of the justice sector institutions. The Netherlands also called for incorporation in the work plan of the Ministry of Justice of the conclusion of the meeting between EU and PA representatives held in Brussels on 8th May 2012 on human rights, rule of law and good governance.⁷²

The coordination role of the Netherlands was not an easy one, given the multiplicity of actors and stakeholders taking part in the works of the Justice SWG. In the context of the Justice Sector Working Group, overlaps and duplications of funding was monitored, although more ambitions

⁶⁵ Minutes Judiciary SWG 29.04.2008.

⁶⁶ Minutes Judiciary - Security Sector Group Meeting 19.6.2008.

⁶⁷ Minutes Justice SWG 3.3.2009.

⁶⁸ Minutes Judiciary - Security Sector Group Meeting 6.10.2008.

⁶⁹ Minutes Justice SWG.

⁷⁰ Minutes Justice SWG 1.12.2014.

⁷¹ Minutes Justice SWG 8.07.2009.

⁷² Minutes Justice SWG 19.06.2012.

towards a sector-wide approach can be found in the minutes of the 2008-2009 than in the latest stage. Following a certain fatigue regarding the functioning of the LACS working groups (also in relation to a less prominent role in the PA of the Ministry of Planning which was a key player in the PA-donors coordination process), it was recently decided to reduce the frequency of official SWG meetings at the level of Head of Missions/Heads of Cooperation to discuss strategic and policy issues, and hold more informal and frequent meetings with technical staff to discuss practical issues.

The Netherlands also participated in the Security Sector Working group even if not with a similar intensity as in the Justice SWG. Among other things, NRO reviewed and provided input on the Security Sector Strategic Plan.⁷³ According to other donors who have a key role in that sector, the Security SWG is dominated by the largest donors and the possibilities for the Netherlands and other countries to have a real impact are limited.

3.6.2 *Internal coherence of Dutch policy*

The NRO participated as one single office in coordination activities in the governance sector, e.g. the Representative took part in meetings of the SWG. Yet in terms of internal coordination of development and political activities within NRO, the current portfolio allocation to staff does not facilitate an integrated approach: one officer is in charge of rule of law, and another one is in charge of human rights and political issues (together with support to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) and water). The team did not have the chance to analyse the respective roles of the Tel Aviv Embassy and the NRO and their coherence, however there are no signs of lack of coherence in the examined projects.

3.6.3 *Gender mainstreaming*

There was some attention to gender issues in the UNDP A2J programme. According to the evaluation of the A2J, UNDP's experts have significantly advanced the Ministry of Justice's work on gender. During 2011, the MoJ signed a MoU with the Ministry of Women's Affairs to effectively combat violence against women pursuant to the National Strategy on the Eradication of Violence against Women. Moreover, since 2011, a gender and juvenile justice expert was seconded to MoJ which improved alignment to the PA's Gender-Based Violence Strategy, as already mentioned. . As part of the Legal Skills Diploma, UNDP experts have trained MoJ staff to become responsive to gender. In 2012, UNDP convinced the Attorney General Office (AGO) to incorporate gender elements in its work plan for 2013. The donor relations officer at the AGO has also effectively liaised with the gender and juvenile justice expert based at the MoJ for this purpose.

Moreover, women were the primary beneficiaries of UNDP supported awareness-raising. For example, WCLAC addressed problems with the Personal Status Law and distributed information in small and remote communities, including in Arub refugee camp. WCLAC trained a number of journalists and reporters on the Personal Status Law who are now in a better position to write articles about the effects of the law on women⁷⁴. Finally, UNDP supported the West Bank Palestinian Bar Association in creating a network of women lawyers.

The projects in support to the PCP examined in this study did not show a clear gender focus, although EUPOL COPPS works according to a gender and human rights statement based on EU's Comprehensive Approach to the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR)

⁷³ Fiche results Rule of Law and Security 2012-2013.

⁷⁴ UNDP, "Independent Outcome Evaluation UNDP Rule of Law & Access to Justice Programme in the OPT", May 2013.

1325 and 1820 on Women, Peace and Security.⁷⁵ Moreover, the number of female police staff increased from 270 to 290 between 2012 and 2013 (this is seen also as a result of the secondment of a Dutch gender expert to the PCP).

The MDLF projects and PEGASE do not appear to have mainstreamed any gender issue into their design and implementation.

⁷⁵ EUPOL COPPS, "Gender and Human Rights Statement", <http://eupolcopps.eu/en/node/1116>

3.7 Conclusions and recommendations

Overall, the main strengths of the Dutch support to the justice and security sectors appear to be:

- The leading role in the Justice Sector Working Group, which was performed to the satisfaction of other donors and allows a more coherent approach, including also the PEGASE direct financial support to the justice sector;
- The funding of projects involving civil society organisations that have paid dividends in terms of legal aid services supported;
- Some example of good practices in the support of technical solutions via extensive use of ICT, e.g. radio station in the PCP, MIZAN II database;
- The engagement in constant policy dialogue with the judicial institutions.

The weaknesses derive from the limitations encountered at the political level when dynamics required interventions at higher political level, above the level of sector institutions. Another weakness has been the limited ability to affect the specific choices of demand-driven infrastructural interventions in the security sector, also probably due to a smaller role played by the Netherlands with respect to major donors of the sector.

For the future, it is recommended that the Netherlands keeps its influential role in the justice and security sectors and:

- Considers moving out from supporting infrastructure projects for the PCP, or be much more critical in the ex-ante appraisal of such interventions;
- Strengthens its policy dialogue at the level of the President's office in order to unblock the approval of key legislation drafted in these years, also taking the opportunity of the signature by the PA of human right treaties;
- Uses its leverage for being the donor who contributes to the payment of salaries of the justice staff in more direct and stringent manner to push for reforms in the judicial institutions and greater cooperation at all levels; the development of the justice component of the results-based framework for PEGASE should be the first tool for doing this;
- Continues pressing implementing partners for clearer baselines and results frameworks, remaining aware though that structural results can only be achieved in the long term.

4 Human rights

4.1 Context

4.1.1 Brief description of the sector in Palestine

The human rights sector in Palestine operates within a challenging political context of ongoing violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, including threats to life, liberty and security, restrictions on access and movement of people and goods to and within the West Bank and Gaza, and risks of forced displacement. Palestinian Human Right NGOs have been very active from the late seventies, some of the large organisations predating by 15 years the establishment of Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in 1995. Having started working on Israeli violations, these HR NGOs tend to be well versed in international humanitarian law and human right laws as they apply to occupation but less strongly in the domestic setting.⁷⁶ Israeli Human Rights organisations working to protect Palestinians in Palestine began their work in the late eighties.⁷⁷ According to recent mappings of Palestinian civil society organisations, an estimated 60% of NGOs in the West Bank and 37% in Gaza engage in Human Rights activities but only 3.5% of the total (est. 74) is dedicated Human Rights organisations.⁷⁸

Until 1995, the primary context in which HR/GG work was undertaken is the long standing Israeli occupation. Since the establishment of the PA I 1995, HR defenders have extended their protection and promotion of HR to PA violations.

4.1.2 Main trends and issues

The overall situation of Human Rights in Palestine during the evaluation period has continued to deteriorate as a result of policies and practices related to the Israeli occupation⁷⁹ - including Israeli settler violence- and to PA and Hamas government human rights violations⁸⁰, both of which impact the lives of Palestinians in multiple ways. HR violations of the PA and Hamas-governments, which have been aggravated by the Fatah-Hamas⁸¹ divide, have not shown overall improvement over the evaluation period, but rather have improved and regressed over the period⁸² depending on internal political developments.

The last two years have witnessed the highest Palestinian civil death tolls since 1967, and a significant increase in Palestinian fatalities in the West Bank as a result of hostilities. Over the last six years Israeli settlement expansion has continued, and in 2013 recorded a record increase in growth⁸³, and the forced displacement of Palestinians in Area C has continued.⁸⁴ The Israeli blockade on Gaza – and the tightening of restriction from the Egyptian side - continues to prevent Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza from exercising many of their basic rights.

⁷⁶ Interview with UN OHCHR.

⁷⁷ This period coincides with the first Palestinian Intifada.

⁷⁸ See Gianfrancesco Costantini, Jamal Atamneh, Khaled Ayesh, Fed Al Hussein, "Mapping Study of Civil Society Organisations in the occupied Palestinian territory: final report", EC, May 2011. There are an estimated 23 Israel Human

⁷⁹ The pattern and trends of these violations have been amply documented. See Mervat Rishmawi, "Evaluation of Human Rights project in the Palestinian territories", Human European Consultancy, October 2012.

⁸⁰ Based on a reading of the Annual Reports of the ICHR over the period and selected press releases from PHROC.

⁸¹ Both parties employ intimidation, detention and torture in the internal Palestinian conflict. Both the West Bank and Gaza Strip have also witnessed a narrowing of space for political participation and the exercise of civil rights as authorities in both areas attempt to control and limit activities of civil society, the press and voices of opposition more generally.

⁸² Based on a reading of the Annual Reports of the ICHR over the period.

⁸³ See "Bibi's Settlements Boom: March – November 2013": <http://peacenow.org/Bibis%20Settlements%20Boom%20-%20March-November%202013%20-%20FINAL.pdf>

⁸⁴ UNOCHA, "Fragmented lives: Humanitarian Overview", 2014

HR NGOs working in the sector are heavily dependent on external funding.⁸⁵ Documentation, advocacy and lobbying work is often combined with service delivery – as this is often more attractive to donors (the consortium of donors funding human rights NGOs of which the Netherlands is part represents an exception in this respect). This service focus has resulted in increased competition for funding with the PA, which has led to deterioration in NGO/Government relations. Competition for funding among NGOs themselves is intense, taking focus away from programme implementation. Specialised skills needed to support advocacy and policy development and dialogue are still weak, and access to skills training is constrained by lack of financial resources. In East Jerusalem NGOs have no governmental partner, and use the International Community as an advocacy interface with the Israeli authorities but maintain direct representation with the PA. The initial extreme hostility of the Hamas authorities in Gaza has been tempered over the past 3 years, with NGOs reporting increased – and sometimes unwelcome – levels of contact.⁸⁶ Longer term policy reform and dialogue with the PA and Hamas authorities is impaired by the absence of a functioning legislative body (PLC) and the effective paralysis of the legal reform process.

4.2 Brief description of the Dutch support to human rights

Dutch support over the evaluation period has focused on strengthening the Human Rights sector through capacity development, core funding to HR NGOs, reducing duplication of donor and NGOs efforts, and improving policy dialogue. The value and share of portfolio focused on Human Rights is 9.53 million Euro or 4.95% of the overall portfolio over 6 years (2008 – 2014) comprising of 21 projects.

The vast majority of projects funded (86% of the total number of projects and 96% of funding) have comprised core support to Palestinian and Israeli HR NGOs, with only two very small project-based initiatives (50,000 and 90,000 Euros) to Israeli organisations. The seven sampled projects (seven project numbers; two projects) comprise 66.7% of all sector funding and 33.3% of all project numbers. These two projects are core funding interventions through a donor consortium of a group of Human Rights NGOs⁸⁷ (the Secretariat, three project numbers) and the quasi-governmental Palestine Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR, four project numbers).⁸⁸

⁸⁵ Gianfrancesco Costantini, Jamal Atamneh, Khaled Ayesh, Fed Al Hussein, "Mapping Study of Civil Society Organisations in the occupied Palestinian territory: Final Report", EC, May 2011.

⁸⁶ See USAID (West Bank and Gaza), "Civil Society and Media Sector Assessment", January 2014, USAID

⁸⁷ This donor consortium was launched in 2005 as 'Musasssat', transitioned into the Human Rights and Good Governance Secretariat from 2008 – 2014, and is now in its third iteration as the International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Secretariat. The Netherlands joined the consortium in 2008, which comprises Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland.

⁸⁸ This donor consortium was established in 2002, and currently comprises Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.

4.3 Relevance

4.3.1 *Relevance to the needs of the Palestinian people*

Human Rights projects in the sector are clearly responsive to Palestinian needs. All Palestinian Reform and Development Plans (PRDPs) covering the evaluation period⁸⁹ proclaim the vision of the future Palestinian state as a “an independent, democratic state that respects human rights and guarantees equal rights and duties for all citizens.” Human Rights and partnerships with NGOs are also referenced throughout. The need to protect human rights and foster accountability of government institutions is consistently referenced in the broad PA strategies for the Governance sector. The ICHR is referenced specifically in the Security Sector Strategic Plan for 2014-2016 as one of the important institutions whose work intersects with that of the Security Sector, as well as one of the justice system actors in the Justice Sector Strategy. Sector goals as reflected in NGO strategic objectives and activities are well supported by the combined core funding/small grant approach adopted by the NGO Secretariat.

In the HR/GG Secretariat's planning documents, capacity building needs were carefully and collectively identified. However, the same documents were a little weak on contextual analysis.⁹⁰ Furthermore they did not include an analysis of the sector in terms of stakeholder's needs and expectations. This resulted in some lack of clarity in terms of what was expected from NGO partners in terms of proposals. The new iteration of the Secretariat 2014⁹¹ has, however, based their strategy on a broadly consultative contextual and stakeholder analysis enabling a clear definition of objectives and intervention strategies.

4.3.2 *Relevance to the intermediate goals*

Although state building is outside the mandate of both the Secretariat and the ICHR, both have played an essential role in contributing to a more responsive Palestinian government, and more capable and accountable justice and security services, both of which are key components of a functioning Palestinian State. Through support to HR NGOs work and by directly monitoring and reporting on human rights violations for which the PA and Hamas authorities are directly or indirectly responsible, a culture of accountability is promoted.

Both projects monitor and report on unlawful detention and torture⁹² and the HR NGOs advocate strongly on freedom of expression and assembly. The most recent independent evaluation attributed the non-application of the death penalty since 2013 in the West Bank to the recommendations of the ICHR. ICHR has intensified its work on monitoring the rights of vulnerable groups since 2011⁹³, while 9 of the secretariat-funded HR NGOs focus on women's rights as a strategic issue.⁹⁴ LGBT rights are one area which has not received support from the Secretariat or ICHR.⁹⁵

⁸⁹ PRDP 2008-2010; NDP, Establishing the State and Building our Future, 2011-2013; NDP, State Building to Sovereignty, 2014-2016

⁹⁰ In the steering committee minutes of April, 2013 donors noted that context analyses section of the Annual Report of 2012 lacked deeper analysis of certain events and their consequences during 2012, such as the UN Fact Finding Mission on Settlements; Palestinian UN statehood bid, and its ramification on human rights situation/partners activities;

⁹¹ NIRAS/Birzeit University Law Centre in a partnership arrangement with NIRAS as the lead. The previous Secretariat, managed by NDC, transitioned into the new edition in September 2014.

⁹² See ICHR Annual Reports for the period 2008-2014, www.

⁹³ Four separate projects have been implemented: a national inquiry on disability rights funded by Diaconal, a child's rights project funded by Save the Children in 2012; and two projects on monitoring and reporting on Gender based violence funded by UN Women in 2012 ND 2014.

⁹⁴ The NGOs include MIFTAH, WCLAC, WATC, PWWSO, JCW, and BADIL, Women for Life, WSC and WAC.

⁹⁵ Although a proposal was presented to the Secretariat by AI Qaws for Sexual and Gender Diversity in Palestinian Society, a dispute ensued between NDC and the donors regarding the award. Although the award was ultimately not made, the explanation provided by NDC to donors after a re-appraisal was that the proposal did not meet established criteria, it was

The Secretariat, by creating a mechanism for funding both Israeli and Palestinian NGOs, could be seen as a way to help to create the preconditions for the emergence of the two state solution - the end goal of Dutch development assistance - by creating better relations between Israelis and Palestinians. However, the extent to which the mechanism does this is difficult to estimate. All Palestinian NGOs interviewed were hostile to any encounter with their Israeli counterparts as part of their engagement with the Secretariat especially any joint public action. The possibility of creating a stronger constituency for peace through Israeli HR organisations public advocacy around human rights violations committed by the government of Israel is, at the moment, bleak. One Israeli NGO interviewed (Hamoked) explained that the space for public advocacy inside Israel was getting smaller as a result of the recent series of illiberal Israeli governments. They themselves did not advocate directly with the Israeli public, but passed on the results of their work in the form of briefing papers to diplomats and the foreign and local press.

4.3.3 Consistency with the Dutch sector development policy

Both the Secretariat and ICHR support work with civil society and address themes highlighted in Dutch sector development policy. The Secretariat has provided core support over the evaluation period to 9 HR NGOs who are members of the national coalition working on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 which explicitly links women's rights to the issues of peace and security. Both the Secretariat and ICHR support work with civil society and address themes highlighted in Dutch sector development policy including the abolition of the death penalty, ban on torture, women and children's rights and the protection of human rights defenders.⁹⁶ Since 2010, a grouping of 12 Secretariat funded HR NGOs has re-invigorated the Palestinian Human Rights Council (PCHRO) to conduct joint advocacy on themes of common concern.⁹⁷

According to NRO, key human rights issues in the context of the Justice Sector and a cross-check of the reports of ICHR and EUPOL COPPS are identified and included in the key messages brought to the political dialogue with the Ministry of Justice and other PA counterparts⁹⁸ NRO also cooperates with EU partners in drafting EU Heads of Mission Statements on Israel's violations of IHL, most recently Israel's abrogation of its responsibilities under IHL to protect the citizens of Gaza.⁹⁹ The two donor consortiums themselves are evidence of the Dutch establishing (ICHR) and supporting (Secretariat) like-minded groups. A lead for the ICHR donor consortium, NRO has closely monitored governance and reporting issues within ICHR work.¹⁰⁰

4.3.4 Adequacy of project deployed activities to the solution of the identified problems in the sector

Both projects to large extent deployed approaches and activities which were appropriate to the needs and problems of the sector.

The HR/GG Secretariat carried out a diverse programme of capacity building for beneficiary partners who aimed to provide some basic skills in key areas of weakness including fiscal management and project cycle management. Larger HR NGOs felt that, while that consortium

generally felt by donors and NDC both that the issue was one of social and cultural prejudice and NDC felt vulnerable in taking such a project on.

⁹⁶ See Al Haq, "Israeli Authorities deport Human Rights Defender", October 11, 2010, <http://www.alhaq.org/advocacy/human-rights-defenders>, accessed 3 September, 2015.

⁹⁷ Al Haq, "Palestinian Human Rights Organisations – PHROC", <http://www.alhaq.org/advocacy/targets/palestinian-human-rights-organisations>, retrieved 19 August, 2015.

⁹⁸ Interview with NRO staff. An example of an issue taken up with the PA quoted was the use of torture by the Palestinian Civil Police, freedom of speech and the death penalty.

⁹⁹ EU Heads Of Mission statement on Gaza, March 2014. Accessed at <http://www.eccpalestine.org/eu-heads-of-missions-report-on-gaza/>, 27 August, 2015.

¹⁰⁰ See minutes of Technical Donor Meetings, June 2011 – December 2014.

approach has reduced their transaction costs at one level (less financial and narrative reporting); their funding has been reduced overall in comparison to previous bilateral arrangements. As a result, additional resources have had to be devoted to fund raising. Smaller NGOs, however, were not impacted in the same way.¹⁰¹ NGOs had mixed feelings about the capacity building assistance provided by the Secretariat, with larger and more experienced NGOs less satisfied with technical content and timing. The OHCHR confirmed that the larger NGOs require more technical skills in specialised areas including IHRL in the domestic context. The consortium approach had, however, reduced competition among the partners which allowed some measure of joint advocacy to develop through PHROC, but policy dialogue within project activities was generally absent.

ICHR, by receiving and dealing with diverse complaints from Palestinian citizens, fulfils an essential need for ordinary Palestinian voices to be heard. Furthermore, the training that ICHR carries out with PA security sector staff promotes a much needed awareness among security officials of their obligations under IHRL.¹⁰²

In such a challenged context, where progress is always incremental, HR activities can rarely be considered adequate. Human rights NGOs have consistently used the IHL framework as their frame of reference. There is no evidence that improvements in the human rights situation created by occupation over such a long period of time have materialised. Notwithstanding the authority of international law and the expressed will of State Members of the United Nations, there is growing interest among human rights' actors to endorse a parallel strategy. This strategy, the Boycott and Disinvestment Campaign (BDC), involves a global effort to gain control over the debate about legal entitlements and moral proprieties in the conflict¹⁰³ in the face of the consistent failure of Israel to comply with the clear legal standards embodied in the Geneva Conventions.¹⁰⁴

The consortium approach has provided a great measure of financial stability for the ICHR. While the dependence on a limited number of donors increases the financial vulnerabilities of ICHR, the coherence of such a small donor group which is fully committed to the goals of ICHR does allow for collegial strategic discussions.¹⁰⁵ The decentralisation strategy, recommended as part of an earlier evaluation, has allowed the ICHR better outreach to all areas of Palestine, although the possibility of ICHR work in Area C has yet to be tested.

4.4 Human rights: effectiveness

4.4.1 Delivery of project activities and outputs

A common issue for both projects was the absence of a consistent results-based management framework with a clear baseline against which to assess progress to project objectives, enabling the response of the duty bearers and rights holders to be linked to the project activities. There were no well-defined causal links between the very broad project goals of promoting HR and the specific objectives of the projects themselves. In particular, the response of the duty bearers (PA Hamas, Israel, International community) was not linked to the results of project activities. As a consequence, while the project deliverables at the level of outputs (results of activities) were often

¹⁰¹ Interviews with Al Haq, WCLAC and WAFAC.

¹⁰² Senior security officials were predominantly high level military commanders in the PLO and have not yet had prolonged exposure to the very different requirements of civilian governance practices.

¹⁰³ The Boycott and Disinvestment Campaign was launched in 2005 by Palestinian civil society activists who issued a call for a campaign of boycotts, divestment and sanctions (BDS) against Israel until it complies with international law and Palestinian rights - See more at: <http://www.bdsmovement.net/#sthash.cZKm1yOy.dpuf>.

¹⁰⁴ The Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention) and elsewhere in international humanitarian law and international human rights law.

¹⁰⁵ Karlstedt C., Pace J., Ansara K., "External Evaluation of The Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR)", May, 2013.

well defined and able to be measured, it was not specified how these results (outputs) led to the achievement of the goal.¹⁰⁶

A review of the evaluations carried out and minutes of the Steering Committee meetings indicate that both implementing partners have been urged to develop better results frameworks.¹⁰⁷ Progress has been registered especially for the ICHR: while the strategic plan for 2011-2013 included output indicators only, the plan for 2014-2018 includes both output and outcome indicators. A new results framework has been developed for the new iteration of the Secretariat in 2014 but it is too early to assess the results of the application of the framework as baseline studies still have to be carried out.

The Secretariat was to a very large extent successful as a grant management facility in channelling funds to NGOs. It was less successful in delivering expected outputs in capacity building, and policy dialogue. Over the two project phases covering the period July 2008 through June 2014, the Secretariat supplied 93 core grants for a total of US\$19.4million to 32 NGOs and supported an additional 10 NGOs with 44 project grants valued at US\$1.4 million. The secretariat also provided 56 organisations with capacity building services. Under the policy dialogue component, the Secretariat staff established four thematic sub groups in 2008 to develop sector policy¹⁰⁸, conducted three rounds of consultations with project partners in the West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza during 2011 and facilitated annual thematic events for the partners celebrating International Women's and Human Rights day. Two of the thematic sub groups never convened, and the themes of the other two were adopted by the PCHRO. Only one meeting was convened with beneficiary partners and donors in December 2008, and no other evidence of policy dialogue activities was found. Beneficiary NGOs had mixed feelings about the capacity building assistance provided by the Secretariat, with larger and more experienced NGOs less satisfied with technical content, the quality of some of the trainers and timing. However, all NGOs interviewed highly commended the financial management training which provided much needed strategic fiscal management and planning guidance.¹⁰⁹

In Gaza in particular ICHR has expanded its activities over the evaluation period since the ban on monitoring prisons and detention centres was lifted in 2011 by the Hamas authorities.¹¹⁰ ICHR is also actively involved in multiple national coalitions and bodies dealing with HR issues, conducting extensive training and awareness raising, and undertaking research. The non-application of the death penalty since 2013 in the West Bank has been attributed by the most recent independent evaluation¹¹¹ to the recommendations of the ICHR. The evaluation does suggest, however, that much of the training carried out could be undertaken by HR NGOs, with ICHR focusing on carefully targeted security sector staff.¹¹² ICHR's decentralised structure with five sub offices allows good outreach to all areas and this is a strong point.¹¹³

¹⁰⁶ Ibidem. The evaluation says that "proper programme identification seems to have been lacking. The absence of a clear baseline, proper indicators, a monitoring framework and clear objectives in terms of what needs to be addressed within the HR/GG situation, are crucial factors, which make any assertions on general impact nearly impossible".

¹⁰⁷ Ibidem. The Evaluation concludes "ICHR will need to continue to develop its long term strategies for change and complement them with a more comprehensive Results Framework with clear indicators and baselines".

¹⁰⁸ Sub groups included.

¹⁰⁹ Interviews with Al Haq, WCLAC, WAFAC.

¹¹⁰ ICHR statistics show that complaints submitted to ICHR in Gaza have increased from 888 in 2010 to 1,409 in 2011, see "The Status of Human Rights In Palestine: Nineteenth Annual Report", 2014.

¹¹¹ Karlstedt C., Pace J., Ansara K., "External Evaluation of The Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR)", May, 2013.

¹¹² Ibidem.

¹¹³ See ICHR Annual reports for 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014, where figures of complaints per sub office are presented.

4.4.2 Achievements of outcomes

To a large extent, both projects have met their objectives as stated in their planning documents. HR/GG partner NGOs have been strengthened and ICHR has contributed to the protection and promotion of human rights and consolidated its role as the national HR institution. This conclusion is based on a review of expert evaluations over the period and interviews with independent experts and HR/GG NGOs. As yet, however, there is no baseline for either project which would allow a more quantitative appraisal of progress over time. Results based monitoring frameworks with indicators for both projects have been under development for much of the evaluation period, but remain to be finalised. To put this in some perspective, it should be noted that as yet, no other agencies working in the Justice or Security sector have established indicators that can measure the increase in HR awareness or more positive behaviour of rights holders (citizens) or duty bearers (governments) as a result of their own work. There is arguably a case to be made for assuming that increases in HR violations by the PA and/or Hamas authorities are closely linked to regression associated with the internal political split.¹¹⁴ A review of evaluations, partner implementation reports and interviews do suggest, nonetheless, that project activities have strengthened the sector organisations, and has improved their ability to effectively absorb additional funds.

The ICHR has established itself as a reputable and independent institution in both the West Bank and Gaza which has become a key reference point for citizens' complaints related to human rights violations by both the PA and Hamas authorities. ICHR for example has been fully accredited by the international Coordinating Committee of Human Rights Institutions (ICC) and is a full and leading member of the Asia Pacific Forum of Human Rights Institutions (APF). This illustrates the regard with which it is held on the regional and international level. ICHR staff indicated that ICHR has been asked to train staff of other APF institutions. HR NGOs interviewed commend the work and role of the ICHR and UN OHCHR staff feels that they are ready to take on the work of ensuring PA compliance with the recently signed international treaties and conventions, which ICHR has expressed a keen willingness to do. Further, ICHR helps to keep the "issues on the agenda and documented."¹¹⁵ However, some concerns remain to be addressed particularly in relation to internal governance issues related to a prolonged re-structuring process, and a keener prioritisation of resources on ICHR's key niche areas (court monitoring, legal commentary, development of preventive approaches based on analysis of data collected) where the ICHR has clear comparative advantage, rather than trying to "do everything."¹¹⁶

The work supported by the Secretariat has clearly impacted the lives of rights holders who were reached by the partner NGOs. In 2013, according to NDC (Secretariat) data, beneficiary NGOs provided approximately 20,216 legal consultations, undertook 5,994 cases of legal actions, attaining positive outcomes in 9,995 cases and provided successful legal representation and/or advice for 27,604 beneficiaries. The core funding combined with the more flexible project funding, has conferred some measure of financial stability on beneficiary partners and has allowed flexible responses to emergencies.¹¹⁷ The objective of policy dialogue, however, remains unmet. Although

¹¹⁴ Al-Haq has found that the use of torture is driven primarily by political interests within the fractured political context of the OPT, and most often as a form of revenge against perceived political enemies, Al Haq Press Release, 2008

¹¹⁵ Interview with NRO staff.

¹¹⁶ The 2013 Evaluation, recommended that ICHR more fully prioritise its work across its core activities including a prioritisation of its advisory services to areas which are at the core of its mandate (judicial institutions), at present ICHR is a members of 10 national consultative bodies. The evaluation goes on to recommend the prioritisation of its resources to meet training demand through integrated planning with COS, to give priority to report topics based on an analysis of incoming complaints, and to focus on new issues such as the advice to the PA on monitoring the newly PA-endorsed international treaties and conventions, see Cecilia Karlstedt, John Pace, Khalil Ansara, "External Evaluation of The Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR)", 2013. These recommendations were confirmed during interviews with NGOs and UN OHCHR

¹¹⁷ During the most recent war in Gaza, Secretariat supported NGOs collectively documented and reported on violations through a quickly processed grant.

the large NGOs have their own direct multiple channels to both the PA, donors and the international community at large, they have no direct access to the Israel authorities. In any case while all consortium donors maintain bilateral relations with the larger human rights NGOs, a consortium approach gives donors access to a much wider range of perspectives on issues, trends and sector priorities.¹¹⁸

4.4.3 Contribution towards sector strategic goals

All evidence suggests that there was very limited degree of achievement of the strategic goals for the sector. Despite some qualitative impressions recorded in documentation¹¹⁹ of both projects that the PA and Hamas authorities respect for human rights has improved, there is no objective evidence to support this. In fact, using "increase in complaints received" as a proxy indicator, a review of ICHR data from their Annual Reports shows no improvement over the period and some signs of regression in the last two years. ICHR reports also indicate that the pattern of violations has remained the same over the years since monitoring data has been kept. Further, ICHR reports also indicate that no PA or Hamas security officials have been held to account for the violations reported against them.

Conversely, there is a large amount of quantitative data produced by UN organisations and Israeli human rights NGOs showing that levels of Israeli HR violations have been sustained in some areas and increased in others. For example, in 2014 as compared to 2013 there has been an increase in 31% in the destruction of donor-funded infrastructure in Area C, an increase in 20% in the numbers of people forcibly displaced from Area C, imports into Gaza are down by 16% on 2013 (from 59,076 trucks to 47,590) despite the enormous requirements of construction materials required for Gaza reconstruction, Settlement expansion is increasing, Israel continues to fail to comply with clear legal standards of IHL, and the UN continues to fail to enforce recommendations of fact findings mission on Gaza and settlements.¹²⁰

It can be concluded that to a large extent, respect for human rights by duty bearers has not increased. Nonetheless, it might also be concluded that without the efforts of HR NGOs and organisations like ICHR, the situation would be very much worse for the rights holders. And, at a lower level of results, there are some positive developments. Interviews with staff of UN OHCHR affirmed that HR NGOs operating in Palestine consistently deliver solid and thorough documentation and analysis of the HR situation, providing a solid base for advocacy and lobbying work.¹²¹ The re-invigoration of PCHRO to conduct joint advocacy work is very encouraging. The president declared in 2013, following the representation of ICHR and others that all forms of torture are prohibited, no death sentence will be approved, and no special dispensation will be made for alleged honour killers. Further, recent EU Heads of Mission statements on HR violations have been stronger and EU member states are becoming more visible.

