

# Joint Strategic Evaluation

## **Joint Evaluation of the Global Logistics Cluster**

### **Vol.I – Full Report**

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***Measuring Results, Sharing Lessons***

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# **Executive Summary**

## **Introduction**

### **Evaluation Features**

. The joint evaluation of the global logistics cluster (GLC) was commissioned by WFP's Office of Evaluation in partnership with the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs Policy and Operations Evaluation Department and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) Evaluation Office, at the request of WFP's Logistics Division. It covers GLC work from 2005 to 2012.

. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess the satisfaction with, and the effectiveness, efficiency, utilization and results of, GLC products, services and activities at the global and country levels. The evaluation was conducted between November 2011 and July 2012 by an independent team comprising a leader, two logistics specialists, an information management specialist and a research analyst.

. With a strong emphasis on learning and accountability, the evaluation aimed to inform future strategy and preparedness for emergencies. It coincided with development of the GLC strategy and, more broadly, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee's (IASC's) Transformative Agenda.<sup>1</sup> The primary intended users of the evaluation are WFP senior management, GLC Support Cell (GLCSC) leadership and partners participating in the logistics cluster at the country and global levels.

### **Approach and Method**

. A theory-based approach was taken to assess the extent to which GLC inputs and activities resulted in the expected outputs and outcomes, and how external factors and assumptions affected results. The expected relationships between GLC inputs and their anticipated outcomes were structured as a GLC theory of change (see Figure 1, page 8). The GLC theory of change builds on past IASC evaluations and incorporates logistics cluster policies and plans, and stakeholder perceptions; it serves as a framework for the evaluation.

. The evaluation analysed qualitative and quantitative data gathered from more than 200 key informant interviews, survey respondents, primary and secondary source documents, Google analytics on the Logcluster.org website, and direct observation of operations in Haiti, Pakistan and South Sudan and at a GLC partner meeting. It addressed four main evaluation questions:

- i) What are the results of logistics clusters' operations at the country level?

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<sup>1</sup> The Transformative Agenda seeks to make the humanitarian response system more efficient and effective by addressing lessons learned regarding leadership, coordination and accountability.

- ii) To what extent did the GLCSC's activities and products provide value to users?
- iii) To what extent have logistics clusters at the global and country levels worked effectively with partners under WFP's leadership?
- iv) To what extent have the lessons derived from logistics cluster experience informed decision-making?

. Seven case studies from 42 GLC operations were selected, representing the diversity of emergency and activity types, scales of need and cost, inter-cluster coordination, civil/military relations, preparedness work, and national capacity development efforts. The case studies were from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan and South Sudan. Two emergency responses where the cluster was not activated – in Ethiopia and Liberia – were also reviewed for comparison purposes.

. Given the wide array of GLC stakeholders, effort was made to expand ownership of the evaluation by discussing and developing initial recommendations at an international workshop in May 2012 and a later GLC global meeting.

. **Limitations.** Although the limitations do not diminish the credibility of the findings, the conclusions must be understood in the context of the cluster's global scope and complex operational structure, the different combinations of logistics services and coordination activities required to respond to the different contexts, and the time that elapsed between cluster events and the evaluation, which limited respondents' recollection. These challenges were compounded by missing and inconsistent data, difficulties in locating key informants because of staff rotation and turnover, and the relatively short time available for site visits.

## **Context**

. The IASC established the GLC as one of nine clusters in December 2005. WFP was designated lead agency, partly to address deficiencies identified by the humanitarian response review,<sup>2</sup> including insufficient coordination among humanitarian partners to provide appropriate and timely goods and services to affected populations. Humanitarian logistics continue to evolve in the midst of increasingly frequent and severe disasters in progressively more complex operating environments, including conflict situations. In addition, there continue to be restrictions related to access for humanitarian workers and to import of humanitarian supplies, a proliferation of actors, and persistent under-recognition by humanitarian agencies of the importance of logistics. Funding and overarching accountability trends within the humanitarian sector drive the growing demand for efficiency, professionalism and high-calibre logistics response.

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<sup>2</sup> Adinolfi, C., Bassiouni, D., Lauritzen, H. and Williams, R. 2005. *Humanitarian Response Review 2005*. Geneva, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

. Although the GLC is important for participants, and crucial for populations affected by disasters, its work represents a fraction of total global humanitarian logistics. Total annual humanitarian logistics spending is estimated at between US\$7 billion and US\$14 billion,<sup>3</sup> while estimated total civilian and military logistics expenditures are more than US\$6.7 trillion.<sup>4</sup> In contrast, the GLCSC's total budget for 2005–2012 was only US\$16.6 million, and the total budget for all 26 Special Operations associated with GLC operations from 2006 to 2011 was US\$490 million.

### **Characteristics of the Global Logistics Cluster**

. The GLC is a group of humanitarian organizations and other stakeholders committed to addressing logistics needs during humanitarian crises, through broad partnerships. There are no criteria for membership, as the cluster seeks to avoid exclusivity.

. The GLCSC's mission is to facilitate the humanitarian logistics community in exploiting shared assets, aptitudes and competencies at the global and field levels.<sup>5</sup> Over time, the GLCSC's structure and functions have adapted to changing operational demands and expectations. Table 1 outlines the GLC's main components.

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<sup>3</sup> Majewski, B., Navangul, K.A. and Heigh, I. 2010. A Peek into the Future of Humanitarian Logistics: Forewarned is Forearmed. *Supply Chain Forum – An International Journal*, 11(3).

<sup>4</sup> Rodrigues, A., Bowersox, D. and Calantone, R. 2005. *Estimation of Global and National Logistics Expenditures: 2002 Data Update*. East Lansing, Michigan, USA, Michigan State University.

<sup>5</sup> Global Logistics Cluster. 2010. *Logistics Cluster and Humanitarian Reform*. July 2010: [http://www.logcluster.org/about/logistics-cluster/background-information/general\\_overview](http://www.logcluster.org/about/logistics-cluster/background-information/general_overview)

**Table 1: Components Of The Global Logistics Cluster**

Component	Global level	Country level
Partnership	<p>Open platform and collaboration coordinated by GLCSC.</p> <p><i>Participants:</i> United Nations agencies, international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), donor governments, corporate partners, standby partners, the United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot and the United Nations Humanitarian Air Services</p> <p><i>Activities:</i> meetings (in person and by conference call), information-sharing and training.</p>	<p>Open platform and collaboration coordinated by country cluster cell.</p> <p><i>Participants:</i> United Nations agencies, international and national NGOs, donors and national governments.</p> <p><i>Activities:</i> cluster meetings, information-sharing, operational coordination, and use and provision of common services.</p>
Support Cell	<p>GLCSC – staff from WFP and seconded from international NGOs, other United Nations agencies and standby partners.</p>	<p>Country cluster cell – staff from WFP country office or, as needed, deployed on short-term assignments from GLCSC and/or other WFP offices as a logistics response team.</p>
Cluster lead agency	<p>WFP assigned by IASC. Leadership involves:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• appointing a global coordinator;</li> <li>• resourcing, and providing back office infrastructure and support for the GLC; and</li> <li>• carrying out representational and leadership responsibilities for partners and donors, accountable to the Emergency Relief Coordinator and the IASC.</li> </ul>	<p>Assigned by the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) or Resident Coordinator; to date has always been WFP. Leadership involves:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• providing/arranging logistics services as provider of last resort;</li> <li>• resourcing the country office, and providing back office infrastructure for the cluster; and</li> <li>• carrying out representational and leadership responsibilities for managing cluster staff, accountable to the HC and in coordination with the humanitarian country team.</li> </ul>

The first logistics cluster was activated for the Pakistan earthquake in October 2005 at the request of the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator and prior to final endorsement of the clusters. By February 2007, 11 country logistics clusters had been activated and the GLCSC was formally established with clear guidelines and expanded staffing.

From September 2006 to November 2011 the GLCSC received income totalling US\$16.6 million. Since 2009, WFP has provided 32 percent of GLCSC funding,<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> From the Programme Support and Administrative budget.

largely through the mainstreaming of 9.5 positions into WFP's core staff at Headquarters. Expenditures totalled US\$13.9 million.

. **GLC operations.** Between 2005 and 2011, the logistics cluster was active in 42 humanitarian responses across 29 countries. GLC Special Operation funding appeals were launched for 26 of these responses and totalled US\$490 million, of which 61 percent was funded. Some Special Operations attracted a wide range of donors, especially Pakistan and Haiti in 2010; others relied on the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund. More than 200 staff have been deployed for the cluster since 2005, increasing from 10 in 2006 to a high of 71 in 2010.

. **Mandate and roles.** Guidance for the GLC's mandate and roles is divided in three tiers:

- i) overarching coordination policies and decisions of the IASC, which establish the purpose, architecture, expectations and coordination mechanisms;
- ii) strategies, policies and decisions of WFP's Executive Board and management, which determine how WFP undertakes its lead agency responsibilities; and
- iii) business plans, preparedness and deployment plans, guidance and systems developed by the GLCSC to operationalize IASC and WFP decisions and the direction set by GLC partners in global meetings.

. Along with the emergency telecommunications cluster, the GLC is designated by the IASC as a "common service area". Unlike other thematic clusters, these two provide services for other clusters and humanitarian organizations, as well as coordination, but this additional role is not formally defined.

## **Findings**

### **Country-Level Results of Logistics Cluster Operations**

. **Overview.** The evaluation confirmed the links between GLC inputs and activities and expected outputs related to collaborative response, information-sharing, pooled resources, rapid deployment, increased funding for common logistics services and delivery of goods. The cluster's operations enabled outcomes and results including more use of information, increased coordination, better decisions, reduced duplication, greater efficiency, greater predictability and better national preparedness.

. However, quantifying the cluster's contributions to outcomes was difficult because of limitations in reporting and financial tracking systems, lack of performance indicators, and inconsistent monitoring and data consolidation. Although common service data showed that prioritization decisions were appropriate, these data were not consistently analysed and transparently communicated. This led to the misperception that WFP as cluster lead agency benefited disproportionately from common services, especially when partners' cargo was not ready for storage and uplift and WFP used the existing logistics capacity




rather than leaving it underutilized or idle. Given the humanitarian context, the evaluators see this approach as practical.

. GLC outcomes are influenced by the degree of humanitarian organizations' participation in coordination meetings and as users of common services. Non-participation limits the cluster's achievements regarding coordination, economies of scale and coverage/reduced duplication. Participation is not mandatory and many organizations have limited in-country resources. Qualitative analysis found that most stakeholders judged that logistics cluster operations brought the greatest improvements to the reach of smaller international NGOs – with annual budgets of less than US\$100 million – and other organizations lacking heavy logistics capacity. In Haiti, for example, the logistics cluster moved 5,540 mt from January to May 2010, while the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies alone received total consignments of 11,231 mt from January to June 2010.

. **Relevance, effectiveness and efficiency.** Overall, GLC operations were found to be highly relevant, valuable and effective. In interviews, key informants across locations, field versus Headquarter levels, and organizations shared the view that cluster operations had an overall positive effect on humanitarian logistics approaches. They also reported that improved logistics approaches contributed to enhanced programme delivery, increasing the positive effect on beneficiaries. Survey responses (see Figure 1), analysis of records, and key informant interviews presented consistent findings. Effectiveness was confirmed across multiple dimensions, including increased fundraising, enhanced timeliness, cost savings, improved coverage/reduced gaps and duplication, greater predictability and improved information-sharing.

**Figure 1: Respondents' perceptions on results of working in partnership with the Logistic Cluster - % positive responses**



Source: Evaluation team

. WFP's special account for the GLC and advance funding mechanisms significantly enhanced initial timeliness and the likelihood of achieving desired outcomes. These mechanisms allowed rapid gap assessment and the establishment of logistics services when other actors most needed information and predictable support.

. **Cluster activation.** General satisfaction was found with activation processes and the deployment of resources in emergencies, but there was concern about the deactivation processes that permit closure of clusters and transition to other coordination systems, usually government-led. Interview and survey data showed agreement across NGOs, United Nations agencies, donors, national governments and GLC staff that deactivation processes were not clear or effective. Currently, there is no formal IASC guidance regarding deactivation protocols. Some informants from WFP and other United Nations agencies expressed the view that the logistics cluster, unlike programme clusters, should have a clearly defined activation period.

. **Financial management, monitoring and reporting.** Financial and reporting systems were not geared to supporting the GLC's effective management and monitoring, and were applied inconsistently. WFP's internal systems for financial management and project reporting generate broad financial and implementation information. Many partners have far more detailed financial and programme reports and expect the same level of transparency from the GLC; the evaluators found that WFP systems were poorly constructed for activity-based financial analysis. This limited the GLC's ability to lead on cost-efficiency issues.


. **Human resources.** Human resource systems and procedures did not support operations adequately; problems were related to selection, hand-over and staff performance assessment.

. **Service user prioritization.** In each of the case studies the evaluation found that the logistics cluster met the needs of self-identified users and matched the humanitarian community's priorities. Transport data analysis refuted the perception that WFP benefited disproportionately from common services. Prioritization decisions were found appropriate, but lack of performance indicators, tracking systems and transparent communication of costs and benefits were a significant weakness. The evaluation analysed cargo<sup>7</sup> tracking data for users of logistics cluster common transport in Haiti, Libya and South Sudan. This analysis showed that international NGOs accounted for the most requests and the greatest volume transported, while other United Nations agencies were the largest category of users by weight transported (see Figure 2). Although WFP was in the top three users, the amount of WFP cargo transported by the cluster represented only a small fraction of total WFP commodity movements.

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<sup>7</sup> Cargo transported by the logistics cluster includes a wide range of essential humanitarian items across many sectors, including shelter, health, food and water/hygiene goods and equipment, and fuel and office equipment.

**Figure 2: Average percentage total logistics cluster common transport for Haiti, Libya and South Sudan by user type**



\* IOM = International Organization for Migration; INGO = international NGO

. **Service gaps.** Primary gaps identified by partners included assistance for customs clearance, procurement and specialized programme logistics. Expectations that the GLC can or should provide such services differed among stakeholders, reflecting the lack of an agreed “service catalogue”.

. **Lasting results.** There was evidence that GLC operations provided significant lasting results. Some stakeholders in interviews expressed the firm view that the cluster is not intended to be activated for long enough to have lasting results. However, three-quarters of survey respondents said that the GLC had slight or major effects on increasing the capacity of national and international actors. In Haiti, for example, the logistics cluster geographic information systems team trained Haitian personnel and established close coordination with the National Centre for Geospatial Information; in Pakistan, the cluster team included a project with the national government to build and hand-over a series of strategic emergency supply warehouses.

### **User Value of Global Logistic Cluster Support Cell Activities and Products**

. **Overview.** The evaluation found that WFP inputs of skilled staff, funding, back office systems and leadership enabled the GLC to undertake the expected global and country activities in information management, operations support, coordination and funding. Prioritization of support to field operations limited the GLC’s focus on performance monitoring, cargo tracking systems and partnership activities. Partners were generally very satisfied with GLC information products, and the website was heavily used. Training courses were widely appreciated for their high quality and inter-agency value.

. **Capacity, structure and functioning of the GLCSC.** The GLCSC was well established and capacitated, but staff skills and demand were primarily oriented

towards field support rather than global management, performance monitoring, partnership maintenance and the development of tools, guidance and systems.

. The GLC Global Cluster Coordinator position is combined with that of Head of WFP's Augmented Logistics Intervention Team for Emergencies (ALITE), which allowed inadequate time for GLC leadership responsibilities. In qualitative interviews, some GLC participating organizations perceived the dual reporting relationship and nature of the position as a possible conflict of interest.


. Secondments of staff from other agencies to the GLCSC reinforced the inter-agency character of the cluster. However, the rationale for using seconded staff was generally too heavily based on representation rather than on needs linked to a clear GLCSC strategy.

. **Global activities, information products and guidance.** Partners were generally satisfied with activities, but identified gaps in support for country-level emergency preparedness and a forum for strategic discussions. Preparedness activities emphasizing operational readiness and contingency planning were viewed as effective, but the GLC lacked a strategy for building the preparedness capacities of national actors.

. **Website.** The logcluster.org website has been well used, with half a million visitors and 1.6 million page views from January 2008 to September 2011. There were substantial spikes related to emergencies (see Figure 3) and small but significant use in field locations. Analysis of website traffic found heavy use of operational products, country information and maps. Interview respondents reported that the site was more advanced than those of other clusters, and that it was useful for operations and planning.

. **Information products.** Survey data found overall high levels of satisfaction with GLC information products, averaging 74 percent, with operations products, especially mapping, obtaining the greatest appreciation and use. Preparedness products – customs and logistics capacity assessments – were appreciated, but viewed as being incomplete or not updated. From 2009 to 2011, 54 logistics capacity assessments of national-level preparedness were conducted, but only 13 are currently available on logcluster.org because of delays in implementation of a new digital database.

**Figure 3: Logcluster.org website traffic**



. **Training.** Evaluation survey responses and end of training questionnaires showed that participants and their sponsoring organizations viewed GLC training courses<sup>8</sup> as having had moderate to high effects on enhancing participants' knowledge, skills and abilities in coordinating with and obtaining access to GLC services. Primary gaps identified were in training for logistics cluster coordinators, the targeting of staff for deployment as cluster coordinators at the country level, and general awareness training for WFP field staff and managers in their representational, leadership, operational and back-office support roles for managing a country-level logistics cluster.

### **Effectiveness of Partnership Management at the Global and Country Levels**

. **Overview.** Activities including meetings, training, contingency planning and information management increased collaboration and information-sharing, leading to strengthened partnerships and better coordination at all levels. Coordination and partnerships contributed to improvements in coverage, predictability of service provision, capacity and preparedness. However, the evaluation found that partnership outcomes were limited by factors related to organizations' inconsistent participation in global-level meetings and a decline over the previous three years in GLCSC's outreach to humanitarian logistics leaders and organizations for participation in its strategic planning.

. **Global-level partnerships.** Under WFP's leadership, the GLC has been inclusive in its meetings, staffing and some special projects, leading to improved outcomes of increased coordination and stronger logistics partnerships.

. Six-monthly global meetings were attended by 35 to 45 participants each, representing a mix of stakeholder types. However, the turnover of institutional

<sup>8</sup> Including training in logistics response; in the "service mindset", via distance learning; for standby partners and the corporate sector; and in a variety of topics for partners and field staff. On average, GLC spent between US\$250,000 and US\$300,000 per year on training.

representation was significant: many international NGOs did not attend, and GLC/WFP and United Nations attendance was disproportionately high.

. Engagement between senior WFP logistics staff and their counterparts in partner organizations had diminished over the previous three years. Although senior GLCSC staff participated in some broader humanitarian logistics platforms, strategic and sustained engagement with significant logistics initiatives and actors from academic, research and professional logistics organizations appeared to be lacking. Issues related to a shared vision of the GLC's role and mandate, its leadership and transparency caused some disengagement from the GLC. It is plausible that drop-off in outreach and disengagement are linked.

. Between global meetings, the GLC worked well with partners on some projects; partners expressed high satisfaction with the logistics operational guide and its collaborative development process.

. **WFP leadership.** The evaluation found widespread agreement that WFP is best positioned to lead the GLC. Although stakeholders had initially been concerned about WFP's ability to create a participatory and collaborative cluster, most reported that the GLCSC exceeded their expectations for inclusiveness and efforts to work together.

. **Inter-agency rapid response roster.** The GLC has not been able to develop and sustain an emergency roster in recent years because of partner reluctance to deploy staff. In addition, WFP country offices were very interested in working with people they knew, usually drawn from WFP's worldwide pool of staff, redeployed through temporary assignments.

### **Adaptive Learning and GLC Decision-Making**

. **Overview.** The evaluation found that discussions at global and country coordination meetings, GLC training sessions and some information products contributed to informal learning and adaptation over time. However, GLC efforts to learn lessons were limited to specific internal exercises and basic surveys of partner satisfaction. The GLCSC demonstrated improvement and learning, but this relied heavily on the core staff consistently employed or deployed in the cluster. Combined with limitations in reporting systems, this situation reduced the ability to quantify achievement of outcomes and identify areas for improvement in the GLCSC or wider system. The cluster system as a whole is undergoing transformation, driven by lessons learned from implementing humanitarian reform. The GLC may benefit from the additional clarity and emerging guidance, but it will have to adapt to the evolving system.

. **Learning systems.** No formal systematic efforts were found for collecting, documenting, sharing and discussing lessons learned with GLC/WFP staff and consultants and partners deployed in country-level logistics clusters. Unsystematic recruitment, one-time deployments and lack of debriefing were found to reduce institutional memory. Following operations, participants' satisfaction was gauged, and GLCSC staff attempted to document lessons learned internally. A good practice example was identified in the global shelter cluster.

. **Unintended consequences.** Positive unintended consequences included improved long-term capacity in contingency planning among participating organizations and enhanced logistics knowledge among staff. Credibility and relationships with national and local authorities also increased following logistics cluster operations. Cluster efforts to rehabilitate transport infrastructure enhanced response logistics and facilitated long-term development and commercial activities.

. Unintended consequences with mixed results included increased requests from national and international military actors for GLC contact. In addition, the cluster website enabled direct beneficiaries, and not just organizations with logistics requirements, to contact cluster staff regarding needed assistance. The cluster's reputation for successful fundraising for its operations may have increased WFP country offices' incentive to seek cluster activation, irrespective of needs. The influx of cluster staff during major operations enables training sessions and activities that benefit partners, but this can raise expectations that are difficult to meet.

. Negative unintended consequences included the potential for heavy logistics capacity to lie idle because of the cluster's "no regrets" approach. With its large quantities of cargo, only WFP can employ capacity that is underutilized by partners, potentially reinforcing negative perceptions about the use of funds and services. Successful provision of common services can create dependency if other organizations reduce their investments in logistics capacity, and risks enabling the deployment of organizations that lack logistics capacity and the ability to sustain programmes in the recovery phase. Increased expectations of support can continue after cluster deactivation, with no alternative mechanisms for coordination, information management, common transport and storage.

## **Factors Explaining Results**

### **⇒ Internal factors**

. Internal factors enabling cluster results were the strength of WFP's core logistics capabilities, infrastructure and scale. Strong infrastructure for global and country office transport, highly experienced logistics staff, and WFP's practical results-oriented culture provided the logistics cluster with a strong foundation for its work.

. Internal factors that hindered cluster operations included WFP's human resources systems and culture, which treated seconded staff as outsiders. The

reporting lines between cluster staff and WFP country offices can be a hindrance when country offices are unfamiliar with cluster responsibilities or WFP operations are so large that the cluster is unable to secure support and representation with the humanitarian country team/HC. WFP financial management and reporting systems were not designed for inter-agency operations supporting many sectors, and do not readily allow analysis of cluster performance. A self-reliant culture within WFP often prioritized rapid problem-solving rather than including partners.

⇒ ***External factors***

. External factors that enabled cluster results included WFP's credibility on logistics issues among other actors, and its strength in attracting donors to fund significant logistics costs.

. External factors hindering cluster results related to partners' willingness and ability to participate in coordination meetings and use common services, the complexity of the operating environment, challenges in managing civil-military relations for a partnership of agencies with different policies, external security restrictions, and the multiplicity of actors in large-scale emergencies.

## **Conclusions and Recommendations**

### **Conclusions**

. Overall, the evaluation found the theory of change underpinning the GLC's operations to be valid, although the relative emphases on elements and the strength of causal linkages varied. Assumptions and external factors affected the strength of outcomes, particularly in terms of efficiency and effectiveness.

⇒ ***Effectiveness and results***

. Overall, GLC operations were relevant, effective and provided value to participating organizations. Logistics cluster activities undertaken at the global and country levels from 2005 to 2011 resulted in better logistics approaches, which increased the effects on beneficiaries by enhancing partners' programme delivery. However, the common logistics services provided by the cluster were only a small proportion of total humanitarian logistics activity. Achieving significant impact on the overall performance of humanitarian response would require expansion of the GLC mandate to address persistent bottlenecks, and increased use of cluster services by humanitarian organizations.

. Country-level results were strongly supported by the GLCSC, which evolved since 2005 into a well-established unit with good human resource capacity. The GLCSC was primarily oriented towards field support rather than global management, performance monitoring, partnership, and the development of tools, guidance and cargo tracking systems, although strong positive results were found in many of these areas.



. Under WFP's leadership, the GLC worked well with partners. Global meetings attracted participants from a range of stakeholder groups, but many significant international NGOs did not participate. GLC and WFP outreach to humanitarian logistics leaders and organizations diminished over time.

⇒ ***Efficiency***

. The evaluation found that WFP inputs of skilled staff, funding, back office systems and leadership enabled the GLC to undertake the expected global and country activities in information management, operations support, coordination and funding of common logistics services. However, WFP financial, reporting and tracking systems did not enable the level of transparency required to ensure partners' trust, accountability and performance benchmarking for logistics services. WFP's special account for the GLC and advance funding mechanisms significantly enhanced timeliness and the likelihood of achieving outcomes. GLC prioritization decisions were appropriate, but the costs and benefits of common services were not well communicated.

⇒ ***Utilization and satisfaction***

. Partners were generally very satisfied with GLC information products, and the website was heavily used. Training courses were widely appreciated for their high quality and inter-agency value. Partners were satisfied with the GLC's activation and deployment of assets in initial phases, but viewed deactivation as more problematic. Partners valued operation products and activities highly, and viewed them as the best developed. Preparedness information products were valued, but were generally perceived as incomplete and not updated frequently enough. Customs clearance and procurement remained strategic operational bottlenecks for humanitarian logistics, and partners desired more assistance in these areas.

## **Recommendations**

. The following summarized recommendations reflect contributions of the evaluators and key stakeholders, as noted above. The same recommendations are presented in detail in section 3 of this report and these form the basis of WFP's management response.

