Ministry of Foreign Affairs

IOB Evaluation

The Only Constant is Change

Evaluation of the Dutch contribution to transition
in the Arab region (2009-2013)

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April 2015

Preface

Four years after the Arab uprisings, 2015 offers a good opportunity for reflection. The Arab region has witnessed turmoil and change, and the turbulent times are continuing. At the start of a new year, the future seems inconclusive. The countries in transition across the region are all to some extent marked by political strife, continuing protests and conflict, inequality, high youth unemployment, poverty, tentative reforms and an uncertain political future. What is happening in the Arab region is anything but clear, predictable and unengaging. Hence an evaluation of the Dutch contribution to transition in the Arab region 2009-2013 (including support to democratisation, the rule of law and sustainable economic growth) is all the more interesting. The support given by the Netherlands is an important element of foreign policy in which the role of aid is significant.

As the evaluation entailed investigating more than one policy domain, IOB needed to adopt an innovative way of thinking and working in order to produce a 'hybrid' evaluation. Therefore, evaluation questions were investigated using triangulation and several approaches, to enhance confidence in the ensuing findings. For example, besides classic effectiveness measuring methods to gauge the effectiveness of individual aid projects, MaxQDA software was used for the analysis of interviews and diplomatic cables. This enabled a large volume of data to be collated and classified, and, more importantly, made it easier to retrieve results relating to evaluation questions on foreign policy and diplomacy.

The report was prepared by IOB inspector Dr. Margret Verwijk with research assistance by Ms. Elise Landowski and Dr. Jochen Stöger. Internal quality support was provided by Prof. Ruerd Ruben, Mr. Bas Limonard and Mr. Frans van der Wel. An international reference group provided useful feedback to the formulation of the Terms of Reference of this evaluation and an earlier draft version of this report. The members of this group were Prof. Maurits Berger (University of Leiden), Dr. Nikolaos van Dam (former diplomat and Middle East scholar), Dr. Reinoud Leenders (King's College London), Prof. Nadia Molenaers (University of Antwerp), Mr. Chris Baaré (the Netherlands Enterprise Agency) and Mr. Ernesto Braam (Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

IOB would like to thank the numerous interviewees and participants in focus group discussions both at home and abroad, including staff interviewed at the Embassies of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Egypt, Libya and Morocco for generously availing their time and sharing their thoughts. We hope that this evaluation report, which is based on in-depth qualitative analysis, will help prepare Dutch policies and programmes for the years to come. Our findings demonstrate that supporting Arab countries in transition requires **presence, patience** and **partnership**.

The final responsibility for the content of this report rests with IOB.

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The Only Constant is Change

Contents

List of figures, tables and boxes

Abbreviations

AA	Association Agreement
AIV	Advisory Council on International Affairs (Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken)
ALDE	Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
CBO	Community Based Organisations
CDA	Christian Democratic Appeal (Christen Democratisch Appèl)
CSI	Civil Society Initiatives (Matra South programme component)
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CU	ChristianUnion (ChristenUnie)
D66	Democrats 66
DAG	Donor Assistance Group
DAM	North Africa and Middle East Department (Directie Noord-Afrika en Midden-Oosten)
DDE	Sustainable Economic Development Department (Directie Duurzame Economische Ontwikkeling)
DGGF	Dutch Good Growth Fund
DIE	European Integration Department (Directie Integratie Europa)
DMM	Multilateral Institutions and Human Rights Department (Directie Multilaterale Instellingen en Mensenrechten)
DSH	Department of Stabilisation and Humanitarian Aid (Directie Stabiliteit en Humanitaire Hulp)
DSO	Social Development Department (Directie Sociale Ontwikkeling)
DVB	Security Policy Department (Directie Veiligheidsbeleid)
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC	European Commission
EIB	European Investment Bank
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI	European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
EP	European Parliament
ESA	Strategy Advice Unit (Eenheid Strategische Advisering)
EU	European Union
EKN	Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
G2G	Government-to-Government cooperation (Matra South programme component)
GDP	Gross domestic product
GL	Green Party (Groen Links)
HGIS	Homogeneous Group for International Cooperation (Homogene Groep Internationale Samenwerking)
IATI	International Aid Transparency Initiative
IFI	International Financial Institution
ILO	International Labour Organisation

IOB	Policy and Operations Evaluations Department (Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en Beleidsevaluatie)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LGBT	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
Matra	Refers to a subsidies programme intended to contribute to the process of developing a democratic, pluriform state governed by the rule of law (Maatschappelijke transformatie)
MENA	the Middle East and North Africa region
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the Netherlands)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIF	Neighbourhood Investment Facility
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PvdA	Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid)
PvdD	Party for the Animals (Partij voor de Dieren)
POGAR	Programme on Governance in the Arab Region
PP	Building the capacity of political organisations (Matra South programme component)
PSOM	Programme for Cooperation with Emerging Markets (Programma Samenwerking Opkomende Markten)
PSI	Private Sector Investment programme
RVO	Netherlands Enterprise Agency (Rijksdienst voor Ondernemend Nederland)
SGP	Reformed Political Party (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij)
SPRING	Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth
UN	United Nations
VVD	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie)