4.4.4 Unintended effects

The projects have had both unexpected positive and negative effects. Positive consequences which can be attributed to the HR/GG Secretariat included increased cooperation among HR NGOs. The HR partners wanted to lead the sector in developing policy and joint advocacy and did not see a

¹¹⁸ Consortium donor interviews.

¹¹⁹ ICHR Annual Reports of the evaluation period.

¹²⁰ UN OCHA, "Fragmented lives: Humanitarian overview", 2014; Peace Now, <http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/settlements>, accessed 25 August 2015; Richard Falk, "Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967", UN., January 2014.

¹²¹ Interview with staff of UN OHCHR.

role for the Secretariat in this¹²². As a result PCHRO was re-invigorated in 2008 and has been conducting joint meetings and advocacy ever since. The more negative unanticipated effects have included increased competition for resources and enhanced dependency. All large HR NGOs interviewed said that their levels of core funding had absolutely decreased as a result of the HR/GG consortium funding mechanism. Under prior bi-lateral funding arrangements, they said that they had received substantially greater amounts of funds, although this might also depend on overall decreased levels of development funding. As a result, they now had to re-allocate additional resources to fund raising, taking focus away from programme implementation.¹²³ This issue is being addressed.¹²⁴

The almost total dependence of ICHR on donor funding is a negative effect which was not expected when the consortium was established. Dependence on external funding is not in compliance with the Paris Principles and is not satisfactory in the long run as it poses a risk for ICHR and renders the donors to be a steering body for the organisation.¹²⁵ In the long run ICHR needs to develop a strategy for how to reduce dependence on donors.

4.4.5 *Fiduciary mechanisms*

Mechanisms to reduce fiduciary risks were to a large extent built into the design of the projects, with no evidence of any irregularities. ICHR has developed a risk management plan as part of its strategic planning process since 2011 dealing with internal and external risks. All risks have well elaborated mitigation measures. Risks are identified for finance and corruption.

ICHR has also appointed an internal auditor since 2011 who reports directly to the Board of Commissioners. ICHR budget are 3 years in length. All financial and management audits affirm that the internal controls are strong including bidding procedures. Authorisation thresholds for payments seem reasonable¹²⁶. The current auditors Ernst & Young are quoted in the most recent external evaluation as saying that there are “no major concerns with ICHR’s accounting and financial management” and that all external audits since 2009¹²⁷ have had clean opinions.

The Secretariat is managed as part of the NDC’s overall programs. The Secretariat has a separate bank account and NDC appointed an internal auditor in 2011. NDC also appointed Price Waterhouse Coopers as the external auditor in 2008. All audits for the evaluation period had clean opinions with no materials comments.

4.4.6 *Explanatory factors*

Palestine is both an occupied and divided territory which affected how well the projects performed in several ways. The effective paralysis of the legal reform process in both the West Bank and

¹²² Sidoti C. and Qazzaz H., “Review of the Human Rights and Good Governance Secretariat supporting Non-Government organisations working in the Occupied Palestinian Territory”, 23 June, 2009.

¹²³ Interviews with Al Haq, WCLAC.

¹²⁴ See Indevolve Sweden AB, “Effectiveness of core funding to CSOs in the field of human rights and international humanitarian law in occupied Palestine: Final Report”, 5 June, 2015, Cecilia Karlstedt, Waddah Abdusalam, Smader Ben-Natan, and Haneen Rizik.

¹²⁵ Karlstedt C., Pace J., Ansara K., “External Evaluation of The Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR)”, May, 2013, page 13. The Paris Principles require, among other criteria, that NHRIs like PCHR, are, as state bodies, funded by the state budget.

¹²⁶ Above 400 shekels has to be authorised by two of three signatories (executive Director, Finance Manager, Board members) above \$5,000 has to be authorised by a Member of the Board and the Executive Director.

¹²⁷ The issues with the 2009 audit was the lack of alignment of the budget with the chart of accounts, the significant losses on exchange rates, and the non-transfer of the PA funds to the institution. These matters have since been addressed with appropriate software and ongoing discussions with donors and the PA.

Gaza as a result of a non-functioning PLC¹²⁸ as well as the capabilities of the PA itself, creates a legal vacuum which impacts longer term policy input and reform work. Although ICHR has developed effective working mechanisms, ICHR's functions are not yet regulated by law as the PLC was became dysfunctional before the statutes were presented for ratification. As a result, the ICHR still lack the instruments to enforce access to information or locations where the PA or Hamas is unwilling to cooperate. Although this renders it somewhat dependent on the good will of security commanders and PA officials, ICHR was able to recommence visits in Gaza following strong lobbying work by UNOHCHR with Hamas authorities.¹²⁹

In area C, ICHR has limited prospects to address violations as it has no Israeli partner and - in common with human rights NGOs - highly constrained access. Human rights NGOs have similarly constrained access to Area C, East Jerusalem, and communities in the Seam Zone. The internal conflict between Fatah and Hamas prevented ICHR from operating in Gaza for some years and also influences the responses of both parties to complaints of citizens associated with the opposite side of the divide.

While coordination mechanisms exist between all donors who fund both ICHR and the Secretariat, there was no linkage with LACS coordination mechanism which resulted in a lost opportunity for increased synergies between human rights and the Rule of Law interventions. Staff of human rights NGOs and ICHR seem to be extremely committed to their work which helps to explain why, in such difficult operating circumstances, they are able to achieve.

The NRO led the ICHR donor consortium for most of the evaluation period. The minutes covering the period indicate that as well as facilitating permits for ICHR to Gaza and sundry correspondence, NRO was actively involved in pressuring for a more transparent process for the selection of ICHR Commissioners which ICHR was immediately responsive to.¹³⁰ NRO also helped to streamline and re-focusing evaluation ToR for the Commission which helped in providing a useful 2013 Evaluation report. It seems that there may have been some reluctance of donors, including the Dutch to engage in policy dialogue with Human Right NGOs in a consortium framework. While donors can be like-minded, their individual foreign policies may prevent joint advocacy initiatives towards the PA or Israel based on NGOs recommendations. As already explained, the NRO did engage in bilateral representation of human rights issues to both the Ministry of Justice and the PA but there was little evidence of consortium based policy dialogue towards PA and Israel in the period covered by the evaluation.¹³¹

4.5 Sustainability

Both projects in the sector sample are still on-going with new funding commitments for another phase of activities. Norway will be joining the Secretariat during its new phase. Longer term sustainability for the ICHR is a current issue as the PA does not yet make regular annual contributions. As noted above (4.4.4) the current consortium funding approach is seen as a mixed blessing by some larger NGOs. The findings of a recent independent study on the best use of core funding do recommend a more flexible approach.

¹²⁸ Israel arrested numbers of PLC members, making a quorum impossible, Marian Houk, "American Chronicle", 10 August 2009/

¹²⁹ Interview with UN OHCHR/

¹³⁰ See Minutes of Donors Meeting, December 2014, ICHR/

¹³¹ Although donors tend to blame NDC for not doing enough under the policy dialogue component, according to Cecilia Karlstedt, John Pace, Khalil Ansara, "External Evaluation of the Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR)", 2013, "the Secretariat was told by donors that this is their role and there is no need for the Secretariat to play a role in this as such. One of the challenges is that the four donor countries do not always have the same position on issues and that positions may change when national governments change after elections".

4.6 Role of the Netherlands and coherence

4.6.1 Donor coordination and coherence of donor approaches

The mechanism developed for donor coordination at the level of the two consortia works well. Donors are strongly committed to the support of human rights work in Palestine. ICHR Steering committee Minutes indicate that NRO have played an active coordination role with other donors by facilitating consensus. As explained above, there is limited linkage of human rights projects to the LACs coordination mechanisms. As Co-chair of the Justice Sector Working Group, the Netherlands may be in a good position to facilitate this kind of linkage, despite the difficulties of such a mediation role.

The pooling of funds by donors has, to a very large extent, reduced duplication of donor efforts in the sector. The UNDP Access to Justice Programme does fund the same beneficiary partners as the Secretariat but there is bilateral consultation (UNDP/Secretariat) during the process.¹³² The ICHR has implemented three projects supported by donors from outside the consortium. According to the most recent evaluation (2011-2013) this has created some concern among human rights NGOs who are already working with national coalitions on the same issues.¹³³

The existence of the two donor consortia is a good example of coherent policy approaches of donors to the human rights sector. Some evidence of differences in donor strategies have been noted in the Evaluation (2013) of ICHR and highlighted during discussions on funding decisions of the Secretariat, but these do not seem to have impaired the smooth functioning of the donor consortia concerned.

4.6.2 Internal coherence of Dutch policy

According to the NRO, there was strong alignment between the human rights issues identified in the ICHR reports and the messages delivered to the PA during visits of the Foreign Minister Timmermans on 2013, the visit of the PA Foreign Minister to the Hague in 2014, and the Dutch Human Rights Ambassador Kees Van Baar to Palestine in 2015. During the latter visit, the HR Ambassador was able to have one-on-one meetings with some of the HR/GG Secretariat beneficiary partners whose messages were, according to NRO staff, incorporated in the speaking points of the Ambassador.¹³⁴ Within NRO there is frequent and active sharing of information across portfolios, although as mentioned in the prior chapter the portfolio allocation to staff does not favour an integration or rule of law with human rights.¹³⁵

When supporting NGOs working on human rights, the Netherlands was generally consistent with its policy of keeping good relations with both the Israeli and the Palestinians. For instance NRO was always extremely alert towards any suspect of anti-Semitic attitudes amongst the funded organisations and punctually raised concerns in donor consortia whenever they appeared.¹³⁶ The

¹³² Interview with NDC.

¹³³ The Evaluation of 2013 notes that CSOs do not understand ICHR's strategies or focus in regard to ESC rights and the present initiatives (the 2 projects on women's rights) are seen as unclear and short sighted. Specialised CSOs are not consulted and there is limited sharing of information in the areas of women and child rights. The CSOs would like to have clear mechanisms for collaboration to address different issues related to vulnerable groups.

¹³⁴ Al Haq confirmed that this meeting took place, but says that NRO did not provide any feedback on the action taken.

¹³⁵ Interview with NRO staff.

¹³⁶ The mid-term review of the HR/GG Secretariat for instance reports that "the donor consortium met three times in January 2011 (when the Badil case featured prominently on the agenda) and at least eight times in the first five months of 2011. The minutes of these meetings reflect anxiety that the programme could continue to cause political difficulties and problems for the donors, as the Badil case had done. Although all donors are vulnerable, in general terms the Dutch felt most vulnerable to political pressure generated by Israel and/or its international supporters and the Swiss felt the least vulnerable, with the Swedes and the Danes somewhere between." Badil was a Betlehem-based NGO that had published a cartoon based on an anti-semit stereotype. Dammers C., Madi A., Review of Human Rights/Good Governance Secretariat

Netherlands supported the idea of funding both Palestinian and Israeli organisations under the condition that they would use funding in the Palestinian territories.

4.6.3 Gender mainstreaming

There is no evidence from project documents that the Secretariat included gender mainstreaming as a programming theme, or included the requirement of an organisational gender strategy as part of supporting documentation for a grant proposal, or as an evaluation criterion for grant proposals. NGOs that lack a gender analysis run the risk of not understanding the gendered impact of human rights violations and the most appropriate way to address particularly female victims.¹³⁷ Furthermore there is no sex disaggregated data in their reporting. One of the recommendations of the evaluation of 2013 is to address these issues as a matter of some concern. However, the Secretariat did provide core funding to nine women's rights focused NGOs (29% of grantees, 21% of funds).

According to the 2011-2013 evaluation of ICHR, policy guidance on gender is required so that ICHR can mainstream gender in its approaches, build capacities and skills within ICHR in gender analysis and equality and develop its own internal gender policy. ICHR is building its skills in monitoring gender-based violence through its project with UN Women. It can be concluded that gender mainstreaming considerations are largely absent from these projects.

4.7 Conclusions and recommendations

The strengths of the Dutch support to the sector include: a core funding focus for beneficiary partners to strengthen their strategic engagement; willingness to lead a donor coordination mechanism; potential for building stronger linkages with rule of law (justice and security) interventions to bring additional coherence to their portfolio and greater impact on both rights holders and duty bearers.

Weaknesses include a perceived reluctance to have a higher profile in advocacy work around human rights issues - although some donors and organisations interviewed think that NRO is becoming somewhat more vocal and visible.

The following recommendations are made regarding the continuation of support in the sector:

- Human rights activities should continue to be supported as they contribute to the greater accountability of PA and Hamas authorities in terms of their human rights obligations and promote a culture of accountability.
- The advocacy role of the NRO should be strengthened: human rights can contribute to stability, greater regional security and peace if all ways and means and current mechanisms are explored to see how NRO, in partnership with like-minded donors and its EU partners, can more effectively hold Israel accountable for its IHL and IHRL violations.
- High quality technical assistance is still needed for human rights actors in the areas of strategic advocacy, monitoring human rights conventions and treaties, human rights based approaches, the gendered impact of human rights violations in general, and gender mainstreaming within programmes.

in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, January 2011. An internal memo drafted on 2 February 2011, moreover, reports as an example of donor alertness towards anti-Semitic stances the case of a letter drafted by SDC on behalf of the donor consortium to Badil, protesting for the publication of an article on their website written by an holocaust-denier "Anniversary of the Theft of Palestine: Boycott of Israel proposed at International conference"; leading to the removal of the article from the website.

¹³⁷ Karlstedt C., Pace J., Ansara K., "External Evaluation of The Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR)", May, 2013.

- Support to ICHR should continue to encourage a clear strategic focus on its niche areas and better outreach to NGOs who work in complementary areas.

5 Humanitarian aid

5.1 Context

5.1.1 Brief description of the sector in Palestine

The Humanitarian sector in Palestine operates within a complex and volatile political and economic context. The long standing political stalemate in the Middle East peace process, intra-Palestinian conflict and occupation policies have resulted in an increasingly damaging deterioration of Palestinian living conditions. Constraints on Palestinian economic development are related to the political uncertainty, movement and access restriction and a fragmented regulatory environment which have resulted in a pervasive and overall economic decline.¹³⁸ The impact of three wars in Gaza¹³⁹ between 2008 and 2014 has resulted in a series of increasingly unprecedented humanitarian crises with significant loss of life, shelter and service infrastructure.¹⁴⁰

The two most significant humanitarian actors in the sector are UNRWA and the Palestinian Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA). Both have substantial annual budgets for relief/humanitarian work¹⁴¹. UNRWA provides assistance to refugees inside and outside the camps, while MoSA provides assistance to both non-refugees and refugees outside the camps.¹⁴² The humanitarian field is densely populated with international organisations and NGOs including ICRC and its local Palestinian Red Cross and Crescent counterparts, 12 UN agencies¹⁴³, over 85 international NGOs¹⁴⁴, and very large numbers of Palestinian NGOs¹⁴⁵, including Zakat Committees and Charitable societies.

In 2008, UN OCHA established the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) to more effectively guide and coordinate the humanitarian response and develop policy on issues relating to humanitarian access in Palestine. A separate HCT Advocacy Working Group (AWG) was also established chaired by UNOCHA to facilitate coordinated advocacy, initiatives and events and develop common messaging on humanitarian concerns. Thematic coordination groups – or clusters – bring together all stakeholders working in the defined area of expertise to harmonise response. Prompted by the renewed emergency in Gaza in 2009, the LACs coordination structure created a Humanitarian Task

¹³⁸ According to the Economic Monitoring Report of the World Bank to the AHLC of September 12, 2014, "growth has decelerated since 2012 to less than 2% in 2013 and the economy entered into recession in 2014."

¹³⁹ Gaza wars may refer to any of three conflicts between Israel and the Hamas-controlled Palestinian territory in the Gaza Strip: Gaza War (2008–09), also known as Operation Cast Lead, 2012 conflict, also known as Operation Pillar of Defense 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict, also known as Operation Protective Edge. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza_War.

¹⁴⁰ For details on the scale of the need and the responses over this period in Gaza, see <https://www.ochaopt.org/>.

¹⁴¹ The Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) Annual Budget is US\$396m; UNRWA's West Bank and Gaza Annual budget for both Relief and Social Services (R&SS) and emergency activities for 2013 was an estimated US \$341 Million. Staffing levels are less comparable with UNRWA West Bank and Gaza R&SS and emergency staff totaling 1,228, while MoSA has only see <http://www.pmf.ps/documents> and UNRWA programme budget, 2012-2103. MoSA also receives significant amounts of funds from Arab countries which is not shown in the national budget, interview with EU senior expert working on the EU programme for reconfiguring the Social Protection System in Palestine.

¹⁴² An estimated 66% of all MoSA's cash transfer and food caseload are refugees, including 80,000 households (628,000 individuals) in Gaza. Interview with Daoud Al Deek, Deputy Minister, MoSA.

¹⁴³ UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, UNRWA, FAO, WHO, UNESCO, UNOHCHR, UNWomen, UNFP, UNDSS, UNMAS.

¹⁴⁴ The Association of International Development Agencies (AIDA) working in Palestine has over 85 members.

¹⁴⁵ It is difficult to be precise with numbers as critical emergencies (floods, wars, drought) ebb and flow and local implementing partners are not always identified in aid flows over the past 12 years. But based on the most recent civil society mapping exercise carried out by the EU in 2011, Gianfrancesco Costantini, Jamal Atamneh, Khaled Ayesh, Fedaa Al Hussein, "Mapping Study of Civil Society Organisations in the occupied Palestinian territory", EC, 2011, page 35, suggests that as early as 2006, over 23% of CSOs were involved in providing relief and humanitarian assistance. If we use the most recent official figure of registered CSOs active in Palestine from the Ministry of Interior (2,176 in 2009), a minimum estimate of 500 CSOs would be active on the ground, many of whom subcontract with international NGOs to implement relief and early recovery initiatives.

Force in 2009 to bring additional coherence and synergy to humanitarian, early recovery and development work.¹⁴⁶

5.1.2 Main Trends and issues

The West Bank and Gaza have been in the top 10 recipients of humanitarian aid globally over the period 2002 to 2012 receiving a total US\$648m annually over this period. Assistance peaked at US\$1.2 billion in 2009, when it was the second largest. UNRWA has been the recipient of a more or less constant 20% of all humanitarian aid to Palestine, with the exception of 2009, when a very successful Emergency Appeal (EA) raised US\$330m, raising UNRWA's share to 48% of the total. The proportion of ODA that has been humanitarian assistance has averaged 35% over the 2002-2012 period. Despite increasing humanitarian needs, funding as a percentage of humanitarian requirements for Palestine overall - and UNRWA in particular - is decreasing. Donors and UNRWA itself have re-evaluated the effectiveness and efficiency of their response, particularly in relation to better targeting of the most vulnerable categories of refugees. UNRWA has piloted new approaches that are showing some evidence of decreasing food insecurity under the current economic and political constraints.¹⁴⁷

In 2005, a thorough organisational reform was launched in UNRWA to bring greater efficiency to its operations. Despite the initial resistance within UNRWA, particularly from local staff,¹⁴⁸ progress has been made particularly in strategic planning, results-based management and an openness to consider new approaches to poverty alleviation in situations of prolonged humanitarian need created by occupation policies.¹⁴⁹ At the end of 2011, OCHA re-framed the approach to the humanitarian situation in the Palestinian territories by bringing together and synthesising all the factors which drive the continuing deterioration. As a result, the humanitarian situation has now been clearly articulated as protection-based crisis, resulting from on-going conflict and occupation, a lack of respect for international law, a near complete absence of accountability and a system of policies that severely undermine Palestinian communities to live normal, self-sustaining lives. These factors have begun to re-shape both the programming and advocacy responses of donors.

For the past twelve years, the UN and its partners have managed an annual humanitarian appeal based on the consolidated key needs presented by humanitarian actors in the OPT. In 2013, this process and prioritisation of key projects was reconfigured based on a consultative planning process with HCT members and involving the PA. The process entails developing strategic objectives, output and outcome indicators for the sector, identification of most vulnerable categories of people – including refugees - and a focus on geographical areas where the PA has very limited reach.¹⁵⁰ The inclusion of the PA and HCT members is intended to support alignment with national and international longer term development strategies, by complementing the PNDP and the Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). In a parallel development, a new vulnerability

¹⁴⁶ The HTF is co-chaired by MoPAD and UNSCO.

¹⁴⁷ See DFID, "Improving Food Security for the People of Gaza", ATOS Consulting, 2015. It should be noted that the DFID study has not been finalised, but DFID have informed us that the main findings are unlikely to substantially change.

¹⁴⁸ For a discussion of internal governance issues in UNRWA, see DFID's support for Palestine Refugees through UNRWA, September 2013, Independent Commission for Aid Impact, page 4-9. The evaluation team experienced attempts to influence policy by refugees through the blocking of access to Jalazone camp in Ramallah in August by the Camp Services Committee. As a result of widespread tension across the refugee camps in August, UNRWA was only able to organise two field visits in the West Bank and unable to organise visits to camps in Gaza.

¹⁴⁹ This resulted in the production of a Medium Term Strategy (MTS) covering the period 2010 – 2014.

¹⁵⁰ The appeal document is now named the Strategic Response Plan (SRP). The categories deemed most at risk include refugees in camps, herding and Bedouin communities in Area C, fishermen in Gaza, Gaza farmers working in the buffer zone next to the eastern border, IDPs and those at risk of displacement, West Bank farmers working land in the seam zones (the areas carved out of the West Bank by the separation wall). The geographical target areas include Area C, East Jerusalem, H2 in Hebron and the seam zones.

mapping methodology is being carried by OCHA in partnership with the PA and PCBS to fill information gaps.

The period 2008 through 2014 has thus been a period of transition and, to some extent, policy shifts within the humanitarian community and UNRWA itself.

5.1.3 *Brief description of the Dutch support to humanitarian aid*

Bilateral Dutch support to the humanitarian sector¹⁵¹ has focused primarily on food security, improved access to emergency health services, sanitation and shelter, protection, resilience building, and early recovery. The Humanitarian sector represents a 22.6% share of the overall portfolio valued at 43.55m Euros. Support was provided to six of the seven UNRWA Emergency Appeals (EA) for West Bank and Gaza over the period 2008 – 2014 covering food and cash for work assistance, emergency shelter, access to health and education services, protection, UXO education, and management support. Support was also provided to the Netherlands Red Cross (access to emergency health services), WFP (in-kind food assistance), Oxfam Novib (access to health services, home gardening, advocacy), Islamic Relief (food, resilience training for children), ICRC (medicine and blankets), PARC (local food redistribution from poor farmers), OCHA (ERF), UNICEF (emergency water and sanitation) and UMAS (UXO clearance and awareness).

The sample for evaluation comprised six UNRWA Emergency Appeals, whose main objectives over the period were preventing the deterioration of food security, ensuring access to basic needs and services, promoting and protecting refugee rights, and ensuring effective response implementation with relevant stakeholders. The sampled projects represented a 59.4% share of the overall humanitarian portfolio by value (€ 25.85 Million), and 33.3% of the total number of projects in the sector (18)¹⁵².

5.2 Relevance

5.2.1 *Relevance to the needs of the Palestinian people*

The emergency appeals were well aligned with the three Palestinian national plans of the evaluation period.¹⁵³ Earlier plans (2008-2010, 2011-2013) were more general in their depiction, giving priority in the short term to the provision of humanitarian relief through PA agencies and other national and international bodies. In the most recent plan (2014-2016), the Social Sector Strategy makes explicit reference to working with UNRWA and the necessary integration of development initiatives and humanitarian support.¹⁵⁴ Palestinian Civil society organisations recognise the essential and effective leading role that UNRWA plays in addressing the existing humanitarian needs, identifying the lack of assistance as a pressing protection issue.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵¹ The Netherlands also contributes to UNRWA and other multilateral organisations through its multilateral funding department; this support is out of the scope of the field study.

¹⁵² Overall ToR Evaluation Palestinian Territories 2008-2014, p. 17.

¹⁵³ Palestinian Reform and Development Plan 2008-2010; National Development Plan 2011-2013; National Development Plan 2014-2016.

¹⁵⁴ The 2014-2016 National Development Plan: From State Building to Sovereignty explains that "To ensure integrated, inclusive, sustainable and cost-effective service delivery, the government has promoted partnership with the private sector, local and international NGOs, and UN agencies including the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)." Page 60.

¹⁵⁵ In an August position paper, the PHRCO addressed the current UNRWA funding crisis directly, citing field research conducted with Palestinian refugees in the region by BADIL one of whose main findings was that "lack or absence of humanitarian assistance was identified as the most pressing protection gap, whilst 89% of refugees surveyed across the region (West Bank, Gaza, Jordan and Lebanon) stated that this gap had a significant impact on stability in the Middle East generally.", Palestinian Human Rights Organisations Council, "Position Paper on the Current Funding Crisis of UNRWA, International Responsibility and a Framework of Short and Long-term International Interventions Necessary for Maintaining the Functioning of UNRWA, and Ensuring Fundamental Rights of Palestine Refugees", August 2015.

UNRWA emergency appeal documents provide extensive context and conflict analysis, carefully distinguishing the situations in Gaza and the West Bank. The documents draw on key socio-economic data and trends produced by leading international and UN organisations including the World Bank, regular food security surveys carried out by a consortium comprising WFP, FAO, UNRWA and the PCBS¹⁵⁶ and data provided by their own Economic Monitoring Unit.¹⁵⁷

5.2.2 *Relevance to the intermediate goals*

Within the context of a final peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, the services that UNRWA provides will be handed over to the PA. The services that UNRWA currently provides, including emergency interventions, are being aligned with PA capacities and standards to ensure an efficient transition of responsibilities. UNRWA provides direct service, like a governmental authority, but through voluntary contributions rather than through taxation. The present scope of UNRWA services in Palestine is so extensive¹⁵⁸ that a semi-autonomous, parallel state structure has evolved to administer these services.¹⁵⁹ In this context, support to UNRWA clearly meets the intermediate goals of Dutch engagement in Palestine of contributing to political stability, supporting the development of a functioning Palestinian state.

Interviews with a broad range of humanitarian actors suggest that UNRWA's continuing delivery of emergency and humanitarian aid is critical in providing local stability which could be considered a precondition for longer term regional stability. It was abundantly apparent during the evaluation period, that the perceived or actual diminution of services is seen by refugees as a direct threat and creates immediate civil unrest within the camp communities.¹⁶⁰

Over the evaluation period, the reconceptualising of the design and implementation of the emergency appeal interventions have been an integral part of the organisational reform process being undertaken within UNRWA since 2005 to streamline its work across its basic services.¹⁶¹ In the new overall UNRWA strategic five year plan (2016-2020), projected humanitarian interventions are fully integrated into the overall social services plan, including indicators for monitoring allowing for better prioritisation between services.¹⁶² By mainstreaming its humanitarian response through its department of Relief and Social Services, UNRWA is replicating the current PA structure, enabling a smoother transition for the future. UNRWA is piloting revised modalities for more efficiently addressing food security needs of refugees outside the camps in the West Bank using e-

¹⁵⁶ WFP, FAO, UNRWA, PCBS, "Socio Economic and Food Security Surveys", 2011, 2012.

¹⁵⁷ This unit is based in the UNRWA Gaza Field Office and gathers and analyses data on the cost to UNRWA of the blockade, including additional staffing, transit and logistical costs resulting from Israeli security approval requirements. The unit also provides data on UNRWA's expenditure in Gaza as a share of Gaza's GDP, which was estimated at 18% in 2014.

¹⁵⁸ Registered refugees comprise 55% of the population of Palestine (47% in West Bank and 83% in Gaza). Of these, 19% live in camps (9% in the West Bank and 40% in Gaza). UNRWA provides basic services through a fully developed health, educational and social service infrastructure to refugees living in camps in Palestine. In addition, UNRWA provides emergency services to the most vulnerable refugees inside and outside of the camps, see UNRWA, "Emergency Appeal, 2012", context analysis. In the current Strategic Response Plan, which covers humanitarian needs of all Palestine, of the population targeted in Gaza of 1.3 million, 70% are refugees and of the population targeted in West Bank of 0.6 million, 38% are refugees. UNRWA anticipates providing food assistance to an estimated 900,000 refugees in need, UNOCHA, "2015 Strategic Response Plan OPT".

¹⁵⁹ UNRWA is the second largest employer in Palestine, with 16,006 local Palestinian staff (Gaza 11,731 and West Bank 4,275), UNRWA, "Emergency Appeal, 2012".

¹⁶⁰ See footnote 66 above.

¹⁶¹ The organisational reform process, driven by donors, consists in the development of a strategy and strategic framework which can guide all operational issues, resource management, decision making and other management issues. Dorain La Guardia, Alex Talmon-l'Armeé, Peter Slits, Helge Rieper, "Medium Term Strategy mid-term evaluation", UNRWA, 2013.

¹⁶² See UNRWA, "Medium Term Strategy", 2016 – 2020. UNRWA senior planning staff say that the roll out of this integrated planning approach is uneven across all 5 fields, but Gaza field has already (re)integrated emergency management within the Relief and Social Services department.

vouchers,¹⁶³ improving its targeting and referral system for both food assistance and job creation opportunities¹⁶⁴, and continuing to use the same poverty assessment mechanism piloted by the PA Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA). UNRWA's increasing alignment with the Humanitarian Country Team strategy, which mandates alignment with national development initiatives, has improved UNRWA's coordination with the PA through MoSA, but a more strategic policy dialogue is required to address issues of parity and consistency of social protection standards.¹⁶⁵

In the context of high and rising unemployment levels, particularly in Gaza,¹⁶⁶ food insecurity is driven by a lack of economic access to food. By addressing these needs for refugees who are highly vulnerable to extreme levels of poverty and deprivation, UNRWA helps to reduce coping strategies which result in the fragmentation of households and increasing psychological and social problems,¹⁶⁷ including reducing number of meals eaten per day, selling household assets, withdrawing children from school.

5.2.3 Consistency with the Dutch sector development policy

The effectiveness and impact of the implementation of UNRWA's emergency appeals show to a very large extent consistency with the Dutch development policy in the humanitarian aid sector. Over the evaluation period this policy has included addressing acute emergency needs and linking this support to prevention and rehabilitation of refugees, contextualising the aid provided in terms of Dutch diplomatic, defence and development requirements, increasing use of local capacity and more attention for disaster prevention, less duplication and more coordination, neutrality and free access to people affected by emergencies, greater accountability for results in line with international principles, and use of NGOs when the UN is not the suitable channel.