. **Recommendation 1: GLC strategy.** Design a three-year GLC strategic plan that settles mandate issues, establishes a shared vision and partnership attributes, identifies core ("mainstreamed") budget requirements, sets key performance indicators, and identifies communications and branding approaches. (GLCSC and partners, by December 2012)

. **Recommendation 2: Financial and reporting systems.** Develop specific systems and practices for the GLC at the global and country levels, to enhance transparency, performance monitoring and management, including financial tracking of key performance indicators for the outputs and outcomes of global- and

country-level projects and operations, cargo/storage tracking and analysis, and project/operations reporting. (GLCSC and WFP Logistics Development Unit, by June 2013)

. **Recommendation 3: Organizational structure and decision-making.** Strengthen GLC management and the coherence and consistency of cluster lead agency decisions by clarifying the need for WFP country directors and staff to consult the GLCSC on activation and staffing decisions and separating the Global Cluster Coordinator and Head of ALITE positions. (WFP Director of Logistics, by December 2012)

. **Recommendation 4: Improved partnerships.** Improve partnerships within the GLC by conducting stakeholder mapping, increasing strategic outreach to key humanitarian logistics actors, considering the establishment of a strategic advisory group, including partners in a systematic lessons learned process, and developing a collaborative project management approach. (GLC Coordinator and WFP Director of Logistics, by December 2012)

. **Recommendation 5: Human resource management.** Improve cluster human resource management by establishing a dedicated GLCSC staffing coordinator, developing and maintaining a robust GLC response roster, improving briefing and debriefing of deployed staff, developing a deployment toolkit, finding cost-effective ways of bringing cluster staff together to discuss lessons, and reducing the use of unfunded secondments by exploring alternative external recruitment approaches. (GLC Coordinator and WFP Director of Logistics, by June 2013)

. **Recommendation 6: Global policy and inter-cluster coordination.** Increase engagement in inter-cluster coordination at the policy and operations levels by sharing and seeking good practice with other clusters, contributing timely inputs for field testing of IASC reforms, training cluster staff on the evolving system, collaborating with programme clusters to operationalize new IASC assessment and operations planning tools, and sharing the results of this evaluation with other clusters and major humanitarian actors. (GLC Coordinator, WFP Cluster Working Group, WFP Policy Officer – Geneva, and partners, by June 2013)

# **1. Introduction**

## **1.1. Evaluation Features**

1. **Background:** The joint evaluation of the Global Logistics Cluster (GLC) was commissioned by the World Food Programme's (WFP) Office of Evaluation (OE) in partnership with the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Policy and Operations Evaluation Department and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) Evaluation Office, based on a request from the WFP Logistics Division. The evaluation provides cluster specific insights to WFP as the cluster lead, and to other partners based on reflections and analysis of GLC operations and activities (2005-2012). The evaluation was conducted between November 2011 and July 2012 by an independent team comprising a leader, two logistics specialists, an information management specialist and a research analyst.
2. **Rationale:** Conducting a specific evaluation of the GLC aimed to fill gaps in cluster specific history and provide an analysis of its effectiveness and quality of partnerships at global and country levels. The evaluation is meant to provide WFP (as cluster lead agency) and partners with information that can help form the basis of future strategies, and support learning and improvement and enhance GLC preparedness for future emergencies. The timing of the evaluation turned out to be more strategic than initially expected due to a concurrent global effort to develop a GLC strategy and the ongoing Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) efforts to improve the cluster system (known as the Transformative Agenda).
3. Further information on the background and rationale for the evaluation can be found within the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the evaluation (Annex 1).
4. **Purpose.** The evaluation serves two primary purposes of learning and accountability as described in the TOR:
  - a) Assess and report on the quality and results of the operations and activities undertaken by the Logistics Cluster from 2006-2011 (accountability).
  - b) Determine the reasons why certain changes occurred – or did not occur – within the Logistics Cluster's operations and activities since the inception of the humanitarian reform in 2006, to draw lessons that should help in further implementation of the new direction (learning).
5. **Objective.** The objective of the evaluation is to systematically and objectively assess the overall effectiveness, efficiency, utilization, results and satisfaction related to GLC products, services and activities at global and country levels.
6. **Intended users.** The primary intended users of the evaluation are WFP headquarters (HQ) management, GLC Support Cell (GLC SC) leadership and partners actively participating in the Logistics Cluster at country and global levels.
7. **Methodology.** The evaluation methodology was designed to enhance the credibility, validity and usefulness of the evaluation approach and outputs by ensuring rigorous, systematic and replicable methods. Methods of data collection and analysis were identified based on their ability to address the questions noted in the terms of reference (TOR) for the evaluation within the practical constraints related to budget, schedule and key informant and data availability.

8. The initial methodology plan was fully developed and articulated in the Inception Report. This approach is summarized in the Annex 2 and Evaluation Matrix can be found in Annex 3.

9. The evaluation used both qualitative and quantitative data gathered from documents, interviews, a web-based survey and limited direct observation. Data collection sought to involve as many stakeholders as possible as key informants and included:

- a) Extensive interviews with 224 individuals selected either directly by the evaluation team or identified by the initial interviewees, maximizing both breadth and depth of the input.
- b) A 62 item internet survey sent to a random sample drawn from regular recipients of GLC weekly updates and other reports. This survey generated 51 respondents for a 32.7 percent response rate.
- c) Several hundred documents (including activity reports, financial records, shipping records, past evaluations, etc.) provided by the WFP OE, case study key informants and research by the evaluators.
- d) Extensive data collected by Google Analytics regarding the use and users of the publicly accessible Logcluster.org website.
- e) A limited number of observations of on-going GLC operations in Pakistan, Haiti and South Sudan and observation of a GLC global level meeting of partners in Geneva.

10. Approximately 120 interviews were conducted focusing on global level questions. Remaining interviews focused on seven critical case studies were conducted related to operations (the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Haiti, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan and South Sudan) to more specifically evaluate the GLC operations. Two additional situations where the cluster was not activated were reviewed (Ethiopia, Liberia) to examine how logistics coordination and common service needs are addressed in the absence of the cluster.

11. Case studies were selected using a purposeful sample from a list of 42 GLC operations (see Annex 7). The criteria for selecting case studies involved creating a sample that maximized the diversity of cases including the following attributes:

- a) Combinations of cluster activities and services (coordination, information management, common logistics services (e.g. transport, warehousing);
- b) Types of emergencies (e.g. conflict, natural disaster, outbreak);
- c) Scale of need and operational cost;
- d) Cases featuring inter-cluster coordination challenges or innovations;
- e) Cases featuring civil/military interaction with the cluster;
- f) Cases featuring preparedness work by the cluster;
- g) Examples where the cluster has deliberately incorporated the national government and sought to contribute to lasting national capacity.

12. The unit of analysis for each case study was a specific operation, rather than all operations that have taken place in a particular country. These case studies sought to utilize the same data collection tools and indicators across cases, but differences in report formats and data availability between locations limited this goal. The process

for conducting these studies was initiated with open-ended inquiry, followed by descriptive analysis and quantitative analysis of performance and usage data where available. The evaluation team then constructed a consolidated data set and cross-case analysis to identify similarities, differences and trends among operations as a basis for addressing the various high level questions noted on the evaluation matrix and formulating the recommendations.

13. The theory of change (see Section 1.3.1, Figure 1) developed during the inception phase was based on the key evaluation questions presented in the TOR as well as existing policies, plans and perceptions. The evaluation assessed the extent to which the theory of change reflects the actual work of the GLC through analysis of the data collected during the case studies, global-level feedback and reports of user satisfaction and use of the various products of the GLC.

14. Limitations: As noted above, the primary focus of the evaluation methodology was to ensure a rigorous process for addressing the evaluation questions and maximizing the credibility and usefulness of findings for a very diverse group of stakeholders. As with any evaluation, this was conducted within specific parameters, and these realities logically imply limitations. While the following parameters do not diminish the overall credibility of the findings, the conclusions of this evaluation must be understood within the limitations implied by the following factors:

- a) Global scope of operations and very complex operational structure;
- b) Extensive list of complex questions noted in the evaluation matrix;
- c) Very different nature of each operation limited the ability to compare across case studies;
- d) Short time for site visits, which precluded more extensive observations or confirmation of findings reported within interviews;
- e) Missing and/or inconsistent availability of data between countries selected for case studies;
- f) Difficulty in locating all key informants given rotation and turnover for past operations and activities;
- g) Elapsed time between certain activities and operations and the evaluation limited detailed recollection by some key informants;
- h) Many interviews conducted by phone, rather than in-person, which may have limited candor and information collection;
- i) Insufficient response to the survey by stakeholder sub-categories to allow for extensive data disaggregation;
- j) Accelerated data analysis schedule.

## **1.2. Context**

15. The field of humanitarian logistics continues to mature against a backdrop of increasingly frequent and impactful disasters set against a progressively more complex operating environment. Funding and overarching accountability trends within the humanitarian sector have created greater demand for efficiency, professionalism and a higher calibre of logistics response.

16. While total humanitarian response spending on humanitarian logistics is estimated to be between US\$7 billion and US\$14 billion per year,<sup>9</sup> this remains a fraction of the global civilian and military expenditures on logistics, estimated at more than US\$6.7 trillion in 2002.<sup>10</sup> In contrast, the GLC SC's total budget since inception in 2005 is US\$13.9 million, and the total budget for all 26 Special Operations (SO) associated with Logistics Cluster operations from 2006-2011 was US\$490 million.

17. Contextual trends and factors affecting humanitarian logistics based on literature and findings of the evaluation include: rising complexity and scope, increasing needs in conflict affected areas, increasing government restrictions related to access and import, wider competition and proliferation of actors, and persistent lack of recognition of the strategic importance of logistics in humanitarian agencies.

18. The evaluation seeks to gauge performance and results within this context. Though looming large for participants and crucial for disaster impacted populations, the GLC and related logistics coordination is a minor part of the global logistics spectrum. Annex 4 provides a more thorough review of the context.

### **1.3. Subject of the Evaluation**

19. The GLC was established as one of nine clusters by the IASC in December 2005 to follow up on recommendations of the Humanitarian Response Review<sup>11</sup>. This cluster system was created as one measure to address observed deficiencies in the humanitarian system during the 2004 Asian Tsunami and the conflict in Darfur.

20. In its December 2005 decision, the IASC designated agencies to serve as "global cluster leads," including WFP as the lead of the Logistics Cluster. Though the evaluation did not find a documented rationale for the selection of WFP as lead of the Logistics Cluster, key informants involved in the IASC decisions at the time note that WFP was selected because of its significant proven heavy logistics capacities and its experience in facilitating the work of the United Nations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC).<sup>12</sup>

21. The cluster system was designed to operate at two levels. At the global level the system is expected to strengthen system-wide preparedness and technical capacity to respond to emergencies (primarily through the naming of lead agencies to ensure greater "predictability and accountability"). At country levels the cluster system is intended to "ensure a more coherent and effective response by mobilizing groups of agencies, organizations and NGOs to respond in a strategic manner across all key sectors or areas of activity."<sup>13</sup>

22. The GLC began work in late 2005 (initially as the Cluster Working Group on Logistics). Since this time no guidance has been offered by the IASC regarding the

<sup>9</sup> "A Peek Into the Future of Humanitarian Logistics: Forewarned is Forearmed", Majewski, Navangul, Heigh, Supply Chain Forum – An International Journal, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2010.

<sup>10</sup> A. Rodrigues, D. Bowersox, R. Calantone. 2005 "Estimation of Global and National Logistics Expenditures: 2002 Data Update", Michigan State University, East Lansing.

<sup>11</sup> Adinolfi, C., D. Bassiouni, H. Lauritzsen and R. Williams (2005) "Humanitarian Response Review" 2005 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), Geneva.

<sup>12</sup> The UNJLC was established in March 2002 as a common humanitarian service. While WFP hosted the UNJLC, it was an inter-agency mechanism meant to coordinate and pool resources as needed. UNJLC's mandate differed from the GLC in that it was a stand-alone mechanism, non-operational and did not include the provider of last resort concept.

<sup>13</sup> "Generic Terms of Reference for Sector/Cluster at the Country Level", IASC, 2006

specific mandates of the Logistics Cluster. However, work plans, budgets and updates from the GLC have been presented to the IASC suggesting general concurrence with its activities and direction. Generally the IASC stated that each of the clusters would be responsible for “establishing broad partnership bases” to engage in standards and policy setting, building response capacity and providing operational support.<sup>14</sup>

23. However, IASC documents do list the Logistics Cluster under the category of “common service area” along with the Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC), while all other clusters are designated under categories of “technical areas” or “cross-cutting areas.” In practice the GLC acts as a service cluster that enables the work of other humanitarian actors. As a service cluster the GLC has dual roles of coordinator and service provider, which distinguishes the Logistics Cluster from seven of the other clusters that focus on coordination.

24. The GLC is actually a complex and interlinked set of organizations, structures and open forums. These can be summarized across three primary dimensions: 1) partnership, 2) support cell and 3) cluster lead agency, at global and country levels, as depicted in Table 1.

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<sup>14</sup> “Guidance Note on Using the Cluster Approach to Strengthen Humanitarian Response”, IASC, 24 November 2006

**Table 1 – Components of the Global Logistics Cluster**

Component	Global Level	Country Level
Partnership	<p>Open platform and collaboration coordinated by GLC SC including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• GLC Meeting &amp; Call Participants</li> <li>• Stand-by Partners</li> <li>• Logistics Emergency Team (LET – corporate sector)</li> <li>• Information Product Users</li> <li>• Training Course Participants</li> <li>• UNHRD, UNHAS</li> </ul>	<p>Open platform and collaboration coordinated by country cluster cell including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Logistics Cluster Meeting Participants</li> <li>• Information Product Users and Contributors</li> <li>• Common Logistics Service Users and Providers</li> </ul>
Support Cell	<p>GLC SC based primarily in Rome comprised of staff selected from WFP and secondees from NGOs, other United Nations (UN) agencies and Stand-by Partners.</p>	<p>Country cluster cell – staff wholly or partly dedicated to cluster work – may be WFP country office (CO) staff or deployed from outside the country as a Logistics Response Team (LRT), or a temporary duty assignment (TDY) for other WFP or GLC SC staff.</p>
Cluster Lead Agency	<p>WFP assigned ongoing responsibility by the IASC. Involves:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Appointing a Global Cluster Coordinator (who serves as the head of GLC SC)</li> <li>• Ensuring the resourcing, back office infrastructure and support required for the GLC to conduct its work at global and country levels</li> </ul> <p>Representational and leadership responsibilities for WFP Logistics Division Director, Executive Director, other Senior Leaders and staff vis-à-vis partners, donors and accountable to the UN Emergency Response Coordinator (ERC) and IASC.</p>	<p>Responsibility of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) or Resident Coordinator (RC) to assign cluster lead agency responsibility though IASC documents stress cluster lead arrangements at country level should be in line with the global level if possible to enhance predictability. To date, WFP has always been identified as the country level cluster lead. Involves:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Serving as provider of last resort and providing (or arranging) operational capacity to implement common services</li> <li>• Ensuring resourcing and back office infrastructure to support the cluster</li> </ul> <p>Representational and leadership responsibilities for WFP CO Logistics Director and Country Director vis-à-vis managing Logistics Cluster staff, accountability to the HC and coordination within the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT).</p>

25. In the absence of specific guidance on its mandate the GLC has developed a few key statements defining its components.<sup>15</sup> The Logistics Cluster overall is defined as a “group of humanitarian organizations and other stakeholders committed to commonly address logistics needs during humanitarian crises on a broad partnership basis”. No formal membership definition exists as the cluster has sought to remain open and not exclusive. Logistics Cluster participants are defined as organizations “engaging at any point at global and/or country level in activities related to the Logistics Cluster”. Both the global and country-level Logistics Cluster support cells are defined as being comprised of “dedicated inter-agency staff”.

<sup>15</sup> “Logistics Cluster Concept and Guidelines”, Endorsed by the GLC meeting March, 2007



26. The defined mission of the GLC SC is to facilitate the humanitarian logistics community to exploit shared assets, aptitudes and competencies both at global and field levels.<sup>16</sup> In a separate document, the core purpose of the GLC SC is defined as, “To foster coordination and synergy among humanitarian logistics actors in order to maximize their individual and combined performance in preparing and responding to complex emergencies and natural disasters”.<sup>17</sup>

27. Between 2005 and 2011, the Logistics Cluster has been active in 42 operations across 29 countries providing logistics sector coordination and operational support and sometimes undertaking preparedness activities.

28. The GLC also strives to improve humanitarian response through collective participation by developing systems and processes such as coordination tools, common pipelines and information management that improve collaboration and cumulative impact of humanitarian response activities.

29. The IASC driven humanitarian reform process operates under the assumption that broad participation will increase coordination and improve humanitarian outcomes. Given this overall context, the evaluation seeks to gauge the quality and results of the Logistics Cluster at the global and country levels.

### **1.3.1 GLC Theory of Change**

30. While no official logic model or theory of change has been explicitly developed for the GLC, many of the policies, strategies and guidance documents discussed in the sections above provide clear indications of how various inputs and activities are intended to lead to outputs, outcomes and results for the cluster.


31. Using the logical framework and models developed for the Cluster Approach Evaluation 2 as a starting point, the evaluation team developed a theory of change based on documentary review and interviews during the inception. Given the perceived differences between “service clusters” and the other thematic and programme clusters cited by stakeholders during inception phase interviews, the theory of change organizes activities and outputs into the distinct categories of “coordinator role” and “service provider role”.

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<sup>16</sup> “Logistics Cluster and Humanitarian Reform”, GLC, July 2010

<sup>17</sup> “WFP Logistics Cluster Support Cell 2008-2010 Business Plan”, GLC, January 2009

**Figure 1 – GLC Theory of Change<sup>18</sup>**



<sup>18</sup> Acronyms used in Theory of Change graphic: Concept of Operations (CONOPS), Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), Situation Reports (SitRep), Logistics Operational Guide (LOG), Information Management (IM), Logistics Capacity Assessment (LCA), United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS), Geographic Information Systems (GIS), Civil/Military (Civ/Mil), Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot (UNHRD).

32. Through this evaluation, the theory of change, shown in Figure 1, is confirmed to be valid, though the relative emphasis on certain elements and the strength of causal linkages varies as described throughout Section 2 of this report.

33. The theory of change presented above shows the diverse set of inputs from partners, the cluster lead agency (WFP), humanitarian policy makers and donors that enable the work of the GLC. These inputs allow the GLC to conduct activities that fall into its dual roles of coordinator and service provider. The activities and outputs noted under the coordinator role are similar across most clusters, while those noted under the service provider role are more unique to the GLC. Many external factors and assumptions will potentially influence the effectiveness of GLC activities, as well as their ability to achieve intended outputs. These factors largely depend upon the capacity and quality of contributions from other actors, the overall global demand for support at the time and the working conditions in an operational context.

34. The outcomes and results expected from the work of the GLC are divided into intermediate and longer-term outcomes and overall results. Intermediate outcomes are more likely to be observed and within the control of the GLC to effect, while longer-term outcomes relate more to the total performance of humanitarian actors in an emergency. The overall intended result of the GLC's work is to reduce the adverse consequences of an emergency on the affected population (such as saving lives and improving livelihoods, enabling more rapid recovery). All expected outcomes and results depend upon the ability of other humanitarian actors to effectively coordinate with and use the services and products of the GLC to maximize performance.

35. Given the dual GLC roles of coordinator and service provider, understanding the distinct and overlapping functions of the GLC is complex. The mandate and roles of the GLC are guided by three tiers of strategy, policy and guidance:

- a) Overarching humanitarian coordination policies and decisions of the IASC, which establish the purpose, architecture (governance, cluster lead assignments, etc.), expectations and coordination mechanisms.
- b) Strategies, policies and decisions of WFP's Executive Board and HQ Management, which determine how WFP will undertake its responsibilities as the lead for the GLC.
- c) Business plans, preparedness and deployment plans, guidance and systems developed by the GLC SC to operationalize IASC and WFP decisions and direction set by GLC partners in global meetings.

### **1.3.2 IASC Policy and Previous Evaluations**

36. In 2005 the UN ERC and Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs in the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) commissioned the Humanitarian Response Review.<sup>19</sup> The resulting report recommended assigning "clear responsibilities to lead organizations at a sector level" and the "development of cluster models between networks at the sectoral, regional and local levels".

37. The Humanitarian Response Review was used to launch a comprehensive humanitarian reform process. In September 2005 the IASC Principals meeting decided to implement the "cluster approach" in major new emergencies starting in 2006, and agreed to the assignment of lead agencies for nine clusters, including WFP as the lead for the Logistics Cluster, one of two "service clusters."

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<sup>19</sup> "Humanitarian Response Review," Adinolfi et. al., 2005

38. Key milestones related to the implementation of the cluster system are listed in Table 2 and described in further detail in Annex 5.

**Table 2 – IASC Cluster Implementation and Policy Milestones**

<b>2005 – September</b>	IASC Principals agree to implement the cluster approach in major new emergencies in 2006. IASC Cluster Working Group recommends that WFP should take the lead managerial responsibility and accountability for logistics.
<b>2005 – October</b>	Emergency Relief Coordinator decides to implement the cluster system in response to the Pakistan Earthquake.
<b>2005 – December</b>	IASC Principals formally designate cluster lead agencies.
<b>2006 – March</b>	OCHA issues first CAP to fund the cluster system with GLC requirements of \$9 million. <sup>20</sup>
<b>2006 – Throughout</b>	IASC task team develops guidance to operationalize cluster system, (TORs for country cluster leads, a Q&A on the cluster approach, and a guidance note). <sup>21</sup>
<b>2007 – March</b>	IASC endorses a two-phased approach to evaluating the cluster system.
<b>2007 – April</b>	OCHA issues a second CAP for the cluster system including a US\$8 million request for the GLC (US\$4.3 m for WFP, remainder for seven other agencies). <sup>22</sup>
<b>2007 – November</b>	Phase 1 Cluster Evaluation <sup>23</sup> completed. No specific findings for GLC but some applicable broader issues identified (see Table 1, Annex 5).
<b>2007 – December</b>	IASC Working Group formed to address Phase 1 evaluation recommendations.
<b>2008 – June</b>	Management response matrix <sup>24</sup> for Phase 1 evaluation completed by IASC Working group. Guidance approved on provider of last resort (POLR) concept, with new caveats for security, access and availability of funding.
<b>2008 – December</b>	IASC Working Group issues “Operational Guidance on Responsibilities of Cluster/Sector Leads and OCHA in Information Management”. <sup>25</sup>
<b>2008 – (late)</b>	IASC supports merger of UNJLC and the GLC.
<b>2009 – October</b>	Joint letter <sup>26</sup> sent from lead agencies to their respective country office directors regarding their important role in implementing clusters and part of “mainstreaming efforts.” (Signed by WFP’s Director of Emergencies.)
<b>2009 – July to 2010 – March</b>	Phase 2 Cluster Approach Evaluation <sup>27</sup> conducted focusing on operational effectiveness and outcomes primarily at the country level.
<b>2011</b>	ERC and IASC Principles initiate “Transformative Agenda” to address findings of Phase 2 evaluation and lessons from Haiti and Pakistan. Principals Task Team and Sub-Working Group on Cluster Approach formed.

<sup>20</sup> US\$110,000 of this total was for OCHA to hire a database manager to develop and maintain a relief items stockpile database, the remainder appears to be for the GLC. “Appeal for Improving Humanitarian Response Capacity: 2006 - Cluster”, OCHA

<sup>21</sup> These core documents still form the primary foundational guidance for the cluster system today.

<sup>22</sup> US\$110,000 of this total was for OCHA to hire a database manager to develop and maintain a relief items stockpile database, the remainder appears to be for WFP as lead agency for the GLC. “Appeal for Improving Humanitarian Response Capacity: 2006 – Cluster,” OCHA.

<sup>23</sup> “Cluster Approach Evaluation – Final,” Stoddard et. al., November 2007.

<sup>24</sup> “Recommendations from the 2007 Cluster Evaluation Report: IASC Working Group’s Management Response Matrix” OCHA (Humanitarian Response Support Unity (HRSU)), 2 June 2008 – accessed in December 2011 at <http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/policy/thematic-areas/evaluations-of-humanitarian-response/reports#2007>

<sup>25</sup> “Operational Guidance on Responsibilities of Cluster/Sector Leads and OCHA in Information Management” accessed in December 2011 at <http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/pageloader.aspx?page=content-subsidi-common-default&sb=73>

<sup>26</sup> “Joint letter from Cluster Lead Agencies to their Directors/Representatives at Country Level,” November 2009, accessed December 2011 at <http://onerresponse.info/Coordination/ClusterApproach/publicdocuments/Cluster%20Lead%20Agencies%20joint%20letter%20on%20dual%20responsibility.%20November%202009.pdf>

<sup>27</sup> “IASC Cluster Approach Evaluation, 2<sup>nd</sup> Phase, April 2010 – Synthesis Report,” Steets, Grünewald et. al., accessed November 2011 at [http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/gppi/GPPi-URD\\_Cluster\\_II\\_Evaluation\\_SYNTHESIS\\_REPORT\\_e.pdf](http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/gppi/GPPi-URD_Cluster_II_Evaluation_SYNTHESIS_REPORT_e.pdf)

39. The Phase 1 Cluster Evaluation, completed in November 2007, focused on process indicators, achievements and limitations of the cluster approach and lessons learned related to its rollout. In general the evaluation found improvements in filling gaps, extending capacities and enhanced predictability by lead agencies accepting responsibility for the totality of their cluster. Accountability for performance was deemed the area of least progress due to insufficient institutionalization of cluster commitments by lead agencies. The quality of partnerships and strengthened surge capacity were noted by the evaluation as areas where smaller gains could be found.

40. While none of the recommendations specifically cites the GLC, some broader issues were raised which appear pertinent to its work as shown in Table 3 below.

**Table 3 – Recommendations from Phase 1 Cluster Evaluation Relevant to GLC**

Actors	Recommendation
Cluster lead agencies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Codify cluster leadership responsibilities and issue clear guidance for senior management in countries of operation.</li> <li>• Adopt an action plan for institutionalizing and executing cluster responsibilities.</li> <li>• Clarify reporting lines/accountabilities for cluster coordinators and country directors and ensure that reporting lines and performance objectives are written into position descriptions and appraisals.</li> <li>• Clarify reporting from global cluster lead agencies to the ERC.</li> <li>• Renew efforts to enhance global preparedness in ways that build upon rather than detract from national/local preparedness.</li> </ul>
IASC Principals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Further clarify the function of Provider of Last Resort and consider developing criteria for gap scenarios that would trigger such action.</li> </ul>
OCHA/the ERC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop global guidance for cluster transition/closeout with the goal of ensuring opportunities for using the cluster to build local response capacity and support contingency planning.</li> <li>• Develop clearer and more detailed guidance on working with recipient states where national disaster response structures are already in place.</li> </ul>
OCHA/cluster lead agencies at field level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop simple, standard field-level information management system for inter-cluster communications and reporting.</li> <li>• Make national capacity building a focus of the clusters' operations in chronic and recurrent emergency countries.</li> <li>• Carry out cluster-oriented contingency planning in all HC and disaster-prone countries.</li> <li>• Initiate information and learning exchanges between cluster countries.</li> </ul>
Donors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support reasonable requests from cluster lead agencies for additional resources to help them fulfill their cluster responsibilities.</li> <li>• Encourage and incentivize operational partners to be active participants and contributors to their relevant clusters.</li> </ul>
INGOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Set and clearly communicate parameters for the level of engagement that can be expected in various clusters, including ... second staff as cluster coordinators when called upon to do so.</li> </ul>

41. The Phase 2 Cluster Approach Evaluation Report credits GLC for a range of capacities built and inclusivity. Case studies suggest GLC strengths including: additional geographic coverage, service coverage, quality and level of global cluster support, meeting needs of humanitarian actors, and quality of information sharing. Weaknesses suggested across case studies for the GLC included; involvement of appropriate national actors, handover and exit strategies, interaction with the financial pillar, and accountability to HC and among members (see Annex 5).

42. The phase 2 evaluation presented six key recommendations with 35 total detailed sub-recommendations. The six key recommendations are shown in Table 4 with selected sub-recommendations most pertinent to the GLC.