Summary and conclusions

The Dutch government responded to the uprisings in the Arab region of 2011 by setting itself the goal of supporting transition. The Netherlands has pursued this goal bilaterally and multilaterally, by combining financial aid and diplomacy. This evaluation discusses the policy on supporting transition in the Arab region and its implementation by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It covers the period from 2009 to 2013, briefly describing the two years preceding the wave of protests that swept through the various countries in the region and describing in more detail the two years thereafter. It includes a study of the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of individual projects supported by the Dutch programme for democratic transition in the Arab region: the Matra South programme.

The report is based on six different studies; (1) an analysis of the Ministry's expenditures to meet the goal of supporting transition in the Arab region, more specifically in the priority countries of Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia; (2) a comparison of the annual plans and reports of Dutch embassies in Arab countries for 2009 and 2013; (3) a desk study by Ecorys of the Matra South programme, to assess to what extent efforts have contributed to the process of democratic transition in the Arab region at programme and project level; (4) a literature review by Dr. Roel Meijer and Laila al-Zwaini of actors and factors supporting or hindering democratic transition; (5) a narrative analysis of diplomatic correspondence between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague and its embassies, including an exercise entailing automated text-mining; and (6) qualitative field research in Egypt, Libya and Morocco. The evaluation also drew on relevant evaluations by the IOB and others, scholarly and scientific literature, longitudinal opinion surveys in Arab countries and relevant database statistics and indexes. These were supplemented with available information on policy implementation.

Main findings

The findings are grouped into two categories: policy and implementation. Together they respond to the evaluation questions posed in the Terms of Reference of this evaluation.

On *policy*, the evaluation concludes that:

1. *The Ministry rapidly developed its policy response towards the Arab region following the Arab uprisings and changing circumstances.*
The policy response was formulated in a relatively short time. It was influenced by relevant reports from the Advisory Council for International Affairs (AIV), evaluations of particular instruments in different contexts and discussions in Parliament. It reflects fundamental values of human rights and democracy as well as economic and security interests in the Arab region.

2. *However, the policy response did not take advantage of a growing evidence base of lessons learned in the area of democracy assistance.*
Efforts to reconstruct a theory of change at the level of policy objectives revealed important assumptions and context-specific insights. The policy response was based on the underlying assumption that Arab countries are moving away from authoritarian rule and can be

considered as countries transitioning towards democracy. What happened in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings clearly shows why this assumption was not correct. Knowledge about how to achieve policy objectives was informed more by practical insights relating to policy instruments than by theoretical insights about how to support countries in transition and lessons learned from policy evaluations and/or knowledge of the Arab region. Although similar factors contributed to the uprisings in countries such as Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan, these countries and their societies vary enormously in wealth, education, traditions, population and institutions. As a result, transition processes are influenced by a country's context and may vary among countries. Moreover, promoting transition in the Arab region is a long-term process that requires long-term commitment. The policy response did not sufficiently incorporate either a country-specific understanding of the challenges faced by Arab countries in transition or a long-term approach for dealing with these challenges.

3. *Bilateral aid and diplomacy are important in supporting the achievement of policy objectives and fostering bilateral relationships.*
The Ministry chose to combine bilateral and multilateral approaches to achieve its policy objectives. The evaluation findings show that after the Arab uprisings, embassies succeeded in offering timely and flexible bilateral support, especially to civil society organisations. In contrast, multilateral organisations have elaborate programme planning cycles and took time to adjust to changes on the ground. The EU was especially slow to respond, and its actual expenditures in the priority countries proved to be much lower than planned and committed. Moreover, not all multilateral organisations and programmes can be assumed to automatically support the implementation of Dutch policy objectives and to foster democracy and rule of law in the Arab region. Bilateral support also enabled embassies to both maintain and enlarge their networks at country level.

4. *Conditionality does not work and in-country demand for change is essential.*
In both bilateral and multilateral EU aid a central concept has been the notion that more political and financial support should be given to those Arab countries that implement more reforms and become more democratic. Application of conditionality as a principle to supporting countries in transition is hampered by a) the prevailing bilateral interests of EU Member States and donors preventing consensus and a unified stand; b) substantial aid flows to Arab countries in transition from, for example, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which reduce the leverage of other donors; and c) difficulties of actually monitoring progress or regress in transition processes and of holding public officials and institutions accountable. Moreover, transition processes need local commitment and ownership. Foreign assistance can at best support transition.