The emergency appeals have successfully addressed acute needs through addressing food, water, emergency health and shelter needs. For example, in 2011, Dutch funds covered the provision of cash grants to 2,390 Gazan households to repair houses damaged during the 2008-2009 war. In all emergency appeals of the review period, Dutch funds were used to support food security needs. In 2011 Dutch funds created 74,941 workdays, providing USD 420 to 2,823 workers and their 17,439 dependents.¹⁶⁸ In 2014, the Dutch support to emergency food assistance in Gaza totalled USD 1,973, 684 million covering the annual food needs of 3,916 households, including the 50 days when Gaza was in a continuous conflict situation. UNRWA is increasingly prioritising protection – building local capacity for resilience to reduce vulnerability to disasters, documentation of protection incidents, and providing rehabilitation support to refugees impacted. In 2014, Dutch funds totalling USD 5,008 662 contributed to the cash grants provided to Palestine refugee families (3,718

¹⁶³ UNRWA has piggy backed onto the well established WFP food security e-voucher programme in the West Bank, which provides targeted refugee households with \$10 per household head per month on a credit card, which is redeemed over the month at designated local shops for a range of food items. Transactions on the card are recorded electronically by the shopkeepers, money is transferred immediately to the shopkeepers bank account, and the card is topped up every month. Beneficiaries interviewed in the shops had high praise for the modality as it provides them flexibility in terms of when and what they purchase, but particularly it provides a measure of dignity and safety which food distributions cannot.

¹⁶⁴ For example, in Gaza GFO introduced a poverty-based prioritisation mechanism as of February 2012. This new mechanism builds on the same comprehensive PMTF system used for food assistance. A dynamic linkage between the food assistance eligibility database and the job creation programme recruitment systems was created. The introduction of poverty prioritisation into job creation programming proved successful: the percentage of poor among job creation programme workers increased from 20 per cent in 2011 to 80 per cent by the end of 2012, reaching 84 per cent among unskilled positions. UNRWA, "Field Implementation Plan Gaza 2014-2015".

¹⁶⁵ For example, the MoSA cash transfer through its social safety net programme is \$70 a month whereas UNRWA's is \$10 per household member per quarter. DFID, "DFID's support for Palestine Refugees through UNRWA", Independent Commission for Aid Impact, 2013 page 19.

¹⁶⁶ Unemployment rates stand at 32.% with real wages remaining severely depressed, UNRWA EA, 2014, page 3.

¹⁶⁷ For fuller description of coping strategies used, see DFID, "Improving Food security for the People of Gaza: Draft Report", Atos Consulting, 2015, page 52.

¹⁶⁸ UNRWA letter to Government of Netherlands reporting on 2009 Dutch contribution, 5 October, 2011

individuals) impacted by residential demolition and/or damages to their private property due to Israeli security forces operations.¹⁶⁹

UNRWA have used Dutch funds (USD 262,478 in 2012 or 10% of this line item) to support increased coordination activities and capacity development. The Agency is actively engaged in the OCHA-led humanitarian coordination efforts, feeding into most UN clusters¹⁷⁰, leading the Cash-for-Work sector in Gaza and the West Bank, and co-leading the Food subsector in Gaza. UNRWA is a member of the interagency consortium including WFP, FAO with the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics which is leading attempts to unify assessment methods and implementation in the field of food security through the annual production of socio economic and food security surveys.¹⁷¹ Other standard coordination activities included the Agency's involvement in the OCHA-led humanitarian cycle planning, contributing to the Strategic Response Plan led by OCHA which primarily focuses on addressing humanitarian needs in Gaza, Area C and East Jerusalem where the most vulnerable populations are located, and where the PA has very limited – or no - access. UNRWA works with the PA through MoSA and has access to MoSA's beneficiary lists.¹⁷² The Agency also works very closely with WFP in carrying out food security programmes in both the West Bank and Gaza field, providing the logistical support for WFP food distributions in the West Bank.

UNRWA carries out regular and systematic neutrality inspections on all its facilities. In 2014 for example, 1,049 neutrality inspections of UNRWA's 247 operating installations in the West Bank were undertaken during the year with 19 incidents relating to neutrality reported.¹⁷³ No major misuse of installations was reported. In Gaza, three incidents were reported of guns on UNRWA property, but occurred in schools that were closed for the summer. UNRWA immediately condemned the incidents. As part of the organisational reform program, the Agency has developed and rolled out a results-based monitoring framework for the emergency appeals, whereby emergency activities are now monitored and reported against a set of indicators tracked quarterly, semi-annually, or annually. For the past two years, UNRWA has reported emergency-related activity results against output indicators.¹⁷⁴ In 2012 UNRWA started actively engaging in a process of emergency preparedness, both through a review and in the improvement of its internal capacity to respond to emergencies, and by participating in coordination work and simulation exercises together with national authorities and regional organisations. As a result, field specific Risk Registers outlining the main hazards, risks and vulnerabilities it could likely face have been

¹⁶⁹ Out of the above referenced 662 families, 87 families (482 individuals) displaced as a result of the demolitions of residential structures in West Bank including East Jerusalem, received emergency cash assistance. This included 31 families that received rental subsidies and in some cases also cash assistance to cover personal belongings, comprising of 20 families residing in East Jerusalem and 11 in other areas of the West Bank. Another 56 families (331 individuals) received cash assistance to cover personal belongings lost or damaged due to demolitions or evictions; this covered personal needs such as food, water, clothing and heating. The remaining 575 Palestine refugee families (3,236 individuals) received cash assistance to cover repairs to their private properties (such as broken doors, windows and water tanks) incurred by the ISF during military or law enforcement operations. This crisis intervention support was provided in close coordination with the Shelter Cluster and was reported on through the inter-agency demolition response system. UNRWA, "Emergency Appeal Report, 2014".

¹⁷⁰ Thematic coordination groups – or clusters – bring together all stakeholders working in the defined area of expertise to harmonise the humanitarian response. Clusters include, Water and Sanitation, Education, Health, Shelter, Food Security, Protection.

¹⁷¹ Two surveys have been produced, one for 2011 and one for 2012. See WFP, FAO, UNRWA, PCBS, "Social and Economic Food Security Survey", 2011, 2012.

¹⁷² Because of the scope of humanitarian assistance and the large number of humanitarian actors involved, opportunities exist for end beneficiaries to benefit from multiple humanitarian interventions responding to the same need. The food security assistance component of the emergency appeal assistance is only delivered after cross checking of MoSA's beneficiary list. However, MoSA has indicated that UNRWA do not share its beneficiary lists with them, increasing the possibilities of double dipping, interview with MoSA staff.

¹⁷³ Occasional graffiti and other items on external walls and isolated instances of inappropriate posters or graffiti inside installations were found. In some of the installations close to affected areas after the summer hostilities, a greater number of politically motivated stickers and some posters were found on outside walls. All such instances were addressed immediately by the Agency. UNRWA, "Emergency Appeal Report, 2014", page 20.

¹⁷⁴ See UNRWA, "Emergency Appeal Report for the OPT, 2013", 2014.

prepared and Action Plans elaborated for all core support departments outlining a number of key preparedness actions that need to be achieved in the short to medium term.

The Netherlands have consistently chosen to support UNRWA through the emergency appeals in preference to other humanitarian actors. Out of the total humanitarian funds provided to the Palestinian Territories through bilateral channels over the review period, of € 43.55 Million, a total of € 25.85 Million (59.4%) has been channelled through UNRWA.¹⁷⁵

5.2.4 Adequacy of project deployed activities to the solution of the identified problems in the sector

UNRWA's emergency appeals over the period have – to a large extent – deployed approaches based on humanitarian good practice that were found to be appropriate to address the needs and problems identified in the sector. Over the period of review, emergency appeal implementation approaches and activities have been to some extent modified based on a growing understanding of best practice in humanitarian assistance. As part of the agency's organisational reform process – and strongly encouraged by key donors¹⁷⁶ - UNRWA began to shift to greater needs-based targeting in 2008¹⁷⁷ to improve the impact of its poverty and food insecurity reduction strategy, which is by far the largest component of EA interventions. While coverage is wide, the impact on poverty reduction and food security is limited because of the small amounts of food and or cash provided.¹⁷⁸ This point will be further elaborated below under effectiveness. The increasing importance of the protection component over the review period is particularly relevant to the context, which is conceptualised as a protection crisis with humanitarian consequence. Support to temporary shelter in Gaza has been critical in the aftermath of the three major wars. The increasingly coordinated approach to management with all relevant stakeholders reduces duplication of efforts, which, in the context of the contraction of funding is particularly important.

5.3 Effectiveness

5.3.1 Delivery of project activities and outputs

According to UNRWA, the outputs and activities delivered directly correspond to the level of available funds.¹⁷⁹ All activities funded under the EAs under review have been completed. For reasons of time, logistics and security¹⁸⁰ we focused our field work and review on the food security component (Food/Cash assistance and Cash for Work [CfW]) component of the projects, which received the majority (84%) of Dutch assistance. A review of all reports, data and recent independent evaluations of both CfW and e-voucher programs in Gaza triangulated with beneficiary and participating shop keeper interviews, and focus groups in the West Bank provide adequate evidence that outputs reported are reasonably stated.¹⁸¹ UNRWA staff explained that the funding

¹⁷⁵ Overall ToR Evaluation Palestinian Territories 2008-2014, p. 27.

¹⁷⁶ In 2009, the EC published an evaluation of its long standing partnership with UNRWA in which recognised UNRWA's positive shift to needs-based rather than status-based targeting. A targeting reform was completed in Gaza. In the West Bank progress was much slower due to a great number of difficulties including strikes in the camps: Francois Grunewald, Veronique de Geoffroy, "Evaluation of the DG Echo partnership with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian refugees in the Near East", Groupe URD for the European Commission, 2009.

¹⁷⁷ Targeting is done through a mathematically sophisticated proxy means testing system (PMTS). This system was developed by the MoSA in collaboration with the World Bank and is now used by UNRWA and the WFP. When the Palestinian National Cash Transfer Programme (PNCTP) was launched in June 2011, coordination in the area of social assistance was strengthened between MoSA, WFP and UNRWA, who rely on the PNCTP database for beneficiary identification.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid, foot note 82, page 19. and interview with DFID.

¹⁷⁹ Interview with UNRWA staff.

¹⁸⁰ See foot note 66, above.

¹⁸¹ For example, one shopkeeper interviewed, who has been 5 years with the WFP program, reported that 60% of his profits come from the e-voucher program. Over the 5 years he has been able to double the area of his shop, comfortably feed his

shortfalls - that have been experienced for every EA under review - required UNRWA to contract their prioritised interventions in both depth and scope against the results originally planned, but food security remained the top strategic priority throughout. Figures for 2011 show, for example, that even though only 40% of overall funding requirements were met, food assistance still accounted for 45% of expenditure.

5.3.2 *Achievements of project expected outcomes and results*

UNRWA's emergency appeal activities have multiple objectives, two of which have been met to a large extent (effective and coordinated response; promoting and protecting refugee rights) and one (mitigating the deterioration of food security) only partially. The UNRWA has a robust monitoring capacity but a still very limited evaluation capability, relying on external sources of data¹⁸² to assess its outcomes. The strategic objectives of the emergency appeal reports are quite operational and, not well aligned to the outcomes stated in the emergency appeals themselves. As a result, the criteria of progress towards meeting the objectives are not clearly articulated and no baseline against which to measure progress has been developed. Nonetheless, evidence from independent evaluations and field-based interviews show that while the objectives of better stakeholder coordination have, to a large extent, been achieved, the mitigation of food insecurity among the refugee population has been achieved to only a partial extent.

The e-voucher strategy,¹⁸³ piloted on a limited scale in the West Bank since April 2014, has improved the food security of households targeted by ensuring a minimum input of dairy products and protein into the household diet.¹⁸⁴ The secondary effects of this approach in terms of the knock on effects in the local economy are also striking, with agricultural food processing and retail sectors reporting increases in sales, enabling an expansion of production and workforce.¹⁸⁵ However, evidence from field observations and focus groups suggests that, in contrast, CfW interventions do not impact levels of household poverty or food security in any meaningful sense. Although the programme targets the poor, the level of remuneration is too low and too infrequent to make a sustained difference.¹⁸⁶ In addition, CfW opportunities in the camps frequently target jobs that are already part of UNRWA's routine services, such as sanitation work, suggesting that another objective of the programme is to supplement UNRWA staffing cheaply. The rather poor showing of the CfW programme in addressing food insecurity may be largely to do with its inadequate design, which at present includes multiple objectives with no strategy for creating longer term employment. Nevertheless, several female beneficiaries explained that their CfW placement at the UNRWA

six children and cover the fees of his wife to complete her education. Thirty-nine (22%) of his e-voucher clients are from UNRWA.

¹⁸² WFP, FAO, UNRWA, PCBS, "Social and Economic Food Security Survey", 2011,2012.

¹⁸³ The e-voucher operates in the same way as a credit card and is topped up every month to the limit of the beneficiaries allowance for the purchase of a limited list of nutritious food items (dairy products, pasta, tinned fish etc) which are all locally produced. The e-voucher imitates the shape and material of a credit card and is entered into the electronic data capture (ECD) machine by the shopkeeper in the same way that a credit card is used. The value and type of food is immediately captured and the money is transferred directly into the bank account of the shopkeeper from a central FAO fund. The dignity of beneficiaries is maintained, the local economy benefits, the beneficiary families are guaranteed a certain amount of fresh and high protein food, and the administration costs are very low.

¹⁸⁴ A total of 90.6% of households targeted by the E-voucher programme in Gaza moved up to a better Food Consumption Status category according to an analysis of WFP survey data presented in the draft final report of the 2015 independent evaluation of DFID's Food Security program:DFID, "Improving Food Security for the People of Gaza", ACTOS Consulting, 2015 which compared the outcomes of the WFP e voucher programme and the UNRWA CfW programme in Gaza on levels of food insecurity. The report, dated June 15, 2015, is still being finalised but DFID say that the main findings are unlikely to change substantially.

¹⁸⁵ See DFID, "Improving Food Security for the People of Gaza: Independent Evaluation", Atos Consulting,2015.

¹⁸⁶ Female beneficiaries of the CfW programme reported that while they spent some of the money on food, most of it was used for education, transport costs and savings for unexpected expenditures. The "salary" of NIS 1,000 per month for a maximum of 3 months per year is quite some way below the official poverty line of NIS 1,450.

Women Centre had given them the skills necessary to generate income from home doing dressmaking and food preparation.¹⁸⁷

It is more difficult to assess the outcomes of the EA protection component without having an initial baseline. Programmatic responses to external protection threats include increasing beneficiary resilience, mitigating the consequences through cash and in-kind transfers, referrals to health and legal services, and public advocacy.¹⁸⁸ UNRWA has completed an internal compliance review of its own protection standards in service delivery for benchmarking purposes.¹⁸⁹

5.3.3 Contribution towards sector strategic goals

UNRWA's emergency services to a very large extent contribute towards achieving the strategic goals for the sector. UNRWA has saved refugees from hardship and privation and helped to reduce permanent damage to the Palestinian social and economic fabric. Furthermore, through the organisational reform process, UNRWA is becoming a more effective and efficient needs-based service provider, and is becoming better prepared for a future handover of responsibilities to the PA.

Refugees as a group suffer higher rates of poverty, food insecurity and unemployment than the Palestinian people as a whole¹⁹⁰ and data shows that food insecurity levels are rising. UNRWA targets the category of "abject poor"¹⁹¹ (living on less than \$1.6/day and unable to meet basic food needs) through its social safety net program, which is significantly underfunded. As a result, greater numbers of abject poor are now being targeted by the EA. During periodic crises (war, floods, loss of shelter, house demolition etc.), these refugees become effectively destitute, requiring UNRWA to re-allocate funds for their care. The organisational reform process, by refocusing and simplifying strategic objectives and institutionalising emergency planning within UNRWA's core program, is enabling UNRWA to better clarify its vision and develop unambiguous priorities.

5.3.4 Unintended effects

UNRWA's emergency assistance activities had several unanticipated positive outcomes. One of most striking unexpected positive effects of the project was the empowering effects on women involved in the CfW program, which developed social networks, gained self-confidence, skills, and achieved a measure of financial independence. The confidence gained has enabled some women to develop home-based strategies to generate small amounts of income.¹⁹²

Further, the e-vouchers and cash transfers are spent by the recipients on purchases of goods and services (including dairy products and eggs) from the local economy, generating additional levels of aggregate demand and thus economic opportunities for suppliers of these goods and services¹⁹³

¹⁸⁷ Interviews with female beneficiaries, Arroub Camp.

¹⁸⁸ This is sometime coordinated with the HCT Advocacy Team led by OCHA, interview with UNRWA Protection Consultant.

¹⁸⁹ The report and a 'mobilisation survey' in which actions taken and results achieved were requested but not have no been received at the time of writing.

¹⁹⁰ In 2014, for example, unemployment rates among refugees was 30.61% compared to 26.25% for non refugees; figures for food security – 52% for refugees, 49 for non-refugees; poverty levels – abject poverty (living on less than \$1.6/day) 13.1% for refugees and 6.6% for non-refugees.

¹⁹¹ UNRWA classifies refugees into 3 categories of food security as part of its poverty targeting strategy: the food secure who live with more than US\$ 3.75 per day, the "Absolute Poor" – vulnerable to food insecurity – living with between US\$ 1.75 and US\$ 3.75 per day, and the "Abject Poor" who are food insecure living on less than US\$ 1.75 per day, UNRWA West Bank, "Field Implementation Plan 2012-2013", page 5.

¹⁹² Interviews with women CfW beneficiaries in Ein El Sultan camp, Jericho.

¹⁹³ WFP report that monthly sales of participating dairy producers have tripled since the start of the programme – a 207% increase against only 64% for non-participating dairy producers. In addition an average of 18.6 new jobs have been created per participating dairy processor., see DFID, Improving Food Security for the People of Gaza: Independent Evaluation, Atos Consulting, 2015.

and additional tax revenue¹⁹⁴. In addition, food aid recipients are able to use household income saved for other types of essential expenditures in the local economy. It also could be argued that by engaging in direct and continual negotiations with the Israeli authorities on movement and access restrictions, UNRWA – to the extent that these are successful – helps to mitigate these for Palestinian economic actors.

Nonetheless, the protracted nature of the humanitarian crisis is continuing to create a significant dependency of refugees on UNRWA services. By way of illustration, the waiting list for job creation posts in UNRWA Gaza among women has increased by more than 40% between March 2013 and March 2015 and there is no UNRWA data which shows that longer term job opportunities have been created for beneficiaries as a result.¹⁹⁵

5.3.5 *Fiduciary mechanisms*

Risk management strategies are developed for all UNRWA's programmes at the level of each Field Office. There is no evidence of a separate risk management strategy for emergency appeals. However, regular monitoring of beneficiary lists and on-site observation in participating e-voucher shops is carried out, which was observed during the team's field visits. Similar monitoring and spot checks are carried out in the CfW with monitors being rotated across camps, supervised by area UNRWA officers.

Other evidence of fiduciary risk management was gleaned from independent evaluations over the period including that commissioned by the EC (2009) and those commissioned by DFID (2013), (2015).¹⁹⁶ The on-going management and organisational reform process has enabled new financial systems to be progressively designed and implemented which permit strategic needs-based resource allocations.¹⁹⁷ Recent financial tracking case studies have shown that fiduciary risks are low, suggesting good levels of efficiency and cost management.¹⁹⁸ A recent Assurance Review commissioned by the DFID Internal Audit Department established that the controls over the e voucher programme are sufficiently robust to provide reasonable assurance over the risk of fraud.¹⁹⁹

Budgeting has been made more transparent by the recent (2013) introduction of Activity Based Costing and monthly reporting on the financial situation with internal audits executed by the Department of Internal Oversight (DIOS). The UN Board of Auditors 2013 UNRWA audit was positive but with room for improvement in internal control, treasury, asset management and procurement and urges a better anti-corruption policy. UNRWA's internal controls were deemed satisfactory according to the EU Pillar Assessment (December 2014). UNRWA also has an Ethics Office which has recently been extended, which has led to more complaints being handled in the past years globally and at the level of the field, where complaints boxes and mechanisms have been developed to report perceived inequity in targeting.

¹⁹⁴ Ibidem. WFP estimated that for every dollar redeemed by beneficiaries at the retail level, and estimated 4.9 cents of additional VAT revenue is generated from the PA.

¹⁹⁵ Ibidem.

¹⁹⁶ Francois Grunewald, Veronique de Geoffroy, "Evaluation of the DG ECHO Partnership with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East", EC, 2009; DFID, "DFID's Evaluation of DFID's Support for Palestine Refugees through UNRWA", Independent Commission for Aid Impact, 2013; DFID, "Improving Food Security for the People of Gaza: Independent Evaluation", Atos Consulting, 2015

¹⁹⁷ Francois Grunewald, Veronique de Geoffroy "Evaluation of the DG ECHO/UNRWA partnership", January 2009, page 40.

¹⁹⁸ DFID, "Evaluation of DFID's Support for Palestine Refugees through UNRWA", Independent Commission for Aid Impact 2013, page 14

¹⁹⁹ DFID, "Internal Audit Department, 2015, Assurance Review of the WFP Voucher Programme", Report 27-15, Draft, 15 January, referenced in the final draft report of ; DFID, "Improving Food Security for the People of Gaza: Independent Evaluation", Atos Consulting, 2015

5.3.6 Explanatory factors

The major factor negatively impacting the success of the emergency appeal activities is the continuing deterioration in Palestinian economic performance resulting from the blockade of Gaza and the movement and access restrictions across the West Bank. The extensive geographical and sectorial scope of UNRWA's EA project increases its vulnerabilities in regard to the movement and access of goods and staff into and out of Gaza and across the West Bank increasing transaction costs.²⁰⁰ The transitional shelter cash assistance, part of which the Dutch contribution covers, is a result of the security delays associated with getting construction materials into Gaza through the Karem Abu Salem crossing.²⁰¹

Persistent public advocacy by humanitarian and development actors has had no sustained impact on the situation, including the efforts of UNRWA. The other major negative factor impacting EA success linked to occupation policies is the parallel expansion of settlements and house demolitions of refugee communities in Area C and East Jerusalem, creating increasing numbers of displaced and forcibly relocated families. The emergency appeal programme responds by meeting immediate needs for shelter and food, rehabilitation/reintegration packages when new shelter is found, and emergency counselling for the traumatised families.

The PA has facilitated to the extent possible the work of the project by sharing beneficiary lists and targeting methods. Because of the PA's fragmented access to Area C, East Jerusalem and the Seam Zone in the West Bank, UNRWA - in collaboration with the WFP-targets these areas, delivering food assistance to the refugee Bedouin and herding communities in Area C and refugee farmers in the seam zone.

5.3.7 Sustainability

The EA components and activities by reasons of their humanitarian intent are not designed to be sustainable. The lack of impact in terms of meeting food security and poverty alleviation objectives have more to do with changing conditions which give rise to these phenomena rather than to the technical approaches adopted, although evidence suggests that some improvements can be made in the area of targeting and project design. The emergency-related activities – as with all UNRWA programs – suffer from a fragile funding situation which impairs the Agency's ability to more strategically invest in the on-going management and organisational reform effort which would be able to improve its response. Nonetheless, as cooperation with the PA and other key humanitarian actors improves, additional and longer term sustainability could result.

5.4 Role of the Netherlands and coherence

5.4.1 Donor coordination and coherence of donor approaches

NRO's contribution to the success of the emergency appeal activities was somewhat limited both in terms of negotiating with UNRWA, engaging in policy dialogue and donor coordination. Donors and humanitarian agencies interviewed felt that, on balance, the Netherlands are overall not very engaged with UNRWA both at the level of policy dialogue and at the local level despite their position among the top 10 donors to successive emergency appeals. The Netherlands have, however, displayed a "reasonable interest" in the bi-annual Ad Com meetings and are

²⁰⁰ Data provided by UNRWA show a total of 2,662 access incidents affecting 27,462 staff persons over the evaluation period resulting in the loss of 3,856 working days (29,129 hours).

²⁰¹ UNRWA estimates that for 2013 and 2014 alone, a total of US\$14.2 of additional staff, transit and logistical costs resulting from Israeli security approval requirements on access and monitoring of construction material, food and non-food items imported through Karem Abu Salem, "Economic Analysis", UNRWA Gaza Field Office, 2015.

characterised as being a helpful member of the humanitarian donor community through their “neutrality and balance” . The Dutch have, moreover, organised bilateral meetings of their auditors with UNRWA on how to improve fiduciary risks and provide answers to questions if asked by the Foreign Ministry. UNRWA staff said that during the 2014 hostilities, the NRO was in touch “on a daily basis” to monitor developments.

In respect to donor coordination, the Netherlands only attended the meetings of the LACs Humanitarian Task Force (HTF), which was established in 2009 to better coordinate donor humanitarian and development responses with the PA, very infrequently over the evaluation period. The Netherlands despite being a global member of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Group globally (GHDG) is not a member of the GHDG in Palestine, launched in 2009 to discuss more strategic humanitarian issues. We did not find any evidence of bilateral economic diplomacy or policy dialogue towards the PA or Israel and Dutch input into the HCT advocacy group is not visible. As noted above, the Netherlands does not yet participate in the LACs humanitarian/development coordination mechanism. Although donors are not involved in the HCT response coordination mechanism (the clusters), when most active donors are invited on an ad hoc basis, the Dutch are not prioritised.²⁰²

Donors feel that there is a good general donor consensus – independent of any changes on the political front - on the essential need to support UNRWA. This is illustrated by the consistency of which the same donors repeatedly support both emergency appeal activities and the general fund.²⁰³ All donors interviewed spoke of the essential role of UNRWA in contributing to local and regional security.

5.4.2 *Internal coherence of Dutch Policy*

There is growing coherence between Dutch humanitarian and human rights policy at the sector level as the HCT humanitarian policy is now clearly framed as a protection crisis with humanitarian consequences. An interesting connection exists between some of the human rights NGOs funded by the HR/GG secretariat and UNRWA's advocacy efforts. Bimkom, for instance has worked with UNRWA to produce a report on the discriminatory planning issues in Area C in relation to forced displacement of the refugee communities in Area C. This could be an area of useful cooperation in order to promote longer term peace prospects.

5.4.3 *Gender Mainstreaming*

According to UNRWA documents, gender equality is an element across all UNRWA programmes. UNRWA introduced a policy on gender equality in 2007.²⁰⁴ UNRWA has established gender taskforces to implement this strategy through Gender Action Plans, who report up twice every year. Sex aggregated data is presented in EA appeals and reports. A commendable effort has been made with gender in the CfW component of the EA. In Gaza, CfW opportunities have increasingly privileged women with direct female beneficiaries growing from 17% in 2012 to 25% in 2014. In the West Bank, the percentage of direct female beneficiaries is even higher at between 30% - 35% over the same period. While cultural and social factors limit the number of positions open to women, UNRWA is actively working to close this gap by expanding the range of jobs available to women.

²⁰² Interviews with OCHA staff.

²⁰³ See Financial Tracking Services: Tracking Global Humanitarian Aid Flows, <http://fts.unocha.org>.

²⁰⁴ Implementation of Strategy on Gender Mainstreaming with the United Nations System: Repository of policies, strategies and action plans within the UN system, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/repository/UN_system_GE_chart.pdf updated 5 January 2012.

5.5 Conclusions and recommendations

The major strength of Dutch support to the humanitarian sector is the consistently high levels of funding both to UNRWA core services, the EA and other humanitarian actors. The Netherlands has been in the top 10 donors to EA for five of the six years of the period under review, and in the top 10 donors to UNRWA overall over the same period. Within EU rankings, the Netherlands has been in the top 20 donors to the EU support for UNRWA in the period 2000 to 2014 and in the top 10 for 4 of the years under review (2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012). Donors feel that the Netherlands is a helpful member of the humanitarian community, providing some balance to policy dialogue based on their neutrality.

The major weakness is seen to be the unbalanced link between the Netherlands position of relatively strong financial contribution in relation to its current levels of engagement and influence in the sector. The Netherlands, for example, despite being a member of the GHDG at global level is not member of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Group²⁰⁵ established in 2009 chaired by ECHO and Sweden where humanitarian issues, such as the role of evaluations, design of humanitarian interventions, and the promotion of common implementation standards are discussed.

The following recommendations are made regarding the continuation of support in the sector:

- The Netherlands should consider making multi-year financial commitments to UNRWA which would enable the agency to make more strategic investments in support of greater programme efficiencies and longer term approaches to poverty alleviation and food security strategies.
- The Netherlands should engage more actively with like-minded donors on humanitarian issues through the GHDG to better inform its humanitarian programming response.
- The Netherlands should engage with like-minded donors using its position as a medium-sized UNRWA donor to leverage influence where useful in policy dialogue with UNRWA and public advocacy within the EU framework and the HCT framework. For example, one aspect to be highlighted would be to stimulate UNRWA to start a sustained policy dialogue with the PA at the highest levels so that standardisation of assistance packages and approaches can be facilitated. Another aspect would be improved targeting using evidence-based findings from independent evaluations.
- As the UN General Assembly continues to reiterate, in the absence of an international political solution to the situation of Palestine refugees after over six decades, UNRWA's provision of services will remain essential for the well-being, human development and protection of the refugees. UNRWA and its humanitarian partners have been involved in emergency appeals in the OPT since 2003. Almost 10 years later, none of the political root causes of the humanitarian situation have been addressed and as a result, tackling humanitarian needs remains important. This implies the need of continuing the support.

²⁰⁵ The GHDG group is co-chaired by ECHO and Sweden and includes DFID and Switzerland.

6 Conclusions

6.1 Introduction

The evaluation of the projects in the sectors of economic reconstruction, governance, human rights and humanitarian aids was based on a large sample of projects including 62% of the overall Dutch bilateral development portfolio in the Palestinian Territories in all the funding sectors. This provides sufficiently robust evidence to make a number of general considerations on the programme in response to the first and final central question for the field study: *“To what extent has the programme of economic reconstruction, governance, budget support, human rights and humanitarian aid in the Palestinian Territories in the period from 2008 until mid-2014 been relevant, effective, sustainable and coherent in terms of contributions to the development of a viable Palestinian economy, a functioning Palestinian state, the improvement of the human rights situation of the Palestinian population and the relief of needs of the Palestinian refugees?”*.

6.2 Relevance

The Dutch development programme was well focused on a limited number of sectors. There was a good balance between looking for an own added value and cooperating with international efforts through donor consortia and pooled funding (e.g. PEGASE, UNRWA, HR/GG and ICHR).