**Table 4 – Key Recommendations of Phase 2 Cluster Evaluation Pertinent to GLC**

<b>Key Recommendation</b>	<b>Sub-Recommendation (pertinent to GLC)</b>
1. Support existing preparedness, response and coordination mechanisms and capacities where appropriate.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct analysis of the context, coordination and response mechanisms and capacities before implementing and ensure appropriate links</li> <li>• Identify appropriate partners in national and local authorities</li> <li>• Strengthen cooperation and coordination between clusters, national actors and development actors at every stage from preparedness to response and the transition to development</li> </ul>
2. Strengthen cluster management and implementation modalities.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Continue to strengthen the “mainstreaming” of cluster lead responsibilities</li> <li>• Strengthen the role of HCs in the cluster approach</li> <li>• Reinforce the role of INGOs in clusters</li> <li>• Clarify the criteria, processes and terminology for cluster implementation, transition and exit</li> <li>• Ensure that cluster coordinators, especially at sub-national level, have sufficient time and skills to fulfill their responsibilities</li> <li>• Improve information sharing and management</li> </ul>
3. Enhance the focus on strengthening the quality of humanitarian response in cluster operations and activities.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ensure that clusters have a clear operational focus</li> <li>• Facilitate the participation of national and local NGOs and strengthen their capacities</li> <li>• Further strengthen the role of clusters in defining, adapting, using and promoting relevant standards</li> <li>• Ensure integration of cross-cutting issues in assessments, policies, tools, training courses, guidance, planning and operations</li> <li>• Improve mechanisms to deal with multidisciplinary issues and inter-cluster gaps</li> <li>• Further strengthen learning</li> </ul>
4. Increase the focus of resources for the cluster approach on the local level.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strengthen training courses for facilitation, coordination and cross-cutting issues on the national and sub-national levels, minimize turnover of coordinators and improve handover processes</li> <li>• Provide dedicated part-time or full-time coordination capacities for sub-national clusters</li> <li>• Create reporting links between global and national clusters and ensure that national clusters support sub-national ones</li> <li>• Define decision-making procedures between national and sub-national clusters to decentralize operational decisions</li> </ul>
5. Provide sufficient funding and define ways for linking clusters and financing mechanisms.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide adequate funding for coordination activities</li> <li>• Ensure adequate funding for cluster strategies and activities “sponsored” by clusters by: strengthening links between clusters and pooled funds, creating strategic links between clusters and bilateral donors, strengthening links to and the inclusion of non-traditional donors</li> <li>• Improve the governance of funding mechanisms to limit conflicts of interest and ensure direct access of international and local NGOs to funding and enhance the transparency of financial transactions linked to clusters</li> <li>• Further define/clarify what POLR entails</li> </ul>
6. Resolve outstanding policy issues at the global level.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop concrete, context-specific guidelines on the linkages between clusters and peacekeeping and political missions</li> <li>• Focus the activities of global clusters on identifying and addressing conflicts and systemic incoherence</li> </ul>

### **1.3.3 WFP Strategies, Policies and Decisions**

43. No records related to WFP's initial decision to accept the role of lead agency for the Logistics Cluster were located or identified by key informants during the evaluation. However, WFP's Head of Logistics was reportedly very active in leading early efforts to establish the Logistics Cluster during the Pakistan earthquake in late 2005 when the ERC decided to implement the cluster system for the first time.

44. The first official document highlighting WFP's implementation of its lead role appears to be from August 2006 when the WFP Executive Director issued notice of the establishment of a special account for the GLC.<sup>28</sup> The notice states that the account will fund establishment of a single integrated financial management system for WFP to manage the cluster and stresses that WFP, as lead agency "is responsible to resource and manage the total Logistics Cluster budget at the global level".

45. The WFP Strategic Plan 2008-2013<sup>29</sup> incorporates the organization's cluster lead responsibilities. This strategy states that, "priority will be given to fulfilling WFP's role and responsibilities as the cluster lead agency for logistics," and that, "In order to meet its cluster mandate, WFP must continue to provide efficient, reliable and predictable services to the entire humanitarian community while adopting a customer service approach towards its operational responsibilities".

46. The 2008-11 Logistics Division (OML) Business Plan<sup>30</sup> builds upon the WFP role in leading the GLC by calling for WFP "to be the logistics service provider of choice for WFP programmes, and to the wider humanitarian community by 2010". The plan also outlines GLC services and a value proposition (see Table 4, Annex 5).

47. This Business Plan also states the intention to integrate the separate support structures of the UNJLC and GLC under a single GLC SC with the following stated mission "To foster coordination and synergy among humanitarian logistics actors in order to maximize their individual and combined performance".<sup>31</sup>

48. The WFP Management Plan 2012-2014 presented to the Executive Board in October 2011<sup>32</sup> states that the priority area of "cluster leadership" has been mainstreamed into the regular Programme Support and Administration (PSA) budget with US\$1,824,702 allocated to the GLC to cover 9.5 staff and non-staff costs for 2012.

### **1.3.4 GLC Plans, Guidance and Decisions**

49. Nine GLC meetings at the global level have been held since 2006 to bring together partners. Discussions and presentations during these meetings have focused on a wide range of topics including GLC plans, mandate, services, activities, products, procedures, funding, lessons learned, thematic issues and cross-cluster coordination and communication. While the meetings do not serve a decision-making or governance function, participants have provided input and sometimes

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<sup>28</sup> WFP Executive Director's Circular, "The Establishment of a Special Account for the Global Logistics Cluster," 1 August 2006 (ED2006/05)

<sup>29</sup> "WFP Strategic Plan 2008-2013", accessed in November 2011 at <http://www.wfp.org/content/wfp-strategic-plan-2008-2013>

<sup>30</sup> "WFP OML 2008-2011 Business Plan," 27/01/2009

<sup>31</sup> For further information on the integration of UNJLC and GLC see "IASC Working Group Summary Note, Outcomes of the Global Logistics Cluster Meeting, October 2008."

<sup>32</sup> WFP Executive Board Second Regular Session, Rome 14-17 November 2011, "WFP Management Plan 2012-2014," (WFP/EB.2/2011/5-A/1)

endorsed guidelines, plans and general direction setting presented by the GLC SC. Key decisions, plans and issued guidance are summarized in Table 5.

**Table 5 – GLC Planning, Guidance and Decision Milestones**

<b>2007 – March</b>	GLC meeting participants endorsed the “Logistics Cluster Concept and Guidelines,” including definitions, key processes, reporting lines, activation process, TOR for the support cell, TOR for country level Logistics Clusters and TOR for the LRT.
<b>2008 – January</b>	GLC SC Business Plan <sup>33</sup> developed outlining its mission, key attributes, customers, stakeholders, products, services, comparative advantages, performance drivers, objectives, key performance indicators and projects.
<b>2009 – January</b>	2008-2010 GLC SC Business Plan <sup>34</sup> developed outlining purpose, values, goals, structure, value chains and diagrams the links between processes, service outputs and customers, planned development projects and includes key measures for core areas of operational support (preparedness and response), information management and normative guidance/policy.
<b>2010 – July</b>	GLC SC produces document “Logistics Cluster and Humanitarian Reform” <sup>35</sup> summarizing reform and cluster principles and policies, the GLC SC mission, activation protocols, activities, definitions, reporting lines, country TOR for the cluster and overviews of the CONOPS tool, GLC information products and GLC Civ/Mil relations principles.

### 1.3.5 GLC Operations and Activities Overview

50. By February 2006, WFP had already dedicated three staff members to lead the development of the GLC at a global level. By February of 2007 the GLC Support Cell was formally established with clear concepts and guidelines and expanded staffing.

51. The financial expenditures of the GLC SC since September 2006 provide one way of trying to assess the level of activities at a global level. The GLC SC income and expenditure statements show total expenditures of \$13,906,260 from September 1, 2006 to November 4, 2011. The consolidated expenditures are shown in Table 6.

**Table 6 – GLC SC Expenditures – September 2006 to November 2011**

Category	Amount per Year(s) in US \$					TOTAL
	2006-2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	
Staff/Consultants (salary and benefits)	1,171,896	1,625,890	1,630,556	1,454,183	1,475,781	7,358,306
Travel costs	912,508	725,263	393,526	325,593	375,285	2,732,175
Communication and IT Services	32,616	36,137	74,013	53,911	702	197,380
TC/IT Equipment	29,757	20,870	22,430	74,683	47,488	195,228
Meetings and Workshops		166,118				166,118
Training costs	267,222	209,188				476,410
NGO Secondment costs	310,000	272,035	446,618	556,261	461,466	2,046,381
MoUs with UN Agencies	300,000					300,000
Other	11,801	10,672	132,585	133,982	145,222	434,262
	3,035,801	3,066,173	2,699,728	2,598,613	2,505,945	13,906,260

52. Noted discrepancies in the expenditures shown above in Table 6 are primarily explained due to variance in accounting methods. For example, while the training course costs were captured for 2006-2008, these costs are incorporated into other

<sup>33</sup> “Global Logistics Cluster Support Cell – Draft Business Plan 1” 31 January 2008

<sup>34</sup> “WFP Logistics Cluster Support Cell 2008-2010 Business Plan” 27/01/2009

<sup>35</sup> “Logistics Cluster and Humanitarian Reform” The Global Logistics Cluster Support Cell, July 2010




categories and the budget of the WFP Logistics Development Unit (LDU) in subsequent years. The expenditures on Memorandum of Understanding (MoUs ) with UN agencies relate to wages paid for staff seconded by other UN agencies. In subsequent years these costs were accounted for under the staff/consultants category. NGO staff costs have fluctuated over time based on the number of seconded staff in the GLC SC during that year.

53. Detailed retrospective understanding of the past expenditures of the GLC is complicated by a loss of institutional memory due to staff turnover. Despite efforts to compile more detailed project and activity financial data at a global level, the evaluators found that WFP systems are not able to produce this data without an extensive financial audit.

54. In addition to the expenditures shown in Table 6, the GLC has benefited from the investments of partners and various WFP units. Organizations participating in the GLC have contributed staff time and used their own financial resources (for meeting travel and expenses and special initiatives). Other WFP units have also covered expenses for participating in GLC meetings and in some cases have invested significant time and resources towards developing GLC tools and training modules, in particular the Logistics Development Unit. WFP finance, resource mobilization, logistics, information technology, and policy staff also provide the back office support and infrastructure that enables the GLC SC to conduct its work.

55. While global expenditures have remained relatively steady between 2006 and 2011, income has been less consistent, partly linked to the initial surge of funding from CAP appeals. Income versus expenditure patterns is shown in Figure 2.

**Figure 2 – GLC SC Income vs. Expenditures**



56. Since 2006 the GLC SC has received income totalling US\$16,601,046. Eight government donors<sup>36</sup> contributed 52 percent in 2006 and 2007. The European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) contributed 17 percent in 2009–

2011. Thirty-two percent of GLC SC total income was provided by WFP from its “PSA Allotment” during 2009, 2010 and 2011, which reflects the “mainstreaming” of 9.5 positions into WFP’s core headquarters budget.

57. Funding received in 2006 and 2007 exceeded annual GLC requirements. Most of this funding was received through the two CAPs, which were intended to cover a

<sup>36</sup> Income for 2006 and 2007 is shown as coming primarily from the following donors, mostly linked to the CAP appeals: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States.

24 month period. Thus, no additional income was required or sought to fund GLC activities in 2008. Annex 6 provides detailed income sources for the GLC SC by year.

58. Table 7 shows the types of activities undertaken by the GLC SC and partners at a global level since 2006. These activities are covered in greater detail in Section 2.

**Table 7 – Global GLC Activities**

<b>Partnership</b>	<b>Systems and Tools</b>	<b>Normative Guidance</b>	<b>Field Support</b>	<b>GLC SC Management</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bi-annual meetings of GLC partners</li> <li>• Managing partnerships with corporate sector actors (e.g. LET)</li> <li>• Facilitating ongoing communication and dialogue on thematic issues</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Information management system (website, reporting protocols, records)</li> <li>• Training course development and management</li> <li>• Roster development and management</li> <li>• Financial tracking</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mission, values, services, procedures and decision-making processes of GLC</li> <li>• Logistics Operations Guide (LOG) and IM Guidelines</li> <li>• Disseminating IASC policies, humanitarian standards</li> <li>• Representing GLC in IASC and policy bodies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Advice and guidance to cluster teams in field</li> <li>• Support writing, clearing and disseminating information products</li> <li>• Liaison with WFP corporate offices to ensure back office support for cluster operations</li> <li>• Secure appropriate staff for country level clusters</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strategic and business planning</li> <li>• Recruiting and managing staff (including secondments)</li> <li>• Resource mobilization and financial management</li> </ul>

59. GLC Operations. The first logistics cluster was activated for the Pakistan earthquake in October 2005 at the request of the ERC. WFP immediately dedicated senior logistics staff to support the cluster allowing it to assist other actors.

60. A total of 42 GLC operations have been conducted since 2005. Annex 7 provides a summary of these operations. Operational activities most frequently described include gap assessment, IM, coordination, common services and liaison with CIV/MIL and national governments.


61. From 2006-2011 WFP launched 26 SO funding appeals including Logistics Cluster requirements, totalling US\$490 million. SOs often consolidate requirements of the Logistics Cluster, the ETC and WFP field logistics augmentation, and an unknown fraction of this total relates to the Logistics Cluster.

62. The average funding ratio for these SOs (as of November 2011) stood at 61 percent or a shortfall of 39 percent.<sup>37</sup> Some attracted a wide range of donors (Pakistan and Haiti) while others relied only on the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF).

63. 238 staff have been deployed for the cluster since 2005, according to records available. Figure 3 shows the number of staff deployed each year by function.

<sup>37</sup> Of the 26 SOs, 10 were still active as of November 2011, 6 of which were due to be closed as of December 31, 2011. Coverage of the currently active SOs is actually higher than the overall average with 59 percent of requested funds received.

**Figure 3 – Logistics Cluster Staff Deployed for Operations**



64. Forty-eight people were deployed as cluster coordinators from 2005 to 2011. Of these, 28 were deployed once, 13 twice, five three times; two were deployed four times.

## 2. Evaluation Findings

65. The key findings of the evaluation are presented in summary statements below, with references to the sections where detailed findings and analysis can be found. Key findings are organized under each of the TOR's four key evaluation questions.

66. ***What are the results of the Logistics Cluster's operations at the country level?***

a) Overall GLC operations were found to be highly relevant and are broadly considered a valuable and effective contribution to humanitarian efforts in very difficult contexts. Stakeholders overwhelmingly agree the GLC has improved humanitarian logistics, better enabled participating organizations to have greater effect on emergency affected populations and enhanced programme delivery (see Section 2.1.1 and Section 2.1.4).

b) The general finding of effectiveness was confirmed across multiple dimensions of results, including increased fundraising capacity, enhanced operational timeliness, cost savings, improved coverage/reduced gaps and duplication, greater predictability and accountability and improved information sharing (see Section 2.1.4).

c) Financial and reporting systems have not been geared to support the GLC and are inconsistently applied, which limits the ability to conduct activity-based financial analysis across countries, and indicates a lack of strategic global coordination and authority (see Section 2.1.1).

d) WFP's special account for the GLC and advance funding mechanisms significantly enhance the initial timeliness and likelihood of achieving desired outcomes by helping jump-start operations. These mechanisms allow for rapid gap assessment and establishment of logistics services when other actors most need such information and predictable support (see Section 2.1.2).

e) General satisfaction was found with activation processes (with important areas for improvement) and proactive deployment of resources in emergencies, in contrast with broader concern with deactivation process (see Section 2.1.2).

f) Human resources systems and procedures have not supported operations adequately, with problems found relating to selection, handover and staff performance assessment (see Section 2.1.2 and Section 2.3.4).

- g) Prioritization decisions have been appropriate, but lack of transparent communication about the costs and benefits of common services is a significant weakness in GLC work with partners (see Section 2.1.3).
- h) Primary gaps for partners found in GLC operations at the country level included assistance for customs clearance, procurement and specialized programme logistics (see Section 2.1.4).
- i) Some evidence was found that GLC operations have provided significant lasting results in countries, but this is limited by its designed role and mandate (see Section 2.1.5).

**67. *To what extent did the GLC's activities and products provide value to users?***

- a) The GLC SC is well established and relatively well capacitated, yet staff skills and interest are primarily oriented towards field support and augmentation rather than global management, performance monitoring, partnership maintenance and development of tools, guidance and systems (see Section 2.2.1).
- b) The GLC Global Cluster Coordinator position is combined with the head of WFP's Augmented Logistics Intervention Team for Emergencies (ALITE), which gives the coordinator less than adequate time and focus to dedicate to the significant responsibilities of leading the GLC (see Section 2.2.1).
- c) Staff seconded to the GLC SC by other agencies have reinforced the inter-agency character of the GLC. However, the rationale behind using secondees is generally too based in the notion of representation and optics rather than a human resources plan based on staffing needs linked to a clear GLC SC strategy (see Section 2.2.1).
- d) Partners have been generally satisfied with activities, but identified gaps in preparedness activities and serving as a forum for strategic discussion (see Section 2.2.1 and Section 2.2.6).
- e) The logcluster.org website has been well used, with substantial spikes in use related to emergencies, and small but significant use in "field" locations. Heavy use of operational products, country information and maps was found, while pages related to tools, road transport and photos receive less use (see Section 2.2.3).
- f) Primary gaps found in GLC normative guidance include guidance for civil/military relations applicable across partners and handling of Unsolicited Bilateral Donations (UBDs) (see Section 2.2.4).
- g) Training courses provided by the GLC showed high satisfaction among participants and sponsoring agencies. Primary gaps identified were for a dedicated Logistics Cluster coordinator training course and further general awareness training courses for WFP field staff and managers (see Section 2.2.5).
- h) Overall satisfaction with information products was found to be high, with greatest appreciation and use for operations products, especially GIS/Mapping. Preparedness products were appreciated but not viewed as complete or updated (see Section 2.2.3 and 2.2.4).

**68. *To what extent have the Logistics Clusters at global and country levels, under WFP's leadership, worked effectively with partners?***

- a) Global meetings have been consistently attended by 35-45 participants representing a consistent mix of stakeholder types. However, turnover among participants has been significant, many INGOs were missing, and GLC/WFP and UN attendance was disproportionately high (see Section 2.3.1).
- b) Engagement between senior WFP logistics staff and their counterparts in partner organizations appears to have diminished over the past three years. Issues around shared vision of the role and mandate of the GLC, its leadership and transparency have caused some disengagement with GLC (see Section 2.3.1).
- c) The GLC has worked well with partners between global meetings on some specific projects; partners cited the development of the LOG as an example of collaboration and reported high levels of satisfaction in both the development process and utility of the final product. However, follow-up activity following global meetings was found to be low (see Section 2.3.1).
- d) The evaluation found overall agreement that WFP is best positioned to lead the Logistics Cluster. While many people were initially concerned about the ability of the WFP to create a participatory and collaborative atmosphere as cluster lead, the majority of stakeholders (across all categories) report that the GLC SC has far exceeded expectations on inclusiveness, and have been largely satisfied with the GLC efforts to work with them (see Section 2.3.2).
- e) The GLC has not been able to develop and sustain an emergency roster in recent years due to lack of partner willingness to deploy staff with GLC, demand for temporary duty assignment (TDY) opportunities and the strong interest of country offices to work with people they know throughout the WFP system. (see Section 2.3.4)

**69. *To what extent did the lessons derived through Logistics Cluster experience inform decision-making?***

- a) No formal systematic lesson learning efforts were found to collect, document, share and discuss lessons from operations with staff and partners. Ad hoc recruitment, one-time deployments and lack of debriefing were found to reduce institutional memory. Participant satisfaction has been gauged following operations and GLC SC staff have attempted to document lessons learned internally. A good practice example was identified in the global shelter cluster (see section 2.4.1).
- b) Lessons learned across the humanitarian system have been driving on-going evolution of humanitarian reform. The Transformative Agenda of the IASC appears to be addressing some system deficiencies that have negatively impacted the GLC but evolution of the cluster system will require some GLC adaptations (see Section 2.4.2).

**2.1. Findings Regarding Operations at the Country Level**

70. The evaluation found that country level operations of the Logistics Cluster are demonstrating links between the inputs and activities depicted in the theory of change (Figure 1 above) and the expected outputs related to collaborative response, information sharing, pooled resources, rapid deployment, increased funding and


delivery of goods. Evidence was found to suggest the cluster’s operations are achieving some of the intermediate outcomes, outcomes and results – including use of information, increased coordination, better logistics decisions, reduced duplication, greater efficiency, greater predictability and accountability and better national preparedness.

71. However, the evaluation also found it is difficult to quantify the cluster’s achievement of outcomes due to limitations of the reporting and financial tracking systems in place, lack of key performance indicators and inconsistency in monitoring and consolidation of data. While common service data shows that prioritization decisions have been appropriate, and benefits shared by all types of organizations, this data has not been consistently analyzed and transparently communicated to other humanitarian organizations. The lack of transparent cost/benefit information has perpetuated some unnecessary suspicion regarding the fairness of WFP’s decisions as cluster lead agency.

72. A key external factor that affected the ability of Logistics Clusters to achieve intended outcomes is the participation of humanitarian organizations, both in coordination meetings and as users of common services. Participation is not mandatory and organizations have limited in-country resources. Non-participation presents real limits to what the Logistics Cluster can achieve in terms of coordination, economies of scale and coverage/duplication.

### 2.1.1 GLC Work in Case Study Operations - Evaluation Matrix (EM) 1.a

**Figure 4 – SO Expenditures by Activity Type**



73. The evaluation studied seven operations in depth to better understand the work of the cluster for and with partners at the country level. All seven case studies included operations funded by an SO. A total of US\$322 million was requested in the SOs for these operations as of the end of 2011, representing 66 percent of all SOs launched from 2006-2011 that included Logistics Cluster requirements. Cases studied had an average funding ratio of 54 percent (compared to the overall average of 61 percent).<sup>38</sup> Figure 4 at left shows the percentage of expenditures by activities for the SO related to each case

study, excluding South Sudan, which was unavailable due to recent revision.

<sup>38</sup> The funding ratio for case study operations is lower than the overall average largely due to the early closure of the Kyrgyzstan Logistics Cluster, resulting in a 23 percent funding ratio.

74. Activities shown in Figure 4 include some that fall outside of the Logistics Cluster's activities. For example, SOs for four of the case studies include funding for the ETC. Air transport activities can cover both UNHAS cargo and passenger movement, the latter of which do not fall under Logistics Cluster coordination.

75. While more detailed study of activity-based cost trends across case studies was attempted, WFP financial records are oriented by project category and further detailed analysis proved impossible without an in-depth audit of records.

76. For example, the evaluation team intended to identify the costs for common transport and warehouse services, special projects (such as assembling supplier information), and general coordination and information management activities. However, for each operation expenditures are primarily reported in terms of whether they were considered direct operational costs (DOC), direct support costs (DSC) or indirect support costs (ISC). Where more detailed funding ratios are presented in SO reports they are not consistently disaggregated across operations (see Annex 8).

77. Expenditures across the six case studies averaged 80 percent on DOC (including procured services and facilities such as chartering of barges, aircraft, truck fleets and warehouses), 15 percent on DSC (including staff, travel, office space, basic equipment) and 5 percent on ISC (general corporate support (HQ, Regional and Country) not directly linked to implementation of operational activities).

78. Case studies were selected to provide a diversity of experiences over time and types of emergencies. Annex 8 provides an overview of financial data for each of the case studies followed by the objectives, implementation notes and core data.

79. The first table in Annex 8 shows the financial metrics captured for the primary SO project for each case study. This table also depicts the variation in activities and budgeting categories for SO projects, with some SOs breaking out Logistics Cluster activities while others seem to combine cluster activities and WFP augmentation activities into more functional categories. Interestingly, costs for the ETC appear to be more consistently segregated than those of the Logistics Cluster. New guidance for developing SOs was recently introduced, and should ensure GLC activities are clearly identified in joint SOs. GLC managers are also advocating for SOs dedicated solely to the Logistics Cluster for operations where significant services are being offered.

80. Annex 8 also shows the stated project objectives for each SO found in standard project reports (SPR) and budget revision documents (BR), and information on implementation against objectives found in SPRs and GLC SitReps, bulletins, and annual reports. At the level of detail covered in prose within these documents, the cluster appears to have met its broad objectives in case study countries.

81. The core figures show the level of standardized reporting for SOs found in the SPRs. While operations differ in types of services, and thus appropriate performance metrics, there appears to be inconsistency on what is reported. For example, information management and coordination metrics, which should be common to all Logistics Cluster operations, are reported for four and one of five operations respectively.

82. Table 8 provides an overview of the findings from case study operations.



**Table 8 – Results of the Logistics Cluster in Case Study Operations<sup>39</sup>**

**GLC Evaluation - 7 Case studies - Key Findings**

	Pakistan			Haiti			DRC			Myanmar			Kyrgyzstan			Libya			South Sudan		
Period Covered	2010-2012			2010-2012			2006-2012			2008			2010			2011			2011-2012		
Type of Emergency	Natural - Floods			Natural - Earthquake & Health - Cholera			Complex Emergency: Conflict, Health - Measles, Natural - Floods			Natural - Cyclone			Political Unrest			Internal Conflict and Displacement			Complex Emergency: Conflict, Drought, Refugee Return		
Logistics Cluster Staffing (totals throughout operation)	CC	LCO	IM	CC	LCO	IM	CC	LCO	IM	CC	LCO	IM	CC	LCO	IM	CC	LCO	IM	CC	LCO	IM
Contextual Factors	7	6	3	3	14	4	1	1	3	2	14	1	2	2	1	6	2	8	2	6	0.5
Relevance and Gaps	Highly disaster prone, conflict prone, separatists movements, Pakistan/US anti-terrorism collaboration. Govt' high capacity for certain level (e.g. 2011 floods of 5 million). Widespread poverty and wealth disparity - underlying chronic emergency by some standards. Constant shifting of affected areas as floods spread.			Disaster prone (primarily hydrological), underlying chronic emergency. Widespread poverty and low human development. Highly urban and normally insecure environment. National government and humanitarian agencies severely affected by earthquake as well. Overwhelming number of humanitarian and other actors responded.			Years of persistent internal and regional conflicts - significant internal displacement. Large but mostly inaccessible geographic area and humanitarian community split between capitol and eastern parts. Neglected and undeveloped infrastructure.			Destroyed infrastructure and very "strong" closed country, strict controls. Significant challenges for humanitarian access with large staging area and coordination center emerging at regional level. 85,000 reported dead, estimated 800,000 displaced.			Outbreak of violence, humanitarian community anticipated that it would grow in magnitude and severity but after a few weeks crisis abated.			Massive displacement, slowly evolving conflict with shifting areas of control and insecurity. Massive displacement spilling over into neighboring countries, many of which were foreign workers. Political and military involvement of Western countries and UN.			Independence referendum, anticipated large scale violence. Localized border and internal violence. Widespread poverty, poor infrastructure (rendered inoperable during rainy season). Political stalemate between North and South over oil revenues threatening economy. Significant refugee return and ongoing displacement. Lack of government capacity and systems.		
Relevance and Gaps	<b>Relevance</b> - Largest ever humanitarian response by total affected population. Shifting geographic location of floods and concerns about use of military helicopters in North. <b>Gaps</b> - MCDA principles and policies of various actors differ significantly posing challenge for GLC as partnership under lead of a UN agency.			<b>Relevance</b> - Non-deactivation increased immediate relevance. Massive coordination needs with a very inclusive approach and too many stakeholders. Highly used common services by agencies without strong logistics. Larger use of IM products. <b>Gaps</b> - procurement and clearance and program logistics were the biggest bottlenecks and unmet needs.			<b>Relevance</b> - Lack of dependable and cost effective transport served as catalyst for common transport. Road, rail, river, lake and airstrip rehabilitation highly relevant. Persistent high coordination needs given complexity. <b>Gaps</b> - Some questions about how ongoing information and coordination needs would be covered if cluster is deactivated.			<b>Relevance</b> - Heavy logistics capacity highly relevant given accessibility within country and challenges for humanitarian agencies to deploy staff. Preexisting WFP presence and capacity increased relevance. <b>Gaps</b> - Some partners question the quick deactivation and raise concerns about the uncovered ongoing needs left in the absence of the cluster during the recovery phase.			<b>Relevance</b> - Only five partners but credited with deploying in anticipation and scaling down quickly when crisis faded. <b>Gaps</b> - national NGOs and partners not as aware/not participating in use of common of services.			<b>Relevance</b> - Coordination on periphery of conflict and sea transport seen as relevant during conflict and significant transport and information services used during and after. Security restrictions limited relevance in active conflict areas. <b>Gaps</b> - Besides those related to security/access no significant gaps noted that could have been filled by the cluster.			<b>Relevance</b> - "Everything in South Sudan is about logistics" and most NGOs don't have the capacity or funding to mobilize the logistics infrastructure support needed on their own. Users more familiar with common services after UNJLC. <b>Gaps</b> - Sub-national cluster capacity, ongoing bottlenecks with procurement and customs, smaller NGOs not very aware of services and cite overwhelming coordination structures in country.		