On *implementation*, the evaluation concludes that:

5. *The Ministry has managed to launch a relatively large portfolio of bilateral assistance despite clear staffing constraints in The Hague and in embassies.*
In the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, existing instruments such as the human rights fund and the fund to advance to status of women proved very helpful for responding swiftly to

emerging needs for relevant assistance. With the launch of the bilateral Matra South programme throughout the Arab region, policy priorities (democratisation, strengthening the rule of law and protecting human rights, economic growth) were made operational through a raft of instruments. By mid-2014 approximately EUR 41 million had been committed according to plan, to: a private sector investment programme, government-to-government cooperation, civil society initiatives, training of civil servants and young diplomats, capacity building of political organisations, and a scholarship programme. A myriad of actors are involved in the implementation of the bilateral programme. Programme steering and monitoring of programme implementation are hampered by staffing constraints.

6. *The attainment of policy objectives at the level of the Matra South programme components cannot be measured, but individual projects of three programme components score well on effectiveness.*

Fragmentation of financial support is a concern, both in terms of the programme as a whole and within individual programme components. This makes it difficult to achieve significant results at the level of programme and policy objectives. Findings indicate that a). the relevance of the programme for capacity building of political parties and organisations is low; b). the private sector investment programme does not target priority countries sufficiently, and c). the efficiency of the government-to-government programme is low. However, the individual projects (in support of civil society as well as projects in the private sector investment programme and the government-to-government programme) have reached or are likely to reach their planned outputs and objectives and may be considered sufficiently effective.

7. *The portfolio of bilateral assistance was not sufficiently targeted to the priority countries and to the policy objectives of democratisation and rule of law.*

The majority of projects do target priority countries. However, their budget does not exceed EUR 14 million, and the lion's share of the budget has been allocated to regional projects or to non-priority countries in support of the policy objective of economic growth. More than half of the bilateral resources have been used by means of the private sector investment programme linked to the third policy objective of supporting economic growth and employment. Less budget has been committed to democratisation and little money has been committed to rule of law and human rights. Governments in transition have benefited little from bilateral assistance.

Issues for the future

- On policy: making use of evidence and the state of the art in democracy assistance to further improve policy formulation. A policy in support of democratic transition will make sense only if it can be kept up over the longer term. Assumptions need to be checked, and not all policy principles can be applied to Arab countries in transition.
- On implementation: seeking coherence among bilateral instruments and between bilateral and multilateral aid can further improve efforts to contribute to transition in the Arab region. The balance in the type of funding channels and instruments used deserves greater attention. Staffing levels need to correspond with policy ambitions.

To conclude, the only constant in the Arab region is change.

1

Introduction

This chapter presents succinct background information on this evaluation. It also describes the main objective of the study, its scope, research questions and methods as well as its limitations. The main considerations for this evaluation are:

- The Arab region has changed radically in a short time and is in transition. Since the start of 2011 a number of Arab countries have been the scene of mass protests, socioeconomic unrest and political instability.
- Changes have been made to the Netherlands' foreign policy in response to the changing situation in the region.

As a consequence, from a political, diplomatic and financial perspective it is desirable to evaluate this changed policy and its implementation.

1.1 Objective, scope and purpose of the evaluation

This evaluation covers policy objective 2.5 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (henceforth 'the Ministry') in which 'promoting transition in priority areas' is set out under the Dutch Foreign Affairs policy article 'Security and stability' (Explanatory Memorandum 2014). Transition is the process of change from one form, state, style or place to another. Neither the policy memorandum 'Transition in the Arab Region', nor budgets and letters to Parliament contain more detailed definitions of the concepts of transition, democratisation or, for example, democratic transition. However, Parliamentary Papers indicate that the government aims to support a sustainable transition in the Arab region that leads to:

- democratisation, especially fair and free elections;
- development of the rule of law and protection of human rights, with special attention to gender equality, media freedom (including internet freedom), religious freedom, protection of minorities and LGBT rights;
- economic growth, partly by building the economic infrastructure, including promoting employment.

Transition has different connotations, but as used in this report it refers to a transition or a movement towards democracy. According to the Ministry, a democratic and stable Arab region (and Egypt, Libya, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia in particular) serves the Netherlands' interests in the fields of security, trade, energy supplies and combating illegal migration. Policy documents do present the motives underlying the policy but no clear theory behind it.