The Dutch funded projects were generally aligned to the PNDP although in practice the PA was not always involved to a great extent, especially in agricultural projects. The interventions responded to pressing needs of the Palestinian population, especially in the humanitarian and human rights sectors, but also in the economic, justice and security sectors.

There were a few projects that did not seem to be based on a clear strategy but seemed to respond more to a political logic and did not evolve in more strategic development support. This is the case with the MDLF funded projects that were supported for purposes of quick political stabilisation.

The choice of certain specific activities and outputs within the projects was sometimes not clearly justified and rather demand-driven (e.g. PCP, MDLF). This was more often the case with infrastructural interventions. Contextual understanding was not always thoroughly elaborated in these projects, while it was normally present in other projects.

The intention to contribute to the intermediate goals was clearer in projects of the economic reconstruction and governance sectors (focus on justice and security system). However the PA was never a partner of choice and funding went also to organisations that besides watchdogs are also competitors to the PA for funding (e.g. human rights sector). This was based on a realistic assessment of the capacities in place, but also has implications for the achievement of the intermediate goal of a functioning state. There was however a constant attention to alignment and occasions to feed into PA planning processes, for instance by contributing to the development of sector strategies, were never missed.

6.3 Effectiveness

The activities and outputs were delivered in the vast majority of cases. Some changes were made to implementation schedules due to the Gaza wars; and some delays were generated in projects in the security sector principally because of the slow cooperation of Israeli authorities.

The expected outcomes were not always clearly defined at the beginning of the projects and the donors only pushed for result frameworks towards the second part of the evaluation period. As a result, the information collected to gauge indicators set within these results frameworks does not always allow to clearly grasp progress over the whole evaluation period.

Based on the available evidence, the expected outcomes were achieved to a variable extent within the selected projects.

The achievement of sector strategic goals was limited despite the efforts put in. The objective of preventing and reducing damage from the conflict received greater contributions than the more ambitious development-related objectives. For instance, the land development programs contributed to prevent permanent damage to the agro-economic sector structure of Gaza and West Bank and to keep people on their land; the export opportunities were preserved and (in small part) resumed in Gaza after the blockade since 2007 but not expanded as it was the ambition.

Likewise, the municipalities in the Gaza strip could continue to exist also thanks to the MDLF funded quick impact interventions, and the support to UNRWA helped to reduce permanent damage to the Palestinian social and economic fabric by saving refugees from deprivation and hardship.

Moreover, the Dutch-funded projects contributed to obtain some progress in building capacity and systems. For instance, the know-how and skills of the farmers and agronomists were enhanced and higher standards were established for producing agricultural crops that are marketable internationally and gain more acceptance by the Palestinian consumers. The capabilities of the Palestinian civil police were increased both in terms of equipment and in terms of knowledge and skills. The use of ICT was fostered both in the justice sector through the MIZAN II database and in the Police via the radio station and the operational database. The Strategic planning was strengthened across all supported sectors, as testified by the production of strategy documents (agriculture, justice, security) and by the establishment of strategic planning units (e.g. in the justice institutions). The human rights sector, including NGOs, was consolidated and is now better able to absorb and manage funding. To some extent, UNRWA has become a more effective and efficient needs-based service provider to Palestinian refugees and is prepared for a future handover of responsibilities to the PA.

Some progress was also made in the direction of accountability of the justice and the security systems. The judicial institutions and the police have established complaint systems. After years of investments and support, the public perception of the police is overall good. There is also some evidence that Palestinians do believe in justice institutions, although they still resort to a large extent to informal justice to obtain quicker outcomes. Some notions of respect of women's and child rights have been instilled in the police that have been supported in setting up family protection and juvenile justice units. However, the compliance with human rights is still far from satisfactory, according to both the Independent Commission on Human Rights and NGOs.

Overall, it can be concluded that the Netherlands contributed to build an important piece of Palestinian State: a functional and, to some extent, accountable justice and security system, including the presence of watchdogs such as an independent human rights institution and an active civil society. The system is not yet working perfectly and operates in a challenging institutional context, but it is recognised by stakeholders and other donors that such a system did not exist until few years ago and materialised thanks to the continued support that was also partly provided and coordinated by the Netherlands.

The available evidence does not allow to conclude that the Netherlands made a substantial contribution to building a viable Palestinian economy. The viability of a Palestinian economy depends in large part by the fulfilment of conditions such as geographical contiguity, territorial sovereignty over land and resources (including Area C), capable transport infrastructures, unrestricted movement of goods and labour between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and between the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the outside world, and ultimately peace and security as a precondition for long-term investments. As long as these conditions are not met the goal of a viable economy remains far. However, the Dutch support to economic reconstruction helped preserve the further deterioration of the socioeconomic fabric in specific areas (especially in the West Bank) and build skills and systems. As such, Dutch economic development interventions represented a honest effort to contribute to the end goal, not shying away from risks and responsibilities and putting at stake the country's image for that.

It can also be confirmed that the Dutch development cooperation contributed together with other donor interventions to preserve a certain degree of stability in the Palestinian Territories. By supporting UNRWA, providing budget to partly pay the Palestinian Authority's wage bill, and funding a number of land reclamation and infrastructural interventions, it helped keep the Palestinian authority in place and the Palestinian people on their land; although this did not remove the threats to stability represented by the continued settlement expansion on the Palestinian Territories and the increasing Gaza-West Bank divide – issues still requiring decisive interventions by the international community and the parts in conflict.

The Netherlands chose implementing partners that were reliable in terms of capacity to put in place sound financial practices. Most interventions were executed by international organisations having clear policies in this respect. The strategic bilateral national partner, PARC, was assessed prior to allocation of funding regarding its audit and control systems and strictly monitored. The Netherlands provides its sole support to the PA through the PEGASE mechanism, which is well tested and includes a multiple layer of audits and controls.

6.4 Sustainability

None of the interventions supported by the Netherlands can be considered sustainable in the sense of having its results continuing without donor funding. The Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian economy are heavily donor-dependent and donor funding mitigates the restrictions imposed by Israel and that alter the conditions for a "normal" development trajectory.

Having said that, there were projects that showed greater elements of sustainability in terms of ownership by Palestinian organisations. These were, for example, the Access to Justice and Strengthening the Rule of Law with regards to the legal aid component performed by NGOs, especially in Gaza; and in part in relation to the incorporation in the Ministry of Justice permanent staff of some of the advisor hired under the project. Also the NGOs and cooperatives participating in the agricultural projects showed engagement and ownership, although this decreased in the most recent development of the programme.

On the other hand, a number of unsustainability factors still derive from the two major binding constraints of any development intervention in the Palestinian territories: the Israeli occupation and the internal divisions on the Palestinian side.

The wars and the continuing blockade in Gaza generate uncertainty and do not encourage long-term thoughts and investments by the already psychologically exhausted and materially deprived inhabitants of the Strip. The always present possibility of land and equipment confiscation, stopping orders, demolitions is per se a threat for the sustainability of all projects in area C. The restrictions to trade between Gaza and West Bank as well as the Israeli gatekeeping role for export from the Palestinian Territories to the rest of the world challenge the sustainability of any achievement in the internationalisation of the Palestinian economy.

The internal Palestinian divisions, on the other hand, contribute to the stalemate in the process of building up an integrated justice system across Gaza and the West Bank. They also play a role in relaying activities within particular ministries. The intra-Palestinian conflict has also been found responsible of regress in the human security compliance by security agencies.

The Dutch programme had an attitude towards these constraints that can be characterised as risk taking accompanied by reasonable risk analyses and sufficient follow-up at the technical level by NRO to reduce damage. However on certain issues (e.g. dispute between justice system institutions, containerisation of agricultural export) the more high level obstacles from both the Israeli and the Palestinian side could not be overcome. Relying on the ability of technical solutions to overcome political problems and on the good will of the two parties helped in certain cases but proved insufficient to prevent lack of results or stalemate in other cases.

6.5 Coherence

The Netherlands used in a coherent manner policy dialogue, humanitarian support and development funding. There were interventions by ministers and ambassadors in support of the funded projects when these required political steps. There were several examples of Dutch-led policy dialogue with the PA in the Justice Sector working group and bilaterally in the agricultural sector. There was not a very intensive participation of the Netherlands in donor activity related to humanitarian support, and this represents a missed opportunity to strengthen coherence between relief, recovery and development efforts and to address the key role of UNRWA. Within development interventions, there was coherence for instance in earmarking budget support to the justice sector which also represents a focus of the Dutch-funded projects; this provides leverage in negotiating reforms of the sector with the PA. There were also efforts to link together the justice and security system interventions; even if more could have been done to bring issues related to human rights in the Justice Sector Working Group where key duty bearers, the rule of law institutions, are supported.

Annex 1 – Evaluation matrix of the field study

Table 2 Evaluation matrix field study

Criterion	Sub question	Indicators	Means of verification
Relevance	To what extent were the projects in the economic reconstruction sector consistent with the Dutch sector development policy?	<p>The projects address one or more of the following four pillars: increased sustainable agricultural production, access to better nutrition, more efficient markets and a better business climate.</p> <p>Use of the bilateral channel</p> <p>Public-private cooperation</p> <p>Use of Dutch knowledge and expertise.</p> <p>Presence of innovation elements</p> <p>Presence of measures for the creation of a favourable business environment</p> <p>Economic diplomacy used to create preconditions</p>	<p>Desk research</p> <p>Project documents: proposals, fiches</p> <p>Interviews with:</p> <p>NRO and Ministry of Foreign Affairs</p> <p>Representatives of key ministries</p> <p>Independent experts/civil society organisations</p> <p>Implementing partners</p>
	To what extent were the projects in the governance sector (including targeted budget support) consistent with the Dutch sector development policy?	<p>The projects reflect the following policy elements:</p> <p>Attention to democratisation and good governance in the first programming period</p> <p>Attention to rule of law, justice and security in the second period/good governance becoming a crosscutting issue</p> <p>Attention to capacity building</p> <p>Constant attention to anticorruption</p> <p>Entry conditions referring to human rights, quality of governance, corruption and social exclusion are ascertained</p> <p>The budget support is clearly earmarked for certain sectors e.g. security</p>	<p>Desk research</p> <p>Project documents: proposals, fiches</p> <p>Interviews with:</p> <p>NRO and Ministry of Foreign Affairs</p> <p>Representatives of key ministries</p> <p>Independent experts/civil society organisations</p> <p>Implementing partners</p>

Criterion	Sub question	Indicators	Means of verification
	To what extent were the projects in the human rights sector consistent with the Dutch sector development policy?	<p>The projects reflect the following policy elements:</p> <p>Linking human rights with peace, stability and security</p> <p>Work with civil society</p> <p>Addressing themes like: abolition of the death penalty, ban on torture, human rights and religion, women's and children's rights, discrimination against homosexuals and protection of human rights defenders (Since 2013)</p> <p>The NRO and the projects:</p> <p>Raised human rights issues in political dialogue</p> <p>Cooperated with EU partners</p> <p>Formed like-minded groups</p> <p>Maintained ties with human rights defenders and international organisations</p> <p>Supported human rights projects and gathered and supplied information on human rights issues ('public diplomacy').</p>	<p>Desk research</p> <p>Project documents: proposals, fiches</p> <p>Interviews with:</p> <p>NRO and Ministry of Foreign Affairs</p> <p>Representatives of key ministries</p> <p>Independent experts/civil society organisations</p> <p>Implementing partners</p>
	To what extent were the projects in the humanitarian aid sector consistent with the Dutch sector development policy?	<p>The support is provided to programmes and projects that reflect the following policy requirements:</p> <p>The humanitarian aid is to cover acute emergency aid, prevention, rehabilitation and care for refugees, including supporting their return and integration</p>	<p>Desk research</p> <p>Project documents: proposals, fiches</p> <p>Interviews with:</p> <p>NRO and Ministry of Foreign Affairs</p> <p>Representatives of key ministries</p> <p>Independent experts/civil society organisations</p>

Criterion	Sub question	Indicators	Means of verification
		<p>Humanitarian aid is contextualised in the 3D (diplomacy, defence, development) approach</p> <p>(from 2011)</p> <p>More self-reliance and resilience (more use of local capacity and more attention for disaster prevention)</p> <p>More effectiveness (less duplication and more coordination)</p> <p>Free access to people affected and neutrality</p> <p>Greater accountability for results and operating in line with international principles and agreements.</p> <p>UN as preferred channel; NGOs when this channel is not suitable.</p>	<p>Implementing partners</p>
	To what extent were the projects in the sector a response to the needs of the Palestinian people?	<p>Consistence of project objectives with the Palestinian National Development Plans</p> <p>Projects respond to the goals set for the sector by Palestinian civil society organisations</p> <p>Projects documents contain detailed needs analyses</p>	<p>Desk research</p> <p>Project documents: proposals, fiches</p> <p>National development plans of the PA</p> <p>Interviews</p> <p>Representatives of key ministries</p> <p>Independent experts/civil society organisations</p> <p>Implementing partners</p> <p>Beneficiaries</p>
	To what extent did the projects in the sector contribute to the solution of the identified problems in the sector?	<p>Projects deploy activities that are suitable to address the identified needs/problems, according to experts</p>	<p>Desk research</p> <p>Project documents: proposals, fiches</p> <p>Interviews</p> <p>Representatives of key ministries</p> <p>Independent experts/civil society organisations</p>

Criterion	Sub question	Indicators	Means of verification
			Implementing partners Beneficiaries
	To what extent were the projects in the economic reconstruction sector relevant for the achievement of a viable Palestinian economy?	<p>The projects pursue objectives concerning²⁰⁶:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Access to and availability and use of land and water for food production High yields of horticultural crops produced by agricultural cooperatives Strong public and financial institutional framework for the agricultural sector Access to markets for farmers Competitiveness of agricultural products Institutional capacity of the government for service delivery in the agricultural sector No impediments to movement and access for agricultural goods and farmers Good quality and marketability of horticultural products <p>Extent to which the contribution to a viable Palestinian economy is explicitly addressed in the project strategy.</p>	Desk research Project documents: proposals, fiches
	To what extent were the projects (and the budget support) in the governance sector relevant for the achievement of a functioning Palestinian state?	<p>The projects and the budget support pursue objectives concerning:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Capable, accountable and responsive justice and security services 	

²⁰⁶ In this question the indicators reflect the criteria for viable economy and functioning state mentioned in the TOR, regardless of the fact that they are derived from the MASP 2012-2015 only.

Criterion	Sub question	Indicators	Means of verification
		<p>Security and justice institutions capable of delivering criminal justice services</p> <p>Cooperation within and between security and justice sector actors</p> <p>Equal access to and delivery of justice and security for vulnerable groups including women</p> <p>Capable and responsive government</p> <p>Civic participation to hold public actors within justice and security sector accountable</p> <p>Criminal justice and security establishment accountable to the public</p> <p>Extent to which the contribution to a functioning Palestinian state is explicitly addressed in the project strategy</p>	
	<p>To what extent were the projects in the human rights sector relevant for the achievement of a functioning Palestinian state?</p>	<p>The projects pursue objectives concerning:</p> <p>Safeguarding against human rights violations such as unwarranted police arrest, torture and death penalty</p> <p>Respect for human rights defenders and for women's, children's and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) rights</p> <p>Freedom of expression, assembly and religion</p> <p>Extent to which the contribution to a functioning Palestinian state is explicitly addressed in the project strategy</p>	

Criterion	Sub question	Indicators	Means of verification
	To what extent were the projects in the humanitarian aid sector relevant for the achievement of a functioning Palestinian state and a viable Palestinian economy?	<p>The projects and the support pursue objectives concerning:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establishing UNRWA as efficient and effective service provider prepared to handover to PA Prevention of the permanent damage to the socioeconomic fabric <p>Extent to which the contribution to a functioning Palestinian state and to a viable Palestinian economy are explicitly addressed in the project strategy</p>	
	Based on the information collected on the different sectors, to what extent was the overall programme relevant? Why and when was it more relevant?	Evidence of relevance of projects and sector programmes from sector reports	Sector reports
Effectiveness	To what extent were the projects in the sector implemented according to plans and delivered the expected activities and outputs?	<p>Evidence that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Activities were actually implemented Planned outputs were produced. 	<p>Desk research</p> <p>Project documents: implementation reports, reviews, evaluations, audits</p> <p>Interviews</p> <p>NRO</p> <p>Implementing partners</p>
	To what extent did projects in the sector achieve their expected outcomes/results?	<p>Outcomes/results clearly identified in project documents (and not just outputs).</p> <p>Evidence of the achievement of expected project outcomes/results.</p>	<p>Desk research</p> <p>Project documents: implementation reports, reviews, evaluations, audits</p> <p>Interviews</p> <p>NRO</p>

Criterion	Sub question	Indicators	Means of verification
			Implementing partners Beneficiaries Independent experts
	<p>To what extent did projects in the economic reconstruction sector contribute to achieving the strategic goals for the sector according to the MASP in force at the time of the project? (MASP 2008-2011)</p> <p>Improved access to financial services for cooperatives, farmers and agribusinesses</p> <p>Prevention of permanent damage to agro-economic sector structure of Gaza and WB</p> <p>Preservation and expansion of export opportunities (MASP 2012-2015)</p> <p><i>People fulfil their needs for water(*)</i></p> <p><i>More effective water governance(*)</i></p> <p>Sustainable food production for the population</p> <p>Access to markets for farmers</p>	<p>Evidence of:</p> <p>Greater availability of financial services</p> <p>Increased access to financial services by farmers</p> <p>Greater availability/better quality of agricultural services</p> <p>Stronger public and financial sector framework (legal and institutional framework and capacity of financial institutions, Moan, etc.)</p> <p>Increased export</p> <p>Increased yields of horticultural crops</p> <p>Good quality and marketability of horticultural crops according to experts</p> <p>Improvement (or at least no worsening) in movement and access for agricultural goods and farmers</p>	<p>Desk research</p> <p>Project documents: implementation reports, reviews, evaluations, audits</p> <p>Interviews</p> <p>NRO</p> <p>Representatives of key ministries</p> <p>Implementing partners</p> <p>Beneficiaries</p> <p>Independent experts</p>
	<p>To what extent did projects in the governance sector (including budget support) contribute to achieving the strategic goals for the sector according to the MASP in force at the time of the project? (MASP 2008-2011)</p> <p>The democratisation process in the PT is</p>	<p>Evidence of:</p> <p>Functioning democratic mechanisms (elections, participation between elections) at national and local level established and used</p> <p>Transparency and accountability instruments adopted by the government (e.g. codes of conducts anti-corruption established and applied)</p>	<p>Desk research</p> <p>Project documents: implementation reports, reviews, evaluations, audits</p> <p>Interviews</p> <p>NRO</p> <p>Representatives of key ministries</p> <p>Implementing partners</p>

Criterion	Sub question	Indicators	Means of verification
	<p>sustained and further strengthened.</p> <p>Restructured and strengthened Palestinian security forces, able and equipped to maintain law and order in the PT and to contain armed groups that operate outside state control;</p> <p>Enhanced Palestinian SSR-process.</p> <p>Enhanced performance of the justice system and its main institutions as well as co-operation between them;</p> <p>Increased public confidence in the justice system</p> <p>(MASP 2012-2015)</p> <p>Palestinians receive capable, accountable and responsive justice and security services;</p> <p>A more capable and responsive Palestinian government.</p>	<p>Palestinian security forces better able and equipped to maintain law and order and contain armed groups (e.g. examples of success in operations)</p> <p>Security Sector reform process:</p> <p>Decrease in illegal detentions</p> <p>Reformed legal framework for security</p> <p>Civilian oversight mechanisms established and functioning</p> <p>Improvements in the performance of the justice system (e.g. timeliness of judgments); from 2012: focus on criminal justice</p> <p>Increased cooperation between institutions of the justice system</p> <p>Better cooperation within and between the security and justice actors</p> <p>Increased confidence in the justice system according to opinion polls; increase in complaints filed (from 2012)</p> <p>More equal access to justice by vulnerable groups and by population of areas B and if feasible C.</p> <p>Increased civic participation to hold public actors within justice and security sector accountable;</p> <p>Criminal justice and security establishment accountable to Palestinian public.</p>	<p>Beneficiaries</p> <p>Independent experts</p>

Criterion	Sub question	Indicators	Means of verification
	<p>To what extent did projects in the human rights sector contribute to achieving the strategic goals for the sector according to the MASP in force at the time of the project?</p> <p>(MASP 2008-2011) Increased respect for human rights by both the PA and the government of Israel, resulting in a reduction of human rights violations.</p> <p>(MASP2012-2015: no specific goals are indicated)</p>	<p>Trends in human rights violations of different type (as reported by ICHR and other sources)</p> <p>Other signs of increased respect of human rights by duty-bearers</p> <p>Lower level expected results to be also considered:</p> <p>Improved monitoring, documentation, legal aid and advocacy of local human rights NGOs, in order to address Israeli and Palestinian human rights violations (2008-2010);</p> <p>Strengthened human-rights NGOs operating large and effective networks (2009-2011);</p> <p>A structured human rights dialogue with the PA focussed on the fight against torture and organised violence, promotion of women's and children's rights, the abolition of the death penalty and the investigation of honour killings and of assassinations of alleged collaborators (2008);</p> <p>The informal Working Group on Human Rights, co-chaired by NRO, is functioning effectively and takes practical actions to redress human rights violations (2008-2011);</p> <p>Quality input into EU interventions with respect to</p>	<p>Desk research</p> <p>Project documents: implementation reports, reviews, evaluations, audits</p> <p>Reports from ICHR and Human Rights organisations</p> <p>Interviews</p> <p>NRO</p> <p>Representatives of key ministries</p> <p>Implementing partners</p> <p>Beneficiaries</p> <p>Independent experts</p>

Criterion	Sub question	Indicators	Means of verification
		adverse effects of the occupation (2008-2011).	
	<p>To what extent did projects in the humanitarian aid sector contribute to achieving the strategic goals for the sector according to the MASP in force at the time of the project? (MASP 2008-2011)</p> <p>Prevention of permanent damage to the Palestinian social and economic fabric</p> <p>UNRWA is an effective and efficient needs-based service provider to Palestinian refugees and is prepared for a future handover of responsibilities to the PA.</p>	<p>Evidence of:</p> <p>People saved from destitution (2009); data on access to services, poverty, etc. of refugees</p> <p>The management reform and change process in UNRWA has led to an organisation with a clear strategic vision and the ability to prioritise in the biennium budget 2008-2009</p>	<p>Desk research</p> <p>Project documents: implementation reports, reviews, evaluations, audits</p> <p>Interviews</p> <p>NRO</p> <p>Representatives of key ministries</p> <p>Implementing partners</p> <p>Beneficiaries</p> <p>Independent experts</p>
	<p>To what extent has the targeted budget support i.e. funds meant for payment of salaries and pensions of (retired) civil servants of the Palestinian Authority from 2008 until mid-2014 been spent in line with the intentions?</p>	<p>Evidence of expenditure on salaries and pensions from audits and reports</p>	<p>Desk research</p> <p>Project documents: implementation reports, reviews, evaluations, audits</p> <p>Interviews</p> <p>NRO</p> <p>Implementing partner (EU)</p> <p>Representatives of key ministries</p>
	<p>What are explanations for successes or failures of the projects?</p>	<p>Obstacles encountered in project implementation related to</p> <p>the Israeli occupation</p> <p>the weaknesses on the Palestinian side</p> <p>other factors</p> <p>Adopted measures to address obstacles</p>	<p>Desk research</p> <p>Project documents: implementation reports, reviews, evaluations, audits</p> <p>Interviews</p> <p>NRO</p> <p>Other co-funding donors</p>

Criterion	Sub question	Indicators	Means of verification
		Key success factors	Representatives of key ministries Implementing partners Beneficiaries Independent experts
	What were unanticipated positive or negative consequences of the projects?	Unanticipated positive or negative consequences of the projects as reported by partners, beneficiaries and external observers For the wellbeing of the Palestinian population For the conflict	Desk research Project documents: implementation reports, reviews, evaluations, audits Interviews NRO Other co-funding donors Representatives of key ministries Implementing partners Beneficiaries Independent experts
	What was the contribution of the NRO to the success of the projects, including via negotiation with implementing partners, policy dialogue and donor coordination?	Effects of negotiations by NRO with implementing partners on project effectiveness and efficiency Intensity of project monitoring by NRO Evidence of economic diplomacy, policy dialogue towards PA and Israel conducted bilaterally or through donor coordination fora, and other activities carried out by the Netherlands, that contributed to the positive results of the projects	Desk research Documents on donor coordination and sector-related policy dialogue with the Palestinian Authority and Israel Project documents: implementation reports, reviews, evaluations, audits Interviews NRO Other co-funding donors Representatives of key ministries Implementing partners

Criterion	Sub question	Indicators	Means of verification
	To what extent were mechanisms built into the design of the projects to reduce fiduciary risks; were irregularities reported; what measures were taken to mitigate these?	Existence of risk analyses in project appraisals and in project documents including planned mitigation measures Actual functioning of these mechanisms Reported irregularities and adoption of countermeasures.	Desk research Project documents: implementation reports, reviews, evaluations, audits Interviews NRO Implementing partners
	Based on the information collected on the different sectors, to what extent was the overall programme effective? Why and when was it more effective? Which were the main obstacles and success factors?	Evidence of effectiveness of projects and sector programmes from sector reports	Analysis of sector reports
Sustainability	To what extent were the projects sustainable? Which factors contributed to or hampered sustainability of the achievements?	Evidence of actual continuation of activities / persistence of effects after completion of the projects Factors contributing to – or hampering - sustainability related to: the Israeli occupation the weaknesses on the Palestinian side donor behaviour other factors	Desk research Project documents: proposals, fiches Interviews with: NRO and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Representatives of key ministries Independent experts/civil society organisations Implementing partners Beneficiaries
Coherence	What has been the role of the Netherlands in local donor coordination (in the overall programme and at sector level)?	Intensity, quality and effects of the participation of the Netherlands in relevant LACS sector working groups and other donor coordination fora according to NRO, LACS and other donors.	Desk research Documents on donor coordination and sector-related policy dialogue with the Palestinian Authority and Israel Project documents: implementation reports, reviews, evaluations, audits

Criterion	Sub question	Indicators	Means of verification
			Interviews NRO Other donors
	Are there any overlaps and duplications with projects funded by other donors in the various sectors?	Existence of projects funded by other donors that fund the same beneficiaries for very similar activities Measures adopted by the Netherlands unilaterally or in the context of donor coordination fora to reduce overlaps and duplications.	Desk research Documents on donor coordination and sector-related policy dialogue with the Palestinian Authority and Israel Project documents: implementation reports, reviews, evaluations, audits Interviews NRO Other donors
	To what extent was the development policy (in the overall programme and at sector level) tuned to other elements of Dutch policy to promote peace between Israel and the Palestinian Territories and to policies of other actors?	In relation to the selected projects and the sector: Examples of coherence - or lack thereof - between Dutch development activities, economic diplomacy and policy dialogue at sector level as well as in relation to the conflict. Actual coordination of development, economic diplomacy and policy dialogue within NRO. Examples of coherence – or lack thereof – between policy approaches of the Netherlands and those of other donors towards the same sector (as can be detected at the project level).	Desk research Strategic documents Dutch policy documents Interviews with: NRO and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Representatives of key ministries Independent experts/civil society organisations Implementing partners Beneficiaries

Criterion	Sub question	Indicators	Means of verification
	To what extent was gender mainstreamed into the programme and projects of the various sectors? (Gender mainstreaming as part of the Dutch development policy)	Monitoring of gender mainstreaming in projects by NRO Evidence of gender results in the design and implementation of the projects.	Desk research Strategic documents Dutch policy documents Project documents: proposals, fiches Project documents: implementation reports, reviews, evaluations, audits Interviews with: NRO and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Representatives of key ministries Independent experts/civil society organisations Implementing partners Beneficiaries

(*) As there are no water related projects in the sample, these expected results will not be considered.