<sup>39</sup> Acronyms – Cluster Coordinator (CC), Logistics Cluster Officer (LCO), Information Manager (IM), Military and Civil Defense Assets (MCDA)



**Table 8 – Results of the Logistics Cluster in Case Study Operations (continued)**

**GLC Evaluation - 7 Case studies - Key Findings**

	Pakistan	Haiti	DRC	Myanmar	Kyrgyzstan	Libya	South Sudan
Period Covered	2010-2012	2010-2012	2006-2012	2008	2010	2011	2011-2012
<b>Effectiveness and Satisfaction</b>	<p><b>Effectiveness</b> - cluster system seen as ineffective but LC viewed as most effective.</p> <p><b>Satisfaction</b> - High levels of satisfaction among partners using services, donors and host government, security restrictions cited as having negative impact on LC staff accessibility outside working hours and in affected areas.</p>	<p><b>Effectiveness</b> - Global recognition of the quality of the LC response. Main effectiveness obstacle related to the lack of inter-cluster dynamic on specific programs. Challenges with HR - staff turnover, non-French speakers, lack of medical logistics expertise during outbreak and lack of admin/finance support.</p> <p><b>Satisfaction</b> - partners highly satisfied overall, some concerns about WFP visibility and perceived conflict of interest.</p>	<p><b>Effectiveness</b> - LC has displayed flexibility in terms of geographical areas covered and wide variety of assistance offered. Common services transitioned to WFP logistics management.</p> <p><b>Satisfaction</b> - partners in general are extremely satisfied with LC services. Good cohesion between LC partners and WFP at provincial level.</p>	<p><b>Effectiveness</b> - <b>Satisfaction</b> - very high general satisfaction, airbridge, helicopters, warehousing, help with customs clearance all highly regarded.</p>	<p><b>Effectiveness</b> - key output of deployment is creating the LCA - little need for services and few partners.</p> <p><b>Satisfaction</b> - High levels of satisfaction, especially that cluster had discipline to deactivate quickly, some around WFP's significant % of CAP.</p>	<p><b>Effectiveness</b> - sea transport seen as effective, inability of cluster to operate in conflict zone limited potential for greater impact (though some question if enough actors were operational for there to be significant gaps)</p> <p><b>Satisfaction</b> - partners satisfied overall with services offered, especially sea transport of personnel and goods.</p>	<p><b>Effectiveness</b> - <b>Satisfaction</b> - partners largely satisfied, some concerns about delegated implementation of CTS, perception of growing quality and support for LC by GLC SC and WFP, some resentment of WFP yield from CAP.</p>
<b>Efficiency: Cost and Timeliness</b>	<p><b>Cost</b> - underutilization of helicopters.</p> <p><b>Timeliness</b> - scaling was rapid given the massive nature of the emergency and the requirement for several hubs throughout Pakistan. HR aspects were seen as slow by some due to slow onset of emergency and overtaxed HR following on heels of Haiti EQ.</p>	<p><b>Cost</b> - Very expensive operations due to the suddenness, the scale and the accumulation of crises but seen as good value for the cost.</p> <p><b>Timeliness</b> - seen as very efficient and timely considering scale of response.</p>	<p><b>Cost</b> - Initially seen as cost effective and much cheaper, higher quality alternative to available commercial options. New cost-recovery service (run outside of cluster) seen as expensive but good quality.</p> <p><b>Timeliness</b> - Good speed and timeliness.</p>	<p><b>Cost</b> - one UN agency reports significant savings due to ability to shift from own trucks to cheaper LC barge services.</p> <p><b>Timeliness</b> - airbridge operations, helicopter and barge services credited with significantly improving partner response timeliness.</p>	<p><b>Cost</b> - Cost was seen as good value for money in the sense of preparedness. The system was ready to scale up but was not required.</p> <p><b>Timeliness</b> - Services provided were timely and appreciated by partners.</p>	<p><b>Cost</b> - partners noted cost savings for staff transport on sea vessels and through UNHAS. Transport operation moved large volume of heavy equipment for reasonable cost.</p> <p><b>Timeliness</b> - timely deployment and scale up in surrounding countries but security restrictions delayed activation in areas deemed unsafe by UNDSS.</p>	<p><b>Cost</b> - questions raised by some about cost of CTS but as free service individual agencies see it as saving them significant resources, risk of under-utilization for newly contracted helicopters.</p> <p><b>Timeliness</b> - timeliness of transport and notification of related schedules sometimes challenged.</p>
<b>Other Key Issues</b>	<p>Tension between CO and GLC SC over selection of CC. Tension between UNHAS and GLC (which was on the ground first). Repeated requests for consolidated common service tracking data have not yielded results so analyzing who benefited from services is not possible.</p>	<p>Challenges with coordination given massive numbers of organizations attending LC meetings in early stages. Government, local NGOs, private partners not well represented in LC.</p>	<p>Very important role played by the Common Pool Fund and CERF under the leadership of OCHA and HC.</p>	<p>No cargo or warehouse data available.</p>	<p>Preparedness is a major gap in Central Asia, the role of GLC in preparedness for this region is undefined.</p>	<p>Regional impact of emergency and necessity of staging areas required and allowed for global coordination giving GLC SC more of an operational management and oversight role.</p>	<p>Highly active HC and inter-agency coordination mechanisms with regular requirements for LC interaction. Selection of initial CC by CO was done with little contact with GLC SC. Tensions arose between CC and CO over time. Turnover coincided with critical period and some focus was lost on planning and preparing for likely needs (including effective participation in CAP process during late 2011).</p>

### **2.1.2 Extent to Which Logistics Needs, Gap and Risk Analysis During a Crisis Inform LC Activation and Deactivation Decisions (EM 1.b)**

83. Through document review, interviews and the survey, the evaluation team evaluated how analysis of needs, gaps and risk analysis relate to the decisions regarding activation and deactivation of the Logistics Cluster.

84. Key informants at country and global levels were asked about their perceptions of the activation and deactivation protocols and process. Two survey questions asked about activation and deactivation protocols (satisfaction and frequency of updates).

85. Generally interview responses from NGOs, UN agencies and GLC staff suggest satisfaction with the decisions to activate the Logistics Cluster and clarity of the activation process. However, a number of WFP and GLC staff also noted that familiarity with the activation process is low among field staff, and that this sometimes leads to challenges between the GLC SC and WFP country staff.

86. A diagram of reporting lines for the Logistics Cluster at country and global levels, and a basic decision tree on the activation process have been disseminated by the GLC since being endorsed by the global GLC meeting in March 2007.<sup>40</sup> However, throughout the evaluation stakeholders raised key issues about the activation process and reporting lines, both within WFP and the broader humanitarian architecture.

87. Key informants from both NGOs and WFP noted that the activation triggers are difficult to apply in practice in chronic and slow onset emergencies, which complements the evaluator's observations and information gleaned from documentary evidence (or lack thereof). For example, the rationale for the long-term activation of the Logistics Cluster in DRC is questioned when compared to the perceived constant coordination requirements in other complex emergency contexts (e.g. Gaza, given the challenges of access and movement).

88. The criteria for initiating a field cluster shown in the activation decision tree are ambiguous since they do not identify whose recommendations, requests and assessments of a situation take precedence. This ambiguity is complicated by the defined reporting lines. Stakeholders noted common concerns that the process and reporting lines leave most authority at the field level, which sometimes results in inconsistent application of activation criteria, decisions on appropriate cluster leads, selection of personnel and initial response approaches.

89. The lack of clear authority at global levels is viewed by some other cluster leads and GLC staff as making it very difficult to ensure standardization and quality. At the field level, however, various stakeholders stressed the value of empowering people with the deepest knowledge of the local context and needs to make decisions.

90. Informants across stakeholder groups suggested that this is partially related to a natural headquarters vs. field authority tension. However, INGO, WFP and UN Agency informants noted that in chronic, slower onset and smaller scale emergencies, lead agency country offices and the HCT can also be motivated to activate clusters by perceived visibility and resource mobilization benefits. Regardless of motivation, the lack of global level authority seems to contradict professional emergency response best practices that emphasize "push" rather than "pull" in the initial phases of large sudden onset emergencies. The evaluation team

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<sup>40</sup> See "Logistics Cluster Concept and Guidelines", GLC, March 2007

found that in some cases this tension between “push” and “pull” has the effect of bringing the GLC SC into conflict with WFP senior field staff and at times HCs. These tensions have led to a reduction in timely decision-making regarding activation and staff deployment in a few cases, and moderately increased costs given the time required to collect evidence to justify GLC SC assessments of needs and advocate for their position.

91. The evaluation team has observed, through seeking documentation regarding activation decisions, that it is difficult to find clearly documented IASC rationale explaining the criteria used to make specific activation decisions. The lack of such a system makes it difficult to confirm or challenge questions about activation legitimacy that do arise. However, one UN Agency noted the perception that the GLC is better about documenting its activation decisions through various tools posted to its website than other clusters (e.g. the CONOPS documents).

92. In large sudden onset emergencies, stakeholders across categories generally credit WFP and the GLC with taking a proactive approach to deploying resources immediately. This “no regrets” policy is seen as the appropriate approach for logistics given the importance of timeliness to establishing logistics infrastructure. By deploying teams quickly in these emergencies, the GLC is seen as better positioned to conduct rapid assessments on infrastructure and market gaps and quickly establish services to enable others to respond.

93. WFP advance funding to “jump-start” the cluster’s operations is also viewed as a demonstration of its flexibility to move quickly. The view that it is better to respond fast and strong than to scale back if the cluster is not needed appears to match the original intent of the cluster system. The evaluation team found that WFP’s special account for the GLC and advance funding mechanisms significantly enhance the initial timeliness and likelihood of achieving desired outcomes. This funding enables rapid gap assessment (even prior to activation) and establishment of logistics support services in early stages of an emergency when other actors most need such information and predictable support.

94. The deactivation process is reported to be much less clear and effective by stakeholders. Fifty-six percent of survey respondents noted dissatisfaction with deactivation and two-thirds said that these protocols are not updated frequently enough. Those who are dissatisfied and said they are not updated frequently enough come disproportionately from within WFP (79 percent of those dissatisfied and 87 percent not frequently enough). The qualitative data from the survey shows that the dissatisfaction is related to deactivation, not activation, protocols.

95. Interview data shows agreement across NGOs, UN agencies, donors, national governments and GLC staff that deactivation processes are not clear or effective. No interview responses suggested that deactivation processes were clear. No formal IASC guidance currently exists related to deactivation protocols, though the GLC has advocated for including this on the IASC’s agenda. The dissatisfaction expressed by stakeholders, in the judgment of the evaluation team, is primarily related to the lack of clear protocols at the IASC level, and different approaches of the HCs and HCTs, rather than the decision-making of the GLC and its country-level cluster staff.


96. Informants noted that deactivation is complicated by post-emergency needs for logistics coordination, which the cluster system was not envisioned to address. Some INGO’s noted that their programmes tend to grow in the early recovery/recovery phase as the Logistics Cluster is contemplating deactivation. Others stressed that

logistics coordination needs continue after the emergency phase and could result in greater cost effectiveness and other efficiencies. In contrast, a number of WFP and UN agency informants noted that the Logistics Cluster, unlike programme clusters, should follow a “stop/start” lifecycle with a clear activation period.

97. The need to clarify the role of the Logistics Cluster in transition phases was noted across stakeholder groups, in particular pertaining to capacity building of national actors and emergency preparedness – and the Logistics Cluster has perceived potential added value for both. Some suggest a different categorization should be contemplated, outside of activation, to cover defined capacity building, preparedness and transition work. However, stakeholders also appear to mostly agree that continuation of large-scale common services after a defined period of time could lead to dependency and donor fatigue (outside of chronic emergency situations where they see deactivation as difficult to contemplate). Most IASC guidelines focus on improving performance during an immediate emergency response rather than speaking to the objectives and approaches expected during the phases of transition to recovery.

98. Based on various IASC and GLC documentation, Figure 5 shows the theoretical lifecycle of the Logistics Cluster from activation to deactivation. This theory, like the cluster system, reflects the original concept of rapid scale up, with more of a “push” approach by the GLC SC, for a defined period of time, followed by a decoupling point when human resources and service may be scaled down or transitioned to a CO to focus more on coordination, capacity building and preparedness work.

**Figure 5 – Theoretical Lifecycle for GLC Operations**



99. The theoretical lifecycle shown in Figure 5 does not, however, match the observed reality in many of the evaluation case studies, and key informants stressed that the actual lifecycle for the Logistics Cluster is very dependent on context. Annex 8 contains further discussion of the observations from case study countries regarding the actual observed lifecycles of the Logistics Cluster.

### **2.1.3 Prioritization of Logistics Needs/Gaps in Relation to Common Services and Resource Mobilization (EM 1.c)**

100. **Prioritization Results Based on Usage of Common Services.** The evaluation found that the Logistics Cluster met the needs of self-identified users and matched the general sense of priorities for the humanitarian community in each case studied. While some stakeholders questioned whether the cluster's common services were benefiting WFP more than other humanitarian organizations, analysis of available transport data refuted this suggestion.

101. Based on general direction provided in IASC policy documents, the two service clusters (GLC and ETC) are meant to provide services to other clusters, and their identification of gaps and priorities should be informed by the assessments of other clusters.<sup>41</sup> In reality this concept is rarely, if ever, borne out, given the urgency of establishing a logistics infrastructure during emergencies and the inability of programme clusters to conduct rapid assessments to identify priorities.

102. In most emergencies the GLC is left to put in place the services its staff and participants deem most necessary and adjust over time based on changing needs. Logistics Clusters do receive input from the HCT/UNCT or HC about priorities at a very broad level (e.g. food, water/sanitation, health and shelter, not education supplies). This leaves significant room for interpretation about specifics. However, no examples were found where the Logistics Cluster refused to move particular items based on interpretation of priorities.

103. The submission of cargo movement requests (CMR) or temporary storage requests (TSR) form the basis for managing demand. In cases studied the capacity for providing services most frequently exceeded or matched demand.

104. Transparency related to prioritization and benefits of common services is raised as a problem by stakeholders in multiple case studies across NGOs, UN agencies and sometimes donors. Detailed usage analysis does not appear to be conducted for each operation or shared with partners in any of the seven case study operations (with one exception of temporary storage snapshots that show which agencies have stocks in GLC temporary warehouses). During the course of the evaluation it was observed that the GLC SC is aware of this gap in systems.

105. The evaluation team sought consolidated cargo tracking data for all case studies where common transport services were implemented. The evaluation found that no standardized system for tracking cargo has been implemented across cluster operations, and in some cases sub-national cluster activities are tracked by location and do not appear to be consolidated at any stage of an operation.

106. Consolidated cargo tracking data was secured by the evaluation team for the case studies in Haiti, Libya, Kyrgyzstan and South Sudan. Data from Myanmar, Pakistan and DRC was not located and is not centrally held by the GLC SC.

107. Based on the data made available to the evaluation team, detailed analysis was conducted on the common transport services provided by the cluster in Haiti, Libya and South Sudan. The results of this analysis are presented in Figures 6, 7 and 8 below. Data provided for the Kyrgyzstan operation is not presented, as common service requests were few and there were fewer than 10 users.


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<sup>41</sup> See "Final Report of Cluster Working Group on Logistics" IASC, September 2005 accessed on May 5, 2012 at [http://www.logcluster.org/about/logistics-cluster/background-information/Logistics\\_Cluster\\_WG\\_Retreat\\_060807.pdf](http://www.logcluster.org/about/logistics-cluster/background-information/Logistics_Cluster_WG_Retreat_060807.pdf)

**Figure 6 – Haiti Logistics Cluster Common Transport Service Analysis (18 January to May 2010)**

Haiti Logistics Cluster - 18 Jan to 31 May 2010 Common Transport Service

Duration of Service Analyzed	4.5 months
Total Weight Transported (MT)	5540
Total Volume Transported (m3)	21,847
Total Number of Requests for Transport	2,065



Top Users by Number of Requests




Agency	Requests	% Total Requests
1 WFP	257	12%
2 Brigada Médica Cubana	226	11%
3 NICCO	156	8%
4 WHO/PAHO	120	6%
5 Handicap International / Atlas Logistique	114	6%
6 Concern Worldwide	114	6%
7 Solidarites	98	5%
8 FAO	94	5%
9 UNICEF	90	4%
10 Agro Action Allemande	88	3%
<b>Total Users Comprised</b>		<b>65%</b>

Top Users by Total Weight


Agency	Weight MT	% Total Weight
1 WFP	977	18%
2 FAO	757	14%
3 ShelterBox	236	4%
4 Handicap International / Atlas Logistique	229	4%
5 World Vision International	227	4%
6 Un Techo para mi Pais	195	4%
7 IOM	174	3%
8 Concern Worldwide	172	3%
9 NICCO	162	3%
10 Fraternite Notre Dame	158	3%
<b>Total Users Comprised</b>		<b>58%</b>

Total Users by Volume

Agency	Volume M3	% Total Volume
1 WFP	2,771	13%
2 Handicap International / Atlas Logistique	1,253	6%
3 Un Techo para mi Pais	1,215	6%
4 ADRA	1,014	5%
5 FAO	940	4%
6 Concern Worldwide	820	4%
7 WHO/PAHO	796	4%
8 Logistics Cluster	758	3%
9 ShelterBox	732	3%
10 GrassRoots United	653	3%
<b>Total Users Comprised</b>		<b>50%</b>




**Figure 7 - South Sudan Logistics Cluster Common Transport Service Analysis (2011)**





**Figure 8 – Libya Logistics Cluster Common Transport Service Analysis (31 March to 25 October 2011)**





108. Cargo transported by the Logistics Cluster across operations includes a wide range of essential humanitarian items and goods required to implement humanitarian programmes. Analysis of the cargo tracking data shows requests for transport of items across sectors including shelter (tents, tarps and construction items), health (medicines, health kits, medical equipment, mosquito nets), food (commodities and nutritional supplements), and water (bottled, tanks, pumps, hygiene equipment). Cargo moved by the cluster for various humanitarian actors also includes vehicles, fuel, generators and office equipment.<sup>42</sup>

109. Based on the analysis of tracking data, NGOs make up the largest category of organizations using GLC common transport. NGOs also made the most individual requests across all three operations.

110. In terms of weight transported, NGOs were the biggest category of beneficiaries of service in the Haiti earthquake and South Sudan operations, while UN agencies benefited most in terms of weight transported in Libya.

111. In terms of volume transported, NGOs benefited most in Haiti and South Sudan, while WFP made up the largest percentage of volume transported in Libya.

112. Examination of the individual agency/organization users of common transport services shows that WFP falls within the top three users in all three cases when measured by number of requests, weight or volume.

113. Demand for transport services varies by stakeholder category and other operational factors over the lifecycle of an operation. Analysis of user demand over time is presented in Annex 8.

114. While WFP falls into the top tier of users across all three operations, it should be noted that the total weight and volume moved by the Logistics Cluster for WFP represents a very small fraction of WFP total commodity movements. For example, in Haiti the amount moved by the cluster for WFP represents only 0.08 percent of total WFP commodities moved in Haiti during the same period of time. During the cholera outbreak, WFP did not use the cluster's common transport service at all.

115. Past attempts to design a common system for tracking have not resulted in a deployable system. To rectify this gap the GLC SC has recently developed and deployed a simplified Microsoft Excel-based tracking tool to at least one country level Logistics Cluster with the stated purpose of rolling this tool out as a standardized global tool for tracking common service requests and provision. The new tool includes automated calculations feeding a dashboard of key metrics, which if consistently utilized, would provide the ability to conduct more systematic analysis of common service beneficiaries and performance in the future.

### **Linkages Between Prioritization and Resource Mobilization**

116. In prolonged or chronic emergencies the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) and sometimes a Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) or other pooled funding mechanism can play a significant role in linking needs and gap identification with common services and resource mobilization. In these cases members of the HCT have a more formalized role to play in influencing funding proposals put forward by

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<sup>42</sup> Although some data is available regarding the types of cargo moved by the cluster, each of the three databases available track cargo type differently, some by general sector category and others by more specific types of items. These inconsistencies prevented the evaluators from analyzing and quantifying trends related to types of cargo in a meaningful way.

the Logistics Cluster, and in theory, this should allow for other clusters to influence the services of the Logistics Cluster based on needs.

117. The Logistics Cluster also assembles information on needs and gaps during the process of developing its SO project and funding proposals. The SO project documents mirror the CONOPS, which are developed with partner input. SO proposals are consolidated (for ETC, the Logistics Cluster and any other WFP logistics augmentation) and reviewed by the WFP project review committee, which considers the quality of information provided to justify funding requests.

118. Once an SO is approved, the Logistics Cluster can request advance funding from WFP's reserve fund. From this point forward services follow a "first come, first served" system dependent on individual agency requests if no shortage of capacity exists. When demand exceeds capacity, the Logistics Cluster prioritizes requests based on interpretation of the broad strategic priorities set by the HC or HCT.

119. The most frequent prioritization issue relates to instances in which the Logistics Cluster establishes transport capacity before or beyond a partner's ability to mobilize goods. Participants in the Logistics Cluster often are unable to provide pipeline forecasts in time to influence initial service decisions leaving cluster participants and staff to base decisions on the scale of common services based upon general estimates of need and constraints. Common transport is often arranged based on contracts with commercial providers that have a minimum use or load requirement. When faced with under-utilized or idle capacity, the Logistics Cluster has sometimes filled the void with WFP food to maximize the use of contracted resources. While the evaluators see this as practical, it can lead to partner questions about prioritization benefiting WFP. If this becomes frequent it can also reinforce suspicions about whether the Logistics Cluster overestimated the need in order to ensure benefit to WFP.

#### **2.1.4 Extent to Which the Logistics Cluster's Operations Resulted in Better Logistics Approaches (EM 1.d)<sup>43</sup>**

120. Overall results. At a macro-level the evaluators considered whether the totality of the GLC's operational work has much effect on a total humanitarian operation. The high level ambitions stated in IASC policy documents suggest that the cluster system is intended to positively affect overall coverage, efficiency and effectiveness.

121. To consider the results of the GLC towards these objectives at a macro-level, the full scale of humanitarian response would need to be compared to the scale of GLC activities. Consistent and accurate measures of total logistics activities and outputs in any one operation unfortunately appear highly difficult to quantify.

122. Two examples identified in Haiti help put the total volume of Logistics Cluster work into context. In Haiti the Logistics Cluster moved a total Of 5,540 mt and 21,847 m<sup>3</sup> for requests made between January 2010 and 31 May 2010. In contrast, the IFRC alone received total consignments of 11,231 mt between January 2010 and 24 June 2010 and dispatched relief shipments of 6,934 mt.<sup>44</sup> The total tonnage

<sup>43</sup> While clear differences were noted between WFP (including GLC) staff compared to other respondents for some questions when conducting the survey analysis, statistical significance testing is not feasible because of the small sample sizes when disaggregated. In situations where large differences were found they are noted in the analysis.

<sup>44</sup> <http://www.ifrc.org/docs/appeals/10/MDRTH00821.pdf> accessed on 14 April 2012.

shipped by the GLC between 2010 and 2011 (16,000 mt) represents 5 percent of the total WFP cargo during the same period (300,000 mt).

123. Based on stakeholder comments in interviews and the sense of the evaluation team, the Logistics Cluster's operations are only handling a small percentage of total humanitarian supplies for transport and less for storage. This suggests that significantly achieving the higher level objectives of the cluster (outcomes and results shown in Figure 1 – Theory of Change) requires expanding the number of users and volume of throughput for Logistics Cluster common services over time. However, as it is constituted today, Logistics Cluster operations are driven by actual demand of partners and supply of funding from donors. Any strategy to increase use and thus achievement of higher level objectives would have to take these critical factors into account.

124. Key informants share a consistent view across locations, levels (field/headquarters) and organizations that the Logistics Cluster's operations do have an overall positive effect on improving humanitarian logistics approaches, suggesting that stakeholder expectations are not as far reaching as general IASC language might suggest. Global and case study interviews also suggest that a majority of stakeholders view Logistics Cluster operations as most improving the reach of smaller INGOs<sup>45</sup> and other organizations that lack heavy logistics capacity. Without the Logistics Cluster these organizations could not afford to devote nearly as much resource to commodities and programmes. INGOs that use cluster services generally agree that their operational effectiveness benefits, but many perceive that the greatest benefit is accruing to UN agencies, and in particular WFP.

125. Survey results regarding the overall results perceived by organizations working with the GLC show the following:

- a) 84 percent of survey respondents said that working with the GLC has enabled them to have greater effect on emergency affected populations, with the same percentage positive response from both WFP and non-WFP respondents.
- b) 65 percent of WFP and 80 percent of non-WFP survey respondents said that GLC operations enhance their organization's programme delivery.
- c) 77 percent of WFP and 80 percent of non-WFP survey respondents said that GLC operations have a positive effect on beneficiary populations.

126. Additionally, the evaluation team's observations and review of GLC documents show many examples where the cluster's country-level work allowed organizations to share information and coordinate towards solving logistics problems, function in ways they could not have achieved on their own or deliver goods at reduced cost to their organizations (since cluster transport and storage are often funded through separate resource mobilization efforts at no cost to users).

127. When considered as a whole, the evaluators found that the Logistics Cluster's operations do result in better logistics approaches for participating organizations suggesting a strength in terms of the outcomes of the GLC's service provider role.

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<sup>45</sup> For the purposes of analysis the evaluators categorized INGOs based on publicly available total budget data – smaller INGOs with budgets of less than US\$100 million annual, as opposed to the largest INGOs that have budgets of US\$1 billion and above. While no known acceptable definition exists there are clear logistics capacity differences between the two ends of this spectrum.

128. However many NGOs, local organizations and sometimes national governments in case study countries do not participate actively in the Logistics Cluster or make significant use of its services. To the extent these actors play a significant role in emergency response, their non-use and non-involvement lessens the potential for overall results of the cluster.

129. Reasons cited for non-participation include lack of awareness about the cluster and lack of capacity to participate in the plethora of coordination mechanisms (clusters and other regular meetings). Reasons for non-use of services included lack of agency specific need for support (more frequently medium to large NGOs with capacity and those working mostly on development projects), the urgency of an agency specific need (when cluster services are seen as moderately less timely due to the time it takes to consolidate a full shipment of inter-agency cargo), and lack of familiarity with the cluster's service offerings (usually smaller organizations without the capacity to participate in meetings).

130. Resource mobilization and contributions. Seventy-five percent of WFP survey respondents report that working with the GLC has led to increased financial and in-kind resource mobilization. In contrast, only 47 percent of non-WFP respondents judge that it has increased their resource mobilization.