The evaluation covers the period from 2009 to 2013, and thus covers the two years preceding the wave of protests that swept through various countries in the Arab region and the two years thereafter. This made it possible to cover the changes in Dutch policy after 2011. Priority was given to the five Arab countries mentioned above: Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. Field research undertaken and referred to in this study focuses on transition support given to Egypt, Libya and Morocco. These countries were chosen on the basis of their relevance for policy, the scope they offer to study transition from a variety of

perspectives, the scale of the resources deployed and their different political, historical and institutional perspectives in the light of transition. The selection of countries illustrates the different contexts in which both bilateral and multilateral support is provided in a variety of ways. The emphasis of the study is on bilateral support that includes Matra South. Of course, not all the activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs intended to promote transition in the Arab region can be expressed in monetary terms. Factors other than funding that play an important role in achieving the Netherlands' policy objectives are diplomatic efforts and political cooperation.

The evaluation was included in the Ministry's budget and the associated evaluation programme. It was intended to be an evaluation into effectiveness to account to Parliament for the policy it has pursued in the Arab region. The Matra South programme started in 2012, and was structured along the lines of the Matra programme for Central and Eastern Europe.[1] After an exploratory study, the evaluation was started during 2014 to coincide with the process of deciding on whether to prolong the Matra South programme, which was scheduled to end in 2015. To enable the evaluation to review as much Dutch policy implementation as possible, the report was to be completed during the first quarter of 2015. This report provides an assessment of the formulation and implementation of Dutch policy and draws on local perspectives in the context of Arab countries in transition. It not only accounts for results achieved so far but could also inform future policy formulation and implementation.

1.2   Research questions and methodology

The central research question was how the Netherlands has contributed to promoting democratic transition in the Arab region. Subsidiary questions were formulated to serve as guidelines in evaluating the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of this contribution. Below is an overview of relevant research components linking evaluation criteria and evaluation questions, as well as the research method applied:

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[1]   The Matra programme was launched in November 1993 and supported transitions to a pluralist and democratic society, governed by the rule of law in Central Europe (then South-East and Eastern Europe) following the revolutions in the 1980s.

Table 1	Overview of research components	
How has the Netherlands contributed to promoting democratic transition in the Arab region?		
Subsidiary questions	**Research components**	**Methods**
On policy 1. Which problems or other factors underlie Dutch policy on transition in the Arab region?	Review of the literature on democracy aid. Review of the literature on actors and factors supporting or hindering democratic transition.	Assessment of policy theory and policy reconstruction (sessions with staff in The Hague and embassies in Cairo, Tripoli and Rabat).
2. In developing the policy, was attention given to theoretical and practical insights relating to democratic transition?	Review and reflect on policy theory. Transcription of interviews. MaxQDA qualitative analysis of semi-structured interviews incl. codes and memos for interpretation.	Semi-structured interviews with key informants. Narrative analysis of semi-structured interviews on the basis of research questions. Secondary data, including archival records, parliamentary papers, Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV) reports, scholarly literature and relevant documents from other actors and agencies.
Relevance		
On policy implementation 3. To what extent have the policy priorities been made operational through feasible measures and appropriate instruments to promote transition in the Arab region?	A desk study of the Matra South programme. Review of the literature on actors and factors supporting or hindering democratic transition.	A comparison of the annual plans and reports of Dutch embassies in Arab countries for 2009 and 2013 incl. an analysis of the Ministry's expenditures.

Relevance		
4. How relevant were these measures to the priorities? To what extent are they a logical extension of Dutch policy, its stated ambitions and the specific context in Arab countries? Did they take the following factors into account? a. did the Netherlands work with national and local partners and take account of their priorities? b. did the Netherlands work with other international actors and, in doing so, devote attention to the complementarity of their political, diplomatic and financial efforts?	Transcription (incl. Arabic to English translation) of interviews. MaxQDA qualitative analysis of semi-structured interviews, incl. codes and memos, for interpretation. Review and reflection on policy implementation.	Tapping local knowledge sources, semi-structured interviews with key actors and stakeholders in Morocco, Egypt and Libya (incl. observation and a few focus groups). Document analysis of national strategies, policy documents of other actors in the region/countries (strategies and interventions). Narrative analysis of semi-structured interviews on the basis of research questions. Narrative analysis of diplomatic correspondence between the Ministry in The Hague and its embassies. Secondary data including archival records, dossiers on individual activities, reports and documents from a variety of actors and agencies.
Efficiency		
5. How timely was the Netherlands' use of its instruments and how much synergy was there between them? 6. How well did the Netherlands work with other partners and actors at national and international level? 7. What financial, political and diplomatic resources were deployed to implement policy in the period covered by this evaluation?	A desk study of the Matra South programme. Transcription (incl. Arabic to English translation) of interviews. MaxQDA qualitative analysis of semi-structured interviews, incl. codes and memos for interpretation. Review and reflection on policy implementation.	Tapping local knowledge sources, semi-structured interviews with key actors and stakeholders in Morocco, Egypt and Libya. Narrative analysis of semi-structured interviews on the basis of research questions. Secondary data, including archival records, dossiers on individual activities, reports and documents from a variety of actors and agencies.