Annex 2 – List of consulted persons and organisations

MFA / Sector	Institutions	Name	Title
MFA	NRO	Mr. Geert Kampman	Deputy HoM / Head of Cooperation
MFA	MENA Department	Mr. Joost Van Eетро	Senior Policy Adviser ; Former NRO Senior Policy Advisor
MFA	NRO	Ms. Lama Al Tarazi	NRO Coordinator / Assistant Policy Officers
MFA	NRO	Mr. Wijnand Marchal	First Secretary - Economic Affairs
MFA	NRO	Mrs. Dicky Methorst	First Secretary – Rule of Law
MFA	NRO/PARC	Dr. Thameen Hijjawi	NRO Technical Advisor, Ex-PARC Director
MFA	NRO	Mrs. Annemieke Van Soelen	First Secretary Political, HR, Humanitarian Affairs
Economic Reconstruction	Hebron Municipality	Mr. Hisham Abu Sneineh	Manager Hebron Central Park. Station
Economic Reconstruction	Hebron Municipality	Eng. Ahmad Ebedo	Head Engineering Unit Hebron Municipality
Economic Reconstruction	Jenin Municipality	Mr. Walid Abu Mwais	Mayor Jenin
Economic Reconstruction	EU Rep	Mr. Ammar Al-Khateeb	Programme Manager, Land Development, Infrastructure
Economic Reconstruction	EU Rep	Mr. Paolo Curradi	Head Section Water & Land Management
Economic Reconstruction	EU Rep	Mr. Carlo Marsico	Programme manager, Agriculture, Food Security
Economic Reconstruction	FAO	Mr. Ciro Fiorillo	Head of Office
Economic Reconstruction	FAO	Dr. Azzam Saleh Ayasa	Head of Programme
Economic Reconstruction	JICA	Mr. Raslan Yasin	Chief Programme Officer
Economic Reconstruction	JICA	Dr. Abdel Nasser Makky	Chief Programme Officer
Economic Reconstruction	JICA	Mrs. Nawras Mansour	Programme Coordinator - Ramallah
Economic Reconstruction	JICA	Ms. Miyoko Inoue	JICA Representative
Economic Reconstruction	LACS	Mr. Jochen Peters	Aid coordination Officer (Economic Sector)
Economic Reconstruction	MDLF	Mr. Hazem Kawasmi	GD for Operations -
Economic Reconstruction	MDLF	Mr. Abdel Mughni Nofal	Director General for MDLF

MFA / Sector	Institutions	Name	Title
Economic Reconstruction	MDLF	Mr. Mohammad Ramahi	Manager -Financial & Administrative Dept.
Economic Reconstruction	MDLF	Mr. Mutaz Moheisan	MDLF Coordinator Gaza
Economic Reconstruction	MDLF	Mr. Muhammad Rabaaya	MDLF Coordinator WB
Economic Reconstruction	MOA	Mr. Ibrahim Qtaishat	DG of Extension & Rural Development
Economic Reconstruction	MOA	Mr. Khaled Al-Khatib	Head of Public Relations
Economic Reconstruction	MOA	Mr. Raid Abu Khalil	DG Agricultural Control
Economic Reconstruction	MOA	Dr. Izzidin Abu Arqub	Chief of International Relations
Economic Reconstruction	MOA	Mr. Tareq Abu Laban	DG of Marketing
Economic Reconstruction	MOA	Eng. Abdullah Q. Lahllouh	Deputy Minister
Economic Reconstruction	PARC/WB	Mr. Khalil Shiha	General Director
Economic Reconstruction	PARC/WB	Mr. Izzat Zedan	Director of Programs
Economic Reconstruction	PARC/WB	Dr. Abdelatif Mohammad	Dep. Gen. Director - Director of Programs & Projects
Economic Reconstruction	PARC/WB	Dr. Abdalghani Sya'arh	
Economic Reconstruction	PARC/WB	Mr. Khaled Dawood	
Economic Reconstruction	PARC/GS	Mr. Taysir Muhaisen	PARC Deputy Director General Gaza
Economic Reconstruction	PARC/GS	Mr. Eisa Eddnaf	Programs & Projects PARC – Gaza.
Economic Reconstruction	PARC/GS	Mr. Ayman Baddah.	External relations PARC Gaza.
Economic Reconstruction	UAWC	Mr. Islam Nairoukh	Project Manager High Value Crops
Economic Reconstruction	UAWC	Mr. Fuad Abu Seif	Acting Director General of UAWC
Economic Reconstruction	UNOPS	Mr. Nicholas O'Regan	Director, Jerusalem Project Centre
Economic Reconstruction	UNOPS	Mr. Said Omar	Programme Development Manager
Economic Reconstruction	UNOPS	Mrs. Maria Malgorzata Wowro	
Economic Reconstruction	UNOPS	Mr. James Galloway	Infrastructure Programme Manager
Economic Reconstruction	UNOPS	Mr. Geoff Wilson	Programme Manager

MFA / Sector	Institutions	Name	Title
Economic Reconstruction	UNOPS	Mrs. Ashika Tanki	Business Development Advisor
Economic Reconstruction	UNOPS	Mrs. Fatima ABBASI	Head of Support
Economic Reconstruction	UNOPS	Mr. Yazan Eideh	Programme Specialist
Economic Reconstruction	UNOPS	Mrs. Maysa Haj Hassan	Project Associate
Economic Reconstruction	Burkin Cooperative - Jenin Governorate	Mr Sultan Ahmad Khalef	Head of Cooperative
Economic Reconstruction	Burkin Cooperative - Jenin Governorate	Mr Ahmad Anas Masad	Farmer
Economic Reconstruction	Burkin Cooperative - Jenin Governorate	Mr Issam Subhi Khulouf	Farmer
Economic Reconstruction	Burkin Cooperative - Jenin Governorate	Mr Ahmad Abed Masad	Farmer
Economic Reconstruction	Burkin Cooperative - Jenin Governorate	Mr Muhammed Khaled Ibrahim Mansour	Farmer
Economic Reconstruction	Tamoun Cooperative - Tubas Governorate	Mr Muhammed Hassan Niarat	Head of Cooperative
Economic Reconstruction	Tamoun Cooperative - Tubas Governorate	Mr Adnan Fathi Odeh	General Secretary
Economic Reconstruction	Beit Umar Cooperative – Hebron Governorate	Dr. Abed Alghani Hamdan	PARC Programme Manager
Economic Reconstruction	Beit Umar Cooperative – Hebron Governorate	Mrs. Mariam Ali Makhfour	PARC Hebron
Economic Reconstruction	Beit Umar Cooperative – Hebron Governorate	Mr. Jihad Hassan Muhammed Asad	Farmer / Halhoul Village
Economic Reconstruction	Beit Umar Cooperative – Hebron Governorate	Mr. Fathi Sleibi	Farmer / Beit Umar Village
Economic Reconstruction	Beit Umar Cooperative – Hebron Governorate	Mr. Yousef Abu Rayyan	Head of Farmer Cooperative Halhoul
Economic Reconstruction	Beit Umar Cooperative –	Mr. Fathi Ismail Abu Ayyash	Farmer Beit Umar

MFA / Sector	Institutions	Name	Title
	Hebron Governorate		
Economic Reconstruction	Beit Umar Cooperative – Hebron Governorate	Mr. Akram Jaber Za'afeef	Farmer / PARC Volunteer
Economic Reconstruction	Beit Umar Cooperative – Hebron Governorate	Mr. Nasri Sabarneh	Farmer
Economic Reconstruction	Beit Umar Cooperative – Hebron Governorate	Mr. Radwan Omar Abu Ayyash	Head of Cooperative Beit Umar
Economic Reconstruction	Beit Umar Cooperative – Hebron Governorate	Mr. Zeidan Abu Ayyash	Farmer Beit Umar, Member
Economic Reconstruction	Beit Umar Cooperative – Hebron Governorate	Mrs. Najlah Abu Ayyash	Cooperative for Farmer Loans
Economic Reconstruction	Beit Umar Cooperative – Hebron Governorate	Mr. Ghazi Abu Ayyash	Farmer
Economic Reconstruction	Beit Umar Cooperative – Hebron Governorate	Mr Odeh Abdel Hadi Alameh	Farmer
Economic Reconstruction	Beit Umar Cooperative – Hebron Governorate	Mr. Faisal AbuAyyash	Farmer
Economic Reconstruction	Beit Umar Cooperative – Hebron Governorate	Mr. Odeh Issa Hassan Awad	Farmer
Economic Reconstruction	Jiftlik Village Cooperative	Mr. Shehadeh Hassan Hamed	Farmer
Economic Reconstruction	Jiftlik Village Cooperative	Mr. Khaled Hindermah	Farmer
Economic Reconstruction	Jiftlik Village Cooperative	Mr. Harbi Abdallah	Farmer
Economic Reconstruction	Jiftlik Village Cooperative	Mr. Abdallah Khruabi	Farmer
Economic Reconstruction	Faroush Bani Dajan Cooperative	Mr. ra'fet Muhammed Yousef sadek Shaheen	Farmer
Economic Reconstruction	Faroush Bani Dajan Cooperative	Mr. Azam Samsam	Farmer
Economic Reconstruction	Faroush Bani Dajan Cooperative	Mr. Ameer Shaker Saleh Haj Muhammed	Farmer

MFA / Sector	Institutions	Name	Title
Economic Reconstruction	Gaza Cooperative Beit Lahiya	Mr. Jamel Abo Hmeida and other members	Vice president.
Economic Reconstruction	Gaza Cooperative Beit Hanoun	Mr. Qassem Qassem	Cooperative president
PEGASE	Deloitte	Mr. Khalil Ghawi	Manager Audit
PEGASE	EU Rep	Mrs. Meriem El-Harouchi	Ops Direct Financial Support - PEGASE
PEGASE	EU Rep	Mr. Josep Farres Desquens	Ops Direct Financial Support - PEGASE
PEGASE	EU Rep	Mrs. Manal Hazboun Qaraeen	Ops Direct Financial Support - PEGASE
PEGASE	EU Rep	Mrs. Michelle Labeuu	Head of Section Macroeconomic Support
PEGASE	EU Rep	Mrs. Basima Adawin	PM HR & Civil Society
PEGASE	MOF	Mrs. Laila Eghreib	Acting DG International Relations
PEGASE	MOF	Mr. Ali Dreidi	Economist - Micro Financial Unit
RoL / HR	Addameer	Adv. Sahar Francis	Executive Director
RoL / HR	Al-Haq	Mr. Shawan Jabarin	Executive Director of Al-Haq - L in S M
RoL / HR	Al-Haq	Mr. Isam Abdeen	Director of Human Rights - National Tm
RoL / HR	Al-Qaws	Mrs. Haneen Maikay	Executive Director
RoL / HR	Attorney General Office	Mr. Khaled Shtayeh	Donor Relations Officer
RoL / HR	Attorney General Office	Mr. Yasser Hammad	Chief prosecutor (head of planning unit).
RoL / HR	Attorney General Office	Mr. Charlie Gabaji	Planning team leader.
RoL / HR	AWN Network	Mr. Salman Bseiso	General Secretary AWN
RoL / HR	BZU	Dr. Mustafa Mari	Director for NGO Secretariat
RoL / HR	BZU	Dr. Ghassan Faramand	Director - Institute of Law
RoL / HR	BZU	Dr. Reem Al-Botmeh	Legal Researcher at Institute of Law

MFA / Sector	Institutions	Name	Title
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RoL / HR	EUPol	Mrs. Daphne Lodder	Deputy Head of Rule of Law
RoL / HR	Hamoked	Ms. Dalia Kerstein	Executive Director
RoL / HR	Hamoked	Mr. Curt Arnson	Executive Director
RoL / HR	ICHR	Dr. Ahmed Harb	Commissioner - Head of ICHR
RoL / HR	ICHR	Mr. Sami Jabareen	Coordinator of Investigations & Complaints Unit
RoL / HR	ICHR	Mr. Majeed Sawalha	Media & Public Relations officer
RoL / HR	ICHR	Mr. Ghandi Amin	Director Monitoring National Legislations & Policies Div.
RoL / HR	ICHR	Mrs. Nisreen De'bas	Director Administration & Finance Division
RoL / HR	ICHR	Mr. Sami Jabareen	Coordinator of Investigations & Complaints Unit
RoL / HR	ICHR	Mr. Mousa Abu Duheim	Manager of West Bank programme operation
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RoL / HR	ICHR Gaza	Mr. Hamdi Sakura	Research Department
RoL / HR	ICHR Gaza	Mr. Rafat Salha	Head of Office
RoL / HR	ICHR Gaza	Mr. Jamil Sarhan	Director of Gaza Program
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RoL / HR	LACS	Mr. Ra'id Malki	Head of LACS Office.
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RoL / HR	MoJ	Mr. Ihab Shihadeh	Legal Advisor - MoJ
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MFA / Sector	Institutions	Name	Title
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RoL / HR	NDC	Mr. Ghassan Kasabreh	Director
RoL / HR	NDC	Mrs. Jamileh Sahliyah	Grants Programme Manager
RoL / HR	OCHA	Mrs. Maria Jose Torres	Deputy Head of Office
RoL / HR	PBA	Mr. Ahmad Al-Natsheh	Treasury of Board; Board member
RoL / HR	PBA	Lawyer Hussein Shabaneh	Director General Palestinian Bar Association
RoL / HR	PBA/Gaza	Mr. Aly AlDen	Board Member of PBA in Gaza
RoL / HR	OQR	Mr. Feras Milhem	Rule of Law Advisor
RoL / HR	OQR	Mr. Tim Williams	Movement and Access Advisor
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RoL / HR	Sweden	Mr. Fredrik Westerholm	Consul HR & Democracy
RoL / HR	Sweden	Mr. Maher Daoudi	Programme Officer – Humanitarian Affairs
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MFA / Sector	Institutions	Name	Title
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RoL / HR	WCLAC	Mrs. Amal Abu Srouf	Director of Programs
RoL / HR	Al-Mustaqbal Association for Violence - Care	Mr. Husni Al Mughani	Chairperson
RoL / HR	Al-Mustaqbal Association for Violence - Care	Mr. Said Abdallah	Projects Coordinator
RoL / HR	Al-Mustaqbal Association for Violence - Care	Mr. Ghasan Al Qishawi	Lawyer
RoL / HR	Al-Mustaqbal Association for Violence - Care	Eng. Majed Hasona	Women Leader "Mukhtar"
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RoL / HR	National Society for Democracy & Law Rafah	Dr. Ibrahim Muamar	Chairperson
RoL / HR	National Society for Democracy & Law Rafah	Mrs. Suad Al Mashni	Lawyer
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RoL / HR	Palestinian Bar Association	Mr. Shaban Al Jarjir	Board Member
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MFA / Sector	Institutions	Name	Title
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RoL / HR	PCPD	Mrs. Hilda Issa	Finance & Administration Manager
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Security	EUPOL COPPS	Mr. Carel Hostra	Head of Planning and Evaluation Department
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Security	EUPOL COPPS	Mr. Nuno Carocha	Assistant To David Wolfe
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Security	PCP	Lieut. Colonel Tareq Dawabshah	International Liaison Officer
Security	PCP	Lieut. Colonel Wafaa Muamar	General Police Administration BTH
Security	PCP	Sergeant Ibrahim Zawahra	HD Juvenile & Family Protection Unit BTH
Security	PCP	Lieut. Colonel Dr. Mahmoud Salah Al-Din	Director Research & Development Unit
Security	PCP	Lieut. Colonel Eng. Suleiman Khatib	ICT Department Director
Security	PCP	Sergeant Muhammed Bani Odeh	Central Administrative Affairs
Security	PCP	Lieut. Colonel Fawaz Taleb	Detention Centre in Ramallah
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MFA / Sector	Institutions	Name	Title
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Humanitarian Aid	UNRWA	Mr. David Hutton	Director of Programme - West Bank
Humanitarian Aid	UNRWA	Mrs. Hannah Meinshausen	
Humanitarian Aid	UNRWA	Mr. Fardau Procee	External Relations & Projects Officer
Humanitarian Aid	UNRWA	Mrs. Virginia Villar-Arribas	
Humanitarian Aid	UNRWA	Mrs. Nana Hansen	
Humanitarian Aid	UNRWA	Mrs. Florence Anselmo	Protection Officer UNRWA
Humanitarian Aid	UNRWA	Mr. Daniel Richardson	Access Officer UNRWA
Humanitarian Aid	UNRWA	Mr. Christopher Nordal	Acting Head of Gaza Field Office Gaza
Humanitarian Aid	UNRWA	Mr. Siobhan Parnall,	Programme Officer Gaza
Humanitarian Aid	UNRWA	Mr. Robert Hurt	Director of Planning, Amman
Humanitarian Aid	UNRWA	Mrs. Aisha Majid	UN Resident & Humanitarian Coordinator
Humanitarian Aid	UNRWA	Mrs. Lubna Madyeh	Chief Field Relief & Social Service Programme
Humanitarian Aid	WFP	Mrs. Arwa Smeir	M&E
Humanitarian Aid	WFP	Mr. Paul Skoczylas	Deputy Country Director
Humanitarian Aid	WFP	Mr. Husni Barakat	Cluster coordinator for Food Security

Annex 3 – Project fiches

1.1 Overview

- 1.2 Project Fiche Land Development II
- 1.3 Project Fiche Land Development III
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- 1.5 Project Fiche GlobalGap
- 1.6 Project Fiche Container Scanners (2 project numbers)
- 1.7 Project Fiche Pégase (7 project numbers)
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- 1.9 Project Fiche Access to Justice (2 project numbers)
- 1.10 Project Fiche MDLF: CDSF & EMSRP II (2 project numbers)
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- 1.12 Project Fiche ICHR (4 project numbers)
- 1.13 Project Fiche UNRWA (6 project numbers)

1.2 Project Fiche Land Development II

1. Basic Characteristics	
Name of Project(s)	Improving Livelihood in the Occupied Palestinian Territories – West Bank & Gaza (Land Development II)
Project number	16445
Executing agencies	Agricultural Development Organization (PARC) Program Management Unit (PMU)
Primary Sector	Economic Reconstruction
MASP sectors:	2008 – 2011: Economic reconstruction, focus on agriculture
Total budget committed	€ 6.340.412 (As stated in the Appraisal Document)
Total disbursements	€ 4.720.000 (ToR)
Start and end date	1 July 2007 – 30 June 2009 (Appraisal document; Final Report)
Geographic focus	West Bank & Gaza: Hebron (16 locations); Tulkarem (2 locations); Bethlehem (6 locations); Jenin (16 locations); Nablus (15 locations); Ramallah (3 locations); Jericho (2 locations); Gaza (1 location); Khan Younis (2 locations)
Information on status	Completed
Co-funders and donor coordination at project level	NRO is the only contributor to this project. PARC has assured that there will be no other donors or implementing organisations active in the geographical areas chosen for this project. According to the appraisal document, close coordination should have taken place in the framework of the agricultural sector working group under the economy strategy group, in particular with Spain and the European Commission, who are working on a Land Development programme as well.
Partnership arrangements and governance mechanisms	Under the overall responsibility of PARC, the local offices of PARC, Union of Agricultural Works Committees (UAWC), Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG), and Land Research Centre (LRC) are the main implementing organisations.

2. Objectives and main focus	
Objectives	<p><u>Overall objective:</u> To improve the access to food for food insecure population in rural areas and to provide temporary and permanent jobs for the unemployed in the disengaged areas through development of agricultural land in the disengaged areas.</p> <p><u>Purpose:</u> To safeguard and improve access to natural resources in 63 locations in North West-Bank and Gaza Strip.</p> <p>(Activity Appraisal document)</p>
Pursued outcomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Access to agricultural land in the targeted locations is improved, harvesting of rain water for both agricultural and domestic purposes in the targeted locations is encouraged. • Fertile agricultural land area in the targeted locations is increased. • The skills and know-how of rural women and farmers in the targeted locations are enhanced. <p>(Activity Appraisal Document)</p> <p><u>Specific objectives:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Increased availability of water resources 2. Average family income has increased 3. Know-how and skills of beneficiaries and project staff of all implementing organisations has improved

Strategy	The action is implemented in the West Bank and Gaza Strip- Palestinian territories. In order to make sure that other organisations can benefit from NRO's funding, the Land Development Programme consists of a consortium of 4 NGO's active in the field of Land Development lead by PARC. This also guarantees that NRO's share in PARC's funding will not exceed 50% of PARC's annual budget. The four organisations are Union of Agricultural Works Committees (UAWC), Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG) and Land Research Centre (LRC). (Activity Appraisal document)
Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Opening and rehabilitation of (84) agricultural roads, • Construction of (340) cisterns for domestic purposes. • Rehabilitation and extension of 3 domestic water supply networks amounting to 27.5 km of various diameters. • Connection of (650) households to existing drinking water networks, • Installation of one pumping station, • Construction of one elevated balancing tank, • Rehabilitation of one collective reservoir, • Installation of (75) irrigation networks in home gardens, • Construction of (82) cement pools for rainwater harvesting from the roof-tops of green houses, • Rehabilitation and extension of 9 collective irrigation networks amounting to (35) km, • Comprehensive land reclamation of mountainous land (leveling, terracing, plowing, cleaning, trees plantation, intercropping and fencing) of (320) hectares in the west Bank, • Rehabilitation of (39) hectares the destroyed agricultural land that were adjacent to evacuated settlements, • Conducting of (115) training for farmers and women and staff of the implementing NGOs • Installing of (52) Demos for irrigation scheduling, • Providing of (740) extension visits to farmers and women, • Publication of (27) brochures, poster and pamphlets. • Conducting of (10) farmer to farmer visits • Conducting a base line survey. <p>(Activity Appraisal Document)</p>
Target groups	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <u>Farmers</u>: in both rain fed and irrigated agriculture. 982 farmers and their families will benefit. Generally these are middle age farmers (35-50 years age) with less number of youth. These generally work in cultivation of fruit trees in their rain fed lands. These are small to middle size farmers with ownerships varying from 5-20 dunums (1 dunum = 0.1 hectare). Farmers (men and women) benefiting of agricultural roads: As a result of opening 74 km of agricultural roads in the West Bank and Gaza and the rehabilitation of 10 km of these roads more than one thousand farmers will be served. 2. <u>Rural Women</u>: These are generally women responsible for their households. Generally their age range between 23- 50 years old. All are un-employed women and the main reason for this is the isolation that they live in away from cities and blocked in their villages due to the closure and check points imposed by the occupation forces. These women have some time to work in their home gardens for the production of food for their families consumption. 3. <u>Un-employed workers</u>: These are the most affected during the

	<p>Intifada. They used to work in Israel and as a result of closing the Israeli labor market for the Palestinians became un-employed. In the targeted villages and small towns these are among the most vulnerable. A major part of the proposed interventions in the present action is known to be labor intensive (building of stony retaining walls and building of cisterns). The number of workers that are expected to benefit in the cadre of this actions is equal to about 15.000 workers who will benefit from 143,000 person-day jobs created.</p> <p>(Activity Appraisal Document)</p> <p>The 2007 progress report mentioned a fourth target group:</p> <p>4. <u>Staff of implementing organisations</u> (consortium members) that will benefit from training of trainers to improve their skills and know-how.</p>
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1.3 Project Fiche Land Development III

1. Basic Characteristics	
Name of Project(s)	Improving Livelihood in the Occupied Palestinian Territories – West Bank (Land Development III)
Project number	20431
Executing agencies	Agricultural Development Organization (PARC)
Primary Sector	Economic Reconstruction
MASP sectors	2008 – 2011: Economic reconstruction, focus on agriculture 2012 – 2015: Food security, water; private sector development
Total committed	\$10.820.000 (Activity appraisal document)
Total disbursed	€7.920.00 (ToR)
Start and end date	1 October 2009 – 30 September 2012 (Activity appraisal document)
Geographic focus	Implemented in 71 targeted locations on West Bank (See p. 2 Final report)
Information on status	Completed
Co-funders and donor coordination at project level	No other donors or funders involved.
Partnership arrangements and governance mechanisms	The programme was implemented by a consortium of five different organizations led by PARC Program Management Unit (PMU). Besides PARC it involved the Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC), Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG), Land Research Center (LRC), the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and the Rural Women Development Society (RWDS).

2. Objectives and main focus	
Objectives (sector specific)	The overall objective as mentioned in the Project Appraisal Document is to increase the capacity for vulnerable communities in rural areas in the West Bank to produce food by reclaiming land. The specific objective is to protect and improve access to natural resources.
Envisaged outcomes	<p>The following three <u>outcomes</u> were envisaged in the activity appraisal documents:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “Enhanced <u>food security</u> through increased local capacity to produce food. Local communities are supported in developing the land in and around their local communities so that the land can be used for farming and/or gardening. • Improved local communities’ capacity to provide their own <u>livelihood</u>. The programme will create a lot of jobs and increase income. Also, because of an increased food production local communities will increase their capacity to provide their own livelihood. Moreover, the project will make more land and water accessible for farmers and thus create additional economic opportunities. • Land reclamation and development will serve as a <u>preventive measure with regard to the risk of land annexation</u> for the purpose of settlement growth.” <p>Four main <u>results</u> were also mentioned in the project appraisal document:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Agricultural land surface areas in the targeted locations increased and served in better way. 2. Water for agricultural purposes increased and available resources in the targeted locations used efficiently. 3. Know-how and skills of the target groups in the targeted locations

	were improved. 4. Extension services provided to farmers in the field of fruit trees and irrigation water management improved.
Strategy	The rationale behind this project as mentioned in the project appraisal document is based on the assumption that benefitting local communities are not capable of making the initial high investments required for land development, but that they will be capable of maintaining the established or improved infrastructure adequately after completion of the project. In order to foster the ownership of the beneficiaries and to ensure a certain financial capacity, with a view to future maintenance costs, 25% of the total budget is carried by the local communities, either financially or in-kind. Additionally, training is provided to the participating communities on how to effectively use and maintain newly available land as well as to maintain the various infrastructural improvements. Finally, the programme aims at alleviating the effects of severe unemployment in the West-Bank by creating 145.000 working days through its infrastructure projects from which the West-Bank population benefits, thus pursuing a viable Palestinian economy.
Activities (Performance indicators for the outputs)	See table below
Target groups	Four main target groups were identified: a. Farmers in both rain fed and irrigated agricultural areas b. Rural women: mainly those who are heading their households, unemployed women c. Unemployed workers d. Staff of organization members of the consortium

Activities: planned, modified and completed units²⁰⁷

Activity	Unit	Originally Planned Units	Modified Planned Units	Completed Units	Achievement %**
Opening of agricultural roads	Km	100	102.66	108.58	106%
Construction of domestic cisterns for HG Development	Cistern	250	250	250	100%
Irrigation networks, seeds and seedling for HG Development	Network	250	250	250	100%
Construction of cement pools	Pool	100	100	100	100%
Construction and rehabilitation of agricultural earth ponds	Pool	25	25	25	100%
Collective Irrigation Networks	Km	37.29	52.61	53.03	101%
Construction of Reservoirs of 500 – 1000 m ³ /Reservoir	Reservoir	10	10	10	100%
Rehabilitation of Agricultural Groundwater Wells	Well	6	6	6	100%

²⁰⁷ Copied from final progress report.

Activity	Unit	Originally Planned Units	Modified Planned Units	Completed Units	Achievement %**
Land reclamation	Hectare	300	309	315.93	102%
Machinery work for land leveling	Hectare	300	309	315.93	102%
Construction of stony retaining walls	M ²	187,500	183,067.3	190,304.1	104%
Land plowing and cleaning	Hectare	300	309	304.2	98.4%
Seedlings	Seedling	120,000	111,359	118,990	107%
Seeds	Hectare	200	218	243.1	111.5%
Fencing	Hectare	220	264.7	271.6	103%
Construction of agricultural cisterns	M ³	24,000	22,586	26,770.4	118.5%
Land rehabilitation	Hectare	200	-	251.7	
Construction of stony retaining walls	M ²	60,000	64,588	63,660	99%
Seedlings	Seedling	30,000	41,294	42,542	103%
Construction of agricultural cisterns	M ³	15,588	16,920	19,663	116%
Irrigation Water Scheduling Demonstrations	Demo	100	100	100	100%
Training courses for farmers	Course	100	100	100	100%
Training courses for staff	Course	10	10	10	100%
Workshops	Workshop	140	140	140	100%
Baseline survey	Unit	1	1	1	100%
Study Tours (Outside country)	L.S	1	1	1	100%
Extension Visits	L.S	1	1	1	100%
Formulation of Agricultural Extension Strategies	Unit	1	1	1	100%
Evaluation of the extension practices of the MOA	Study	1	1	1	100%
Qualifications assessment of the extension workers in the MOA	Study	1	1	1	100%
Assessment of the available agricultural services	Study	1	1	1	100%
Study of the market demand on the various extension services	Study	1	1	1	100%
Study & analysis of the global trends	Unit	1	1	1	100%
Training and upgrading of the extension workers skills	Unit	1	1	1	100%
Development, testing & dissemination of ext. model	Unit	1	1	1	100%
Agricultural Extension Strategy Formulation	Unit	1	1	1	100%
Web Site (Design & Update)	Unit	1	1	1	100%
Publications	Publications	40	40	40	100%

1.4 Project Fiche EurepGap

1. Basic Characteristics	
Name of Project(s)	Enhancing Palestinian Farmers Preparedness for Exports (RAM EurepGap project I)
Project number	16424
Executing agencies	Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees (PARC)
Primary Sector	Economic Reconstruction
MASP sectors	2008 – 2011: Economic reconstruction, focus on agriculture
Total budget committed	€1.777.076,00 (Appraisal document)
Total disbursed	€1.777.076,00 (Final report)
Start and end date	1 July 2007 – 30 June 2009 (Appraisal document)
Geographic focus	Villages in four main districts in West Bank and Gaza (Tulkarem, Jenin, Jericho and north Gaza)
Information on status	Completed
Co-funders and donor coordination at project level	NRO is the only contributor to this project. Close coordination is taking place with other donors (USAID, ACDI/VOCA) that are active in the agricultural export sector in Gaza and with the Ministry of Agriculture. Also coordination takes place with the donors of the Agriculture Sector Working Group: FAO & UNDP.
Partnership arrangements and governance mechanisms	PARC/AAA executes the project, with the help of three subcontracted service providers: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SKAL, an international certification body working in Palestine • BESCO, a supporting external consulting firm • Green Print for Development, a supporting external consulting firm

2. Objectives and main focus	
Objectives (sector specific)	To contribute to job creation and income generation through enhancing the Palestinian farmer's preparedness for export and improving the capacities of beneficiaries by forming a national certification team to meet with the GLOBALGAP standard requirements. (Activity appraisal document)
Pursued outcomes	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Improve Palestinian knowledge and capacity to educate farmers to meet international standards of quality production in order to assure their position in the international markets. 2. Build the institutional capacity of the Palestinian agricultural sector to conduct training and extensions services for farmers to meet European standards. 3. Maintain direct Israeli and international interest in exports from Gaza, which allows for mobilising a broad coalition of Palestinian, Israeli and international stakeholders that lobby in favour of opening (border) crossings with Gaza. (Activity appraisal document)
Strategy	"The project will start working with a big number of interested growers in EurepGap, after which, at a later stage, 150 growers will be selected each year to finalise EurepGAP certification (so 300 growers in 2 years). The project starts targeting 450 farmers in order to select 150 farmers per year at the end. Our target groups will be 106 individual farmers yearly (option 1), in addition to 44 farmers as group certification within cooperatives (option 2). This means that the project will have a total number of beneficiaries of 150 farmers yearly (300 farmers in 2 years). The distribution of the beneficiaries will be among Gaza and the West Bank and depending on the marketing

	contracts to be closed they will be distributed over strawberries, cherry tomatoes and bell peppers. Possibly, a small number can be allocated to other products, like medicinal herbs (pilot)." (Activity appraisal document)
Activities	<p><u>Phase I:</u> Extension and Training (AAA/COAP & BESCO): Conducting internal and external training courses and giving consultancy and extension services for farmers, regarding the importance of safe agriculture, preserving environment , and the possibility of applying that and getting a good economic income.</p> <p><u>Phase II:</u> capacity building (AAA & SKAL): to ensure the capacity of the cooperatives at both technical and managerial areas to be able to design, implement, and maintain the EUREPGAP system at the farmer level. This phase will include some training at the level of cooperatives teams and growers.</p> <p><u>Phase III:</u> EUREPGAP system design (AAA/COAP & BESCO): the cooperatives teams will carry out the EUREPGAP system design at the grower level as well as cooperative level under the supervision of specialised experts.</p> <p><u>Phase IV:</u> EUREPGAP implementation (AAA/COAP & BESCO): The cooperative teams along with the growers will start implementation of the EUREPGAP system to allow for the 3 months period of implementation. Parallel to this phase, specialised training will be organised and conducted at the level of cooperative teams as well as growers.</p> <p><u>Phase V:</u> Internal inspection and control system (AAA/COAP): This phase AAA will give cooperatives and farmers needed information and experience of applying for certification such as needed procedures and information to be filled in the form, in order to prepare farmers for certification process. (Provided by Skal International)</p> <p><u>Phase VI:</u> EUREPGAP certification (SKAL): Skal International will carry out the final inspections on the growers and cooperatives against the EUREPGAP standards. (Activity appraisal document)</p>
Target groups	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 150 individual growers every year; Cooperatives in West Bank: Agronomists association, Farmers association, Tulkarem farmers cooperative, Jenin farmers cooperative; Cooperatives in Gaza: Gaza Agricultural Society for producing and marketing vegetables, Agricultural association of Beit Hanoun, Agriculture Cooperative Association for Farmers of Strawberry, Vegetables & Flowers, Farmers Association for Exporting Tomatoes.