131. The high visibility attained by the Logistics Cluster in emergencies with key donors appears to positively influence funding decisions for logistics needs. As a consolidated request (with perceived benefits related to economies of scale) stakeholders feel donors are more willing to contribute to logistics. Stakeholders, especially smaller partners, also feel that traditionally strong support for WFP and inclusion in the consolidated appeals process (CAP) raise more net for logistics than agencies can do on their own.

132. Timeliness. Seventy-five percent of non-WFP and 88 percent of WFP survey respondents said the GLC improves operational timeliness and leads to greater efficiency. Interview responses related to timeliness appeared to vary within and across stakeholder groups and case studies. The Logistics Cluster was generally viewed as providing a timely service during the emergency phase of sudden-onset emergencies. As conditions improve in a country larger partners often feel they can arrange services that are timelier since they can cater to the exact needs of the agency irrespective of the schedules and delivery locations of other agencies.

133. In chronic emergencies, the perceptions of timeliness varied based on whether agencies had the capacity to arrange their own logistics and whether common loading schedules and delivery locations suited their needs. While large and small organizations make use of common services, the smaller ones are more dependent on the Logistics Cluster and resigned to fitting within its loading and delivery schedules. Larger agencies noted that they use the cluster's transport services when they have non-urgent items to move (because the services are already funded by someone else).

134. Review of GLC documents shows that the GLC and WFP as the lead agency have managed to mobilize staff to initiate the work of the cluster in a timely fashion. The earliest GLC assessments and CONOPS documents for each operation show the timely mobilization of staff has had the benefit of rapidly enabling the cluster to identify gaps and initiate service planning based on the dates of various documents. This documentary evidence is further supported by most key informants who noted the GLC mobilizes quickly following sudden-onset emergencies.

135. Time savings. Fifty-four percent of survey respondents said that working in partnership with the GLC permitted time savings (71 percent of WFP respondents and 40 percent of non-WFP respondents). Twenty-seven percent of respondents said that it had no effect on time (12 percent WFP, 35 percent non-WFP). Numerous informants across external stakeholder groups noted that GLC common services free up time and money that would otherwise be devoted to arranging their own logistics, which can then be used for programmes.

136. Interview respondents across stakeholder groups also noted time savings due to the information products produced by the Logistics Cluster and in some cases the information gleaned from meetings. However, organizations across stakeholder groups also noted that meetings of the Logistics Cluster can cost them precious time, which is only worth the trade-off when meetings are well facilitated and deal with sharing important operational information and discussing real logistics bottlenecks (as opposed to a reiteration of basic activities which can be found in other reports).

137. Cost effectiveness. Generally interview respondents agree that in theory the Logistics Cluster should offer a more cost effective approach for common services and information management by taking advantage of economies of scale and reduced overhead costs associated with each agency conducting the same activities. Among survey respondents 71 percent of WFP and 50 percent of non-WFP respondents said that the GLC operations allow for greater economies of scale.

138. However, most also said they did not have enough information on the cost structure of the Logistics Cluster operations to be able to adequately assess its real cost effectiveness. The evaluators found that this is both an issue of systems not providing the type of activity based accounting information needed to judge cost effectiveness and an issue of partners not being presented with the information that does exist. During the initial phase of most emergencies key informants stress that timeliness is more important to them than cost.

139. Another factor related to cost effectiveness is the attitude expressed to the evaluators by some cluster staff and participants that cost is not a significant concern for the users of common services as long as they can access the services “for free.” However, in cases where the Logistics Cluster shifts to a cost recovery model after the initial emergency phase, many users decide to arrange their own logistics support, suggesting that they feel individually procured solutions are more cost effective (at least at this stage of an operation when market conditions have started to recover). One NGO and one UN agency noted that they had done small scale analysis of the cost of transport if done through the Logistics Cluster during the emergency phase compared to arranging it themselves and found in both cases that the cluster method was more cost effective.

140. At a macro-level, a minority of stakeholders across all categories questioned whether total costs of the Logistics Cluster were higher than necessary. Such comments were most frequent related to use of costly air transport assets and responses varied depending on whether the partner needed assistance in responding to an acute emergency need or something less pressing.

141. The use of air assets presents perceptual challenge regarding the cost effectiveness of the Logistics Cluster when the need for assets is forecast (often with input/requests from partners) and then under-utilized. More exactly predicting demand for air transport is a difficult issue, and often comes down to whether the Logistics Cluster feels it is better to have too much or too little capacity in place.

142. Cost savings. Sixty-one percent of survey respondents report that working in partnership with the cluster resulted in cost savings. The proportion reporting cost savings was similar for WFP (69 percent) and non-WFP (55 percent) respondents. A further 25 percent reported no effect on their costs, while 14 percent reported slight increase in costs. Most users of common services interviewed note that as an individual agency the cluster saves them money since they do not have to pay for the services (in most cases). In three case studies NGOs and UN agencies credited the work of the Logistics Cluster to assemble information on suppliers and vendors as well as market fuel price information as helping them to better negotiate with vendors and save money.

143. Coverage: reduced gaps and duplication. Seventy-five percent of survey respondents report that the GLC has a positive effect on geographic coverage and reducing duplication (same percentage for WFP and non-WFP respondents). By design the Logistics Cluster tries to facilitate discussions on gaps in services as well as geographic areas that are under-served due to accessibility issues. The evaluation team observed and was informed about numerous examples across cases where the cluster staff and partners identified needs for logistics support in sub-national locations and developed a common approach to ensuring coverage.

144. Generally stakeholders interviewed felt that the information sharing functions of the Logistics Cluster have some positive effects, intentional and unintentional, on reducing gaps and duplication. Ad hoc mapping and reporting on the pipeline and assets of various agencies is viewed by partners as a very useful source of information to identify who else is working in a given sub-national context to enable bilateral coordination. Coordination meetings also reportedly provide partners with opportunities to discuss overlap, if any, as well as gaps related to accessibility.

145. Greater predictability and accountability. Seventy-five percent of non-WFP and 69 percent of WFP survey respondents said the GLC has enabled greater predictability and accountability. In interviews some non-UN partners noted that they were not satisfied with the predictability offered by the Logistics Cluster due to lack of influence over activation decisions and security restrictions imposed by UN DSS on WFP/GLC.

146. However, in general the evaluation team found that the Logistics Cluster does lead to greater predictability. In most large scale emergencies there is common agreement that the Logistics Cluster is needed in the early phases and as a result WFP and the GLC have moved quickly to assess gaps and establish services. A review of GLC records shows that common services have been established in 83 percent of the GLC operations shown in Annex 7 (excluding preparedness only “operations”). Though common services may not be required in every operation, their frequency allows partners to plan based on knowing they will be available if needed.

147. Accountability is more widely seen as an area of concern. Some noted that the cluster system as a whole is unbalanced in its focus on accountability to beneficiaries and not partners. While individual users of common services felt the GLC was accountable to them for service delivery against a CMR or TSR, many felt that it was not meeting expectations for transparency related to finances and overall service provision and prioritization. The country Logistics Clusters are accountable, through the WFP country director, to the HC and all HCs interviewed were generally satisfied with GLC accountability and responsiveness to information and service requests.

148. Information sharing. Eighty-two percent of WFP and 85 percent of non-WFP survey respondents noted that the GLC effectively advocates for a culture of information sharing within the humanitarian community. In interviews the GIS and mapping activities of the cluster are most frequently noted as an example of proactive information sharing with concrete results. Other formal and ad hoc information sharing activities are valued in terms of what they produce, though some smaller partners feel that it is a burden to provide information so regularly.

149. Bottlenecks and opportunities. A few persistent bottlenecks and opportunities for the Logistics Cluster to achieve greater results were commonly noted across stakeholder groups and case studies. Customs clearance is the most frequently cited operational bottleneck that partners feel the Logistics Cluster could do more to assist with. In some cases the cluster has provided partners with information regarding customs procedures in an attempt to help with this bottleneck. In a few instances the cluster has also deployed personnel to advise partners at points of entry. Most customs clearance issues relate to exemptions on taxes and duties and government efficiency (and/or corruption). Many INGOs noted a strong interest in more advocacy for blanket exemptions and procedures, and some noted a strong desire for the Logistics Cluster to consider acting as a common consignee for shipments into a country. However, as the Logistics Cluster is not a legal entity in its own right, GLC staff noted that the cluster cannot clear customs on behalf of other organizations. Some WFP and GLC staff also noted concerns regarding legal and reputational risks if WFP (on behalf of the cluster) were to serve as consignee for items from other agencies without being able to control for quality and appropriateness. The only cases of the cluster serving as the clearance agent for other agencies appears to be in instances where the cluster has arranged common transport from outside of the country affected (e.g. Somalia, Myanmar).

150. The second most frequent bottleneck noted is related to procurement for partners. Beyond producing consolidated supplier and vendor information in a few contexts, the Logistics Cluster does not serve as a procurement service provider for partners. In fact, the GLC Concept and Guidelines endorsed by participants at the global meeting in March 2007 explicitly stated that procurement is outside the GLC's mandate. However, some stakeholders misunderstand the relationship between the Logistics Cluster and UNHRD and assume that because they are both managed by WFP they should be more integrated at the country level. WFP managers interviewed noted that there is a planned corporate initiative to explore creating capacities for global procurement of non-food items for other agencies, though it is not explicitly linked to the GLC at this early stage.

151. A third noted bottleneck is the lack of capacity to support logistics for specialized programme areas, as seen in the Haiti cholera response. Stakeholders noted that the GLC does not have an adequate pool of logistics experts with experience in certain areas (especially cold chain management, and handling of the diverse area of programme items some individual agencies handle). However, the GLC did deploy two logisticians with water, sanitation and health skills to support the respective clusters during the cholera outbreak in Haiti. Other stakeholders stressed that capacity is also weak in the various programme clusters to understand and articulate logistics support requirements.

152. Counterfactual Examples. In addition to asking stakeholders about what results from Logistics Cluster operations, the evaluators also sought information regarding what happens in emergencies when the cluster is not activated. Two examples

provided information in this regard: the ongoing drought operations in Ethiopia, and the refugee crisis in Liberia during 2010 and 2011. Key findings from each are briefly summarized below and more fully described in Annex 9.

153. Based on the examples studied in Liberia and Ethiopia, it appears that non-activation consequences depend highly on the context. Where an acute emergency takes place in a context where government capacity and existing coordination mechanisms are weak or cannot manage the increased need, non-activation of the Logistics Cluster can result in less than optimal humanitarian logistics results for partners that would otherwise work with the cluster. However, in contexts where coordination structures are strong, humanitarian organizations are well established and the national government is experienced at handling disasters, non-activation of the cluster may have few if any negative consequences.

154. In global interviews a lack of coordination was cited as the biggest difference when the cluster is not activated, depending however on the people various agencies have in the field and whether there are pre-existing coordination structures for logistics and response established in the country.

155. GLC staff note that the difference between activation and non-activation has significant bearing on WFP's ability to lead coordination in logistics. When the cluster is activated it brings legitimacy for their role as coordinator – partners recognize and accept their role in convening partners and requesting information. When the cluster is not activated, informal coordination can emerge but it depends highly on the legitimacy of the individual leading the effort and their ability to persuade partners of the benefits. Accountability is also felt to be different. When the cluster is activated it has an obligation to be accountable to partners. When not activated, WFP coordination efforts are voluntary and assistance is completely dependent on available resources and competing priorities.

### **2.1.5 Extent to which Logistics Cluster Operations had Lasting Results Beyond the Period of Activation (EM 1.e)**

156. Generally interviews with key informants produced some examples where GLC operations have had significant lasting results. Sixty-one percent of survey respondents (same for WFP and non-WFP) stated that the GLC has slightly positive effects on increasing the capacity of national and international actors, while only 14 percent said it has major effects.

157. In some interviews stakeholders from across donors, NGOs, UN agencies and WFP stated firmly that from their viewpoint the Logistics Cluster is not activated for long enough to have lasting results. Some questioned whether lasting results were even an appropriate concept for a cluster envisioned to be a surge capacity mechanism with a temporary role. Others suggested that it is important for the Logistics Cluster to consider how it can better link to recovery and preparedness in order to ensure it has lasting results even if that has not been the case up to this point.

158. Only two of the seven case studies conducted for the evaluation cover operations where the cluster has been completely deactivated (Kyrgyzstan and Myanmar) so the ability for informants and the evaluation team to truly observe lasting effects is somewhat limited. However examples from both past and “winding down” operations demonstrate examples where the cluster has had or should have lasting results. These include:



- a) In Haiti the Logistics Cluster GIS team has trained and worked with a team of Haitian personnel and established close coordination with the National Centre for Geospatial Information. From early in the operation the Logistics Cluster has planned to integrate this team into the ministry and handover equipment when the cluster is deactivated. The Logistics Cluster has also actively worked with the Haitian government on contingency planning, simulations and other emergency preparedness initiatives.
- b) In Pakistan the Logistics Cluster identified permanent warehouse facilities as a strategic gap early in the 2010 flood operations. Given the frequency of major disasters in Pakistan, the cluster team included a project in its plans and funding requests to work with the national government to build and handover a series of strategic emergency supply warehouses. The Logistics Cluster in Pakistan has also developed a training course for national staff to familiarize them with the cluster and skills needed to support its work to enhance cluster preparedness in Pakistan for future emergencies.
- c) In Myanmar, one NGO noted how their current programme partnerships with a UN agency were formed as a result of relationships established during the Logistics Cluster meetings. Another noted how the relationships formed during cluster operations have future operational benefits as the same people often deploy to subsequent emergencies and know how to work with one another. A UN agency also reports that they are still working with the providers of river transport in the delta area most impacted by the cyclone that are staffed by the same personnel initially trained by the Logistics Cluster.
- d) In DRC, the common transport service of the cluster has led to the creation of a self-sustaining common transport service managed by WFP as an inter-agency service and run as a commercial company. The road repair work conducted by partners and facilitated by the cluster has also been sustained and reportedly increased the ability of other agencies to reach previously hard to access areas with humanitarian services.
- e) In Kyrgyzstan, the Logistics Cluster reportedly handed over some equipment and relief items from the hub it set up to a government ministry.
- f) In Central African Republic, a logistics working group succeeded the cluster. Participants have set up information sharing tools and a database based on Logistics Cluster systems. During working group meetings partners still discuss collaboration to resolve common logistics problems, which is seen as improving overall humanitarian logistics effectiveness.
- g) In South Sudan, the Logistics Cluster is examining gaps in permanent storage and port facilities in the country and discussing with partners whether the cluster could contribute to their construction or rehabilitation with a goal of lasting infrastructure for humanitarian work.

159. The disposition of cluster assets at the end of an operation has been raised as a risk and opportunity for the Logistics Cluster to have lasting results at the end of an operation. Numerous WFP, GLC and a few partner staff noted that equipment purchased for the cluster's operations is not always planned for when deactivation approaches. Some suggested this equipment should be handed over to national and international partners whose work continues while others support keeping items that do not need to be rotated or replenished in WFP stocks for sole use of cluster operations in places with frequent recurring emergencies.

## 2.1.6 Unintended Consequences of Logistics Cluster Operations (EM 1.f)

160. While many informants felt that the cluster’s operations had the intended and expected positive results and quality, a number of examples were noted of perceived unintended consequences. These are categorized as positive, mixed or negative and described in Table 9 below.

**Table 9 – Unintended Consequences (Positive and Negative)**

<b>Positive unintended consequences</b>	Improved contingency planning, logistics and supply chain capacity for response.
	Increased skills & systems capacity for logistics in another UN agency in Pakistan.
	Logistics Cluster capacity enabled a more integrated and decentralized approach to delivering cross-cluster standard packages (Survival Strategy: Pakistan floods).
	Sub-national Logistics Cluster operations increased credibility and good relationships with the national and local authorities.
	Rehabilitating road, port, airstrip infrastructure enabled development and commercial activities.
<b>Mixed unintended consequences</b>	Interface with international military actors in Haiti has dramatically increased demand by international military actors for on-going GLC contact and participation in simulations, training courses and meetings.
	Contact information on the logcluster.org website enabled people in isolated communities to contact cluster staff with information on unmet needs for support during the Pakistan floods.
	SOs including the Logistics Cluster are funded well may increase a WFP CO’s incentive to seek activation, potentially where the needs do not justify activation.
	Donor’s perception of Logistics Cluster success is perceived as increasing pressure on WFP to frame more of its activities in inter-agency terminology even when real services are not in demand from other agencies.
	Influx of skilled international staff enabled numerous training courses for partners and national staff, which partners appreciated, but which are difficult for WFP to sustain without the cluster “surge”.
<b>Negative unintended consequences</b>	“No regrets” approach can lead to excess capacity which only WFP is able to use, potentially reinforcing negative perceptions.
	Risk for dependency and atrophy by organizations using Logistics Cluster services potentially resulting in humanitarian organizations reducing investments in humanitarian logistics.
	Increased expectations for support that can outlast activation, with no committed, capable and funded alternative for coherent coordination, IM and services. WFP and the cluster seen as one and the same and once the cluster is deactivated they still call on WFP first for support before partners look for their own solutions.
	Common services can enable unprofessional actors and others without capacity to sustain interventions to operate during the emergency when they otherwise would not be able to do so. Perceived as unintentionally facilitating or prolonging the proliferation of actors in Haiti.
	When deactivated quickly partners found that their only option for transport of goods was by barge instead of air, which negatively affected timeliness.

## 2.1.7 Key Internal and External Factors that Enable or Hinder Logistics Cluster Operations (EM 1.g)

161. Internal Factors. Internal factors frequently noted by stakeholders as enabling GLC operations relate to core WFP logistics characteristics including a strong infrastructure for transport, highly experienced logistics staff, a practical results-oriented culture and significant assets and resources.

162. Internal factors cited as hindering GLC operations include bureaucracy, a perceived feeling that the cluster's work is a favour by WFP and not a core task, human resources issues (high turnover, poorly functioning roster, working language capacities of staff), reporting lines between cluster staff and WFP, lack of strategic vision, and security regulations.

163. The evaluation team has also identified some other internal factors that appear to hinder Logistics Cluster operations. A combination of these factors and some noted by stakeholders which the evaluators feel are most important are described below.

164. Status of secondees – From the beginning of the GLC, secondees were an integral part of the staffing plan for the support cell in Rome and meant to ensure an inter-agency culture was at the heart of the GLC. The evaluation found, however, that at headquarters and field level secondees appear to have a less than equal status and authority vis-à-vis WFP counterparts, despite in some cases having more years of experience than their WFP counterparts at the same assigned grade.

165. Reported problems relate to how the organizational culture of WFP treats people who are not career staff within WFP. This can negatively affect the GLC's ability to deploy secondees as cluster coordinators, since the effective levels of authority and influence for cluster coordinators depend more on informal relationships and reputation than systems. Inability to delegate appropriate responsibilities and authorities to secondees also calls into question the feasibility of various GLC SC plans and strategies that describe the support cell as being comprised of a "diverse group of logisticians drawn from various humanitarian organizations to implement the Global Logistics Cluster work plan".<sup>46</sup> Over time, the evaluators feel it will become more and more difficult to attract high quality secondees if the level of responsibility and authority they are able to be granted while situated within WFP is not commensurate with their level of experience.

166. Self-reliant culture. Another observed and reported internal issue is the cultural tendency within WFP logistics to try to immediately solve problems itself rather than first looking to see whether other partners might be able to help develop and implement a solution. Although the evaluators did find two cases where common services have been delegated or sub-contracted by the GLC to other partners, the norm default position seems to be that WFP has to manage (and some feel control) all of the activities of the Logistics Cluster during operations. In many cases WFP may be the only agency able to provide needed support, yet as a partnership, there are potential benefits to involving others as more than clients.

167. Decentralized decision-making authority. By design the cluster system empowers country level decision-makers for activation, deployment and management of field operations. This is reinforced for the GLC by WFP's own culture, which places significant authority, even autonomy from some perspectives, at the country office level. This explains the complicated reporting lines between country-level clusters, WFP country offices, the HC, and ERC, which leave the GLC SC with little power over operations.

168. However, the lack of GLC SC authority to guide activation and deployment decisions and provide oversight for field operations makes it difficult to ensure

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<sup>46</sup> "Logistics Cluster and Humanitarian Reform: The Global Logistics Cluster Support Cell", July 2010

standardization, fidelity, quality and implementation of policies. Stakeholders from a wide range of organizations presented the evaluators with examples where this has become a challenge. In three particular recent cases, WFP COs, sometimes with support from an HCT or HC, have pushed strongly for activation without apparently adequate rationale or triggers. In some cases the GLC SC was not even directly informed that the cluster was being activated, or its opposition was ignored. Other cluster leads note that this is a common problem across clusters, though some said it is likely more of an issue within WFP given its own decentralized authorities and the reporting lines it has assigned its cluster coordinators (see below).

169. Reporting lines. The reporting lines of cluster coordinators to the WFP CO during operations offers elements of both enabling and hindering the operations of the Logistics Cluster. The attitudes and approach of CO managers to supporting and representing the cluster appears to vary by country office. There is a risk in countries where WFP has very large ongoing operations, especially during difficult periods for delivering on its traditional core mandates, that CO management may not devote time or attention to supporting the cluster. In other cases country directors can be highly active in cluster operations. This can be negative when their level of understanding about the cluster's modalities is unformed or misinformed. Cluster reporting lines to the CO head of logistics presents a potential conflict of interest, as WFP is both a client and the "back office support"<sup>47</sup> for cluster services. This challenge is more acute for the service clusters because they depend on the cluster lead agency more significantly for back office support than do other clusters, which in some cases can "firewall" or "ring fence" their cluster staff from country offices given their sole focus on interagency coordination and information management.

170. Financial management and reporting systems. WFP's internal systems for financial management and project reporting can also be a hindrance to the Logistics Cluster. As previously noted, these systems at global and country levels are designed based on the needs of WFP's food related programming and traditional donor reporting requirements. Stakeholders across donors, NGOs, and WFP staff noted that the accountability requirements for WFP as a UN agency are often more relaxed than those of INGOs. As a result, systems generate a relatively broad, and some say opaque, level of financial and implementation information. Many partners working with the GLC have had to develop much more detailed financial and programme reports for years and expect the same level of transparency from the GLC, yet the evaluators found that WFP systems are poorly constructed for this task.

171. External Factors. External factors frequently noted by stakeholders as hindering GLC operations include the complexity of the operating environment, civil-military issues, unsolicited bilateral donations, multiplicity of actors in an emergency, and security.

172. Debates during operations regarding the use of military and civil-defence assets (MCDA) and civil/military relations (CIV/MIL) have both enabled and hindered Logistics Cluster operations. These external factors were most acute in the Pakistan and Haiti case studies. Generally the use of military assets and relations with the military are guided by IASC and HCT policy decisions. However, the Logistics Cluster often has to make quick operational judgment calls regarding coordination and

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<sup>47</sup> "Back office support" by WFP for the Logistics Cluster at country-level includes facilities and office space, information technology and communications infrastructure, vehicles and drivers, contracting, financial systems, human resources systems, security and some administrative support.

cooperation with national and international military actors in the absence of detailed guidance.

173. Stakeholders across all categories noted the complex relationship between humanitarian and military actors when responding to both natural disasters and complex emergency scenarios. There are significant opportunities and risks when humanitarian responders engage in cooperation with military actors related to neutrality and impartiality. There is disagreement among participants in the Logistics Cluster on how and when to engage in cooperation with military forces.

174. Basic guidelines for cooperation exist but there is a gap in strategic guidance on how and when to engage host and other military actors during Logistics Cluster operations. The evaluators identified several critical areas for strategic guidance including when to engage with military actors, what constitutes a situation of last resort, how to use military assets for natural disaster response in a conflict setting, and when the use of military assets should end as the emergency phase closes.

175. There are strong commonalities between humanitarian and military logistics including agility, and the ability to operate in remote settings. Globally the GLC could play an interface role for humanitarian agencies and the military to learn more about velocity and agility management in remote areas and integrated logistics support concepts.

## **2.2. Findings Regarding the Activities and Products of the GLC**

176. The evaluation found that WFP inputs of skilled staff, funding, back office systems and leadership have enabled the GLC to undertake the expected global and country-level activities for information management, operations support, coordination and funding. The GLC SC tends to focus on field operations and the Global Cluster Coordinator has also been responsible for managing a separate WFP logistics unit, leaving less than adequate focus on management, performance monitoring, systems, and partnership elements of the cluster. Partners are generally very satisfied with the information products produced by the GLC and the website is heavily used with peaks related to sudden onset emergencies. Training courses are widely appreciated for high quality and inter-agency value.

### **2.2.1 General Description of GLC Work at the Global Level (EM 2.a)**

177. GLC Support Cell. As described in Section 1.3 and Annex 5, a considerable foundation has been established to enable the work of the cluster through WFP corporate decisions, policies and strategies. One of the most significant steps taken was the early establishment of the GLC SC. Over the past six years the support cell has established numerous tools, information products, and protocols; helped facilitate the training of logisticians from many humanitarian organizations; served as surge capacity for operations and represented the GLC in WFP and global humanitarian policy bodies.

178. Organization and functions. The GLC SC is comprised of 13 individuals (staff, secondees, a stand-by-partner on loan and consultants), 11 of which are primarily based in Rome.

179. The GLC SC staff includes two management positions (Global Cluster Coordinator, Deputy Head Cluster Unit), three information management positions (including the website manager), four operations support positions (akin to “desk officers”, one based in Bangkok), one finance consultant, one logistics officer

responsible for the LCA system, one logistics officer focused on the development of a cargo tracking system, and one senior logistics officer primarily assigned to provide surge capacity as a cluster coordinator in the field.

180. The cell is led by the Global Cluster Coordinator, who at present also has responsibility for managing the WFP Augmented Logistics Intervention Team for Emergencies (ALITE) unit in the logistics division. The dual nature of this position is accompanied by a dual reporting relationship, where the Global Cluster Coordinator position reports the WFP logistics director while as head of ALITE he reports to the deputy director of the logistics division. The evaluation found that the dual nature of this position allows less than optimal time and focus for leading the GLC. The dual reporting relationship and nature of the position is also perceived by some consistently active GLC participating organizations as a possible conflict of interest.

181. Given the prominence of the GLC and of WFP's role as lead agency, the Global Cluster Coordinator is often called upon to interact with very high-level leaders from other humanitarian organizations, and directly with senior-most management of WFP. This position is also required to negotiate within WFP (HQ and field) to ensure that necessary support is mobilized to enable the cluster's country-level work. The human resources grade assigned to the position of the coordinator does not appear equivalent to the level of responsibility inherent in these functions. The evaluators found that both the dual reporting structure and the human resources grade assigned to the position can have a detrimental effect on the ability of the coordinator to directly interact with high level leaders and secure necessary support.

182. The overall GLC SC staffing level is deemed adequate by some stakeholders and inadequate by others. The evaluators found these opposing perspectives are rooted in different perceptions of what the GLC SC should be responsible for doing, compared to the total global and field operations staffing needs of the GLC. As the GLC SC has been unable to establish and maintain a well functioning roster (see Section 2.2.6) the staff in the cell have increasingly filled the role of critical surge capacity for field operations. If the GLC SC is to be viewed as the first and most important source of surge capacity for field operations then the total staffing level of the cell should be considered inadequate given other global responsibilities. On the other hand, if the positions in the GLC SC are less frequently called upon to deploy to the field then the total staffing level should be adequate.