Effectiveness		
8. What were the effects of policy implementation? 9. To what extent was the proposed policy actually implemented? 10. To what extent did policy implementation contribute to transition in selected priority countries?	A desk study of the Matra South programme. Transcription (incl. Arabic to English translation) of interviews. MaxQDA qualitative analysis of semi-structured interviews incl. codes and memos, for interpretation. Review and reflection on policy implementation.	Tapping local knowledge sources, semi-structured interviews with key actors and stakeholders in Morocco, Egypt and Libya. Narrative analysis of semi-structured interviews on the basis of research questions. Narrative analysis of diplomatic correspondence between the Ministry in The Hague and its embassies. Secondary data, including archival records, dossiers on individual activities, reports and documents from a variety of actors and agencies.

As demonstrated in above table, the triangulation of both data and methods was pursued to obtain more comprehensive data and insight, reveal inconsistencies and provide verification and validity. Tapping local knowledge sources and undertaking semi-structured interviews with a cross-section of Dutch and international policy makers and practitioners as well as with Arab respondents representing the local authorities, civil society and private sector provided key information in response to the evaluation questions. During 2014 IOB conducted a series of just over 100 semi-structured interviews in the Netherlands, Belgium, Egypt, Libya and Morocco (see Annex 5). With one or two exceptions, permission was received to record the session digitally and interviews were transcribed and systematically analysed for content. The narrative analysis of interviews (2726 codes) and of diplomatic correspondence (1318 codes) was supported by the use of MaxQDA (qualitative data analysis) software. The code systems used are presented in Annex 6.

1.3   Constraints and limitations

The political situation is in flux in the Arab countries that are the subject of this evaluation. Faced with such a potentially explosive context, it is difficult to assess the role and importance of internal and external actors and factors. In addition, in comparison with other actors, the Netherlands is a relatively small player in Arab countries. Given the problems in the region, it is not realistic to expect a significant impact of Dutch efforts on the Ministry's general and strategic policy objectives. Foreign policy goals set by the Ministry are over-ambitious, and little attention is paid to the gap between the stated goals and their realisation. Attribution is a problem because interventions make a relatively small

contribution while at the same time aiming to achieve significant changes that are dependent on a large number of actors and factors. On the other hand there is a general willingness to accept that projects in the areas of democratisation, strengthening the rule of law and human rights are often complex human and institutional processes. Democratisation and strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights are long-term political processes in which changes are not linear but proceed in fits and starts. Furthermore, there is a consensus that achieving progress in these areas requires a great deal of patience. As the findings show, the results have to be seen in context, which makes it difficult to draw general conclusions.

For a number of financial instruments (such as the Private Sector Investment programme (PSI) and the Reconstruction Fund) it became clear during the preliminary study that no programmes were being financed that would be completed before 2013 and whose results would be apparent during the evaluation period. For this reason, the main questions of the evaluation focus on the themes of democratisation and strengthening the rule of law, rather than on the proposed support for economic growth. However, the PSI programme will feature in Chapter 4 from a programme implementation point of view. At times, only limited information was available on the progress of individual projects, and this limited the insight achieved into the outputs and outcomes.

Even though on-the-spot research demands a cautious approach to logistical limitations, insecurity and social and political polarisation, IOB managed to undertake independent field research in Egypt (April 2014), Libya (May 2014) and Morocco (June 2014).

1.4   An overview of the report

The report is in six chapters. This chapter has provided background information on the evaluation. Chapter 2 will situate the evaluation and provide an analysis of actors and factors supporting or hindering democratic transition in the Arab priority countries. An analysis of policy will feature in Chapter 3. That chapter aims at revealing the complex web of activity that is thought to be necessary for goals to be achieved, and discusses assumptions. Chapter 4 presents a description and assessment of bilateral instruments, including an overview of Dutch expenditures on transition and the various policy objectives. Chapter 5 will examine the multilateral response to the Arab uprisings. Last but not least, Chapter 6 will shed light on the role of diplomacy in supporting transition, as well as on the practical application of policy principles. Readers requiring only an overview of the findings and conclusions of this evaluation will find a summary at the very beginning of this report.

Introduction

2

Countries in transition

Evaluation highlights

- Arab countries differ and country context matters.
- Change is happening.
- Within countries there are actors and factors either supporting or hindering change.
- At the heart of the Arab uprisings is the pursuit of a different relationship between citizens and state.

This chapter will introduce the priority countries, explain changes and challenges and describe the factors and actors either promoting or hindering change in Arab countries in transition. It will draw out some of the key findings from the literature review undertaken by Dr. Roel Meijer and Laila al-Zwaini that is available online. The findings discussed here are supported by the Matra South desk study and data from IOB field research and serve to reflect on policy and programme choices made in countries in transition.