1.5 Project Fiche GlobalGap

1. Basic Characteristics	
Name of Project(s)	Improving farmer's capabilities in production of export crops (Global Gap)
Project number	20143 RAM 0110570
Executing agencies	Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committee (PARC); Arab Agronomist Association (AAA); Ministry of Agriculture, Paltrade, Intajuna/Holol Company
Primary Sector	Economic Reconstruction
MASP sectors	2008 – 2011: Economic reconstruction, focus on agriculture
Total budget committed	Original: \$5.069.780,50 (Activity appraisal document) Top up: \$1,536,092.50 Total final budget: \$6.605.882,00 (Final report)
Total disbursed	€4.640.000 (ToR)
Start and end date	Original: 1 July 2009 – 30 June 2012, no-cost extension until 30/9/2012 (Activity appraisal document; Final report)
Geographic focus	West Bank & Gaza Strip
Information on status	Completed
Co-funders and donor coordination at project level	NRO is the only donor
Partnership arrangements and governance mechanisms	<p>PARC cooperated with the Ministry of Agriculture, Paltrade and the InTajuna project. The project proposal documented mentioned the following partnership arrangements:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10 of the Ministry's agronomists will participate in the Global Gap training process and will participate in the provision of extension services, the project will also finance the newly appointed Senior Global Gap Adviser who will be attached to the Ministry, but will also oversee the project's general progress. • Paltrade will organise three trade events to showcase Palestinian produce and perform a marketing study (value chain analysis for the fresh produce sector). • The inclusion of the so-called InTajuna "Our Product" initiative will serve to improve the local market for Global Gap - projects, below are the areas that they will cover: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Increase producer's knowledge of market information - B2B linkages - Marketing - POS campaign - Consumer awareness workshops - Advocacy <p>Further partners mentioned in the final report:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arab Agronomist Associations (AAA) • Center of Organic Agriculture in Palestine (COAP) • Private sector • Sonogrot Company
2. Objectives and main focus	
Objectives (sector specific)	The overall objective of the activity is to improve livelihood standards for targeted farmer's communities through improving the profitability of agricultural products. This will in turn ensure better production quality and potential for

	<p>local and external marketing, hence creating new opportunities for : i) a sustainable livelihood; ii) lower environmental impact and optimal use of scarce land/water resources; and iii) secure rights to land, water and markets. (Activity appraisal document)</p>
Pursued outcomes	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Enhancing the capacity of the national staff for applying GG standards. 2. Promoting farmers capacities for producing GG products. 3. Qualify the national certification body COAP to issue accredited GG certificates. 4. Creation of new marketing opportunities for the farmers. <p>(Activity appraisal document)</p>
Strategy	<p>The activity appraisal document (Bemo) states the following as its strategy:</p> <p>“Firstly, the intensified introduction of the Global Gap standards will result in more products of internationally accepted quality. As a result of this, adverse health effects for farmers will be diminished, environmental impact will be reduced through efficient use of land and water resources and most importantly, products will be eligible for sale in international markets. The latter is especially important as most international market regulations dictate that exports from third countries should be produced according to international standards. For this reason, the Palestinian produce has been exempted from a number of international markets until the year 2007. By enlarging the amount of farmers producing according to international standards, the reputation of Palestinian produce is likely to improve, and the increased produce will also make the Palestinian agricultural market more attractive.</p> <p>The second main component of the programme involves the marketing of the products, both for the local and the international market. This will be done by marketing specialists, who will establish closer cooperation with the private sector and make farmers more aware of the economic opportunities and how to negotiate a good deal for their produce. This is done in order to strengthen the link between the farmers and the market. The project thereby aims to ensure that farmers will actually see an increase in the number of products sold, an increase in the product price and ultimately an increase in profit. To improve the marketing component PARC and the NRO have established and further strengthened contacts with several, more specialised partners.</p> <p>“Sinokrot/Palestine Gardens” (an agro-industrial company that concentrates on agricultural production and marketing) has been involved in the preparatory phase of the project. Paltrade, the National Trade Development Organization which aims to increase export of Palestinian trade, as well as Intajuna (an initiative to improve awareness among Palestinians about high quality production from their own 'soil') are also included in the programme.”</p>
Activities	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Programme Preparation 2. Staff meeting 3. Extension and quality control officer's training 4. Study tour and Global Gap workshop 5. Farmers training 6. Cluster mapping (needs assessment) 7. Extension for farmers 8. Farms Rehabilitation 9. Cooperatives/Packing stations rehabilitation 10. Lab testing

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 11. Traceability system building 12. Development of monitoring and traceability database (Farm Online) 13. Internal inspection, cooperative quality management system (QMS) auditing and Global GAP Certification 14. Consultancy services 15. COAP accreditation 16. Marketing assessment study 17. Local promotional campaigns in collaboration with Intajona program 18. Organising local exhibitions and participating in international exhibitions and movements in collaboration with PALTRAD 19. Publishing of pamphlet about GG certified products <p>(Activity appraisal document)</p>
<p>Target groups</p>	<p>The following target groups were mentioned in the final report:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1) National and institutional level: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. 30 agronomists GG as national team from MoA, PARC, COAP and AAA will be qualified as GG internal auditors and inspectors. b. Building the capacities of 20 cooperatives. c. Palestinian Certification Body (CB) will be established 2) Capacities of 600 farmers within 20 cooperatives are to be improved 3) Farmers affected by Tuta Absoluta pest infection (700 farmers)

1.6 Project Fiche Container Scanners

1. Basic Characteristics	
Name of Project(s)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Installatie containerscanner voor grenscontroles Palestijnse Gebieden – Jordanië (24377) – Installation of containerscanner for the border posts in the Palestinian territories - Jordan 2. Installatie containerscanner voor controle producten vanuit Gaza naar ISR aan grensovergang Kerem Shalom/Karm Abu Salem (24907) – Installation of containerscanner for control products from Gaza to Israel at border crossing Kerem Shalom/Karm Abu Salem
Project number	24377 24907
Executing agencies	UNOPS
Primary Sector	Security
MASP sectors	Security, Private sector development
Total committed	24377: \$ 3,726,708.00 (=€2.608.700) (Beoordelingsmemorandum) 24907: \$ 3,726,708.00 (=€2.608.700) (Beoordelingsmemorandum) Totaal: \$7,453,416.00
Total disbursed	24377: €2.610.000 (ToR) 24907: €2.440.000 (ToR)
Start and end date	24377: 1 July 2012 – 31 August 2013 (Now extended to September 2016)(Beoordelingsmemorandum; Annual Report 2013) 24907: 15 November 2012 – 31 December 2013 (Beoordelingsmemorandum; Final Narrative report)
Geographic focus	24377: Allenby bridge crossing point border post 24907: Kerem Shalom/Karm Abu Salem border post, Gaza Strip
Information on status	24377: On hold – depending on Gol to complete the necessary infrastructure works to house and operate the scanning system. 24907: Completed
Co-funders and donor coordination at project level	No information about other funders or donors.
Partnership arrangements and governance mechanisms	The procurement action is implemented by UNOPS in close cooperation with the involved authorities from the State of Palestine and Gol, as well as the Office of the Quartet Representative (OQR).

2. Objectives and main focus	
Objectives (Sector Specific)	To increase growth opportunities for the Palestinian economy through faster transport of goods into and out of the Palestinian territories through increasing capacity at the border posts. At the same time, Israel's security is guaranteed.
Pursued outcomes	Envisaged results: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Correctly performed tender procedures (only 24377) • Correctly performed order by UNOPS and delivery by Nuctech of the scanner within the agreed time frame. (only 24907) • Sufficient capacity built within the IA and PA for good use and maintenance of machinery. • Decreased export time of products and increase of 30% in the volume of import and export products to and from the oPTs through the border post • Growth in Palestinian economy as a consequence of increase in exported and imported products.

Strategy	The Netherlands will finance a container scanner to enhance the throughput capacity of the border post Allenby Bridge and at Karem Shalom/Kerem Abu Salem. Increased transport of goods from and to the Palestinian territories is expected to further enhance economic growth. At the same time, Israel's security is guaranteed. A viable Palestinian economy is thus explicitly addressed.
Activities	<p>Procurement Action Work Package</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Detailed specifications 2. Detailed specifications approval 3. Tender documents drafting 4. Tender documents clearance (24377 only) 5. Tender (24377 only) 6. Evaluation 7. Award 8. Equipment manufacture and delivery 9. Equipment installation 10. Training on equipment operations 11. Handover of equipment and maintenance plan 12. Closure
Target groups	No information about target groups

1.7 Project Fiche Pégase

1. Basic Characteristics	
Name of Project(s)	PÉGASE DFS (Direct Financial Support)
Project number	18951 (2008-2009) 19599 (2009) 22477 (2010-2011) 24448 (2012-2013) 25056 (2012-2013) 25413 (2013) 25980 (2013-2014) Ongoing programme, but different project numbers and activity appraisal documents for every year funded by the Dutch government.
Executing agencies	Delegation of the European Commission in Jerusalem
Primary Sector	Budget Support
Sectors MASP	2008 – 2011: Good governance, including security, rule of law and human rights 2012 – 2015: Security, rule of law and human rights
Total budget committed	€14.600.000 (18951) €5.100.000, further extension to €10.000.000 (19599) €4.500.000 (22477) €5.000.000 (24448) €1.500.000 (25056) €3.500.000 (25413) €2.000.000 (25980) (Beoordelingsmemoranda)
Total disbursements	According to information from the ToR, all the above budgets were disbursed.
Start and end date	15 November 2008 – 31 march 2009 (18951) 1 April 2009 – 31 July 2009 (19599) 1 December 2010 – 1 March 2011 (22477) 1 August 2012 – 31 March 2013 (24448) 1 December 2012 – 30 March 2013 (25056) 1 May 2013 – 31 December 2013 (25413) 1 November 2013 – 30 April 2014 (25980) (Beoordelingsmemoranda)
Geographic focus	Palestinian territories
Information on status	Completed
Co-funders and donor coordination at project level	PÉGASE is open to all donors, and is managed by EUREP. According to the 2011 evaluation report, the quality of coordination and effectiveness seems to be very good on a technical level. Regular meetings take place between the Heads of Cooperation from the EUREP and the member states, as well as free exchange of information.
Partnership arrangements and governance mechanisms	Pégase is executed and implemented by the European Representation Office (EUREP). The office is supported by a small group of full time experts, both local and international.

2. Objectives and main focus	
Objectives (sector specific)	Multiple objectives are mentioned in the various project appraisal documents:

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Through payment of monthly salaries of the civil police through Pégase the Netherlands strives to contribute to reaching the objectives as stated in the PA's PRDP 2008-2010 and the NDP 2011 – 2013 • Payment of the salaries will decrease pressure on the PA's budget. • The payment of salaries through the mechanism further supports the development efforts in the Rule of Law, as mentioned as one of the sectors in the MASP 2012-2015. • Finally, Pégase gives the EU the opportunity to play a stronger and more coordinating role within the PA and the peace process. <p>In the end, it seems the overall objective is security in the Palestinian territories.</p>
Pursued outcomes	<p>Two outcomes are pursued:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Payment of salaries in the justice and security sector. • Decreasing budgetary pressure for the PA
Strategy	<p>To be able to pay salaries of the civil police and the PA in a trustworthy, controlled way through an existing allocation mechanism (set up by the European Commission in cooperation with the MoF). Funneling the Dutch donations through Pégase contributes to aid coordination and harmonization, and increases the visibility of European efforts for contributing to a <i>viable Palestinian state</i>.</p>
Activities	<p>Transferring the money to the relevant bank accounts.</p>
Target groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civil police servants • Palestinian Authority civil servants

1.8 Project Fiche Palestinian Civil Police

1. Basic Characteristics	
Name of Project(s)	EUPOL COPPS Programme Fund (20718) PCP Programme Fund (22973)
Project number	20718 (2009-2010) 22973 (2011-2013)
Executing agencies	UNOPS in close cooperation with EUPOL COPPS (and PCP)
Primary Sector	Security
MASP sectors	2008-2011: Good governance 2012-2015: Security, rule of law and human rights
Total budget committed	€2.000.000 (20718) (Activity Appraisal document) €5.000.000 (€4 million for phase 1; €1 million for phase 2) (22973) (Activity appraisal document) Total: €7.000.000
Total disbursed	20718: €2.050.000 (ToR) 22973: €4.700.000.
Start and end date	1 November 2009 – 31 December 2010 (20718) (Activity appraisal document), no cost extension until 31 December 2012 (Final narrative report) 1 July 2011 – 31 December 2013 (Phase 1: July 2011 – December 2012; Phase 2: January-December 2013) (22973), extended until 30 November 2014 (Final narrative report)
Geographic focus	Palestinian Territories
Information on status	Completed
Co-funders and donor coordination at project level	The Netherlands funded specific projects within the Palestinian Civil Police Development Programme (PCPDP). Other projects were funded by the Government of Cyprus, the Government of Italy and the Government of Finland. In the specific projects the NRO funded, the Netherlands was the only donor.
Partnership arrangements and governance mechanisms	In 2007 EUPOL COPPS (the European Police Mission) set up a Programme Fund to support the development of the Palestinian Civil Police (PCP). The EUPOL COPPS Programme Fund is formally managed by UNOPS since EUPOL COPPS is not an implementing agency. The Programme Steering Committee (PSC) is responsible for coordinating all programmatic issues related to the development needs and project based assistance for the PCP.

2. Objectives and main focus	
Objectives (Sector specific)	<p>According to the activity appraisal document of the NRO in 2009, the overall objective of the programme fund is "to enable the PCP to ensure security and safety for the society and safeguard public order with efficiency and professionalism."</p> <p>The 2011 activity appraisal document stated the envisaged outcome to be that "the PCP has the improved capacities to safely and appropriately police and serve the Palestinian people". As no programme appraisal document is available, the overall objective of the programme couldn't be retrieved.</p> <p>A third project: the Beit Leed Police Station project, falls under larger project 22973. However a separate activity appraisal document was created, and the</p>

	<p>objective of this project specifically is to: “contribute to a peaceful and more stable Palestinian territory where the PCP is able to uphold security and the rule of law in an effective and accountable manner and involves the construction and delivery of an operational police station to the PCP in Beit Lid Village.” (Project initiation document Beit Lid Police Station, 2012)</p> <p>These objectives do pursue the following issues as mentioned in the Dutch good governance sector policy:</p> <p>Capable, accountable and responsive justice and security services Security and justice institutions capable of delivering criminal justice services Cooperation within and between security and justice sector actors Equal access to and delivery of justice and security for vulnerable groups including women Capable and responsive government Criminal justice and security establishment accountable to the public Specifically focusing upon security.</p>
Pursued outcomes	<p>Pursued outcomes are mentioned as PCP 'objectives' in the 20718 & 22973 activity appraisal document are:</p> <p>Maintaining safety and security for all citizens Reducing crime and the fear of crime Securing public confidence in the rule of law and the police</p> <p>The Beit Lid project initiation document stated the following outcomes as envisaged by the sub-project:</p> <p>Construction of new Police station in Beit Lid completed Procurement of equipment in accordance with priority list Functional Police station in Beit Lid handed over to the PCP</p>
Strategy	<p>The strategy pursued by the NRO is to support the PCP in reaching its objectives through the EUPOL COPPS Programme Fund. A functioning Palestinian state is not explicitly addressed, however implicitly the above mentioned objectives all directly relate to building a functioning Palestinian state.</p>
Activities	<p>The 20718 activity appraisal document identified the following outputs for 2009, 2010 was not mentioned yet as the strategy still needed to be developed. Specific information on activities can be found in the activity appraisal document.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Equipment provided to the Special Police Force; Protection & Guarding Unit; Prison Police; EOD; Traffic Police; Criminal Investigation Department 2. Training provided to the Special Police Force; EOD; Traffic Police 3. Infrastructural projects for the PCP will start such as Model police stations and Storage Warehouses 4. Information communications and technologies: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. IT & Communications Workshop b. General IT equipment and training 5. Transportation: Final requirements of 147 vehicles for the PCP fulfilled 6. Set-up PCP training department 7. PCP Organisational Development Unit up and running <p>The 22973 activity appraisal document identified the following outputs for 2010-2012, however the outputs for 2013 were not yet known at the time as this depended on the new strategy. No information is found on the 2013</p>

	<p>outputs. Specific information on activities can be found in the activity appraisal document.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. HR Administration: The PCP has a functioning HR system that allows them to work in a transparent and accountable manner. 2. Police station in Beit Leed: a new police station is constructed and fully operational in Beit Leed village. 3. Guarding and protection administration: the necessary capacities and procedures are in place for the guarding and protection administration to execute its duties and responsibilities. 4. DCOs in all districts are organised and the capacities and procedures in place to fully execute its duties and responsibilities as the focal point the overall PCP coordination with the Israeli Police. 5. Juvenile Police: Juveniles are treated by the PCP in accordance with international standards. 6. Radio system management and maintenance: PCP has the capacity to completely manage and maintain the radio communications infrastructure with internal resources, and with funding from the Palestinian National Authority. 7. Operations rooms and patrolling: a functional operations rooms command and control system is developed and the patrols have the capacity to execute their function in reactive, proactive and preventive policing.
Target groups	Palestinian Civil Police

1.9 Project Fiche Access to Justice

1. Basic Characteristics	
Name of Project(s)	Strengthening the Rule of Law and Access to Justice for the Palestinian People (Access to Justice)
Project number	21604 25145
Executing agencies	United Nations Development Programme/Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People (UNDP/PAPP)
Primary Sector	Rule of Law
MASP Sectors	2008-2011: Good governance (including security, rule of law, and human rights) 2012-2015: Security, rule of law and human rights
Total budget	€2.000.000 (21604) (Appraisal document) €720.000 (25145) (Extension appraisal document) Total: €2.720.000
Total disbursements	€ 2.120.000 (21604) (ToR) €1.260.000 (25154) (ToR)
Start and end date	1 June 2010 – 31 December 2011(21604) –extended to December 2012. 1 Jan 2013 – 31 August 2013 (25145) (Final report)
Geographic focus	West Bank & Gaza Strip
Information on status	First phase of the programme ended. Second phase programme ongoing (2013-2016)
Co-funders and donor coordination at project level	CIDA/Canada: \$7,019,168.91 Sida/Sweden: \$7,084,137.68 NRO: \$4,372,200.00 Japan: \$756,369.00 Luxembourg: \$132,112.00 BCPR (Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP): \$2,870,680.00 Total: \$22,234,668.59
Partnership arrangements and governance mechanisms	For all elements of the programme, UNDP will work closely with national counterparts.

2. Objectives and main focus	
Objectives (Sector specific)	Strengthened institutional capacity of Palestinian justice system to uphold the rule of law and improve access to justice through legal empowerment of the poor and disadvantaged.
Pursued Outcomes	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Capacity of rule of law institutions strengthened 2. Access to justice at local and grassroots level enhanced 3. Gender and juvenile justice improved 4. Rule of law in Gaza Strip initiated as part of early recovery and reconstruction plans 5. Confidence building among stakeholders within and dependent on the justice system promoted
Strategy	According to the project appraisal document, the UNDP/PAPP programme advocates and promotes the 'rule of law' and 'justice' in the heart of ordinary people in the occupied Palestinian territory so that they can proactively redress rights, abuses and injustice. The programme focuses on the gradual

	<p>preparation for a State of Palestine in the future, as envisaged in the Programme of the Thirteenth Government titled <i>Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State</i>, whilst, to some extent, making an attempt to offer immediate solutions to unfair and unjust situations. As such a functioning Palestinian state is explicitly addressed.</p> <p>The programme has been carefully designed to address existing gaps that have received relatively modest support by the international community through three main entry points: 1) institutional capacity development of the Ministry of Justice at the policy level; 2) enhanced access to justice at local and grassroots level; and 3) building confidence amongst communities in their justice providers.</p>
Activities	See Annex 1.
Target groups	<p>Target groups not specifically identified, generally Palestinian populations across the oPt, namely in Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, however some target groups are more specifically targeted within certain intended outputs.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gender and youth are a specific target group, cross-cutting different aspects of the programme • CSOs and semi-autonomous institutions are actively strengthened • Create and strengthen synergies with already existing or nascent initiatives by UNDP/PAPP such as the Capacity Development Initiative (CDI), the gender justice component of the MDG Fund, Gender and capacity development of the PNA institutions.

Annex 1: Outcomes, intermediate outcomes and activities²⁰⁸

Intermediate outcome	Activity
1.1 Capacity of the Ministry of Justice reviewed and strengthened	1.1.1 Update the previous needs assessment study
	1.1.2 Assess current staff capacity and develop and implement a human resources plan
	1.1.3 Support MoJ in establishing an advisory council as a consultative body
	1.1.4 Provide support to developing an implementation plan for the needs identified with timeframe through the advisory council
	1.1.5 Conduct periodic review of the implementation of the plan and revise accordingly, if needed.
	1.1.6 Assess training needs of MoJ staff.
	1.1.7 Conduct periodic training for the staff to enhance capacities.
1.2 Support to MoJ to lead the drafting of a new justice sector strategy provided.	1.2.1 Support MoJ to establish a justice sector strategy team.
	1.2.2 Support MoJ to facilitate regular and periodic meetings of the team.
	1.2.3 Support to MoJ and MoWA to ensure gender-sensitiveness of the strategy.
	1.2.4 Support to MoJ and MoYS to ensure youth-sensitiveness of the strategy.
	1.2.5 Support to MoJ and the team to produce a first draft by 10 January 2010.
	1.2.6 Continue to provide support to the finalization of the justice sector strategy until its final approval by the cabinet.
1.3 Implementation of 'Justice for the Future' project ensured.	1.3.1 Review the criteria to provide scholarships to potential students who would like to pursue post-graduate studies in law from West Bank and Gaza Strip.
	1.3.2 Create tripartite partnerships among MoJ, UNDP and national and international academic institutions.
	1.3.3 Provide 10-15 scholarships per year through a competitive process.
	1.3.4 Upon the completion of the study, continue to provide support for their internship/traineeship opportunities in relevant institutions, including MoJ.
	1.3.5 Conduct periodic review of the process and revise accordingly, if needed.
1.4 Development and implementation of a legal aid policy supported.	1.4.1 Support MoJ to create partnerships with key legal aid service providers.
	1.4.2 Support MoJ to pilot review cases and analyze them.
	1.4.3 Update MoJ on monthly statistics of cases received and clients visited in legal aid clinics (See output 2)
	1.4.4 Provide training to MoJ staff on legal aid.
	1.4.5 Support MoJ to initiate developing a state legal aid policy.
	1.4.6 Support MoJ to prepare a draft.
	1.4.7 Support MoJ to conduct public consultations on the draft policy.
	1.4.8 Support MoJ to revise and finalise the policy, including the future of legal aid clinics, for submission to the cabinet.
1.5 Legislative drafting skills enhanced	1.5.1 Identify existing tools and curricula.
	1.5.2 Deploy a short-term expert on legislative drafting.

²⁰⁸ For more information on output indicators, responsible parties and budget see Project appraisal document.

Intermediate outcome	Activity
	1.5.3 Advisory council to identify required legislation (to be) drafted by MoJ.
	1.5.4 Conduct pilot review and/or drafting of the identified legislation.
	1.5.5 Conduct periodic review of the training and revise accordingly, if needed.
	1.5.6 Assess the current status of the Bureau of Legal Counsel and Legislation (Diwan al-Fatwa waTashri)
	1.5.7 Provide needed support to strengthen the Bureau
1.6 Public awareness on MoJ's work raised and access to relevant legal information by the public enhanced.	1.6.1 Facilitate establishing partnerships between MoJ and public and private media institutes and advocacy groups
	1.6.2 Review the existing legal database (i.e. Al Muqtafi) and provide support to strengthen it in discussion with Institute of Law of Birzeit University and MoJ.
	1.6.3 Launch regular and periodic public campaign on MoJ's work and existing sources of legal information in the oPt in the user-friendly format.
	1.6.4 Conduct review of the advocacy strategy and revise accordingly, if needed.
1.7 Capacity of the Attorney-General's Office (AGO) strengthened, specific to planning capacity.	1.7.1 Provide support to the establishment and strengthening of the Planning and Project Management Unit.
	1.7.2 Recruit and deploy a planning and project manager, a donor relations officer and an administrative assistant.
	1.7.3 Procure needed equipment for the Unit.
1.8 Capacity of the High Judicial Council strengthened ²⁰⁹	
2.1 Legal aid services provided and strengthened, particularly for the poor and disadvantaged	2.1.1 Establish a clear mechanism on financing modality and profile of service providers and beneficiaries in close consultation with MoJ, PBA and other relevant partners.
	2.1.2 Facilitate establishment of a strategic partnership among MoJ, PBA and UNDP on provision of legal aid services.
	2.1.3 Establish details of the clinics, including members, payments, priority cases, database management, criteria of beneficiaries etc.
	2.1.4 Provide support to PBA in establishing six legal clinics in its branch offices.
	2.1.5 Create and manage database and conduct statistical analysis on a monthly basis on cases registered, case handling (formal/informal), gender- and age-disaggregated data, costs etc.
	2.1.6 Employ and deploy trainees enrolled in the two year diploma course as paralegals through scholarships.
	2.1.7 Collaborate with MoJ and PBA to organise public outreach sessions on available legal aid services.
	2.1.8 Establish partnership with CSOs, CBOs and university law faculties to create synergies with their ongoing legal work and to reach out to the wider range of the public.
	2.1.9 Organise regular and periodic community of practice meetings to identify gaps in each region.
	2.1.10 Facilitate close cooperation between legal aid service providers and MoJ for policy formulation.
2.2 Legal literacy and awareness	2.2.1 Review the existing channels for public outreach to improve legal

²⁰⁹ Only mentioned in evaluation, not in programme document/BEMO

Intermediate outcome	Activity
for rights holders and duty bearers improved.	literacy.
	2.2.2 Identify partners to strengthen ongoing efforts (e.g. Legal Encounter Day) and widen the scope for both rights holders and duty bearers.
	2.2.3 Provide support to CSOs to strengthen their advocacy role in relevant subject areas.
	2.2.4 Launch public and media campaigns on legal rights and duties, particularly targeting the population in rural areas and marginalised and disadvantaged groups.
	2.2.5 Organise regular and periodic community-level information sharing meetings involving people at local and grassroots levels, including women and youth.
2.3 Models for potential linkages between formal and informal justice systems reviewed and developed.	2.3.1 Commission a study that provides models for linkages between formal and informal justice systems
	2.3.2 In collaboration with CSOs and law students, design and implement documentation systems for informal justice.
	2.3.3 Hold a series of public consultations based on the materials collected.
	2.3.4 Assist MoJ in research on policy options regarding rapprochement of formal and informal justice systems, based on recommendations of the study
	2.3.5 Conduct consultative sessions on proposed policy options on informal justice systems with academics and researchers involved in the study and actors involved in the justice system.
	2.3.6 Support finalization of the policy.
	2.3.7 Design and implement training initiatives for informal justice actors on citizens' rights, especially on issues pertaining to women and youth.
	2.3.8 Support establishing a regular channel between formal and informal justice providers to improve mutual understanding.
1. Gender and juvenile justice improved	
3.1 Legislation related to gender justice and its enforcement reviewed	3.1.1 Provide a background study to list legislation related to gender justice, including GBV.
	3.1.2 Prioritise legislation for pilot review (e.g. civil service law, family law)
	3.1.3 Commission and pilot audit of processing GBV cases in three municipalities (northern, central and southern) in partnership with relevant CSOs.
	3.1.4 Hold a series of territory-wide, multi-stakeholder public consultations.
	3.1.5 Draft recommendations for submission to MoJ and MoWA.
	3.1.6 Organise a conference at regional level on gender justice.
3.2 Formulation and adoption of a national policy on youth and adolescent supported in partnership with others	3.2.1 Commission and pilot audit of processing juvenile cases in three municipalities (northern, central and southern) in partnership with relevant agencies (e.g. UNICEF) and CSOs.
	3.2.2 Hold a series of territory-wide, multi-stakeholder public consultation on youth-specific rights.
	3.2.3 Support the adoption of a national policy on youth and adolescent by MoYS in cooperation with UNICEF and other relevant partners.
3.3 Gender and juvenile justice strategy and action plan developed.	3.3.1 Advise MoJ and MoWA on formulating a draft gender justice strategy and action plans based on the recommendations of the conference (See 3.1.6)

Intermediate outcome	Activity
	3.3.2 Assist MoJ in establishing agreement with Ministry of Health for coordination on forensic medicine for GBV-related investigation.
	3.3.3 Advise MoJ and MoYS on formulating a draft national policy on youth and adolescent and action plans.
	3.3.4 Assist MoJ in establishing agreement with Ministry of Education for strengthening rule of law aspects in school curricula.
	3.3.5 Hold a series of territory-wide, multi-stakeholder public consultation.
	3.3.6 Support MoJ, MoWA and MoYS for adoption of the respective strategy and action plans based on consultations.
	3.3.7 Support for the implementation through providing technical assistance.
3.4 Capacity of law enforcement officers and legal professionals on gender justice, specific to GBV, developed.	3.4.1 Recruit a GBV legal specialist
	3.4.2 Assess training needs of law enforcement officers and legal professionals on handling cases in a gender-sensitive manner.
	3.4.3 Design and launch short-term courses for them.
	3.4.4 Evaluate each course upon completion of training for revision.
	3.4.5 Harmonise efforts for GBV with MDG-F on women and MoWA.
	3.4.6 Co-participate in developing a training curriculum on prevention of violence against women.
	3.4.7 Co-host training on provision of assistance for GBV victims for judicial actors.
2. Rule of law in Gaza Strip initiated as part of early recovery and reconstruction plan.	
4.1 Capacity of CSOs to deliver legal aid services and to conduct civic education strengthened.	4.1.1 Assess the current situation in Gaza Strip specific to CSOs' activities on rule of law and access to justice issues.
	4.1.2 Hold a workshop on the results of the assessment.
	4.1.3 Identify criteria for selection of CSO partners for approval by the Programme Board
	4.1.4 Select CSOs, according to the approved criteria, working on the provision of legal services for strategic partnership.
	4.1.5 Establish coordination mechanism (e.g. legal aid network in Gaza) between CSOs and relevant agencies and organizations working on provision of legal services.
	4.1.6 Facilitate cooperation between this network and the legal aid clinic (See Output 2)
	4.1.7 Provide support to the selected CSOs to strengthen their role in advocacy on citizens' legal rights and as alternative justice service providers.
	4.1.8 Assess training needs of CSOs.
	4.1.9 Conduct training with periodic review for improvement.
	4.1.10 Design civic education curricula on rule of law and access to justice, with particular focus on youth in partnership with UNICEF, UNRWA, CSOs and other relevant actors.
	4.1.11 Implement civic education activities, particularly targeting women, youth and disadvantaged groups.
4.2 Capacity of PNA judges and prosecutors reviewed and strengthened	
4.3 Legal literacy and human rights	

Intermediate outcome	Activity
awareness enhanced	
4.4 Accountability mechanisms put in place	
4.5 Human rights advocacy promoted ²¹⁰	
3. Confidence building among stakeholders within and dependent on the justice system promoted.	
5.1 advocacy capacity of CSOs strengthened.	5.1.1 Assess the existing networking and coordination mechanisms in East Jerusalem, Gaza Strip and West Bank.
	5.1.2 Provide support to liaise between them more effectively.
	5.1.3 Provide support to develop, strengthen and implement an advocacy strategy
	5.1.4 Support partners to share best practices.
	5.1.5 Create regular channels for interface with the PNA (e.g. media offices) to improve mutual understanding.
	5.1.6 Create regular channels for interface with citizens to raise awareness.
	5.1.7 Review and evaluate the strategy and mechanisms for improvement.
5.2 Measurements and strategies for public confidence in justice service providers developed.	5.2.1 Conduct a baseline survey on access, awareness, perception, confidence and unmet needs ,with specific focus on the needs of vulnerable groups.
	5.2.2 Establish data-gathering and feedback mechanisms at the regional level and pilot in six cities (where legal aid clinics are established).
	5.2.3 Conduct analysis of the data and support the institutionalization of monitoring and developing response strategies.
	5.2.4 Provide support to strengthen the existing code of conduct for justice sector actors.
5.3 Citizens' access to justice service and information improved.	5.3.1 Identify laws, role of relevant institutions, legal procedures etc. for public knowledge.
	5.3.2 Coordinate with key PNA ministries, other judicial institutions, universities, NGOs, etc. on creative strategies.
	5.3.3 Organise public outreach sessions for the population in six pilot cities on the areas identified (e.g. national and international laws, legal recourse) based on the strategies adopted.
	5.3.4 Monitor regularly and periodically the number of population who chooses to seek legal advice and go through the justice system.
5.4 Efforts to achieve legal harmonization and consistency of legal systems throughout the oPt initiated	5.4.1 Provide forum for dialogue via video conference for legal professionals in East Jerusalem, Gaza Strip and West Bank.
	5.4.2 Liaise this network with CSO network.
	5.4.3 Commission a study to identify a suitable model for the oPt
	5.4.4 Draft recommendation for suitable model for harmonization for submission to MoJ, based on the results of the study.
	5.4.5 Assist MoJ in formulating and drafting of policy options.
	5.4.6 Facilitate holding consultation specific for legal professionals on the harmonization options.
	5.4.7 Facilitate territory-wide public consultation on the harmonization options.