183. Secondees from other UN agencies and NGOs have represented a significant proportion of the GLC SC staffing since its inception. Between two and five secondees have worked in the cell at any one time. The inclusion of secondees was stressed as a key way to demonstrate the inter-agency character of the GLC SC beginning with the earliest plans and documents of the GLC. Though seconded staff come from other organizations, the GLC SC budget has traditionally covered the salary and benefit costs of these staff while they are seconded.<sup>48</sup>

184. However, as the GLC SC has demonstrated to partners that it will be inclusive, some agencies have determined that they no longer feel the need to have a secondee from their agency working within the cell. Other past and present individuals working as secondees note that they sometimes felt under-utilized, partly linked to

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<sup>48</sup> This form of "unfunded secondment" differs from some other partnerships and membership organizations in which secondments from other well capacitated organizations often come fully funded by their home organization.

how the WFP culture treats them as outsiders, diminishing their tacit influence and authority, when trying to secure back office support for the cluster in the field or HQ.

185. Over the past two years, GLC SC management have become more deliberate in trying to use the seconded positions as an opportunity to bring people into the cell that have specialized programme logistics skills in addition to representing participating organizations. Given that secondments to the GLC SC have been unfunded by the sponsoring organization, other options for recruiting for specialized logistics skills from outside WFP's system could be explored to fill programme logistics gaps. Overall the evaluators found that the rationale behind using secondees is generally too based in the notion of representation and optics rather than a human resources plan based on staffing needs linked to a clear GLC SC strategy.

186. As noted in Section 1.3, the GLC SC has developed various documents describing its mandate, functions and plans. However, attention to implementation and management monitoring of performance for non-operational activities seems to be granted low priority. Stakeholders within and outside the GLC SC noted that there has been a gap in strategic vision and documented strategies for the GLC SC. Some are pleased with the efforts to form working groups with partners at the last two GLC global meetings to develop a strategy covering key topics including inter-cluster cooperation, modus operandi, preparedness and funding. However, others note the lack of activity among these groups between meetings as evidence that strategy development may not yet be taken seriously.

187. One of the observed and reported reasons that global strategy, performance management and monitoring appear to be given less priority has to do with demands on GLC staff time and the composition of skills, experience and interests among GLC staff. Most GLC staff (except IM) are highly experienced field logisticians. Given high demand for operations related work, and the lack of a functional roster, staff gravitation to supporting operations and wanting to deploy to the field is easily justified. However, when the entire GLC SC is focused on operations and serving as surge capacity there is no human resource left to focus on meeting global objectives related to development of GLC tools, systems, partner relationships and strategies.

188. A number of global mandate questions were raised in interviews across stakeholder categories. Some stakeholders noted that the GLC should play a more active leadership role within the broader humanitarian logistics community. Some note that the lack of GLC SC initiative in this area has been a missed opportunity for establishing a more coherent overall community of practice or centre of excellence for humanitarian logistics. A growing number of smaller networks, partnerships and initiatives have emerged or grown in the six years since the GLC was founded. Some said that the GLC should serve as an umbrella to knit these professional, academic and thematic initiatives together.

189. Another mandate question raised is whether the GLC SC should be doing something more to bring standardization to the humanitarian logistics sector by leading an initiative to develop a common catalogue of standard relief items, building on the work of various Humanitarian Procurement Centers (HPCs) and the standard catalogue developed by the ICRC and IFRC. Such an initiative is perceived as potentially valuable in helping solve the challenges with monitoring upstream pipelines and tracking of items by type and amount rather than just weight and volume. This type of work would seem to broadly fall under the "normative guidance and policy" section of the GLC's stated purpose.


190. General Information Product Findings. The evaluation team found a high rate of overall satisfaction among GLC users. More than 84 percent of total survey respondents reported that they were satisfied or very satisfied with the existing products. 40 percent of non-WFP respondents reported that they were “very satisfied,” while only 28 percent of WFP respondents registered this level of satisfaction.

191. Overall Website Usage Patterns. The logcluster.org site is a dedicated website for the Logistics Cluster, separate from the WFP website and publicly accessible to anyone. The cluster website seeks to provide timely and useful logistics information to the humanitarian community and includes pages dedicated to specific operations, tools, guidance and preparedness products (customs and logistics capacity assessments). The logcluster.org site has received a total of 499,388 visitors and 1.6 million total page views between January 1, 2008 and October 1, 2011.

192. As shown in Figure 9, this traffic has been relatively steady, averaging 364.5 visits per day (2,561 visits per week). The prominent spike in traffic in January 2010 followed the earthquake in Haiti, and the highest single day of website traffic was 1,901 visitors on January 19, 2010 – six days after the earthquake struck. The visits related to Haiti were roughly twice both the magnitude and speed as the earlier peak of May of 2008 following the Cyclone Nargis disaster in Myanmar. That second highest peak was 721 visitors on May 15, 2008, thirteen days after the cyclone struck.

193. The website traffic following the Haiti earthquake continued at a very high level, as the four-week average of 2,209 visits per week prior to the earthquake was more than tripled to 7,775 visits per week for four weeks following the earthquake.

**Figure 9 – Overall Logcluster.org Website Traffic**



194. Website traffic data indicates a strong bias in favour of operational products, country information and maps, with lower levels of traffic on items such as tools, road transport and photos. This higher use of operations related data is supported by findings in the interviews and in the user product satisfaction survey carried out as a part of this evaluation. The user survey supports the findings from the website data, indicating high levels of satisfaction with operations related data, with roughly equal distribution across WFP and non-WFP respondents (83 percent WFP, 80 percent non-WFP satisfied).

### **2.2.2 User Satisfaction with the Preparedness Information Products of the GLC (EM 2.b)**

195. The GLC produces two primary types of preparedness information products; LCAs and the Customs Information Guide. A Global Stockpile Mapping tool is maintained by OCHA for the GLC. Other ad hoc information products enable



preparedness including a weekly newsletter, teleconferences, contingency plans, and assessment snapshots. Survey data shows overall high levels of satisfaction among all users of preparedness related products. However, interview data revealed a more critical view of these preparedness products, with 64 percent of respondents registering negative impressions of the services as opposed to 35 percent of respondents registering positive views of the subject.

196. Logistics Capacity Assessment (LCA). The LCA is the core preparedness product of the GLC. Survey data shows overall high levels of satisfaction with LCAs, and higher levels of satisfaction within WFP than for respondents working outside the organization. However, interview data indicates higher levels of dissatisfaction with LCAs with highest levels of dissatisfaction registering among GLC and WFP staff. This discrepancy could possibly be attributed to a deeper level of discussion and thought during the interviews, rather than faster on-screen judgments, which can have a positive bias in the online survey format.

197. The LCA pre-existed the GLC as a WFP logistics product. Once the GLC came into being, the LCA was broadened to serve an inter-agency purpose. The GLC is responsible for conducting and updating LCAs in places where WFP does not have a country office. Where WFP does have a country office, the LCA is a CO logistics director's responsibility. From 2009-2011 a total of 54 LCAs were conducted, and the GLC SC plans to conduct an additional 10 LCAs in 2012 with WFP COs possible updating more. However, only 13 LCAs are currently available on the logcluster.org due to delays in full implementation of a new digital LCA database.

198. The digital LCA database is meant to make it easier for partners, WFP and GLC to access and update the LCA information on an incremental basis. This will make it much easier to add new information as it becomes available, rather than having to conduct an intensive multi-week effort every few years, which should improve completion and updating rates.

199. The logcluster.org page for LCA's says that the new database will be launched in 2010, suggesting a two-year delay for this project. GLC staff note that the digital database has actually be in use, informally, for since early 2011, and currently has 25 of the 54 recent LCAs loaded (with others pending clearance or migration). Since early 2011 the GLC SC has shared the link to the digital database with partners that have requested an LCA that is not on the website but happens to be updated in the database. Official launch of the digital LCA database is reportedly planned for the "very near timeframe" once the last few technical issues have been resolved. The website for the digital database also notes that it is fully downloadable for offline use and that a version optimized for mobile devices with offline use will be available.

200. Customs Information Guide. The customs information guide is a road map for negotiating the customs process for humanitarian organizations importing humanitarian aid into an affected country. It may include contact information, key players, forms and processes. At present the guide is a collection of 92 country specific web pages on logcluster.org providing customs related information. While covering a broad set of countries, no customs information is available for three of the 11 countries where the GLC has active operations and many of the countries listed do not have completed information uploaded. Survey data shows overall high levels of satisfaction with Customs Information guide across all stakeholder groups. However, interview data shows dissatisfaction with the customs information by a three to one margin.

201. Other Preparedness Products. In interviews stakeholders noted appreciation for the weekly teleconferences now being held by the GLC SC to discuss on-going and emerging crises. Stakeholders questioned the utility of the Global Stockpile Mapping conducted by OCHA, noting that the information is not updated in real-time and knowing what is stocked where does not solve the information gap on upstream pipeline and incoming commodities. Interview data shows relatively few mentions and mixed positive and negative responses with no significant trends relating to global weekly updates, preparedness maps, Logistics Cluster Snapshots, contingency plans and the website as a preparedness tool.

202. The data shows an overall weakness in availability and usage of preparedness tools. This matches the team's observation that the GLC is more strongly focused on operational response than preparedness.

### **2.2.3 User Satisfaction with the Operations Information Products of the GLC (EM 2.c)**

203. Survey data shows overall user satisfaction as generally high with an average of all products registering at 74 percent satisfaction. Products with the lowest satisfaction are cargo tracking at 42 percent and supply chain monitoring at 22 percent satisfaction. An average of 20 percent of respondents do not use or require these information products, showing that users are selective in their usage and awareness patterns rather than using all products on offer. Satisfaction among WFP and non-WFP users is similar in the survey data and interview data.

204. The interview findings support the survey data, with twice as many informants noting satisfaction as those noting dissatisfaction with operational information products. The evaluation team registered the highest general satisfaction rates among NGO users, closely followed by UN Agencies.

205. There is consensus in the survey data that the operational information products are updated frequently enough, with 89 percent stating that the products are up to date. This opinion is held by both WFP and non-WFP staff.

206. The following paragraphs outline specific findings and trends related to the following operations information products:

207. Concept of Operations (CONOPs). Survey data indicates high (88 percent) satisfaction rate for the CONOPS document, with few specific mentions of the item in interview data. This indicates that the likelihood that the CONOPS is accepted as a process document to establish operational parameters and an outline of the operation but is not a frequently used tool.

208. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). SOPs scored high in the survey data with 86 percent satisfaction, and few specific mentions in the interview data.

209. Situation Reports (Sitreps). Sitreps received the highest positive rating at 93 percent satisfaction, with one of the lowest percentages (6 percent) of respondents unaware of the product. Sitreps received little attention in the interview data.

210. Cargo Tracking and RITA. Cargo tracking received the second lowest satisfaction score with only 42 percent of respondents indicating satisfaction with the service (21 percent of respondents unaware of the product). This is confirmed by interview data where negative comments across all stakeholder groups included dissatisfaction with the RITA process, lack of confidence in existing database system,

and the opaque tracking system leading to questions about impartiality of the Logistics Cluster related to WFP priorities.

211. Meeting minutes. Meeting minutes scored highly in user satisfaction across all stakeholder groups with 81 percent approval. Interview comments indicated that although accurate, the quality of the minutes was varied, with lack of depth in some cases.

212. Maps/Geographic Information Services (GIS). Maps and GIS scored predictably highly at 83 percent satisfaction with 13 percent of respondents unaware of the service. Interview data indicated a three to one satisfaction ratio, listing the service as invaluable to the operation.

213. Logcluster.org website. The Logistics Cluster website ranked highly in customer satisfaction at 90 percent with a low 6 percent unawareness level. Interview data indicates strong positive comments about the site, with significant negative comments. The positive comments focused on the advanced nature of the site compared with other clusters, and the website's role in operations and planning. Negative comments mentioned that respondents felt the website was not frequently updated, and did not have relevance to work in the field. A full analysis of website usage patterns and findings is included in Annex 10.

214. Logcluster.org Low Graphic Website Version. The website's low graphic or mobile version received the highest unknown rate at 63 percent with a satisfaction rate of 58 percent among respondents. There were no specific mentions in the interview data. Given the increase in mobile computing, this is a clear area for improved awareness and development for the Logistics Cluster.

215. Other operations information products. The evaluation found a number of examples of other less standardized operations information products during case study interviews. Examples of these tailor-made products include ad hoc tracking of various agencies' logistics activities (in map or table forms), collection and dissemination of information regarding suppliers and market prices (such as fuel), and efforts to compile information on upstream and in-country pipelines of various actors, sometimes at the request of an HC or OCHA. These situational, demand driven products appear to have broad stakeholder satisfaction, though in some cases interested parties felt more energy should be devoted to ensuring quality and accuracy of information contained in these products.

#### **2.2.4 User Satisfaction with the Guidelines, Standards, Tools and Policies Developed by the GLC (EM 2.d)**

216. The user survey found high rates of satisfaction with guidelines, standards, tools and policies disseminated by the Logistics Cluster. However, non-WFP respondents were much more likely to report satisfaction (93 percent) compared with non-WFP users (54 percent). Additionally, non-WFP employees were much more likely to report not using or requiring these items (47 percent non-WFP to 9 percent WFP).

217. Respondents were evenly split during the interview process on the value of these products, with half of respondents (majority of NGOs) stating that the guidelines/standards/tools/policies were useful, with the other half questioning the usefulness and stating that the Logistics Cluster should focus more narrowly on problem solving and operational coordination.

218. The following paragraphs outline specific findings and trends related to the following guidelines, standards, tools and policies information products:

219. Logistics Operational Guide (LOG). Nearly 100 percent of Non-WFP respondents identified that they were totally satisfied with the LOG, with not a single non-WFP respondent identifying dissatisfaction with the product. Satisfaction levels with the LOG were reported to be lower for WFP respondents.

220. Interview data shows high levels of satisfaction among NGOs with no respondent from any stakeholder groups criticizing the LOG.

221. Procedures for Accessing Common Services. The evaluation team found high levels of satisfaction on this item across the survey data, with few mentions in the interview data. Satisfaction in the survey was equal across WFP and non-WFP.

222. Cluster Deployed Staff Information Tools. A centralized toolkit for Logistics Cluster Coordinators does not currently exist. Useful tools exist in the LRT, SMT and LOG, but several respondents from within WFP recommended that the GLC Support Cell in Rome develop this to support cluster coordinators.

223. Civil-Military Guidance. The evaluation team found no clear and standardized guidance on civil military issues. This remains a gap in current Logistics Cluster guidance and the GLC should consider developing clear guidance on this issue.

224. Unsolicited Bilateral Donations (UBDs). The Logistics Cluster will often develop policy and management systems for the surge of in-kind aid that often arrives in during the acute emergency, clogging runways and ports. There is no standard guidance on this issue, but the team found good practice in the Pakistan 2010 floods case study that the GLC could adapt for global use.

225. Information Management Guidelines. Cluster Coordinators and information managers often develop tools and templates to streamline data collection at the field level. Both the survey and the interview data reports satisfaction with these tools, yet there is clear room for standardization between countries of deployment. This is closely related to the issue of cargo tracking described above.


### **2.2.5 Extent to Which GLC Training Courses Enhance Knowledge, Skills, and Ability to Coordinate and Access the Services of the GLC (EM 2.e)**

226. The GLC has provided training through the LRT training course, the distance learning SMT, training courses for Stand-by-Partners, training courses for LET members from the corporate sector and a variety of ad hoc training presentations for partners and field staff.

227. On average, the GLC has invested between US\$250,000 and US\$300,000 per year on training. Survey responses from this evaluation and end of training questionnaires show that participants and their sponsoring organizations judge training courses to have had moderate to high effect on enhancing participant's knowledge, skills and abilities to effectively coordinate with and access GLC services.

228. The LRT is a week-long simulation based training course developed for the GLC by the WFP Logistics Development Unit (LDU). The course places facilitators, participants and other role players (Italian civil authorities and police) into an unfolding emergency scenario and requires them to play roles that simulate an actual cluster operation. Figure 10 shows the number of LRT participants by type of organization (excluding facilitators) for the first ten LRT courses combined.


**Figure 10 – LRT 1-10 Participants by Organization Type**



229. Held on average biannually in Brindisi, Italy, the course is widely perceived by stakeholders as being of high quality and demand remains high from external partners to send participants each time the course is offered. Participants as well as facilitators reportedly benefit from the simulation format of the training course and the facilitators come from the same diverse group of organizations as participants.

230. One of the original objectives for the LRT training course was to identify, train and select individuals who could serve on a GLC roster for deployment during field operations. Figure 11 shows the percentages of people deployed for the Logistics Cluster operations since 2005 who have participated in the LRT (as facilitators or participants) versus those who have not.

**Figure 11 – Deployed Staff That Have Participated in LRT (facilitators or participants)**



231. Over time, the roster-populating objective of the LRT seems to have been retired as partners proved unable to deploy their personnel with the GLC because they were needed for deployment in individual agency functions. At present, GLC, WFP and external stakeholders consistently reference the purpose and value of the LRT training course as building relationships that become useful in the field, networking and increasing familiarity with protocols for working together in cluster operations.

232. SMT. The SMT is a distance-learning curriculum with modules intended to teach logisticians soft skills such as meeting facilitation, conflict resolution, negotiation and coordination. To date more than 440 staff from 38 humanitarian

organizations have completed the training course, however it is likely that more people have used the programme given the non-submission of participation reports from humanitarian agencies that have received the tool.

233. Stand-by-Partner training course. More than 50 people from Stand-by-Partner organizations have participated in training courses facilitated by the GLC from RedR, the Danish Refugee Council, CANADEM, Irish Aid, MSB, the Norwegian Refugee Council, SDC, THW, Carteomg, FCI, ICR and Ericsson.

234. The most common gap cited by stakeholders regarding training courses is a dedicated Logistics Cluster coordinator training mechanism. As the LRT is simulation based and the SMT focuses on soft skills, no current training system focuses on orienting cluster coordinators to procedures, tools, responsibilities and scenarios they need to understand to be effective in the field. At the same time, it should be noted that a wide majority of stakeholders note satisfaction with the quality of cluster coordinators that have been deployed by the GLC. A dedicated cluster coordinator training course is planned by the GLC SC but not yet funded.

235. The other training gap noted by a number of stakeholders, primarily from within WFP and the GLC, relates to the knowledge and awareness of WFP managers and other staff in the field. While most informants stated the gap in knowledge and awareness of the GLC's mandate and WFP's responsibilities as cluster lead agency has lessened over time, most also felt that more should be done to train people on their potential roles in support of the cluster, especially at country office management levels. GLC SC staff report plans to conduct more training for WFP staff through the Regional Bureaux.

#### **2.2.6 Extent to Which Preparedness Activities of the GLC Enhance Partnerships and Response Capacities (EM 2.f)**

236. GLC preparedness activities identified through the evaluation fall into two primary categories: 1) those oriented towards ensuring the operational readiness of the GLC, and 2) activities which support building the preparedness of other actors, primarily national governments.

237. Operational Readiness of the GLC. Many of the stated objectives, core activities and development projects of the GLC SC are oriented towards ensuring its readiness to respond to emergencies.

238. The evaluation found that the readiness activities most closely associated with specific anticipated emergencies (e.g. hotspots of risk with immediate potential for crisis) received the most time and attention from staff and partners.

239. During the course of the evaluation a number of activities were observed and reported related to a range of emerging potential crises. Scenarios included escalating violence, projected economic collapse, drought and annual flooding. At both country and global level the GLC was seen as actively working with partners to prepare informal contingency plans for these predictable scenarios. Given the increasing number of such situations during the course of the evaluation the GLC adjusted from holding monthly information sharing teleconferences to weekly calls. Partners noted appreciation for the quality of information shared on the calls and satisfaction with the efforts of the cluster to prepare for these scenarios, in many cases prior to any formal discussion of activation.

240. The GLC SC has also developed a conceptual framework for actively preparing itself for such predictable scenarios, called the Staging Areas Project. This initiative is focused on establishing standard practices for conducting assessments, repositioning staff and assets, establishing corridors and supplier arrangements and developing contingency scenarios. Although not formally documented at this time, the evaluators witnessed the framework, borne out of previous experiences such as the Libya crisis, being tested in an on-going situation of internal violence.

241. The development of an emergency roster was found to be the greatest weakness of GLC operational readiness as discussed in previous sections. While consistently mentioned as an objective of the GLC SC, the evaluators found no evidence of a professional roster management system in the GLC. Some GLC, WFP and external key informants stated that the list of people trained in the LRT is a roster. Others noted that more targeted lists of individuals have been created to serve as a roster based on personal recommendations and known skills, experience and knowledge of personnel. Others, however, noted that every attempt to develop and use a roster have failed as various internal and external factors rendered these lists of personnel irrelevant when an emergency struck.

242. The WFP logistics division does maintain a staff database that serves as a type of roster when surge logistics capacity is needed, yet this system does not appear to monitor availability of staff for deployment and depends upon TDY agreements. Consultants are also sometimes used for surge capacity and a list of previous consultants exists, though their availability is not monitored and many work with other emergency response organizations as well.

243. The LET has a roster comprised of individuals that have deployed alongside the Logistics Cluster in operations. WFP Stand-by-Partners also provide surge capacity for both the GLC and WFP logistics augmentation.

244. Fortunately most partners said that the GLC has been able to mobilize and deploy capable people to run the Logistics Cluster during field operations. The evaluation found, however, that a significant amount of staff time at various levels of the support cell must be dedicated to searching for personnel each time there is a need for deployment. Sometimes the ad hoc approach taken leads to delays, greater than desired turnover, and heavy dependence on GLC SC staff to deploy. The other underlying unresolved issue related to the development of a roster is the stated objective of maintaining an inter-agency roster and deploying inter-agency teams for the GLC. For both internal and external reasons this seems to have been deemed impractical, at least for cluster coordinators. However, this conclusion does not seem to have been documented or declared in plans, policies or meeting minutes.

245. Another gap in operational readiness relates to deployment toolkits. Number of GLC staff in the field and support cell suggested that cluster coordinators need an electronic toolkit, to complement cluster coordinator training courses (if developed), with key tools, forms, templates and information that cluster coordinators need while coordinating operations. The LRT training course materials include a "deployment kit" with some of this information, however many cluster coordinators have not attended LRT, which may explain the perception that this is a gap.

246. Stockpiling. The GLC maintains some modest global stocks of items needed to support cluster operations but no evidence was found to suggest serious partner or GLC SC consideration of establishing stockpiles of any particular emergency supplies

for partners. Stockpiling is vaguely mentioned in IASC documentation, sometimes reprinted and disseminated verbatim by the GLC, as a mandated area for all clusters.

247. The potential role of the GLC in this element of supply chain management only comes up in documents and interviews in relation to the stockpile mapping information maintained by OCHA in coordination with the GLC, and in relation to UNHRD. A significant number of stakeholders referred to UNHRD as somehow linked with the cluster, or suggested there should be more of a linkage. A number of NGOs also noted frustration with UNHRD in terms of its prioritization processes (WFP first perceptions) and cost structure. In a few cases, key informants that do not actively participate in the GLC at global levels suggested that the Logistics Cluster was part of an end-to-end supply chain management system because of its links with UNHRD. During the inception phase of the evaluation UNHRD was deemed outside the scope of this evaluation so no systematic effort was made to collect data regarding its performance and user satisfaction.

248. A number of GLC participants have moved to develop their own end-to-end supply chain management arrangements including joint stockpiling initiatives. Four of the largest INGOs (with a combined annual budget of US\$4.5 billion) have formed an initiative called the Supply Chain Consortium for this purpose, which is in the early stages of development. Other organizations that manage Humanitarian Procurement Centres (HPC) are offering or considering offering procurement, warehousing and other supply chain services to other organizations. The GLC has not undertaken any mapping or study of these initiatives to date and GLC SC staff do not consider end-to-end supply chain management part of the GLC mandate.

249. Support for Building Preparedness of Other Actors. Survey respondents from both WFP and non-WFP stated that the GLC has slightly positive effects on establishing better national and global preparedness for emergencies. Interview data shows some anecdotal evidence to support this perception, but does not suggest there is a clear GLC strategy for its role in supporting national preparedness.

250. In chronic emergencies with longer lifecycles, the Logistics Cluster seems to be frequently involved in inter-agency contingency planning efforts. Capacity building with national governments in these situations is often not feasible given the low capacity and ability to engage within the government. In conflict environments where neutrality is critical, and in places where corruption is a major problem, the Logistics Cluster may appropriately shy away from such preparedness work.

251. In natural disaster contexts the GLC does sometimes engage in trying to support national preparedness and capacity building for national governments. The evaluation found that in Pakistan the Logistics Cluster had worked closely with the National Disaster Management Agency throughout the operation and transferred some skills and tools to government counterparts throughout. A focused initiative was also incorporated into the cluster's work plan from the beginning of the flood response to build and handover to the government a network of permanent warehouses in every province to ensure better preparedness for emergencies.

252. In Haiti, key informants noted that the Logistics Cluster had been very active in working with the national government to facilitate contingency planning and simulations and contribute to national preparedness plans. The cluster has also planned from an early stage to transfer GIS/mapping assets and trained national staff to the government upon deactivation.



253. In a few non-operational contexts the GLC has managed dedicated preparedness projects to support national governments. In the Pacific, the GLC has managed an ECHO funded preparedness project to support national disaster management agencies in the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu. The project has combined contingency planning, training courses, conducting LCAs and developing a set of minimum preparedness activities. GLC staff have deployed for two-four week assignments to support the project over a period of two years.

254. In Mongolia, UNICEF requested GLC assistance with inter-agency contingency planning and development of an LCA because WFP does not have a presence in the country. From 2009 to 2011 the Logistics Cluster has worked in Mozambique on contingency planning and developed an inter-agency logistics preparedness and response plan, which is part of a broader HCT contingency plan.

255. GLC staff note that these projects are not part of an overall preparedness strategy based on risk and the GLC is not resourced to provide long-term follow-up support to the national governments to ensure sustainable results.

256. External partners, especially in Haiti, stressed the importance of clarifying the GLC role in support of national preparedness during the post-emergency phase. Most noted a perceived potential value added of the Logistics Cluster.

257. The evaluators found that while the GLC often contributes to building the preparedness capacity of other actors, especially national governments, there is a reluctance to formally incorporate this area of work into its strategy and mandate. This appears partly related to ambiguity in IASC guidance, partly due to concerns about raising expectations without adequate resources, and partly related to lack of consensus among global partners and staff regarding whether GLC should engage in preparedness work.

### **2.3. Findings Regarding the Extent to which the GLC under WFP's Leadership has Worked Effectively with Partners**

258. The evaluation found that activities including meetings, training courses, contingency planning and information management have led to more collaborative response, better understanding of how to work together and better information sharing. These outputs have contributed to outcomes of strengthened humanitarian logistics partnerships and increased coordination, especially at the country-level. Some examples were also identified where these coordination and partnership results contributed to improvements in coverage, predictability, strengthened capacity and better preparedness. However, the evaluation found that partnership outcomes have been limited by external factors related to inconsistent partner participation and a decline in GLC SC activities for strategic outreach.

259. The GLC, under WFP's leadership, has been inclusive in its meetings, staffing and some special projects – leading to improved outcomes of increased coordination and strengthened logistics partnerships. WFP is consistently viewed as remaining the best choice to serve as cluster lead agency. Planned efforts to develop an inter-agency rapid response roster have not achieved expected results due to a combination of internal and external factors.