2.1   Introduction

The protests in Tunisia were sparked by the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi on 17 December 2010, and were followed by a revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests (both non-violent and violent), riots, and conflict in the Arab world. Although the Arab uprisings were preceded in most if not all countries in the region by decades of protests and strikes, protests and social unrest came to a head in 2011. In several Arab countries a call for dignity (*karama*) was expressly made. In Egypt, calls for freedom *(huriya)* were mixed with demands for bread *('aish)* and social justice *('adala ijtima'iya)*. In that country there had been great inequality in economic and political opportunities and access to justice. In many countries the protests briefly enjoyed mass appeal and brought together different groups in society: secularists as well as moderate Muslims and Islamists, middle classes as well as the poor, and political parties representing different ideologies. Depending on the country, women joined men in protest, and Christians, Berbers and Salafists stood shoulder to shoulder in protest. The uprisings led to the downfall of rulers in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. Government changes took place in Jordan, Kuwait, Oman and Lebanon, and the Sudanese president[2] and Iraqi Prime Minister announced that they would not seek re-election. In other countries, such as Algeria and Morocco, concessions were made to placate the protesters.

Box 1   *On change in Morocco*

> If people are upset, they go onto the streets. It hasn't changed the way things are. The authorities in Morocco are quick to react: they are worried about the [protests in the] streets, they don't want dissatisfaction, they understood repression is not the way to go, [the authorities wish to meet some demands and] give them something...

Source: Interviews, Field Research in Morocco.

The year 2011 witnessed exceptional turmoil and protest by men and women of all ages across the Arab region and in the five priority countries profiled in this evaluation: Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. These countries are very different from each other. In terms of population, Egypt has 87 million people, Jordan 7 million, Libya a mere 6 million,

Tunisia 11 million and Morocco 33 million. [3] Two countries (Jordan and Morocco) are monarchies, Tunisia and Egypt are republics, and Libya enjoyed a unique political structure under Gadhafi. Libya's oil reserves are the largest in Africa and its most important market is Europe. Most of the world's reserves of phosphate rock, which yields phosphorus for fertilizer (phosphorus is scarce and a non-renewable resource) are located in Morocco, with Jordan also being important. The EU is dependent on these countries for its imports of phosphate rock. Egypt has gone from being a net exporter to a net importer of oil. Although the mining, energy, tourism and manufacturing sectors of the Tunisian economy are important, and the country has become increasingly middle class, over half of Tunisia's labour force is engaged in farming. In terms of religion, the majority of Muslims in the five priority countries are Sunni Muslims. Egypt is the country in the region with a substantial Christian minority, while Libya and Morocco are known for their ethnic minorities (Amazigh, Tebu, Touareq). Jordan is home to a large number of Palestinian refugees and has been a host country to both Iraqi and Syrian refugees. In addition to all the foregoing, the countries vary in geostrategic significance in the context of a changing geostrategic regional order that cannot be ignored.

2.2 Challenges to transition

The uprisings have turned the spotlight on widespread political corruption, clientelism, nepotism and fraudulent relationships between the public and private sectors. Prior to 2011, the key anti-corruption indices [4] showed corruption levels to be very high in many countries across the Arab region, in comparison to global averages. The five Arab priority countries (Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia) scored poorly in terms of their legal and institutional frameworks in comparison to other parts of the world, in addition to their lack of press freedom and of civil society space. Over time, ethnic and religious minorities had become more conscious of their cultural, political and social rights and had also started to express their grievances during the Arab uprisings. Various opinion polls showed that there had long been widespread discontent among the people of Arab countries for a long time. [5] A survey by the Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies (2012) showed that most people did not rate the general performance of their governments highly, with 60% saying they were dissatisfied.

Although economic growth prior to 2011 was relatively high, wealth was concentrated in the hands of the ruling elite, thereby deepening the differences between rich and poor and giving rise to a growing sense of injustice. With the exception of Libya, the priority countries underwent a statistically significant fall in real gross domestic product (GDP) in 2011, especially in Egypt and Tunisia, in which a working class had emerged. Unemployment rates rose further.

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[3] See Wikipedia: list of countries by population. Website consulted on 25 December 2014.
[4] Namely Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, the Bertelsmann Foundation'sTransformation Index, Global Integrity's Report, Freedom House's Freedom in the World Survey, and the World Bank's Worldwide Governance indicators.
[5] For Arab public opinions surveys, see http://www.arabbarometer.org, http://gallup.com, http://www.aaiusa.org/pages/opinion-polls and the Arab American Institute's Zogby International Surveys.

Entrepreneurs, for example those in Egypt, were tied to the regimes through patronage, and in their respective countries they were more often the object of anger rather than being forces of change. Unemployment among the young, and especially among graduates, was relatively high (25-30 percent), with many of them joining the informal economy (Hanieh 2013). Unemployment rates among young women were even higher than those among young men.