²¹⁰ 4.2 – 4.5 not mentioned in project proposal document, only in evaluation report

Intermediate outcome	Activity
	5.4.8 Support MoJ to adopt a harmonization policy should a unity government be established.
	5.4.9 Conduct training/sensitization sessions for legal professionals
	5.4.10 Conduct training/sensitization sessions for CSOs.

1.10 Project Fiche MDLF: CDSF & EMSRP II

1. Basic Characteristics	
Name of Project(s)	MDLF - Community Development Stability Fund (CDSF) (19028) MDLF – Emergency Municipal Services Rehabilitation Project II (EMSRP II) (15750)
Project number(s)	19028 15750
Executing agencies	Municipal Development and Lending Fund
Primary Sector evaluation	Rule of Law
MASP sectors	MASP 2008-2011: Good governance, including security, rule of law and human rights
Total budget committed	<u>19028</u> : €5,000,000 (Appraisal document) <u>15750</u> : €5,000,000 (Appraisal document) Total: €10,000,000
Total disbursed	<u>19028</u> : €5,000,000 (ToR) <u>15750</u> : €3,290,000 (ToR)
Start and end date	<u>19028</u> : 1 December 2008 – 30 September 2009; extended until June 2010 due to the fact that the approval of the sub-projects took more time than expected and the Hebron Municipality needed more time to complete its Central Parking garage sub-project. (Completion Report) <u>15750</u> : 1 February 2007 – 31 January 2009; extended until June 2011 to enable the completion of the parking meter pilot and to enable the implementation of the additional US\$3 million funding for Gaza. (Completion report)
Geographic focus	West Bank & Gaza Strip
Information on status	Projects completed, MDLF still operating.
Co-funders and donor coordination at project level	<u>19028</u> : The Netherlands is the only funder. <u>15750</u> : Multiple funders, coordinated by the World Bank: World Bank: \$10 million Netherlands: \$6.17 million Germany (KfW): \$21.0 million Sweden (Sida): \$8.0 million Trust Fund through the World Bank (Denmark and IDA): \$8.0 million
Partnership arrangements and governance mechanisms	The MDLF acts as the implementing partner in both projects.
2. Objectives and main focus	
Objectives (+ sector specific)	<u>19028</u> : The objective of the project is to consolidate stability and to improve living conditions at the local level through quick impact socio-economic development projects in areas affected by emergency conditions. <u>15750</u> : The objectives of EMSRP II (According to the project appraisal document) were to: a. Provide assistance for mitigating further deterioration in the delivery of essential municipal services in the West Bank and Gaza. b. Create temporary job opportunities at the local level. c. Promote pilot initiatives that foster collaboration among local

	<p>governments and NGOs and promote municipal cost recovery.</p> <p>Regarding the sector specific objectives as mentioned in the MASP, the above objectives pursue the sector specific objective of: <i>Capable and responsive government</i>.</p>
Envisaged outcomes	<p><u>19028</u>: No clear envisaged outcomes are stated in the activity appraisal document of the NRO (and we do not have the project appraisal document of the MDLF CFDS project itself), however the following goals are described:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Positive impact on the living conditions of the Palestinian population in the north of the West Bank • Support to the security and safety measures of the Palestinian Authority • Positive political signal to both the population and the Palestinian Authority • Support of the existing allocation mechanism of the Palestinian Authority <p><u>15750</u>: For this project no clear envisaged outcomes are stated either in the activity appraisal document of the NRO, nor in the project appraisal document of the World Bank. The latter does however state four 'Windows' or project components through which the funds were dispersed in the first phase. These are the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Municipal Grants for Capital Investments 2. Support to Municipal Innovations and Efficiency 3. Capacity Building 4. Programme Management (including M&E, Audits, Technical Assistance to municipalities) <p>The Netherlands contributed to the first window: Municipal grants for Capital Investments. However, these are not envisaged outcomes but rather subdivisions within the project.</p>
Strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The MDLF (Municipal Development and Lending Fund) was created to accelerate Palestine's drive toward self-sustained, decentralised, prosperous and creditworthy local government (MDLF website). The projects that are implemented by the MDLF also serve this purpose. • A functioning Palestinian state is explicitly addressed in the Dutch activity appraisal documents as part of the reasons to support the CDSF and the EMSRP II.
Activities	<p><u>19028</u>: Specific outputs or activities were not mentioned in the Dutch Activity Appraisal document (BEMO). In the completion report (2010) the following sub-projects were mentioned:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jenin: Paving of Internal Roads • Qabatya: Rehabilitation and Expansion of Water Network • Al-Yamun: Paving of Al-Yamun – Al-Hashimiya Road and Internal Roads • Yabad: Paving of internal roads • Arraba: Rehabilitation of Internal Roads • Seelet Al Hartheyya: Paving and Developing of Internal Roads • Jaba'a: Maintenance of Water Network and Construction of Pumping Station • Kufor Ra'ie: Rehabilitation of internal roads • Meithalun: Paving of internal roads • Seelet Ad Daher: Paving of Internal Roads • Borqin: Construction drainage system • Az Zababedah: Paving of by-pass access road • Hebron: Central Parking <p><u>15750</u>: The Dutch activity appraisal document mentioned the following sector indicators, which can be linked to activities:</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development of a more equitable and transparent municipal finance system, building on the development of MDLF established under EMSRP • MDLF mainstreams rules-based system for intergovernmental fiscal transfers • EAP Access Criteria provides incentive to municipalities to improve budgetary reporting to improve sector monitoring and transparency in financial resource management • Donor Consultative Forum established, linked to the Municipal Development and Lending Fund to serve as a programmatic framework for mobilising and coordinating donor assistance to local governments; • Increased intergovernmental transfers and increased donor aid mobilised through the Municipal Fund; • Improved municipal service coverage.
<p>Target groups</p>	<p><u>19028</u>: No clear mention is made of the target group of the CDSF. However, in the completion report the following municipalities are named under the sub-projects: Jenin, Qabatya, Al-Yamun, Yabad, Arraba, Seelet Al Hartheyya, Jaba'a, Kufor Ra'ie, Meithalun, Seelet Ad Daher, Borqin, Az Zababedah and Hebron.</p> <p><u>15750</u>: According to the activity appraisal document (BEMO) the direct target group are 132 municipalities, whose services benefit 70% of the population of the West bank and the Gaza strip. Indirect beneficiary is the MDLF as it will be preserved for the future.</p>

1.11 Project Fiche HR/GG Secretariat

1. Basic Characteristics	
Name of Project(s)	RAM NDC Human Rights-Good Governance Secretariat I & II
Project number	17962 21250 25290
Executing agencies	NGO Development Centre (NDC)
Primary Sector	Human Rights
MASP sectors	MASP 2008-2011: Good governance (including security, rule of law and human rights) MASP 2012-2015: Security, rule of law and human rights MASP 2014-2017: Security, rule of law and human rights
Total budget committed	€1.110.000 (17962) (Appraisal document) €3.285.000 (21250) (Activity appraisal document) €640.000 (25290) (Appraisal document) Total: €5.035.000
Total disbursements	€1.030.000 (17962) (Appraisal document) €2.590.000 (21250) (Activity appraisal document) €500.000 (25290) (Appraisal document) Total: €4,120.000
Start and end date	1 July 2008 – 31 December 2009 (17962) (Appraisal document; Slotdocument) 1 May 2010 – 30 June 2013 (21250) (Activity appraisal document) 1 January 2013 – 30 June 2014 (25290) (Appraisal document)
Geographic focus	Palestinian territories
Information on status	Completed
Co-funders and donor coordination at project level	Donors 2005-2008: Austria, Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland Donors since 2008: Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands
Partnership arrangements and governance mechanisms	The HR/GG Secretariat, also called Mu'assasat ,is the main executing agency but management of the Secretariat has been executed by different parties: - 2006-2008 Copenhagen Development Consulting (CDC) - 2008-2013 NGO Development Center (NDC) - 2014-2017: NIRAS NATURA AB

2. Objectives and main focus	
Objectives (Sector specific)	The overall objective of the programme is to improve human rights and good governance in the oPt. In its objectives, this programme is more human rights than good governance focused. It supports the projects that will <i>in turn</i> support the objectives of good governance such as capable security and justices services. The HR/GG secretariat will directly pursue civic participation to hold public actors within justice and security sector accountable, by providing grants for Palestinian NGOs that are working to promote and protect human rights/good governance.
Envisaged Outcomes	Certain specific objectives were mentioned in the BEMO documents: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To channel pooled donor funding to Israeli and Palestinian NGOs that are

	<p>working to promote and protect Human Rights/Good Governance (HR/GG) in oPt.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To provide and facilitate services in support to HR/GG NGOs like: a) the facilitation, mentoring, coordination of partnerships among the local NGOs, as well as with international HR NGOs; and b) technical assistance and other capacity building measures, to improve their individual and collective effectiveness, thereby contributing to the further development of the HR/GG sector. To facilitate and strengthen the policy dialogue between HR/GG sector in oPt. and Donors/Diplomatic Missions.
Strategy	<p>A functioning Palestinian state is not explicitly the goal of this programme. Rather it is promoting human rights and good governance as <i>part of</i> a functioning Palestinian state.</p>
Activities	<p>The following are the main activities to be implemented:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> drafting of the detailed criteria for selection; selection and awarding of core funding NGOs; selection and awarding of small grant facility; managing the NGO activity including financial management and disbursement arrangement; monitoring the implementation of the NGO activity; coordinating a Human Rights sector development initiatives programme; implement a joint capacity building programme; develop and maintain a database on the human rights organisations in the oPt; implement quarterly policy dialogue meetings between partner NGOs and donors; conduct quarterly thematic HR seminars for the entire sector; and reporting to the donors. <p>(Bemo 17962)</p>
Target groups	<p>The direct beneficiaries of the donor funds are the Secretariat and the NGOs that are funded through the secretariat and/or receive capacity building help from the secretariat (and/or benefit from facilitation by secretariat of political dialogue with diplomatic missions/donors). A total of 110 grants from the total budget of \$ 22,230,000 were allocated to both Palestinian and Israeli NGO's in the field of Human Rights and Good Governance (HR/GG). (Evaluation Report 2013)</p>

1.12 Project Fiche ICHR

1. Basic Characteristics	
Name of Project(s)	Core Support to The Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR)
Project number	17362 (2008-2010) 22500 (2011, EXT) 22886 (2011-2013) 25813 (2014-2016) (Activity appraisal documents)
Executing agencies	The Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR)
Primary Sector	Human Rights
MASP sectors	2008 - 2011: Good governance, including security, rule of law and human rights 2012 – 2015: Security, rule of law and human rights 2014 – 2017: Security, rule of law and human rights
Total committed	€926.005,66 (17362) €148.451,80 (22500) €900.000 (22886) €1.200.800 (25813) Total: €3.175.258,46
Total disbursed	17362: €890.000 22500: €140.000 22886: €800.000 25813: €400.000 Total: € 2.230.000
Start and end date	1 May 2008 – 31 December 2010 (17362) 1 January 2011 – 30 June 2011 (22500) 1 July 2011 – 31 December 2013 (22886) 1 January 2014 – 31 December 2016 (25813) (Activity appraisal documents)
Geographic focus	Occupied Palestinian Territories
Information on status	The final project (25813) is still ongoing, the rest is completed.
Co-funders and donor coordination at project level	The projects are funded by multiple donors: The Netherlands Representative Office, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Switzerland.
Partnership arrangements and governance mechanisms	N/A

Support to ICHR is divided in four phases. The objectives and main focus points will thus also be divided into these four separate phases.

2.1 Objectives and main focus 17362 (2008 – 2010)	
Objectives (Sector level)	The overall vision of the ICHR is as follows: "An independent state of Palestine where the rule of law and equality before the law prevail and human rights and freedoms of all individuals are protected, promoted and honored." The following overall goal has been established to follow up on the vision: "To establish respect for human rights and basic freedoms in Palestine as

	<p>guaranteed by international declarations and conventions.”</p> <p>These goals correspond with the objectives of the Dutch government for achievement of a functioning Palestinian state, pursuing capable, accountable and responsive justice and security services; capable and responsive government; and civic participation to hold public actors within justice and security sector accountable.</p>
Envisaged Outcomes	<p>Strategic objectives mentioned in the strategy document are the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) To establish and enhance ICHR’s role as a national human rights commission that also operates as Ombudsman for human rights violations, with the following programmes: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. A well functioning programme of monitoring of legislations and national policies. b. A well functioning awareness building and educational program c. A well functioning investigation and complaints program 2) To bolster ICHR efficiency, sustainability and independence, with a well functioning and sustainable Institution-Building Programme
Strategy	<p>ICHR will achieve the above through adopting the following strategies:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitor human rights conditions in the oPT, through monitoring the performance of the three branches of power in relation to human rights; the extent of compliance of public authorities to the Commissions’ recommendations; and monitoring legislation to ensure that it conforms to international standards and the Basic Law; • Promote and strengthen human rights culture, through educating the public, government officials, groups most vulnerable to human rights violations and groups that need a system that strengthens their knowledge of human rights; • Seek to protect human rights through receiving and addressing complaints, including the possibility of resorting to courts. • Seek PA gradual funding, adaption of ICHR law and developing the role of the Board of Commissioners
Activities (Performance indicators for the outputs)	<p>The following outputs are expected:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Production of the following reports: the Annual Human Rights Report; Special reports on patterns of violations; Monitoring reports of law-enforcement in fair trials; Legal reports on the compliance of legislation to international standards; fact-finding reports; and national inquiry reports; • Legislations, draft laws, presidential decrees, and PA agreements reviewed; legal letters and memorandum issued; • Complaints satisfactorily handled; Human rights cases filed by ICHR at courts; human rights violations database developed; • Prisons regularly visited and report produced; • Media strategy developed and implemented; coalitions and alliances locally and internationally developed; • Publication and distribution of press releases; promotional materials; human rights magazine; monthly newsletter; • Public hearing sessions and open hall meetings conducted; • Specialised human rights training as well as training of trainers conducted; • ICHR structure implemented; job descriptions, manuals, financial system and bylaws revised; Board of Commissioners activated; PA gradual funding secured; and ICHR law approved.
Target groups	<p>The main target groups of the work of the Commission are Palestinians living</p>

	<p>in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.</p> <p>Specific target groups of ICHR are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Persons with disabilities; • Women victims of violence; • The pillars of the justice & security sector in developing capacities of official institutions in handling cases of women victims of violence and women in conflict with the law, and undertaking their responsibilities in compliance with human rights principles; • Civil society organisations, especially human rights organisations; • The bar association to develop the capacities of human rights defenders and new lawyers in dealing with human rights issues.
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2.2 Objectives and main focus 22500 (January – June 2011)	
Objectives (Sector level)	As this project is an extension of the previous project, its objectives are the same as of project 17362.
Envisaged Outcomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategic plan 2011-2013 and budget with clear priorities, results framework and indicators are produced as a result of revisiting ICHR's draft Strategic Plan. • ICHR's 16th Annual Report on the Status of Human Rights in Palestine during 2010 produced and distributed to the President and the PLC, and recommendations are followed up with the relevant authorities. • Human Rights Violations in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are monitored and documented. • Citizens' complaints on specific human rights violations received and interventions with relevant authorities are made. • Policies and legislation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are monitored.
Strategy	By providing extra funding to ensure the project can keep going over the bridging period between project 17362 and project 22886.
Activities	<p>Performance indicators:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Donor approval to the produced Strategic Plan 2011- 2013 and Budget that have clear priorities, results framework and indicators by end of April 2011. • Number of monthly human rights situation reports produced and distributed. • Number of regular prisons, detention centers and penitentiaries visit (West Bank and Gaza Strip) • Number of complaints handled
Target groups	Same as 17362.

2.3 Objectives and main focus 22886 (July 2011 – December 2013)	
Objectives (Sector level)	<p>Envisaged outcome:</p> <p>Promoting and protecting the rule of law and human rights through supporting the only official and independent national human rights institution in the Palestine Areas, the Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR).</p> <p>This corresponds to the sector level objectives of the NRO (see objectives 17362).</p>
Envisaged Outcomes	Between 2011 and 2013, the ICHR carried out a strategic plan in which it defined two goals:

	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) The position of ICHR as the Palestinian National Institution of human rights will be consolidated by strengthening the core functions of the organization. 2) On a different level the ICHR will seek to fortify the internal procedures and processes of the organization in order to strengthen ICHR and increase its ability to fulfill its mandate.
Strategy	<p>To reach the two goals, the Strategic Plan identified seven Strategic Objectives.</p> <p><i>Strategic objective 1: Further enhance monitoring and reporting</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Maintain wide access by Palestinians to complaint mechanisms b) Maximise the effects of current complaints and documentation c) Strengthen focus on vulnerable groups (women and disabled) d) Increase systematic monitoring of Courts <p><i>Strategic objective 2: Strengthen effectiveness of interventions</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Strengthen mechanisms of follow up (more specific recommendations, more intensive follow up by Commissioners) b) Enhance the consultative role c) Increase judicial intervention <p><i>Strategic objective 3: Consolidate the promotion of human rights.</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Optimise media and internet platforms to disseminate the culture of human rights b) Increase targeted co-operation and engagement with authorities in training c) Strengthen the engagement with human rights NGO <p><i>Strategic objective 4: Ensure the independence of ICHR</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Fortify the legal basis of the Commission b) Maintaining the Role of ICHR as a Mediator between Civil Society and Palestinian Authorities c) Continue to meet the requirements set by regional and international networks and mechanisms of national institutions (Paris Principles) d) Ensure sustainable funding of the organization <p><i>Strategic objective 5: Maximise the effects of activities and capacities</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Approve and implement new administrative and financial procedures b) Ensure good governance and transparency c) Strengthen internal checks and balances d) Strengthen decision-making and management <p><i>Strategic objective 6: Strengthen transparency and good governance of ICHR</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Strengthen control mechanisms with quality of programs and cost-efficiency b) Centralise and raise the quality of systematic document handling c) Improve support, flow of capacity and materials between centralised office and regional offices d) Improve targeted external access to ICHR material <p><i>Strategic objective 7: Further empower the staff in the field of human rights</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Increase institutional capacities b) Strengthen specialised capacities relevant to the core functions of ICHR, with particular emphasis on gender and disabilities c) Attract and retain highly qualified staff d) Prepare for future human rights audit of budget of Palestinian Authority
Activities	<p><i>Strategic objective 1: Further enhance monitoring and reporting</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Centralization of data-bank and information collection

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Inquiry on the rights on the person on disabilities • Revision of the Complaints Manual • Develop Manual for monitoring of cases with indicators for due process • Develop Manual for visit of detention centers / monitoring prisons & detention centers <p><i>Strategic objective 2: Strengthen effectiveness of interventions</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop an internal media strategy for handling issues where other initiatives and measures have not succeeded • Introduce section of appraisal and criticism, increasingly specific recommendations in the annual report • Initiate project with the Courts preparing a supportive role as a friend of the Court (amicus curiae) <p><i>Strategic objective 3: Consolidate the promotion of human rights.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop web-pages, promotion of the web-pages (planning 2011, realization 2012) • Develop internal media – strategy with clear performance indicators (based on 2011 survey) • Internal strategy identifying targeted training programs where the Commission has a particular advantage, concentrate capacity, institutionalise training models in these targeted area • Introduce network of cooperation (engagement) with NGOs for outsourcing training in other areas of priority • Develop pool of trainers for training of civil society, with emphasis on gender and disabilities <p><i>Strategic objective 4: Ensure the independence of ICHR</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Revise and update the draft law and by-laws of ICHR • Prepare amended version of the Palestinian law for ICHR to present to the PLC in case it resumes its work • Various cooperation-initiatives with civil society (combating policing state, specific targeted rights areas such as torture, combating violence against women), retaining the distinguished role of ICHR • Adopt a clear and open policy statement on how ICHR will relate to the Gaza authorities • Revitalise the relationship with the donors - increase clarity of rights, responsibilities and duties in the relationship with the donors <p><i>Strategic objective 5: Maximise the effects of activities and capacities</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Revise and update the draft law and by-laws of ICHR • Prepare amended version of the Palestinian law for ICHR to present to the PLC in case it resumes its work • Various cooperation-initiatives with civil society (combating policing state, specific targeted rights areas such as torture, combating violence against women), retaining the distinguished role of ICHR • Adopt a clear and open policy statement on how ICHR will relate to the Gaza authorities • Revitalise the relationship with the donors - increase clarity of rights, responsibilities and duties in the relationship with the donors <p><i>Strategic objective 6: Strengthen transparency and good governance of ICHR</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Appointment of internal auditor • Finalise the administrative and financial manual (supplemented by the Governmental systems in handling public funds) • Develop internal guidelines that clarifies the responsibilities of decision
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	<p>making bodies within the Organization – the executive team and the technical team</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Initiate process to discuss changes to the function of Commissioner General • Further develop bylaws regulating the work of the Board of Commissioners • Increase dissemination of information within the organization (Board and other decision-making bodies recommendations and decisions available to staff) • Highlight administrative and financial operations in the narrative report • Establish clear guidelines defining roles and formal delegations, empowerment of senior and middle managers and team building. • Adopt a management principle of consultation and participation in decision making (administrative manual) • Introduce yearly training for staff on procedures and manuals • Develop a human resource software integrated with the accounting system including all relevant information about staff • Define policies and procedures for staff recruitment, promotion, development, terms and conditions • Establish comprehensive system for staff and unit – evaluation (administrative manual) <p><i>Strategic objective 7: Further empower the staff in the field of human rights</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Finalise monitoring and evaluation systems tailored for every Programme Director with criteria to measure effectiveness and quality of programs • Establish internal working group to develop internal strategy on document handling and flow of information, (implement suggestions of the working group) • Introduction of soft-ware linking complaints handling databank with secondary documentation center • Introduce a short deadline for dissemination and translation into English of reports and nota on important incidents.
Target groups	Same as 17362.

2.4 Objectives and main focus 25813 (January 2014 – December 2016)	
Objectives (Sector level)	<p><i>Vision:</i> A free Palestinian society with inherent values of justice, equality, freedom and human rights.</p> <p><i>Mission:</i> In its capacity as the Palestinian national and constitutional human rights institution, ICHR seeks to protect and promote human rights in accordance with the Palestinian Basic Law and the international principles of human rights relying on the Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA).</p> <p>This corresponds to the sector level objectives of the NRO (see objectives 17362).</p>
Envisaged Outcomes	<p><i>Objective 1: Promotion of a human rights based culture in the Palestinian Territories</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1.1 Palestinian citizens have better knowledge of their rights • 1.2 An effective role for education in the promotion and dissemination of a culture of human rights based on Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA) • 1.3 Empowered sectorial institutions and social interest groups in developing and undertaking interventions in coherence with HRBA. • 1.4 Duty-bearers are informed about their duties and legal obligations

	<p>towards rights-holders social, economic and cultural rights.</p> <p><i>Objective 2: Enhancement of the justice systems in accordance with international human rights standards</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2.1 Palestinian Policies and legislation are in compliance with international human rights principles and conventions. • 2.2 An effective access to justice to all Palestinian groups. • 2.3 A proactive and effective accountability system to prevent human rights violations. <p><i>Objective 3: Promotion of international mechanisms for the defence of human rights standards</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3.1 International decisions and positions of UN human rights institutions and other stakeholders are supportive of Palestinian human rights. • 3.2 The Palestinian Territories signs and ratifies international human rights treaties and Conventions, and joins international agencies. <p><i>Objective 4: Development of Institutional performance of ICHR</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4.1 Organizational governance measures and practices are in effect. • 4.2 ICHR's programs and operations have high efficiency and effectiveness • 4.3 ICHR's resources (Financial, material & human) are available and meet the needs of the organization.
<p>Strategy</p>	<p><i>Objective 1:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ICHR intends to raise awareness on human rights throughout the Palestinian society, with explicit attention for women, youth and other vulnerable groups. This should enable rights holders (the people) to hold the duty bearers (PA) to account • Promote the role of education in publishing human rights culture based on the Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA) by providing decision-makers, teachers and social councilors with knowledge about the HRBA and its importance. • Work together with other institutions to develop and implement interventions which are based on the HRBA by training its staff and governing bodies. Also provide logistical support for advocacy campaigns. Additionally, raise awareness of duty-bearers about their responsibilities. <p><i>Objective 2:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stimulate commitment to principles of equality and accountability in accordance with the law in justice systems, and utilise national mechanisms to ensure respect for human rights and guarantee all individuals access to justice • This can be achieved through reviewing legislations and policies to ensure their compliance with international human rights conventions and principles; through monitoring violations of human rights; judicial intervention; and monitoring courts to guarantee sound legal procedures and effective complaint systems. • Work with official Palestinian Institutions: especially the MoI, MoJ and the Palestinian security institutions. <p><i>Objective 3:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide consultation and necessary advice to the PA and relevant official Palestinian institutions on their legal and human rights obligations, especially now it has obtained Observer State Status. • Activate its role in submitting reports on the status of human rights in the Palestinian Territories to UN Special Procedures, treaty-bodies, the

	<p>Universal Periodic Review and fact-finding missions in cooperation with OHCHR.</p> <p><i>Objective 4:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Further institutionalise the work of ICHR and set forth systems and procedures to maintain and further develop internal operations and ensure sound management systems. • Maintain membership at the International Coordination Committee for NHR's, its Accreditation Committee and the relevant regional and Arab networks.
<p>Activities</p>	<p>Envisaged outputs of activities:</p> <p><i>Objective 1</i></p> <p>1.1.1 Awareness raising campaigns on the right to physical safety, life, public freedoms and freedom of expression and opinion</p> <p>1.1.2 ICHR is a reference and a resource centre for human rights to all those concerned.</p> <p>1.2.1 Decision -makers at educational institutions are informed of HRBA and its importance in the educational process.</p> <p>1.2.2 Specific recommendations of mainstreaming human rights principles into the educational curricula</p> <p>1.2.3 Teachers and social councilors are informed of human rights.</p> <p>1.3.1 Staff and governing bodies concerned with women, children, PWDs, citizens of area C of the West Bank and bordering areas of the Gaza Strip received training courses on the rights of their targeted groups.</p> <p>1.3.2 Sectorial institutions networks are supported in organising and carrying out lobbying and advocacy campaigns.</p> <p>1.4.1 Implemented awareness raising campaigns.</p> <p>1.4.2 Specific recommendations presented to duty-bearers for handling citizens' complaints.</p> <p>1.4.3 Duty-bearers (MoSA, MoH, MoL and MoLGAs) are trained</p> <p><i>Objective 2</i></p> <p>2.1.1 Legislations related to marginalised groups are reviewed and presented to relevant authorities.</p> <p>2.1.2 Well-organised advocacy campaigns on legislations pertinent to definite categories and sectors (police law, family protection legislations, juveniles law, economic legislations (health insurance law, security insurance law, public health law and referral law for treatment of cases outside The Palestinian Territories).</p> <p>2.1.3 Reviewed development plans/policies and budgets related to economic, social and cultural rights.</p> <p>2.2.1 Monitoring courts and Public Prosecution.</p> <p>2.2.2 Effective judicial intervention in cases of marginalised groups and human rights violations.</p> <p>2.2.3 Trained law enforcement officials (security agencies, public prosecutor, judiciary, lawyers and staff of Ministries with complaints units).</p> <p>2.2.4 National inquiries and social interest and advocacy campaigns, about definite rights issues related to the rights of women, children, journalists, PWDs and population of area C and bordering areas</p> <p>2.3.1 Monitoring human rights violations</p> <p>2.3.2 Effective complaints system</p>

	<p>2.3.3 Monitoring of prisons, detention centres and protection shelters.</p> <p>2.3.4 Prepared and publicised inquiry reports.</p> <p>2.3.5 Civil monitoring over the security agencies.</p> <p><i>Objective 3</i></p> <p>3.1.1 Effective human rights role of ICHR on the regional and international levels.</p> <p>3.1.2 Publicised studies and reports about the situation of human rights in The Palestinian Territories and the obligations of the occupying power towards the occupied territory on one hand, and the responsibility of the PNA to fulfil its legal obligations on the other, based on international human right conventions.</p> <p>3.1.3 Activated Special Procedures and international contractual mechanisms.</p> <p>3.2.1 Implemented advocacy campaigns to prod the Palestinian Authority to sign and ratify international conventions.</p> <p>3.2.2 Activated advisory role of ICHR.</p> <p><i>Objective 4</i></p> <p>4.1.1 The Board of Commissioner reviews and develops the performance of ICHR based on high standards of transparency and accountability and in accordance with regulatory standards of NHRIs' function</p> <p>4.1.2 Clear and broad membership of ICHR's Board of Commissioners.</p> <p>Developed guidebook of the main functions of ICHR.</p> <p>4.2.1 Developed guidebook of the main functions of ICHR</p> <p>4.2.2 Implemented results-based management monitoring and assessment system.</p> <p>4.3.1 ICHR is governed by regulations and statutes achieving transparency and accountability.</p> <p>4.3.2 Report on the capacities of ICHR's human resources every two years.</p> <p>4.3.3 All ICHR's staff received training courses on necessary administrative and technical skills.</p> <p>4.3.4 Staff Care.</p> <p>4.3.5 Sustainability of ICHR's financial resources.</p>
Target groups	The interventions of ICHR shall give priority to women, children, PWDs, and the Palestinian citizens living in area C in the West Bank and bordering areas in the Gaza Strip. (ICHR Strategic Plan 2014-2018)

1.13 Project Fiche UNRWA

1. Basic Characteristics	
Name of Project(s)	Emergency Appeal UNRWA
Project number(s)	17704 19169 21517 23057 24223 26319 Every year UNRWA produces a new emergency appeal, and the Netherlands decides how much funding to contribute.
Executing agencies	UNRWA
Primary Sector	Humanitarian aid
MASP sectors	Humanitarian aid
Total committed	\$ 5.953.000 (17704) €6.000.000 (19169) €5.000.000 (21517) €4.940.000 (23057) €4.000.000 (24223) €1.500.000 (26319) (Beoordelingsmemoranda)
Total disbursed	Same as committed (ToR).
Start and end date	1 January 2008 – 31 December 2008 (17704) 1 January 2009 – 31 December 2009 (19169) 1 January 2010 – 31 December 2010 (21517) 1 January 2011 – 31 December 2011 (23057) 1 January 2012 – 31 December 2012 (24223) 1 January 2014 – 31 December 2014 (26319) (Beoordelingsmemoranda)
Geographic focus	UNRWA focuses on Palestinian refugees in five areas: 1) the Gaza Strip; 2) West Bank; 3) Lebanon; 4) Syria; and 5) Jordan. The emergency appeals that are supported by the Netherlands are solely focused on the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
Information on status	Completed.
Co-funders and donor coordination at project level	A large variety of donors, both state and non-state actors, fund UNRWA. All the donations are coordinated by UNRWA at a project level.
Partnership arrangements and governance mechanisms	UNRWA has around 110 implementation partners, which include other UN organisations, NGOs and private sector.
2. Objectives and main focus	
Objectives (sector specific)	The objective of the Dutch government of contributing to the emergency appeals of UNRWA is to provide immediate humanitarian aid to address the needs of the Palestinian population.
Envisaged outcomes (As stated in the emergency appeals)	As emergency appeals are set up again every year, every year they include different objectives, strategies and pursued outcomes and outputs (although they often overlap). For this reason the envisaged outcomes and the activities are divided per year. 17704 (2008):

1. To provide a social safety net to vulnerable refugee families, through targeted programmes of food aid, temporary job creation and cash assistance and provision of temporary shelter;
2. To ensure refugee access to primary health care and environmental health services, including mobile health services in the West Bank;
3. To support to development of positive coping mechanisms for particularly vulnerable groups including women and youth, through a broad range of protection strategies, including support to community based organisations and provision of psycho-social support
4. To improve its capacity for needs assessment, emergency planning and service delivery, through the development of programme planning and management systems, including as part of the Agency's Organisational Development Plan.