### **2.3.1 General Description of GLC Work with Partners at Global and Country Levels and Change over Time (EM 3.a)**

260. The GLC works with partners at the global on an on-going basis and at national, sub-national and occasionally regional level for specific operations and sometimes preparedness work. At a global level, the GLC primarily serves in its coordinator role, though some discussions about common service provision offerings take place among partners and occasionally operations (such as Libya) require global facilitation of common services. At the national and sub-national level the Logistics Cluster works with partners in both a coordinator and a service provider role.

261. Principles of Partnership. “Principles of Partnership” (see Annex 11) is a statement of commitment endorsed by the Global Humanitarian Platform (GHP) which brings together the three pillars of the humanitarian community; the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, UN agencies and NGOs. The GHP seeks to improve humanitarian response by strengthening partnerships at global and field levels. Organizations participating in the GHP, including WFP, have agreed through the Principles of Partnership to base their partnerships on the following principles; equality, transparency, results-oriented approach, responsibility and complementarity.

262. Applying the Principles of Partnership to both the coordinator and the service provider roles of the GLC raises interesting questions about the character of a service cluster. While the principles appear to apply well to the coordinator role of the GLC, the service provider role of the GLC has many attributes more common to a service provider and client relationship, rather than an equal partnership. Findings related to how the Principles of Partnership apply to both roles of the GLC, based on interviews and field observations, are shown in Table 10.

**Table 10 –Principles of Partnership as Coordinator and Service Provider**

<b>Principle</b>	<b>Coordinator Role</b>	<b>Service Provider Role</b>
Equality	Observed mutual respect irrespective of size, however some participants feel WFP's size and lead role leads to dominant influence. Appreciable respect for each other's mandates, obligations, independence, constraints commitments; though some expectations of WFP/GLC may be unreasonable. Observed space for constructive dissent at meetings and bilaterally.	Partners not always involved in initial activation and rapid deployment of asset stages (though potentially impractical). Because GLC (through WFP) has far greater logistics assets and capabilities, partners are often dependent (clients) rather than equal (partners) in common services (especially transport). At field level, organizations with greater resources are more likely to be aware of available services and how to access them.
Transparency	GLC practices generally emphasize consultations and info sharing. Financial transparency at global level less satisfactory with low capacity to identify costs of activities and projects in any level of detail. Trust has improved in some segments of partnership but some large NGOs have persistent concerns.	Information on service provision is ok at the design and offering stages, though somewhat passive (self-selection of participants rather than pro-active outreach). Financial cost and benefit information noted as key problem for transparency of common services.
Results-oriented Approach	Global plans generally reality-based, though not always implemented with fidelity. GLC generally perceived as action-oriented, however follow-up on non-operational matters can be slow. Coordination appears to be based on effective capabilities and concrete operational capacities.	Operational plans are very reality-based, developed in participatory fashion (after initial activation and when # of participants is not overwhelming), and adjusted based on emerging realities. Service-provision embodies action-orientation well. Service-provision rooted in core WFP capacities and capabilities, though gaps outside of WFP's core strengths are not always well filled.
Responsibility	At a broad level the GLC accomplishes its coordinator/convener tasks with integrity, in a relevant and appropriate way. IM and operational means, competencies, skills and capacity to deliver on commitments are good within GLC but strategic, partner relationship management and global project management skills and capacities are lacking.	Service provision tasks appear to be accomplished with integrity. Services are relevant and appropriate. Services provided generally benefit from high competencies, skills and capacity to deliver on commitments. Service-mindset investments have improved sense of responsibility to other actors.
Complementarity	Observed respect for diversity of organizations participating in global level activities. Language and cultural barriers noted at field level as challenge in some situations.	GLC service provision role in local capacity enhancement not well formalized or integrated into emergency response, though some positive examples observed during operations and stand-alone projects.


263. GLC Global Meetings. The GLC has organized nine global meetings since 2007. Representatives from 51 partner organizations, companies or agencies have attended the nine GLC meetings. Ten partners have attended at least eight of the nine meetings. Eight partners have attended between four and seven meetings. Eighteen partners have attended two or three meetings and another 15 partners have only attended one.

264. GLC global meetings have averaged forty participants per meeting, with WFP, GLC, UNJLC, and UNHAS representatives making up 32 percent of participants per meeting. One hundred and twenty-one individuals have attended the meeting representing partners, however 80 people have only one meeting and only 14 have attended four or more.

265. The level of participants within their own organizations also appears to have varied with some evidence that organizations are sending fewer logistics senior managers to the meetings over time.

266. Based on the analysis of participation, turnover in participants by organization and individuals appears to be significant. However, when viewed by organization types, the relative balance of participation has remained mostly consistent. Figure 12 shows the number of participants at each GLC Global Meeting by organization type.

**Figure 12 – GLC Global Meeting Participants by Organization Type**



267. Between and Beyond Meetings. The GLC SC has been engaged with partners at a global level in a variety of ways between and beyond the global GLC meetings.

268. Product Development. The LOG provides a positive example of a tool developed that reflects the benefits of the partnership nature of the GLC. Partners are both satisfied with its utility as well as the process employed to develop these guidelines. The LOG was developed for the GLC by a project team managed by staff in the WFP Logistics Development Unit. The project team followed an iterative project development approach that involved numerous stakeholders throughout.

269. After initial drafting of the LOG, a small group of experts from DFID, World Vision and Mercy Corps were intensely engaged in reviewing and making suggested improvements. Following refinement, ten of the largest humanitarian organizations were assembled for a workshop to review the contents and utility and suggest further refinements. Numerous stakeholders suggested in interviews that this process could serve as a model for a GLC facilitated participatory approach for developing other key products and undertaking partnership initiatives.

270. Engagement of the GLC in the Broader Humanitarian Logistics Domain. Senior GLC SC staff participate in some broader humanitarian logistics platforms, though there appears to be a lack of strategic and sustained engagement with some significant initiatives and actors among academic, research and professional logistics organizations. Military and civil-defence gatherings increasingly cover humanitarian logistics issues and the level of demand for GLC participation in simulation exercises and meetings has dramatically increased in recent years. Given the number of initiatives, meetings and partnerships in the logistics sector, stakeholders suggested the GLC needs a strategy for prioritizing its participation and engagement.

271. Strategic Dialogue with Key Humanitarian Logistics Leaders. Engagement between senior WFP logistics staff and their counterparts in partner organizations appears to have diminished over the past three years. The previous WFP Director of Logistics and previous head of the GLC SC reportedly invested significant time in reaching out to the heads of logistics in key humanitarian organizations between meetings and at one point were holding conference calls at this level regarding cluster issues on at least a quarterly basis. This information can be contrasted with information collected in interviews with heads of logistics in major organizations. In two cases the heads of logistics at such agencies were not even aware of the most recent change in leadership in the WFP logistics department and one of them noted having not met the preceding head of logistics either. This drop-off in outreach by the GLC SC and WFP may be linked to lessened strategic level engagement of partners in the GLC meetings and between them.

272. GLC Work with the Corporate Sector. The Logistics Emergency Response Team (LET) is a cross-company partnership of UPS, TNT, Agility and Maersk and the GLC. The LET has a roster of people from over 31 countries with logistics specialties in airport operations, warehouse, transport and management. The LET has established a very clear mandate, limited mostly to natural disaster response, and protocols for how it is activated, what it can provide and for how long.

273. Beyond the LET partnership no evidence was found to suggest that the GLC has engaged other corporate sector actors in strategic discussions regarding humanitarian logistics issues. Some NGOs note that the GLC should more actively serve as a forum for discussing some key trends regarding corporate sector interest in growing their levels of business with the humanitarian sector and the effect this can have on their ability to maintain logistics capacity. Some feel the GLC should take the further step of trying to advocate more with NGO senior management to carefully consider the negative consequences of fully outsourcing logistics functions.

274. Governance structure and “membership”. The GLC has apparently avoided establishing formal definitions of membership, preferring like some other clusters to speak of participants to avoid any potential of becoming exclusive. The governance structure of the cluster remains officially linked to WFP as the cluster lead agency, though the GLC global meeting is sometimes involved in developing plans and endorsing key strategic decisions. For the most part key informants across stakeholder groups feel that this approach is satisfactory. However, some participants and non-participants strongly voiced the opinion that the GLC should establish some form of co-leadership or shared governance to address perceptions of conflict of interest inherent in the single lead agency approach. An almost equivalent number of stakeholders voiced strong warnings that co-leadership and governance structures involving other agencies do not work so well in other clusters and would only serve to reduce the effectiveness of the GLC as a service cluster.

### **2.3.2 Satisfaction of Partners at Global and Country Levels with the Efforts of the GLC to Work with Them (EM 3.b)**

275. When the Logistics Cluster lead role responsibilities were initially assigned to WFP, many key potential partners were reportedly suspicious about whether WFP would be able to facilitate the cluster in a participatory way or whether WFP would simply try to dominate and control all discussions, activities and decisions, potentially putting its own needs ahead of partners.

276. After six years of experience with the GLC, the majority of stakeholders (across all categories) said that WFP and the GLC SC have avoided these worst case scenarios and actually far exceeded expectations on inclusiveness and therefore are largely satisfied with GLC efforts to work with them. However, there are a few distinct stakeholder category trends that merit consideration.

277. UN agencies. At a global level, most UN agencies that were initially concerned about WFP leading the cluster have concluded that this has not become a problem and the GLC SC has managed its responsibilities in a much more participatory and neutral manner than initially expected. Some of these agencies initially seconded staff to the GLC SC, partly to make sure they had a sense of what was evolving and had a sure way of providing feedback. At this point no UN agency secondees are presently working for the GLC SC. While this may be a loss for the support cell, some of these agencies stress it is actually a vote of confidence, showing they do not feel the need to be involved on a daily basis any more given good performance and consultation. Resource constraints (skilled staff and money) are also a key factor in the secondment decisions.

278. INGOs. Discerning the perspectives of INGOs as a category regarding satisfaction with GLC efforts to work with them is difficult given the diverse set of actors covered by this stakeholder group. Three sub-groups appear to emerge from review of the data as described below.

a) Active INGO partners that are critical of the GLC SC. This group includes organizations that consistently participated in the meetings and in some cases provided staff for secondment, but which seem to be lessening their involvement. Frustrations noted revolve around the level of influence they have over GLC strategy, efforts of the GLC SC to engage them regularly, and the role allotted to seconded staff within the GLC SC. Some stress concerns over a conflict of interest inherent with a singular UN agency serving as cluster lead. Others see a conflict of interest in the dual responsibilities and reporting lines of the head of the GLC SC (see Section 2.2.1).

b) Active INGO partners that are largely satisfied with the way the GLC SC has engaged them. This group consists of a combination of organizations that have participated actively throughout the history of the GLC and others who have participated more sporadically or only recently. Satisfaction seems to relate to their sense that they get the services they need at the field level and the information products they want at a global level. In many instances, INGOs in this group do not feel they have the resources or the need to be engaged much beyond the semi-annual global meetings and operational teleconferences.

c) Non-active INGOs that are either satisfied or do not express strong perspectives on the work of the GLC at a global level. This group includes organizations that for various reasons choose not to be formally engaged with the cluster system (largely due to its association with the UN) and others that

simply do not have the resources or interest to engage at a global level. Many of these organizations are using Logistics Cluster services at field and global levels during specific operations and note general satisfaction with them.

279. Partners that have attended GLC global meetings described changes over time in quality of meeting content, outputs and follow-up. The content of meetings has reportedly improved over time, most acutely in the last two meetings where strategic working groups were organized with an aim of developing a global GLC strategy. However, external participants and GLC/WFP staff describe challenges in reaching clear outputs at the meetings. Follow-up between meetings is also cited as a challenge, due to both a lack of engagement effort on the part of partners and a tendency for GLC SC staff to shift their focus back to operations as soon as the meetings are over and until the next meeting is only a few weeks away.

### 2.3.3 The Degree to which WFP’s Capacities and Strengths Facilitate or Limit its Ability to Lead the GLC at Country Levels (EM 3.c)

280. There appears to be common agreement that WFP is best positioned to lead the Logistics Cluster, especially given its dual mandates of coordination and service provision. However some key issues related to perceived conflict of interest, specialized logistics capacities and key support systems were raised frequently by stakeholders throughout the evaluation. Key WFP attributes that facilitate or hinder its ability to lead the cluster at country levels are described below in Table 11.

**Table 11 – Strengths and Weaknesses of WFP as they pertain to its GLC Lead Role**

	Stakeholder	Comments
<b>Strengths</b>	All	WFP’s overall logistics capacities, heavy logistics capacities and infrastructure, speed and ability to do things quickly, pre-existing operational presence in most countries, and WFP’s financial strength and commitment to the GLC (mainstreamed budget support, cluster account, well funded overall logistics infrastructure).
	NGOs	Ability to mobilize resources and ability to enable economies of scale.
	Donors	Knowledge and capacity for food logistics, which brings experience in dealing with road infrastructure, storage, fuel, and air operations.
	GLC	Level of trust established with WFP management gives GLC the ability to operate more autonomously during the initial stages of an emergency.
<b>Weaknesses</b>	All	Knowledge and expertise in complex supply chains requiring expertise in temperature controlled and multi-product catalogue management, non-food procurement, and customs procedures. Security constraints imposed on the cluster. Overall emphasis on “simplistic food logistics”.
	GLC, NGOs, other cluster leads, UN, WFP	Perceived inherent conflict of interest for WFP in the GLC – <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Weakness in transparency and information regarding finances and who benefits from services.</li> <li>• Structural issues (GLC staff reporting lines in the field and Rome).</li> <li>• Broader concerns about the UN system dominating the clusters.</li> </ul>
	GLC, WFP	Weaknesses in cargo tracking, human resources systems (roster management and turnover), administrative and financial systems (not geared to support cluster’s interagency service and partnership needs), contracting and procurement systems (burdensome/slow).

### **2.3.4 The Extent to which WFP Managers (Headquarters, Regional and Country Level), Systems and Support Services have addressed the Needs of Activated Logistics Cluster's at the Country Level (EM 3.d)**

281. Understanding and awareness of GLC among WFP managers at headquarters level appears to be high after six years of GLC activity and high visibility. However certain headquarters support systems have not been significantly adapted to meet the needs of the Logistics Cluster, most notably human resources, tracking systems, and financial management and corporate reporting systems.

282. Human resources systems. At a corporate level WFP has not been able to sustain a reliable and effective emergency roster in recent years. While some departments in WFP have some form of a roster, including logistics and telecommunications, these rosters consist primarily of WFP staff. The corporate approach to emergency staff deployments is primarily dictated by ad hoc assignment of country level staff in smaller emergencies and ad hoc deployment of staff around the world (including staff from headquarters, regional and other country offices) to an emergency setting on TDY. Decisions on TDY deployments appear to be determined through an informal, decentralized process of negotiation between country offices and the unit from which a proposed TDY staff person comes from. There appears to be high demand for opportunities to deploy staff on TDY, sometimes based on factors other than appropriate skills and experience, including personal relationships of individual TDY staff and those in an affected country office.

283. The volume of demand for TDY opportunities and the strong interest of country offices to work with people they know throughout WFP's system has made developing an inter-agency roster difficult for the GLC. While attempts have been made to establish a roster based on LRT trained individuals and others with experience from GLC deployments, GLC and other WFP staff note that the factors noted above have rendered any roster lists irrelevant when an emergency strikes.

284. The current WFP corporate PREP initiative includes an organization-wide roster development project. The envisioned output will be a roster with multiple sub-rosters based on particular functions, one of which is the Logistics Cluster. While this would represent a step forward it is unclear whether such a component of the potential corporate roster would include enough detail about specific Logistics Cluster functions or be well designed to integrate external partners and consultants.

285. Tracking systems. Lack of WFP systems for tracking NFI cargo movement and storage. The absence of a uniform NFI cargo-movement tracking system is conspicuous. GLC logistics officer often succeed in designing a makeshift tracking system that yields good operational results but which often fails to support analysis and statistical reporting features. The tracking system being developed independently from the accounting system in place precludes any analytical cost calculation exercise.

286. Financial management systems. The GLC depends on the WFP accounting system (WINGS) at global and field levels. The WINGS system was created to focus on WFP food aid programmes and tracks few of the types of activity and service provision details important to the GLC and its participants. Costs are broadly lumped together under the heading of ODOC and DSC. This makes detailed cost monitoring and management highly difficult. The one strength of the system is its emphasis on ensuring that total costs do not exceed the limit of the confirmed contribution or the authorized cash advances. This approach, whilst having great merits in preventing



budget overruns, is devoid of any analytical possibilities. GLC cluster coordinators are deprived of the basic tools for monitoring the cost evolution of various component parts of the GLC operation they conduct. This situation is compounded by the tenuous link between the corporate reporting and accounting systems.

287. Corporate reporting systems. There is no standard pattern for reporting the logistic outputs of GLC operations, nor consistency. The structure of the reporting varies from one GLC operation to another. Even the statistical reporting inside one and the same GLC operation varies yearly and the standards differ from one document to another (e.g. the SPRs, the information posted on the website, the annual reports - See Annex X for a sample of the data reported in the SPSs). The production of an all encompassing “end of operation report” based on a set of given and well defined parameters and cleared by the GLC cluster coordinator(s) responsible for the operation seems to be often totally overlooked or not considered as mandatory. Other important component parts of a given SO (e.g. ETC or UNHAS) are at times incorporated in the reporting channels and at other times they are left out or ignored though they often provide vital support to the mission of the GLC. Clear guidance in this respect is not readily available.

288. Regional bureau (RB) managers and systems have not featured prominently in the data collected during the evaluation and their specific functions in support of the cluster when activated appear relatively undefined. In a few cases regional logistics officers have deployed with the cluster. Some regional logistics officers have played a supporting role during operations or in the preparedness phase for monitoring situations and helping to disseminate information about the Logistics Cluster. The GLC SC has one staff person based in the WFP regional office in Bangkok who works closely with RB staff. In Panama, the head of UNHRD has also served to represent the Logistics Cluster in facilitating regional logistics coordination discussions especially related to stockpile monitoring.

289. At the CO level, WFP managers have played a much more direct role in supporting logistics operations. However, many stakeholders noted challenges in the level of awareness and familiarity of country level staff regarding the mandate of the Logistics Cluster and WFP’s responsibilities as cluster lead agency.

290. Country directors technically wear the “dual hat” of also serving as the representative of the cluster in the reporting line between the cluster and the HC and HCT. In most cases the Logistics Cluster coordinator technically reports to the WFP CO logistics director. In reality the day-to-day involvement of country Directors and Logistics Directors varies in intensity. This seems to depend upon the personal interests of individuals in these positions, the prominence of cluster operations, the perceived level and credibility of the cluster coordinators and the level of competing demands from other WFP programmes. The level of HC interest in the Logistics Cluster and demands for its participation in inter-agency coordination mechanisms has also lead to a de facto informal direct reporting relationship between the cluster coordinator and the HC in some cases. When cluster coordinators are deployed on TDY from the GLC SC they appear able to also maintain more of a reporting line back to the GLC SC than those deployed from other positions and locations.

291. In the first few years of the Logistics Cluster, some of these dilemmas were mitigated by the strong “hands on” approach of WFP logistics leadership. However, with turnover in key leadership positions over the past three years this support seems to have become less consistent.

292. Stakeholders suggested that the Logistics Cluster coordinator should report directly to the HC/HCT (as was the perception for UNJLC) or directly back to the GLC SC (as is the case with the way the Shelter Cluster has established its operating protocols). However, other stakeholders stressed that this could lead to problems in getting support from the WFP country office, which is critical for the Logistics Cluster, which depends heavily on WFP for service delivery capacity.

293. For the most part the cluster reportedly gets the operational support it requires to provide common services, especially for transport. Sub-national storage management was found to be a challenge in one case study as the cluster was dependent on WFP local office staff to monitor and manage warehouses, which they appeared to consider a voluntary “gift” rather than a core responsibility leading to differing levels of quality and administrative management.

294. Administrative support systems are often less effective at supporting the needs of activated clusters, especially in the start up or growth phases of a cluster’s operation. Issues range from basic IT support (providing computers, connecting deployed staff to shared networks) to HR support (allowances, medical coverage arrangements) to facilities (office space, housing). Issues raised by stakeholders seem to be a matter of prioritization and competing within the country offices between on-going WFP programmes and temporary cluster operational needs.

### **2.3.5 The Extent to which WFP Manager’s Responsibilities, Systems and Support Services have been Adapted to Enable the GLC to Better Support the Needs of Other Humanitarian Actors and Clusters (EM 3.e)**

295. WFP managers’ responsibilities have changed informally, and in some cases formally, to better support the needs of other humanitarian actors and clusters. The one formal change found is in the standard terms of reference for WFP logistics officers. These TORs have been updated to reflect responsibility for WFP’s role in leading the Logistics Cluster. To complement this change, information on the cluster has been incorporated into various levels of internal WFP logistics training curriculum.

296. On a broader level, the WFP 2008 Logistics Strategy established an overarching objective of WFP becoming the “service provider of choice for the humanitarian community”. To realize this objective a number of initiatives were envisioned to adapt WFP approaches to be more inter-agency oriented. The most concrete result of this strategy is an emphasis on strengthening the “soft skills” of WFP logisticians and staff with the goal of creating a culture based on a service mindset. In addition to the SMT training module, which WFP logistics staff are all encouraged to complete, similar service mindset components have been integrated into other internal WFP logistics training courses and simulation modules.

297. The 2008 Logistics Strategy also included objectives which appear oriented towards increasing WFP’s capacity to provide inter-agency logistics services before and after the cluster on a cost recovery basis. Some of the rationale for increasing these capacities related to an interest in being a more reliable partner and enabler for the humanitarian community. Simultaneously, the strategy presents a clear rationale based on broader trends, which are expected to reduce the needs for traditional WFP heavy food logistics services (e.g. shifts to local procurement and cash programmes). This rationale has been interpreted within WFP and by partners as essentially suggesting that the reason for providing inter-agency logistics services is to ensure

WFP can maintain or grow its core logistics business in the face of external trends that might otherwise lead to shrinking resources, prominence and capacity.

298. For some external partners this latter rationale reinforces perceptions that WFP has an inherent conflict of interest when it comes to inter-agency service provision, in that its motivation is based in large part on perpetuating the existence of its strong logistics services. Negative reactions within WFP (out of concern for how partners perceive these issues) and among partners themselves seems to have led to a tempering of ambition within WFP in the years following the 2008 Logistics Strategy. In effect, the development of a consistent capacity, procedures and platform for providing inter-agency services outside of cluster operations has not materialized. Unfortunately this means that the Logistics Cluster is not currently able to benefit from the infrastructure for common services broadly envisioned in the 2008 strategy, which could have provided a platform that would pre-exist and outlast the cluster, thus enabling continuity and greater dependability for other agencies.

299. The WFP logistics division is currently updating the 2008 strategy. According to those involved in its development, the new strategy will maintain references to being the “service provider of choice,” however it is not clear to the evaluators whether specific initiatives are planned to take this from an ambition to a reality.

300. One of the corporate PREP initiative projects planned will consider developing WFP capacity for non-food procurement for other agencies. Though this project appears still to be at the conceptual and planning stages, if its results show that WFP can develop this capacity and partners would use it such a capacity would represent a significant adaptation that would better enable the GLC to meet needs of partners in an area they have identified as a persistent gap at the operations level.

301. The GLC has benefited from a number of UNJLC systems developed before it came into effect. Most notably the UNJLC knowledge and capacities for strong information management, especially GIS, seem to have been adopted by the GLC and given it a “head start” over all other clusters. Some key informants familiar with UNJLC’s work noted however that important capacities were lost during the merger with the GLC, most significantly a strength in tracking of commodities.

302. GLC linkages to UNHAS – While the evaluators were clearly informed at global levels that UNHAS has its own well-established separate mandate and different governance system, the evaluation found different interfaces between Logistics Cluster’s in the field and UNHAS. The ways in which clients access UNHAS services, through the Logistics Cluster or directly, vary depending on operational history (e.g. who arrived first) and whether UNHAS is transporting personnel and light cargo or running a heavy cargo airlift for the cluster. UNHAS is sometimes included in the same SOs as the Logistics Cluster. In CAPs, UNHAS is sometimes listed as common service and sometimes under the Logistics Cluster. Given this level of variance, it is not surprising that stakeholders have varying perceptions on whether UNHAS and the Logistics Cluster are officially linked and that their preference for how to interface with UNHAS, often based on experience in other emergencies, can be at odds with what they find in a new emergency.

303. The evaluation found no common agreement on ways to resolve this dilemma. The problem with the GLC serving as the primary client link for UNHAS is that it is a temporary arrangement and the Logistics Cluster and UNHAS may very appropriately have different lifecycles in a country.

## **2.4. Findings Regarding Systems for Learning Lessons and the Evolution of Humanitarian Reform**

304. The evaluation found that some GLC activities have contributed to informal learning and adaptation over time, including discussions at global and country-level coordination meetings, sessions at GLC training courses and some information products. However, GLC efforts to learn lessons from operations have been largely limited to ad hoc internal staff exercises and basic partner satisfaction surveys. While the GLC SC has demonstrated improvement and learning over time, this has relied heavily on the core group of staff consistently deployed or employed over time by the cluster. Combined with previous findings related to limitations in performance and financial reporting this reduces the ability to quantify achievement of outcomes and identify areas for improvement.

305. The broader cluster system is rapidly evolving with the on-going IASC Transformative Agenda. The GLC has been engaged in this process and should benefit from certain reforms if it is able to adapt to new systems and procedures. Many of these new systems and procedures are aimed at better enabling all clusters to achieve the outcomes and results described in the theory of change.

### **2.4.1 The Extent to which the GLC has Undertaken Lessons Learned Exercises and Applied Lessons to Inform Decision-Making (4.a)**

306. Most stakeholders report that they have not been engaged in any organized process of determining and discussing lessons learned from GLC operations, though they also suggest that they would like to see such a process put in place. However, the GLC has demonstrated learning and growth over time, mostly based on the institutional knowledge embodied by the core cadre of staff that have been involved in multiple operations and global activities of the cluster.

307. Meeting minutes from Global GLC meetings and WFP senior logistics staff meetings show that some lessons learned have been discussed in varying forms of detail among participants. Within the GLC SC, a process of documenting lessons is reportedly in place that captures lessons at three-month intervals and documented in a matrix which is used in briefings at the global meetings. Informal discussions also appear to take place on a day-to-day basis within the GLC SC regarding lessons from previous operations and how to apply them to current situations.

308. Within WFP, lessons learned exercises are conducted for major emergencies and documented in reports shared within the organization. While these reports do have a specific section on the Logistics Cluster, the exercises and reports are primarily internal in nature. The IASC and OCHA also sponsor inter-agency real-time evaluations and end of operation evaluations. However, these initiatives are broad in nature and only capture information on logistics if there were a critical weakness or significant success. Based on the documents reviewed for the evaluation, the statements regarding the Logistics Cluster found in inter-agency evaluations are limited to broad complementary references to the GLC's performance.

309. The closest thing to a GLC specific lessons learned exercise in most operations is a brief survey distributed to partners that assesses satisfaction with coordination, products and services. A review of the consolidated reports from these surveys shows that the information gleaned is very basic with few strategic issues identified. GLC staff note that a more formal lessons learned approach is under consideration.

310. In Pakistan, two lessons learned exercises were conducted (mid-term and end of operation) among GLC staff. Participants report different levels of satisfaction with the level of discussions (tactical and administrative vs. strategic).