In all five countries the freedom of civil society organisations and especially non-governmental organisations (NGOs) was curtailed by repressive NGO laws that imposed strict constraints on their financial resources, personnel and activities. Besides imposing severe restrictions, authoritarian states also co-opted NGOs. Consequently, in Egypt, Tunisia, and Jordan, professional organisations (such as the Lawyers' syndicate, the Judges' Club and the Doctors' Union) had nevertheless retained some autonomy and were important in preparing the ground for the uprisings. Trade unions and workers also played a key role during the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. In Libya, civil society hardly existed and had no legal basis; it only started to emerge in 2004, after the reforms of Qadhafi's son Saif al-Islam had been implemented. In Libya and Jordan, another force to be reckoned with is tribalism.

Political parties, pluralism and parliamentary elections have both a past and a present in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. Each country has its own unique history of political party development and multipartyism, or *hizbiya*. When revolution swept through Egypt in 1952 and nationalist leaders came to power not just in that country but also across the region, political parties were abolished or tossed aside on the pretext of ideological motivations. Political parties were depoliticised and quiescent. De facto single-party states developed in some countries in which a small number of tolerated and powerless opposition parties stood virtually no chance of winning elections. The total banning of political parties occurred only in Libya: with brief interruptions, from 1951 through to the end of Muammar Qadhafi's rule in 2011. Qadhafi condemned parliaments 'as misrepresentation of the people' and political parties as divisive and 'the modern dictatorial instrument of governing' (Pargeter 2012: 86). One of his slogans was: 'who forms a political party is a traitor' (Langhi 2014: 201). In none of the Arab countries did young Arabs engage in official party politics. The fall of the regimes in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia unleashed a tsunami of political parties participating in elections. In Tunisia, the number of political parties surpassed 100 and in Libya, as many as 142 new political parties registered to compete in elections. Some of these parties existed only on paper.

What has emerged from recent scholarly work and the literature review is that the uprisings grew from an uneasy amalgam of diverse and wide-ranging social, political and religious elements: discontented educated youth, urban intelligentsias, blue- and white-collar workers and professionals, dissatisfied tribes, religious communities, and rebellious regions. These had stepped into the vacuum left behind by the co-opted political parties and civil society, heralding the emergence of social protest movements in the Arab region articulating a rights discourse, comparable to the movements that arose in Latin America in the 1820s and in Europe in 1848 and 1989. However, today the historical and political contexts, the mix and mobilisation of people, the framings of the issues such as dignity and social justice, the level of foreign involvement, and the situation in the Arab countries are very specific to each country.

Box 2   *On change in Libya*

> Everything is different. The biggest thing is security and there is fear. The fear of the unknown. Qadhafi was able to keep some kind of control. People used to be out till 2 am or 3 am in the morning and people are now rushing to get home before dark. The security situation is a major change. Also the mentality: the lack of social responsibility, lack of law... I come from a family that has supported the revolution and continues to do so and I would not reverse this for anything. Libyans need to go through a phase of transition towards civic responsibility and democracy; ours is going to be a bit bloodier than most...

Source: Interviews, Field Research in Libya.

2.3   Actors and factors

The review of literature discussing actors and factors that are promoting or hindering change in Arab priority countries revealed that youth played an important role in demanding change during the uprisings. The initial demonstrators largely belonged to the fringes of society. They had been most negatively affected by inequity, social rifts and authoritarian rule. Those who were willing to go onto the streets during the Arab uprisings were youth activists advocating change, members of youth sections of Islamist organisations and sub-cultures, left-wing activists, young members of women's organisations, independent intellectuals and artists, members of unofficial or break-away trade unions besides the lower echelons of the official trade unions, people living in poor urban neighbourhoods, working in the informal economy, experiencing discrimination or living a marginal life in rural and remote areas.

Many studies have identified the social and psychological characteristics that make today's young Arabs different from young Arabs of former generations. A perceived shift in their basic orientations towards social economic justice and their political orientation towards activism is attributed to more schooling and a greater sense of individuality and self-esteem, as well as to their use of technology, social media and the internet. Social media played an important role in the protests not only as a way to mobilise people but also as an alternative way of free expression. After completing their education, young people expected a different life and a higher standard of living than their parents, only to discover that these cannot be achieved given social exclusion and economic marginalisation. The literature also notes the activism of women, regardless of their political and ideological background. Young women in particular featured prominently in the Arab uprisings. During the uprisings, mobilisation spread to other sections of society, such as the middle classes (represented in civil society organisations) and in some cases (such as in Tunisia) the elite. The uprisings were characterised by cross-ideological, cross-class and interfaith alliances and coalitions.

Box 3   *On actors hindering change in Egypt*

And business men, business tycoons actually. Are they drivers of change or do they want to keep things the way they are? I believe they want to keep things the way they are but with some minor improvements to make the picture beautiful.