19169 (2009):

1. To provide emergency social safety net assistance to vulnerable refugee families through targeted programmes of food aid, temporary employment and cash assistance, to alleviate the impact of increasing poverty and unemployment and support household coping strategies.
2. To guarantee access to essential health services, mitigating the impact of closures and access restrictions on refugees' health and responding to increased demand for services.
3. To protect the rights of Palestine refugees using a broad range of strategies that focus on the immediate and longer term impacts of the conflict.

21517 (2010):

1. The provision of targeted humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable refugee families in the oPt.
2. The protection and safeguarding of Palestine refugee rights through a broad range of strategies that promote respect for human rights and international law.

23057 (2011):

1. To provide targeted emergency social safety-net assistance to the most vulnerable refugee families through food aid, temporary employment and cash assistance. To provide shelter and transitional shelter assistance to refugees displaced or affected by conflict and violence.
2. To guarantee access to essential health services, mitigating the impact of closures and access restrictions on the health status of refugees and respond to increased demand for services. This will be achieved through the provision of additional supplies and equipment to the Agency's network of health centers and the continued operation of mobile health clinics serving isolated areas in the West Bank. Public environmental health risks will also be mitigated through the provision of emergency support to public service bodies critical to public health.
3. To protect the rights of Palestine refugees using a broad range of strategies that focus on the immediate and longer-term impacts of the conflict.

24223 (2012):

1. Prevent the deterioration in the level of food security through targeted social safety-nets to the most vulnerable refugees by providing emergency food and livelihood support for families who are food insecure of facing acute shock.

	<p>2. Safeguard and protect the rights of refugees through a broad range of strategies that promote respect for human rights and international humanitarian law and through ensuring access to essential basic services.</p> <p>3. Strengthened and effective humanitarian capacity and coordination in order to respond effectively to acute emergencies.</p> <p><u>26319 (2014):</u></p> <p>1. The deterioration of food security among already food-insecure refugees, as well as those facing acute shocks, is mitigated.</p> <p>2. The rights of refugees facing acute crises, violations of human rights/IHL and barrier to accessing services are promoted, protected and upheld.</p> <p>3. Agency humanitarian response is implemented effectively and in coordination with relevant stakeholders.</p>
Strategy	In the emergency appeals UNRWA focuses on Palestinian refugees in Gaza and the West Bank and their humanitarian needs. Every year an emergency appeal report is published in which the context and humanitarian needs of the upcoming year are analyzed, as well as objectives and activities for UNRWA are set out. Subsequently an estimated budget is given, and donors are asked to submit resources to be able to support the humanitarian needs of Palestinian refugees.
Activities	See table below
Target groups	Palestinian refugees in West Bank and the Gaza Strip

Activities & outputs

Program	Outputs envisaged/Activities
2008 (17704)	
Emergency Food Assistance	Gaza: to distribute five rounds of food assistance to 139,000 refugee families (app. 700,000 persons) and introduce school feeding at UNRWA schools to 198,000 students.
	West Bank: to distribute four rounds of food aid to 30,000 refugee families (app. 135,000 persons)
Emergency Employment Programmes – direct hire	Gaza: the creation of 4,722,500 job days of temporary employment for an estimated 55,950 refugees (total beneficiaries, i.e. job holders and dependents – app. 250,000)
	West Bank: the creation of 1,242,000 job days of temporary employment for an estimated 34,500 refugees (Total beneficiaries – at least 207,000)
Emergency employment programmes – indirect hire	To generate 39,666 days of temporary employment for an estimated 2,691 unemployed refugees inside West Bank refugee camps and villages (total beneficiaries, i.e. job holders and dependents, app. 16150 persons)
Emergency cash assistance	Gaza: provision of \$20,270,270 in emergency cash grants to an estimated 77,000 refugee families (app. 385,000 persons)
	West Bank: provision of \$18,000,000 in emergency cash grants to up to 60,000 refugee families (app. 300,000 persons)
Temporary shelter and shelter repair	To fund shelter repairs for 5,000 refugee families whose homes have been damaged (Gaza Strip only)
Emergency health	Both fields: procurement of additional medical supplies and equipment to respond to continued increase in demand due to the ongoing crisis.
	West Bank only: 1) operation of five mobile health clinics offering a wide range of free services to refugees living in isolated areas and those most

Program	Outputs envisaged/Activities
	affected by movement restrictions and the Barrier; 2) provision of subsidised hospital care to refugees living in isolated areas through contracts with six hospitals.
Emergency environmental health	Provision of emergency assistance to municipalities and other service providers to ensure continued public health services, such as water treatment, sewerage and waste-water removal.
Support to community-based organisations (Gaza Strip only)	To provide emergency financial support through grants to CBOs in Gaza that offer services to vulnerable groups of refugees, including children and youth, the disabled, elderly and women.
Community mental health (Gaza Strip Only)	To provide counselling and mental health support to vulnerable refugees, including app. 7,000 persons through individual counselling, 25,000 persons through group counselling, and around 240,000 persons through mental health awareness activities (including all students at UNRWA schools)
Children and youth assistance project (West Bank only)	Provision of counselling and mental health support to almost 160,000 refugees in individual and group counselling sessions
	Training of 1,261 UNRWA staff, including counsellors, teachers, school supervisors, social workers and 500 CBO employees on child and youth work
	Life skills workshops for 75,000 refugee children and youth
	Awareness raising campaigns for 55,401 individuals
	Recreational activities for a pool of approximately 200,00 individuals
Operations Support Officer Programme	To improve delivery of UNRWA's humanitarian assistance through: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> regular and systematic monitoring of living conditions of Palestine refugees and other persons of concern to UNRWA, including access to humanitarian assistance from UNRWA and other service providers; provision of logistical support and facilitation of access to humanitarian aid convoys to minimise any disruption to services; development of emergency response mechanisms, including rapid assessment of crisis situations and co-ordination of humanitarian response efforts in crisis situations.
	To safeguard the neutrality and integrity of UNRWA's programmes and installations
	To monitor the problems that affect the human dignity, physical safety, welfare and protection of Palestine refugees and other persons of concern to UNRWA
Emergency Capacity	To reinforce planning, management and monitoring/evaluation of emergency activities through dedicated capacity at field and HQ level, in order to ensure that UNRWA is able to efficiently and effectively respond to demand for emergency assistance.
	areas of UNRWA's work.
	To maintain consistent and co-ordinated planning and implementation of emergency programmes in the two fields, in accordance with programme activities in other areas of UNRWA's work.
2009 (19169)	
Temporary job creation programme	Gaza: to create 4,693,000 job days for approximately 54,000 refugees supporting a further 270,000 Dependents
	West Bank: to create 1,330,500 job days for approximately 33,460

Program	Outputs envisaged/Activities
	refugees supporting a further 167,300 dependents
Cash assistance	Gaza: to provide emergency cash assistance worth \$20,270,270 to a maximum of 77,000 refugee families
	West Bank: to provide emergency cash assistance worth \$15,200,000 to a maximum of 29,300 refugee families
Food assistance	Gaza: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To distribute six rounds of food aid to up to 125,000 refugee families (550,000 persons) covering an estimated 60% of daily needs To provide daily nutritious food to up to 200,000 UNRWA school students
	West Bank: <p>To provide food assistance covering up to 27% of daily calorific needs and non-food items to 58,460 refugee families (350,760 persons) as part of an integrated support programme that includes food aid, cash assistance and temporary employment.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 24,000 families will receive three rounds of food covering 27% of needs for nine months and one round covering 27% of needs for two months, with one month of temporary employment 9,460 families will receive three rounds of food covering 27% of needs for nine months, with three months of temporary employment 25,000 families will receive two rounds of food covering 13.5% of needs for 12 months
Emergency health	Both fields: to purchase additional supplies and equipment for UNRWA primary health care facilities in order to better manage the increased demand for services amongst registered refugees
	West Bank only: to improve outreach of preventive and curative services for 156,000 refugees in isolated areas, who are affected by closures or living under emergency conditions, through: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - operation of five mobile clinics, which will also provide services to non-refugees - provision of subsidised hospital care through contracts with four hospitals
Disability (West Bank only)	To facilitate the access, mobility and mainstreaming into local life for 3,550 disabled refugees in the West Bank through a package of individually adapted rehabilitation services
Environmental Health	Gaza: Provision of emergency assistance to municipalities and other environmental health service providers to ensure continued provision of vital services, including water treatment, sewage and solid waste removal to the entire population of the Gaza Strip, i.e. 1,500,000 persons
	West Bank: Provision of environmental health services to 100,000 refugees in 12 camps under emergency conditions, in particular those in close vicinity of the Barrier or facing IDF incursions, including emergency infrastructure repairs, prevention of water contamination and removal of solid waste
Community mental health	To provide counselling and mental health services to vulnerable refugees, including approximately 41,500 through individual and group counselling and around 259,500 through mental health awareness activities, including all students at UNRWA schools in Gaza and 19,500 in West Bank
Support to community-based organisations (Gaza only)	To provide emergency financial and technical support to CBOs in Gaza to enable the continuation of UNRWA's annual Summer Games programme

Program	Outputs envisaged/Activities
	for children and youth as well as other essential services, including gender-related services
Protection of vulnerable West Bank refugees	To develop existing mechanisms to monitor and respond to protection concerns and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) violations affecting Palestine refugees in the West Bank, with a particular focus on communities affected by the Barrier or prevailing internal violence or at risk of displacement, i.e. approximately 120,000 refugees
Temporary shelter and shelter repair (Gaza only)	To provide temporary shelter support to up to 5,000 refugee families in Gaza whose homes have been damaged or destroyed, and to support repairs and reconstruction of homes damaged or destroyed during the course of IDF military operations or natural disasters
Operation support officers	To improve UNRWA service delivery through: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regular and systematic monitoring of humanitarian conditions and issues affecting the welfare of Palestine refugees and other persons of concern to UNRWA; • provision of logistical support and facilitation of access to humanitarian aid convoys to minimise disruption of services;
	To safeguard the neutrality and integrity of UNRWA's programmes and installations
	To monitor problems affecting the human dignity, safety and welfare of Palestine refugees and other persons of concern to the Agency with a view to promoting and protecting their rights
Emergency preparedness and response (West Bank only)	To ensure the effective and timely delivery of lifesaving assistance to 7,000 West Bank refugees (1,000 families) in the event of a natural or man-made emergency.
Management of emergency programmes	To reinforce planning, management and monitoring /evaluation of emergency activities through dedicated resources at field and HQ levels, to ensure that the Agency is able to respond effectively to refugee needs;
	To ensure consistency in planning and implementation of UNRWA's emergency programming in Gaza and the West Bank, in accordance with broader Agency strategies and goals;
	To ensure effective coordination with other humanitarian partners, including on planning, assessment and monitoring of conditions.
2010 (21517)	
Job Creation Programme	Gaza: to create 4,693,000 job days for approximately 54,000 refugees supporting a further 270,000 dependents
	West Bank: to create 2,215,200 job days for approximately 40,000 refugees supporting a further 190,000 dependents
	To ensure between 30 – 40 percent of all jobs are held by women
Cash Assistance	Gaza: to provide emergency cash assistance worth US\$45,500,000 to ~ 65,000 abject poor families and back to school assistance of around US\$10,000,000 to ~ 207,000 refugee pupils at UNRWA schools
	West Bank: to provide emergency cash grants worth US\$3,360,000 to 4,000 poor families without a breadwinner or facing acute shocks
Food assistance	Gaza: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - to distribute four rounds of food assistance to 675,000 poor refugees (135,000 families), meeting ~76% of daily caloric needs of 325,000 refugees living in abject poverty and ~60% of daily caloric needs of

Program	Outputs envisaged/Activities
	<p>350,000 refugees below the absolute poverty line</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - to provide food for all 207,000 pupils in UNRWA schools through a school feeding programme
	<p>West Bank: to distribute four rounds of food assistance and non-food items to 72,000 of the most vulnerable refugees (11,200 families), including families living in Area C and Barrier affected communities and those without a breadwinner. Food parcels will cover an estimated 50% of daily caloric needs.</p>
Education – Gaza only	<p>To provide learning support to 207,500 pupils at UNRWA schools, through provision of stationery at the start of each term and a range of remedial and behavioural interventions</p>
Health	<p>Gaza:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - to manage the increased demand for services at UNRWA health care facilities through purchase of additional supplies and equipment - to improve the health of school children through an expanded school health programme - to support access to specialised health services for destitute refugees through subsidies for hospital
	<p>West Bank:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - to manage the increased demand for services at UNRWA health care facilities through the recruitment of additional health care professionals and the purchase of additional supplies and equipment - to provide curative and preventive health services to isolated and remote communities lacking access to health services through operation of mobile clinics - to support access to specialised health services for vulnerable isolated and destitute
Environmental health	<p>Gaza: to reduce the risk of public health emergencies and ensure continued provision of water supply and treatment, sewage and solid waste services through provision of emergency assistance to municipalities and other public utilities, potentially benefiting the entire Gaza Strip population</p>
	<p>West Bank: to reduce the risk of water borne diseases and improve the quality and quantity of water available to affected refugee communities through the rehabilitation of water infrastructure and improvement of sanitary conditions in 16 West Bank refugee camps (total population ~176,000 persons)</p>
Community mental health	<p>Gaza: to provide individual counseling to ~ 7,000 refugee students, group counseling to ~ 25,000 students and public awareness activities to ~ 40,000 refugees</p>
	<p>West Bank:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - to provide individual and group counseling to 24,450 and awareness raising for up to 14,442 children - to offer recreational activities for a pool of 5,030 individuals - to train 520 technical advisors, counsellors and camp and CBO staff
Support to Community-Based Organisations – Gaza only	<p>Gaza: to provide financial and technical support to CBOs in Gaza to enable the continuation of UNRWA's annual Summer Games programme for children and youth in 2010</p>
Protection of vulnerable West Bank refugees	<p>to create an improved protective environment for approximately 46,500 refugees affected by military operations and / or at risk of displacement,</p>

Program	Outputs envisaged/Activities
	including 5,200 Bedouin / Herder families in Area C, residents of East Jerusalem and others affected by the Barrier
	to mitigate the humanitarian consequences of human rights abuses faced by refugees and enhance the accountability of duty bearers.
Temporary shelter and shelter repair	Gaza: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - to repair an estimated 1,000 shelters damaged as a result of military operations or natural disasters - to provide rental subsidies to an estimated 2,000 families whose homes have been damaged or destroyed - to provide transitional shelter solutions for up to 350 refugee families living in makeshift shelters - to purchase non-food items for up to 50,000 persons as contingency stocks in case of emergency
	West Bank: to rehabilitate, reconstruct and repair up to 200 hazardous camp shelters
Operations support Officers	To improve delivery of UNRWA services to refugees through: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Systematic monitoring of changing humanitarian conditions and issues affecting the general welfare of the population of the oPt; - Provision of logistical support and facilitation of access to aid convoys;
	To safeguard the neutrality and integrity of UNRWA's programmes and installations
	To monitor issues affecting the human dignity, safety, welfare and basic rights of Palestine refugees and other persons of concern to UNRWA, with a view to protecting and promoting these rights
Coordination and Management	To reinforce planning, management and the monitoring and evaluation of emergency activities through dedicated resources at field and HQ levels
	To ensure consistency of approach in planning and implementation of emergency programmes in Gaza and the West Bank, in accordance with broader Agency strategies and goals
	To maintain effective coordination with other humanitarian actors across a range of activities, including planning, assessment of needs and monitoring of conditions
2011 (23057)	
Food assistance	Gaza: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - to provide four rounds of food assistance to 650,000 poor refugees (130,000 families) thereby meeting ~76 per cent of their daily caloric needs - to provide food for all 213,000 pupils in UNRWA schools through a school feeding programme
	West Bank: to provide, on a quarterly basis, 50 per cent to 65 per cent of the minimum daily requirements (SPHERE standards) of 32,700 food insecure and food vulnerable refugees (5,700 families) with physical impediments to food. The parcel will include NIS20 per person to cover basic non-food items.
Job Creation Programme	Gaza: to create 4,693,000 job days for approximately 54,000 refugees supporting a further 270,000 dependents
	West Bank to create 2,136,264 job days for 32,823 refugees supporting a further 147,703 dependents
	To ensure around 35 per cent of all jobs are held by women

Program	Outputs envisaged/Activities
Cash Assistance	Gaza: to provide emergency cash assistance worth US\$ 55,500,000 to ~ 65,000 abject poor families and back to school assistance of around US\$ 10,000,000 to ~ 213,000 refugee pupils at UNRWA schools
	West Bank: to provide emergency cash grants worth US\$ 3,360,000 to an estimated 7,000 food-insecure & food-vulnerable refugee families that cannot be enrolled in the cash-for-work sector
Education – Gaza only	to deliver educational stationery to 213,000 students at the start of each semester
	to provide the time and space to implement remedial programmes for students in accordance with their academic capacity and need
	to develop a learning environment within schools conducive to participation by all
Health	Gaza: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - to purchase additional supplies and equipment to better manage increased demand from the 850,000 refugees who use UNRWA primary health care services in Gaza. - to improve school health services for 213,000 pupils in response to the identification of more acute needs - to support access to specialised health services for destitute refugees through subsidies for hospital care and referrals to secondary/tertiary facilities
	West Bank: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - to mitigate the negative impact of closures and the socio-economic crisis on refugees' health by facilitating physical and financial access to primary, secondary and tertiary health care throughout the West Bank. - to provide curative and preventative health services to isolated and remote communities lacking access to health services through operation of mobile clinics - to support access to specialised health services for vulnerable, isolated and destitute refugees through subsidies for hospital care
Environmental health	Gaza: to ensure continued provision of water supply and treatment, sewage and solid waste services, through provision of emergency assistance and relief to public utilities in order to help prevent public health catastrophes
	West Bank: to minimise health threats and improve the quantity and quality of water to the approximately 197,800 residents of West Bank refugee camps through rehabilitation of water infrastructure, improvement of sanitary conditions and promotion of best water and hygiene practices
Community mental health	Gaza: treating 7,000 refugee students through individual counselling, helping up to 25,000 refugee students through group counselling and ~ 40,000 refugees through other public awareness activities.
	West Bank: strengthening community and family mental health support activities at 93 UNRWA schools, in 32 clinics and in partnership with the 19 camps' community-based organizations, through group and individual counselling, training, awareness-raising programmes, and the provision of Saturday recreational activities for approximately 10,000 boys and girls.
Support to community-based	Increased access by victims of conflict-related violence to emergency

Program	Outputs envisaged/Activities
organisations – Gaza only	protection mechanisms, material, psychosocial, mental health and/or legal services and/or livelihood support.
Protection of vulnerable West Bank refugees	to provide protection for the 46,000 individuals affected by military operations and who may be at risk of home demolitions and displacement, including Bedouin and herder families in Area C, East Jerusalem residents and communities affected by the Barrier.
	enhance the accountability of duty bearers and thereby mitigate the impact of humanitarian and human rights violations through monitoring, reporting and advocacy.
Temporary shelter and shelter repair	Gaza: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - transitional shelter support for 150 refugee families living in makeshift shelters - shelter repairs for 1,000 families whose shelters have been damaged by military operations - transitional shelter cash assistance for up to 5,000 displaced refugee families - purchase of a stock of emergency non-food items to support refugee families during emergencies
	West Bank: rehabilitation of 150 hazardous camp shelters for refugee families rendered particularly vulnerable by the emergency conditions
Operations support officers	to assist in the delivery of UNRWA services through: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The constant monitoring of and reporting on changes in local humanitarian conditions and issues affecting the general welfare of the population of the oPt - The provision of logistical support and facilitation of access to aid convoys, staff vehicles and health teams
	to safeguard the neutrality and integrity of UNRWA's programmes and installations
	to monitor issues affecting the human dignity, safety, welfare and basic rights of Palestine refugees and other persons of concern to UNRWA, with a view to protecting and promoting these rights
Coordination and management	to provide additional management capacity at field and HQ levels in order to reinforce the planning, management and the evaluation of emergency activities and to meet the increase in demand for emergency programme services
	to ensure the consistent implementation of emergency programmes and that the integrity of the process, i.e. to help eligible refugees in need, is not compromised by the increased workload.
	to ensure effective coordination with other humanitarian partners and that interventions meet the specific needs of distinct vulnerable groups, including women, young people and children.
2012 (24223)	
Emergency food assistance	Gaza: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 600,000 refugees living in poverty provided with 40 to 76 per cent of the daily caloric needs through four rounds of general food distribution - 221,000 school-aged refugee children receive nutritional supplementary school feeding
	West Bank: 67,500 total people provided with food aid,

Program	Outputs envisaged/Activities
	<p>including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 7,500 refugees living in the seam zone provided with 60% of their caloric requirements • 30,000 refugee and non-refugee Bedouin/herders in Area C provided with 60% of their caloric requirements • 30,000 food insecure refugees provided with supplementary food parcels equivalent to 25% of their caloric requirements
Temporary job creation programme	Gaza: Provide temporary employment to 27,620 vulnerable refugee households, benefiting approximately 145,000 individuals (including dependents)
	West Bank: 26,000 refugee households (approximately 130,000 individuals) provided with temporary employment assistance
Emergency cash assistance	<p>Gaza:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 65,000 food insecure or vulnerable refugee households (approximately 325,000 people) provided with emergency cash assistance - 221,000 school children provided with back to school assistance
	West Bank: 7,500 food insecure and food vulnerable refugee households (approximately 37,500 individuals) identified and provided with emergency cash assistance
Protection	Gaza: Emergency support to enable the continuation of essential services and activities to 250,000 children participating in the Summer Games
	<p>West Bank:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Protect 57,500 refugees from the immediate effects of the conflict and occupation - Selected IHL/IHRL violations affecting refugees are systematically collected and acted upon
Operations support officers	All components of UNRWA humanitarian services running efficiently and effectively
	Operational support to safeguard overall access and neutrality provided to 16,060 UNRWA personnel
	Integrity of UNRWA installations maintained
Emergency health	Gaza: 850,000 refugees and 221,000 school children provided with primary health services
	West Bank: 360,000 patients have access to health care throughout the West Bank
Community mental health	<p>Gaza:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Up to 11,000 refugee school children provided with individual counselling - Up to 30,000 refugee school children provided with group counselling - 50,000 refugees provided with counselling referral services
	<p>West Bank:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 11,700 refugees' coping mechanisms to individual, family and community crises strengthened - 1,180 children and their families provided with life skills/psychosocial support in 13 UNRWA schools in East Jerusalem, H2 and North Area - 96 refugees receive psychiatric referral services - 5 trainings provided to 14 psychosocial clinic counsellors and community counsellors and 10 community committees in three areas

Program	Outputs envisaged/Activities
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 10 mental health committees formed with the necessary ability and skills to intervene in crises and emergency situations
Emergency water and sanitation	<p>Gaza:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provision of emergency assistance and relief to public utilities to assist in the prevention of public health catastrophes - Impact of forced displacement mitigated through access to water and non-food items to displaced persons
	<p>West Bank:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rehabilitate public water infrastructure in 10 camps, including infrastructure directly damaged during IDF incursions - Improve solid waste removal and disposal in nine camps through the procurement of sanitation equipment and support to Hebron, Jericho, and Ramallah municipalities - Improve water quality monitoring for two camps in the Jericho area, five camps in the Hebron area, and rehabilitation of the treatment plant - Raise awareness on hygiene and water related issues in each of the 19 camps of the West Bank
Emergency education (Gaza Strip only)	221,000 refugee students provided with emergency education services
Temporary shelter (Gaza Strip only)	1,000 refugee families with shelters damaged as a result of military operations or natural disasters receive emergency support for shelter repair
	4,000 displaced refugee households receive transitional shelter cash assistance (rental subsidies)
	Up to 50,000 refugees receive non-food items during emergencies
Coordination and management	Reinforced planning, management, and monitoring and evaluation of emergency activities through dedicated resources at field and HQ levels
	Consistent approach in planning and implementation of emergency programmes in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, in accordance with Agency's broader strategies and goals
	Effective coordination with other humanitarian actors
2014 (26319)	
<i>Gaza Strip</i>	
Emergency Food Assistance	76% of caloric needs of the abject poor met through food distributions 40% of caloric needs of absolute poor met through food distributions
	100% of UNRWA students guaranteed at least one small meal per day
	100% of pregnant refugee women and children <24 months with access to nutritionally adequate food
Emergency Cash Assistance	100% of 'post-food assistance' poverty gap bridged.
	100% of student's average back to school expenditures covered by cash assistance
	70% of households receiving cash assistance who do not resort to negative coping mechanisms following material loss
Emergency Cash-for Work	79% of CfW beneficiaries using earnings to cover basic food needs.
	38% of CfW beneficiaries indicate using earnings to pay debts
Community Mental Health	60% of cases recovered out of the total number of cases for individual counselling
Emergency Health	100% patients referred to contracted secondary and tertiary health care access these services

Program	Outputs envisaged/Activities
	100% patients claiming reimbursement of expenses from non-contracted secondary and tertiary health care services are fulfilled
	100% of children identified with special needs who receive relevant support
Operations support	100% of staff working at facilities surveyed indicating appropriate practical understanding of what neutrality and integrity mean
	30% of delegations leaving Gaza with additional information on the issues affecting the refugee population
	100% of cases where a breach in services access rights had occurred and is solved
Emergency education	70% of students equipped to actively participate in their learning, as reported by the teachers
	80% of summer-learning students pass their end-of-summer learning exam
Unexploded ordnance risk education	80% of targeted children demonstrating improved knowledge regarding UXOs
Gaza Summer Fun Weeks	85% of children indicating a positive effect in their well-being from participating in the summer fun weeks
Emergency Water and Sanitation	0 outbreaks of waterborne diseases due to non-functioning water and sanitation systems
	0 persons affected by vector-related health problems
Emergency Shelter and Shelter repair	70% of temporary housing cost covered by Transitional Shelter Cash Assistance, on average
	80% of damaged shelters repaired to pre-existing conditions
	100% of displaced or affected refugee families receiving non-food items indicating that their immediate needs were met
<i>West Bank</i>	
Emergency Food Assistance	30-40% of total household food expenditure met through food voucher (average)
	43% of caloric needs of the food insecure in rural areas met through food distributions (on average per quarter)
Emergency Cash-for-Work	100% of food-insecure refugee households in refugee camps benefiting from cash-for-work
	Cash-for-work beneficiaries using earning to pay debts
	Cash-for-work beneficiaries using earning to cover basic food needs
Community mental health	100% of individuals identified as requiring specialised psychological or psychiatric follow up are referred and supported to attend relevant services
	100% of targeted vulnerable communities provided with counselling or psychosocial activities
	Community committee members indicating better ability to respond to psychosocial emergencies and improved linkages with other service providers
Emergency Health	100% of access-restricted and isolated communities targeted by UNRWA with regular access to basic primary health care
Operations Support	80% of recorded issues addressed by the relevant department before the following neutrality inspection
	50% of cases where OSO intervention resulted in safe passage of UNRWA staff, goods, services
Protection	20% of UNRWA interventions followed by concrete measures taken by authorities
	20% of stakeholder awareness-raising initiatives (briefing, field trip etc.)

Program	Outputs envisaged/Activities
	followed by concrete measures taken by the stakeholders
	100% of refugee families suffering displacement and/or damage to their private property receive emergency cash assistance according to Crisis Intervention Model
Coordination and management	80% of outcome indicators that are on track of the target, adjusted as per funding received



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