311. Rotation of staff, within the GLC and partners appears to make formal lessons learned exercises difficult as key stakeholders have often dispersed by the time such activities could be conducted.

312. By contrast, a good practice example from the Shelter Cluster was identified during the evaluation that demonstrates one potential approach to establishing a formal system for examining and using lessons learned information.

313. After each activation of the Shelter Cluster under the IFRC, an independent review is commissioned of the operation. These reviews engage at least a cross-section of the primary participants in the cluster and key external actors (e.g. other clusters, HC/HCT, national governments). For most operations the reviews are kept relatively “light,” though in the largest operations formal evaluations may be conducted (as in Haiti following the earthquake and cholera response). The reviews are posted on the sheltercluster.org website for the benefit of any interested party and for transparency. Within the Shelter Cluster coordination cell a detailed internal review is also assembled to cover topics that only pertain the convening agency.<sup>49</sup>

314. Each year the IFRC brings the results of operations reviews to its annual workshop attended by all of the people at global and country levels that have worked for the cluster to dissect and examine ways of improving its working approaches. In 2009 the IFRC conducted a meta-review of operational reviews to identify trends and challenges that have or have not been addressed. The meta-review included consultations with donors, cluster participants and staff. In 2012 the Shelter Cluster plans to conduct a second meta-review following a similar approach, followed by a formal management response plan.

315. The three key elements offered by this example that appear to be of potential application in the GLC are the conduct of independent reviews after each operation, convening of an annual meeting of global and operations cluster staff to discuss operations from the past year, and a periodic meta-review to identify trends and strategic issues across operations.

#### **2.4.2 How the Evolution of Humanitarian Reform and Support of the IASC Affects the Work of the GLC (4.c)**

316. Since its adoption in 2005, the cluster system and other elements of humanitarian reform have continuously evolved, primarily through the global efforts of the IASC, OCHA and lead agencies to put systems in place, experimentation and adaptation of cluster approaches in different countries, and due to the policy responses to the two cluster system evaluations commissioned by the IASC.

317. Participants in the earliest work of the Logistics Cluster note that the clusters were activated for the first time before any lead agencies had the time to consider how to establish supporting processes and systems. For the first six years of the cluster many informants felt that the Logistics Cluster in particular has outpaced the

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<sup>49</sup> The IFRC agreed to serve as a “convener” of the shelter cluster during natural disasters rather than a “lead agency” given the unique nature and Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

development of many other clusters in terms of IM, protocols and procedures – often in the absence of any detailed IASC policy guidance.

318. There have been three ERCs over the lifespan of the cluster system and each has reportedly brought a different perspective on the evolution of the cluster system. The current ERC took office in September 2010, shortly after the Cluster 2 Evaluation was concluded, during the Haiti cholera outbreak and just before the Pakistan floods.

319. In June 2011, the ERC along with IASC Principals adopted a statement of purpose for on-going reforms to address the Cluster 2 Evaluation recommendations and acutely perceived shortcomings of the humanitarian system in the Haiti and Pakistan operations of 2010. The statement of purpose identified five key areas or action including; leadership, coordination, accountability, building global capacity for preparedness, and advocacy and communications. This statement of purpose became known as the Transformative Agenda.

320. Throughout the period of the evaluation, the IASC Principals and subsidiary groups have been actively working on various elements of the Transformative Agenda. While these on-going efforts to improve the humanitarian system are focused at an overarching level, some of the work taking place has potential implications for the Logistics Cluster. There also appears to be complementarity between issues being discussed under the Transformative Agenda and some of the findings of this evaluation. The GLC has had significant opportunity for input into the Transformative Agenda Key, both through direct participation in the Cluster Working Group, and because the WFP Director of Emergencies has served as the co-chair of the coordination pillar of the Transformative Agenda work.

321. Elements of this ongoing reform process that seem to have the most potential impact on the GLC are discussed in more detail below based on interviews and documentary evidence.

322. How the system responds to “Level 3” emergencies. Discussions under the Transformative Agenda have focused on how the humanitarian system works in catastrophic or “corporate” emergencies. The IASC has adopted a three-tiered system for categorizing emergencies based on criteria including the scale, degree of complexity, urgency, capacity in the affected area (national and international), and reputational risk. Emergencies with the greatest scope, urgency, complexity and reputational risk and the least existing capacity will be categorized as “Level 3”.

323. In December 2011, the IASC Principals endorsed broad proposals for the general criteria for categorizing emergencies and the development of guidance to define systems and practices for enhancing response in Level 3 emergencies. The key elements of this emerging system, since further elaborated by various IASC subsidiary groups are outlined below.

324. Empowered leadership. When a Level 3 emergency is declared by the IASC Principals a determination will be made about whether to deploy a senior level humanitarian leader as HC to augment or supersede the existing HC or RC. The HC may be empowered with additional authority to make decisions and ensure accountability for the work of the clusters. While documents suggest that the seniority of the HC may as a result be higher, and this is presumed to bring with it a more capable level of system leadership, individual clusters will still maintain dual reporting lines to the HC and to their cluster lead agencies. In theory a more experienced HC will offer better guidance and support to the Logistics Cluster.

325. Inter-Agency Rapid Response Mechanism (IARRM). One of the most significant new elements emerging from the Transformative Agenda is the deployment of the IARRM within 72 hours on “no regrets basis”<sup>50</sup> to support the HC. Most notable for the Logistics Cluster, the documents explaining the IARRM concept specifically state that this team will include “Level 3 capable” senior and experienced staff for relevant clusters and coordinators for logistics and common humanitarian services. The documents also emphasize the importance for agencies deploying IARRM members to ensure effective rotation for staff deployment for continuity.

326. The IARRM concept recognizes the importance of the Logistics Cluster in the immediate wave of deployment, which would alleviate any questions regarding whether the GLC should wait for activation decisions in Level 3 emergencies. However, the IARRM concept also increases the importance for resolving issues related to the lack of a professional roster within the GLC and may require the GLC to identify, train and continuously communicate with a larger cadre of highly experience senior logisticians to ensure readiness for deployment within the IARRM.

327. Multi-Cluster Initial Rapid Needs Assessment (MIRA). The MIRA represents another important component of the emerging humanitarian response system. This approach to needs assessment is meant to strengthen the evidence base for strategic planning at the initial stage of emergency response by rapidly assembling information for preliminary scenario definition.

328. The MIRA concept appears to address the findings in this evaluation related to a lack of timely programme cluster and inter-cluster strategies to serve as a basis for prioritizing the GLC’s common services. While the documents describing the MIRA do not explicitly state that this information will be used to prioritize logistics support, it stands to reason that the HCT would base its initial operational priorities, including logistics support elements, on the results of the MIRA.

329. Initial strategic planning process. The reform documents show that the MIRA should be followed by an in depth rapid operations planning process. Within seven days, humanitarian actors in Level 3 emergencies will be required to produce more detailed operational joint plans, articulating realistic boundaries/scope of response and first three months priority strategic objectives. These plans will support the Flash Appeal and include key performance indicators and a monitoring plan.

330. The descriptions of the initial strategic planning process do not explicitly discuss how logistics considerations will be incorporated. While the initial 3 month operational plans should support Logistics Cluster prioritization, it seems critical that the Logistics Cluster be proactive in providing a “reality-check” within the process of developing these plans to ensure that programme objectives are logistically feasible.

331. The Transformative Agenda documents appear to suggest that the MIRA and initial strategic planning process concepts are meant to apply non-Level 3 emergencies as well, though with a longer time frame for each. Given the IASC assumption that clusters may not be required to deploy global personnel in non-Level 3 emergencies it seems important that the GLC consider how to train WFP

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<sup>50</sup> The draft Humanitarian System-Wide Emergency Procedures define “no-regrets” as “Meaning that agencies commit to deploying senior and experienced staff to fulfill the agreed core coordination functions immediately, without waiting for more precise details on exact needs and response plans, and decide at a later date to withdraw surplus staff as relevant.”

country office logistics staff to be prepared to participate in these processes given their potential implications for Logistics Cluster service support to other actors.

332. **Coordination Reference Modules.** A series of coordination reference modules are being developed to support various elements of the Transformative Agenda. These modules build on existing IASC guidance and seek to fill important gaps noted in this evaluation and the two IASC cluster evaluations. Key elements include:

a) **Activation.** The modules articulate the need for activation to be more strategic, less automatic, and more time limited – based on gaps and needs - and periodically reviewed by the HCT. The HCT is encouraged to consider alternate “coordination solutions” other than cluster activation. Importantly the guidance drafted includes a requirement that global clusters are notified in advance of the HCT meeting to discuss activation so they can ensure their input is considered. The draft guidance also confirms UNHCR maintains multi-sector lead in refugee situations. This new guidance on activation supports the more time-bound approach to activation more common in Logistics Cluster operations. It also addresses to some extent the challenges with activation decisions being made without the involvement of the GLC SC. The consideration of other “coordination solutions” suggests that the GLC should give thought to how logistics sector coordination should be handled in the absence of the cluster.

b) **Functions.** Guidance drafted regarding cluster functions remains at a generic cluster level. The guidance notes agreement “that there is a need to restate and return to the original purpose of clusters, refocusing them on strategic and operational gaps analysis, planning, assessment and results.” While these attributes match the approach of the Logistics Cluster, no specific differentiation is made in the guidance to the unique attributes of service clusters, which the evaluators feel is an important gap.

c) **Management arrangements.** The guidance seeks to outline options for better definition and management of participation. This element appears oriented to address scenarios like the Haiti earthquake response where clusters were overstretched by the number of responding organizations. The guidance suggests options including establishing steering committees or strategic advisory groups (max 15 people) in addition to general information sharing meetings, and time limited technical working groups for specific tasks/issues. Criteria for participating in management include; technical relevancy, capacity, operational relevance, commitment to participate. Special caution is noted that such forms of managing participation should not lead to exclusivity within the clusters. This guidance appears to take note of findings in this evaluation that the Logistics Cluster often has a small group of potential partners capable of contributing to logistics operations and strategy and a much larger pool of participants that should participate in information sharing and as potential users of common services.

d) **Inter-cluster coordination.** Guidance aims to enhance collaboration and dialogue between clusters for coherent humanitarian strategies and operational response, monitoring and adaptation. However the guidance seems to reinforce existing systems for inter-cluster coordination, at the HCT and cluster coordinator level where agreement on common operational approaches to strategic priorities is meant to take place. This guidance does not seem to offer



new benefits to the Logistics Cluster. Based on the evaluation findings, alternate creative suggestions to embedding logisticians in programme clusters (either GLC staff or other cluster recruited logisticians) could be considered and promoted by the GLC to ensure better cross-cluster coordination.

e) Other elements to be drafted by June 2012. Some other critical gaps in IASC cluster guidance are in the process of being drafted. Cluster deactivation and transition, sub-national coordination models, NGO shared leadership, and performance monitoring, funding, and accountability sections of the guidance modules all have potential implications for resolving (or complicating) issues raised in this evaluation. However, the evaluators have not identified information to suggest how these discussions are evolving.

333. As part of the Transformative Agenda work, a guidance note on the use of pooled funds in Level 3 emergencies has been drafted. This note states that, “It is expected that some combination of common support service projects such as logistics, telecoms and UNHAS would likely feature in the initial submission [for the CERF].” This appears to position the Logistics Cluster well for early funding needs but will require active engagement of Logistics Cluster personnel in the development of proposals.

### 3. Conclusions and Recommendations

#### 3.1. Overall Assessment

334. Overall the evaluation found that the theory of change underpinning the GLC’s operations to be valid, though the relative emphasis on elements and the strength of causal linkages varies. Assumptions and external factors affected the strength of outcomes, particularly in terms of efficiency and effectiveness.

335. **Effectiveness and Results.** Overall, GLC operations are relevant, effective, and provide value to participating organization. The Logistics Clusters’ activities undertaken at global and country levels from 2005-2011 resulted in the use of better logistics approaches, which enabled greater effect on beneficiaries through enhancing partners’ programme delivery. At present, common logistics services provided by the cluster remain a small proportion of total humanitarian logistics activity. Achieving significant impact on overall humanitarian response performance would require expansion of the GLC mandate to address persistent bottlenecks and increased use of cluster services by humanitarian organizations.

336. Country level results have been strongly supported by the GLC SC, which has evolved since 2005 to a well-established unit with strong human resource capacity. It has been primarily oriented towards field support rather than global management, performance monitoring, partnership and development of tools, guidance and cargo tracking systems, although strong positive results were found in many of these areas.

337. The GLC has worked well with partners under WFP’s leadership. Global meetings have attracted participants from a range of stakeholder groups but many significant INGOs are not participating. GLC and WFP proactive outreach to key humanitarian logistics leaders and organizations has diminished over time.

338. **Efficiency.** The evaluation found that WFP inputs of skilled staff, funding, back office systems and leadership have enabled the GLC to undertake the expected global and country activities for information management, operations support,

coordination and funding for common logistics services. However, WFP financial, reporting and tracking systems do not enable the level of transparency partners require to ensure trust, accountability and performance benchmarking for logistics services. WFP's special account for the GLC and advance funding mechanisms significantly enhance timeliness and likelihood of achieving outcomes. Prioritization decisions made by the GLC have been appropriate, though costs and benefits of common services are not well communicated.

**339. Utilization and satisfaction.** Partners were generally very satisfied with GLC information products and the website is heavily used. Training courses are widely appreciated for high quality and inter-agency value. Partners are satisfied with the GLC's activation, and pro-active deployment of assets in initial phases, but view deactivation protocols as more problematic. Operations products and activities are highly valued by partners and the best developed. Preparedness information products are valued but generally perceived to be incomplete and not updated frequently enough. Customs clearance and procurement remain strategic operational bottlenecks for humanitarian logistics; and partners desire more assistance in these areas.

### **3.2. Recommendations**

340. The following strategic recommendations reflect the joint contributions of the evaluators and key stakeholders. An initial set of recommendations was presented by the evaluators at a workshop facilitated by a neutral organizational development consultant in Rome in May 2012. Twenty-eight people participated in the workshop, representing five INGOs, three UN agencies, two donor governments, the Food Security and ETC clusters, WFP, the GLC SC, the evaluation team and the three evaluation co-managers.

341. Each recommendation was discussed in depth during breakout sessions and participants were asked to verify that the recommendations were valid, linked to evidence, complete, and realistic. Participants also assessed the relative priority and urgency for recommendations, assignment of responsibilities for implementation and estimated ease of implementation. Table 12 shows the detailed recommendations and each supporting finding.

**Table 12 - Evaluation Recommendations with Supporting Key Findings**

Recommendations		Related Key Findings
<b>1</b>	<b>GLC Strategy</b>	
	Design a three-year strategic plan for the GLC with the following key elements:	
a)	Confirmation of the mission and mandate of the GLC at the global level – to include its role in the broader humanitarian logistics domain, its relative emphasis on coordinator and service provide roles, and how the GLC links to other actors to form a total supply chain;	Partners have been generally satisfied with activities but identified gaps in preparedness activities and serving as a forum for strategic discussion. (see Section 2.2.1 and Section 2.2.6)
b)	Confirmation of the mission and mandate of the GLC at operations levels – to include finalization of a service catalogue that clarifies whether it can and should seek to better address key bottlenecks and gaps (through coordination and/or service provision), and its appropriate role in building national preparedness following emergencies and through special projects based on risk;	Primary gaps for partners found in GLC operations at the country level included assistance for customs clearance, procurement and specialized programme logistics. (see Section 2.1.4)  Some evidence was found that GLC operations have provided significant lasting results in countries, but this is limited by its designed role and mandate. (see Section 2.1.5)
c)	Shared vision of what the GLC (partnership and cell) aims to achieve (strategic objectives, deliverables, outcomes) and key partnership attributes to sustain or build;	Partners have been generally satisfied with activities but identified gaps in preparedness activities and serving as a forum for strategic discussion. (see Section 2.2.1 and Section 2.2.6)
d)	An implementation plan and budget broken down by sustainable funding required from the core WFP budget (“mainstreamed”) vs. time-bound projects to be funded by participating stakeholders and other potential donors;	
e)	Analysis of the structure, skills and support systems needed in the GLC SC to achieve objectives;	The GLC SC is well established and relatively well capacitated, however staff skills and demand are primarily oriented towards field support and augmentation rather than global management, performance monitoring, partnership maintenance and development of tools, guidance and systems. (see Section 2.2.1)
f)	Agreed upon key performance indicators for global and country level activities and services and attributes of an approach for transparently communicating cost/benefit and performance information to partners; and	Prioritization decisions appear to have been appropriate, but lack of transparent communication about the costs and benefits of common services is a significant weakness in GLC work with partners. (see Section 2.1.3)
g)	A communications and branding plan to enhance knowledge, awareness and appreciation for the GLC as a platform benefiting all humanitarian actors.	

<b>2</b>	<b>Financial and Reporting Systems</b>	
	Develop GLC specific global and country-level systems and practices to enhance transparency, performance monitoring and management including:	
a)	Financial tracking systems capable of capturing cluster-specific activities at global and country levels;	Financial and reporting systems have not been geared to support the GLC and are inconsistently applied, which limits the ability to conduct activity-based financial analysis across countries and indicates a lack of strategic global coordination and authority. (see Section 2.1.1)
b)	Global project and operations reporting tools that track outputs/outcomes based on key performance indicators linked to the GLC strategy;	
c)	Standardized system for tracking GLC common services (e.g. cargo, storage) and dedicated staff at field level to maintain system and conduct analysis; and	
d)	Standardized operations reporting process to document performance against key performance indicators (e.g. timeliness, cost/benefit) at end of operation (or six-month intervals for extended activation).	
<b>3</b>	<b>Organizational Structure and Decision-Making</b>	
	Strengthen GLC management and the coherence and consistency of cluster lead agency decisions by:	
a)	Clarifying the need for WFP country directors and staff to consult the GLC SC on activation discussions within the HCT and deployment staffing decisions to ensure quality and consistency through an education/advocacy campaign; and	General satisfaction was found with activation processes (with important areas for improvement) and proactive deployment of resources in emergencies, in contrast with broader concern with deactivation process. (see Section 2.1.2)
b)	Separating the Global Cluster Coordinator and head of ALITE positions and reconsidering the grade of the coordinator position to ensure the coordinator is fully focused on the work of the GLC, with a single reporting line, and able to interact at high levels with WFP and external actors.	The GLC SC is well established and relatively well capacitated, however staff skills and demand are primarily oriented towards field support and augmentation rather than global management, performance monitoring, partnership maintenance and development of tools, guidance and systems. (see Section 2.2.1)
<b>4</b>	<b>Improved Partnership</b>	
	Improve the formal and informal partnership elements of the GLC by:	
a)	Conducting a stakeholder mapping exercise with key partners to identify how different actors relate to the GLC at global and country levels and their relative interest in, or influence on its work;	

b)	Undertaking increased strategic outreach by the head of the GLC SC and WFP logistics leaders to key global humanitarian logistics actors to better ensure the GLC benefits from their input and increasingly represents the right actors, not just a diverse set of actors;	Engagement between senior WFP logistics staff and their counterparts in partner organizations appears to have diminished over the past three years. Issues around shared vision of the role and mandate of the GLC, its leadership and transparency have caused some disengagement with GLC. (see Section 2.3.1)
		Global meetings have been consistently attended by 35-45 participants representing a consistent mix of stakeholder types. However, turnover among participants has been significant, many INGOs were missing, and GLC/WFP and UN attendance was disproportionately high. (see Section 2.3.1)
c)	Considering the pros and cons of establishing a small GLC strategic advisory group with representatives from all stakeholder groups, committed to actively advising the GLC SC, with rotating tenures;	Partners have been generally satisfied with activities but identified gaps in preparedness activities and serving as a forum for strategic discussion. (see Section 2.2.1 and Section 2.2.6)
d)	Establishing a systematic approach to engaging partners and staff in meaningful lessons learned exercises for all cluster operations. Consider performing light independent reviews of all cluster operations and meta-reviews every three years to coincide with strategy development/revision; and	No formal systematic lessons learned efforts were found to collect, document, share and discuss lessons from operations with staff and partners. Ad hoc recruitment, one-time deployments and lack of debriefing were found to reduce institutional memory. Participant satisfaction has been gauged following operations and GLC SC staff have attempted to document lessons learned internally. A good practice example was identified in the global shelter cluster. (see section 2.4.1)
e)	Developing a project management approach, modeled on the development of the LOG, as a standard basis for developing new tools and engaging partners in follow-up tasks between GLC meetings.	The GLC has worked well with partners between global meetings on some specific projects; partners cited the development of the LOG as an example of collaboration and reported high levels of satisfaction in both the development process and utility of the final product. However, follow-up activity following global meetings was found to be low. (see Section 2.3.1)
<b>5</b>	<b>Human Resources Management</b>	
	Improve cluster human resources management by:	
a)	Establishing a dedicated staffing coordinator in the GLC SC to manage recruitment, selection, deployment and debriefing;	Human resources systems and procedures have not supported operations adequately with problems found relating to selection, handover and staff performance assessment. (see Section 2.1.2 and Section 2.3.4)

b)	Developing and maintaining a robust GLC specific roster that tracks skills, experience, functional speciality, language and cultural knowledge, and availability. Develop communications protocols for keeping roster informed and engaged (e.g. alerts about emergencies);	The GLC has not been able to develop and sustain an emergency roster in recent years due to lack of partner willingness to deploy staff with GLC, demand for temporary duty assignment (TDY) opportunities and the strong interest of country offices to work with people they know throughout the WFP system. (see Section 2.3.4)
c)	Instituting requirements for end-of-mission reports, briefing and debriefing process for all cluster deployed staff (in-person where possible, by phone as necessary);	Human resources systems and procedures have not supported operations adequately with problems found relating to selection, handover and staff performance assessment. (see Section 2.1.2 and Section 2.3.4)
d)	Developing cluster coordinator training course and deployment toolkit;	Training courses provided by the GLC showed high satisfaction among participants and sponsoring agencies. Primary gaps identified were for a dedicated Logistics Cluster coordinator training course and further general awareness training courses for WFP field staff and managers. (see Section 2.2.5)
e)	Establishing cost-effective ways of bringing cluster staff (GLC SC and deployed) together to formally discuss trends, lessons and potential adjustments to improve operations (e.g. conference calls, webinars, possibly meetings); and	No formal systematic lessons learned efforts were found to collect, document, share and discuss lessons from operations with staff and partners. Ad hoc recruitment, one-time deployments and lack of debriefing were found to reduce institutional memory. Participant satisfaction has been gauged following operations and GLC SC staff have attempted to document lessons learned internally. A good practice example was identified in the global shelter cluster. (see section 2.4.1)
f)	Reducing emphasis on use of unfunded secondments and explore alternative approaches to recruiting for specialized programme logistics skills from outside of WFP.	<p>Staff seconded to the GLC SC by other agencies have reinforced the inter-agency character of the GLC. However, the rationale behind using secondees is generally too based in the notion of representation and optics rather than a human resources plan based on staffing needs linked to a clear GLC SC strategy. (see Section 2.2.1)</p> <p>The evaluation found overall agreement that WFP is best positioned to lead the Logistics Cluster. While many people were initially concerned about the ability of the WFP to create a participatory and collaborative atmosphere as cluster lead, the majority of stakeholders (across all categories) report that the GLC SC has far exceeded expectations on inclusiveness, and have been largely satisfied with the GLC efforts to work with them. (see Section 2.3.2)</p>

<b>6</b>	<b>Global Policy and Inter-Cluster Coordination</b>	
	Increase effective engagement in inter-cluster coordination at policy and operations levels by:	
a)	Sharing and seeking out good practice examples with other global clusters;	Lessons learned across the humanitarian system have been driving ongoing evolution of humanitarian reform. The Transformative Agenda of the IASC appears to be addressing some system deficiencies that have negatively impacted the GLC but evolution of the cluster system will require some GLC adaptations. (see Section 2.4.2)
b)	Establishing strong lines of communication between Logistics Cluster coordinators, GLC SC and newly deployed WFP policy staff in Geneva to contribute timely input on field-testing of reforms and emerging issues vis-à-vis IASC policy bodies and initiatives (e.g. deactivation guidance under development);	
c)	Ensuring GLC cluster coordinator training course builds knowledge and awareness of evolving cluster system;	
d)	Collaborating with programme clusters to operationalize Transformative Agenda assessment and operations planning tools to ensure GLC can provide logistics “reality testing” and increase communications on prioritization across clusters throughout operations; and	
e)	Sharing results of this evaluation with other clusters, the IASC Principals and subsidiary bodies and OCHA to increase common learning.	

## **Acronyms**

<b>BR</b>	<b>Budget Revision</b>
<b>CAP</b>	<b>Consolidated Appeals Process</b>
<b>CERF</b>	<b>UN Central Emergency Response Fund</b>
<b>CHF</b>	<b>Common Humanitarian Fund</b>
<b>CIV/MIL</b>	<b>Civil Military Relations</b>
<b>CMR</b>	<b>Cargo Movement Request</b>
<b>CO</b>	<b>Country Office</b>
<b>CONOPS</b>	<b>Concept of Operations</b>
<b>CRED</b>	<b>Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters</b>
<b>DG-ECHO</b>	<b>European Commission Director General for Humanitarian Assistance</b>
<b>DOC</b>	<b>Direct Operational Costs</b>
<b>DRC</b>	<b>Democratic Republic of Congo</b>
<b>DSC</b>	<b>Direct Support Costs</b>
<b>ECHO</b>	<b>European Commission Humanitarian Office</b>
<b>ERC</b>	<b>Emergency Relief Coordinator and Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Assistance</b>
<b>ETC</b>	<b>Emergency Telecommunications Cluster</b>
<b>EM</b>	<b>Evaluation Matrix</b>
<b>EQAS</b>	<b>Evaluation Quality Assurance System</b>
<b>GIS</b>	<b>Geographic Information System</b>
<b>GLC</b>	<b>Global Logistics Cluster</b>
<b>GLC SC</b>	<b>Global Logistics Cluster Support Cell</b>
<b>HC</b>	<b>Humanitarian Coordinator</b>
<b>HCT</b>	<b>Humanitarian Country Team</b>
<b>HLA</b>	<b>Humanitarian Logistics Association</b>
<b>HRSU</b>	<b>OCHA Humanitarian Reform Support Unit</b>
<b>HQ</b>	<b>Headquarters</b>
<b>IASC</b>	<b>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</b>
<b>IDP</b>	<b>Internally Displaced Person</b>
<b>IM</b>	<b>Information Management</b>
<b>INGO</b>	<b>International Non-Governmental Organization</b>
<b>ISC</b>	<b>Indirect Support Costs</b>
<b>LCA</b>	<b>Logistics Capacity Assessment</b>



LDU	Logistics Development Unit
LET	Logistics Emergency Team
LOG	Logistics Operational Guide
LRT	Logistics Response Team
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OE	WFP Office of Evaluation
OML	WFP Logistics Division
POLR	Provider of Last Resort
PSA	Programme Support Administration
RC	Resident Coordinator
SitRep	Situation Report
SMT	Service Mindset Training
SO	Special Operation
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SPR	Standard Project Report
TDY	Temporary Duty Assignment
TOR	Terms of Reference
TSR	Temporary Storage Request
UBD	Unsolicited Bilateral Donations
UN	United Nations
UNHAS	United Nations Humanitarian Air Service
UNHRD	United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNJLC	United Nations Joint Logistics Centre
WFP	World Food Programme

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