Source: Interviews, Field Research in Egypt.

The field research and available knowledge both point to the following factors affecting transition: authoritarian political systems that include a bargaining model that represses opponents and rewards supporters, marginalisation, economic inequality and skewed economic development, exclusionism, politicisation, sectarianism, clientelism, tribalism, political co-opting of civil society organisations and political parties, and – last but not least – external factors. In the Arab region powerful geostrategic and commercial interests are at play. Over the last decade power has shifted within the Arab region: Egypt, Syria and Iraq are no longer the geopolitical epicentres, and the influence of Gulf countries has grown. Notably, the West (and the US in particular), have experienced a further declining appeal in many Arab countries in the wake of post 9/11 policies, regime change in Iraq, the unresolved question of Palestinian statehood, a time-limited military intervention in Libya and a continuing crisis in Syria. This has left many Arabs questioning the sincerity of western positions and policies and pointing out inconsistencies, assessing the interplay of values and interests among foreign nations differently.

2.4   Conclusions

The struggle for civil, political and social equal rights and political accountability are seen as a hallmark of the Arab uprisings. The most important factor that played a role in the Arab uprisings was a growing critical consciousness of social exclusion that affected individuals or communities and prevented them from participating fully in the economic, social, and political life of their societies. The initial protesters included people working in the informal economy and those living in poor urban neighbourhoods, youth activists from different walks of life, members of highly marginalised groups in remote and rural areas, critical members of trade unions and political organisations, and independent intellectuals. The formation of alliances across ideologies, religions, class, gender, and place was central to the Arab uprisings. The bedrock of these uprisings was formed from concepts and notions of civil, political and social rights and citizenship *(madaniya)*, no matter how vague. The demand for dignity aimed at achieving a fundamentally different relationship between citizens and the state. This is what the five Arab priority countries, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia have in common.

3

The Netherlands' foreign policy

Evaluation highlights
- An effective programme-steering process is hampered by the myriad of actors involved and the practice of informal coordination.
- Staffing constraints: more work with fewer staff.
- Policy has not been sufficiently based on evidence and lessons learned.
- Promoting transition in the Arab region is a long-term process.

After briefly describing the policy focus towards Arab countries prior to 2011, this chapter continues to explain and analyse current Dutch policy on supporting transition in the Arab region. It also describes the actors involved and reconstructs the envisaged process of change of policies and programmes following the Arab uprisings.

3.1   Introduction

Prior to the uprisings, the focus of Dutch embassies in the Arab region ranged from the provision of development aid (in Yemen, Egypt and the Palestinian Territories) to supporting trade and investment (for example, in Oman) besides general and consular affairs (for example, in Tunisia). There were few existing programmes in the Arab region supporting women's rights, human rights and to some extent good governance. Data from the Ministry's management information systems shows that in 2009 the North Africa and Middle East Department (DAM) was mainly engaged in a programme of small activities at country level, with no single and specific corresponding objective related to the Ministry's budget. This changed following the Arab uprisings in 2011.

The investments made in transition following the Arab uprisings in 2011 have been justified by the Ministry on the basis of the assertion that investments in transition (and more particularly democratisation, the rule of law and human rights, and economic growth) contribute to a democratic and stable Arab region focusing in particular on Egypt, Libya, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia.[6] The underlying motivation is that a democratic and stable region serves the Netherlands' interests best in the fields of security, trade, energy supplies and combating illegal migration. Consequently, in all countries that enjoy priority as transition countries, with the exception of Egypt, financial assistance was increased after the uprisings. In Egypt, the designated country budget was higher in 2009 than in 2013, as a result of the aid relationship[7] being phased out. The number of delegated country budget holders (including Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia) was higher in 2013 than in 2009 as a result of the policy response developed in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. A comparison of the annual plans and reports of Dutch embassies in Arab countries for 2009 and 2013 shows that they were increasingly seeking to contribute to the policy objectives of greater security and stability.

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[6]   The phrase "neighbouring Arab region" has been avoided since it does not make sense when applied to five countries that are not geographically contiguous. The EU seeks to tie a range of Arab countries to the south of the European territory of the EU to the Union and applies a European Neighbourhood Policy. See Chapter 5.

[7]   Following a stronger focus of Dutch development aid on least developed and low income countries, whereas Egypt qualified as a lower middle-income country on the DAC list of ODA recipients: see www.oecd.org/dac/stats.

The policy response to the Arab uprisings was shaped by inputs provided by the Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV)[8] and policy interplay with the House of Representatives, including questions and motions submitted by Members of Parliament. It is set out in a plethora of policy documents. According to these documents, the selection of priority countries in the Arab region (Egypt, Libya, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia) is the result of their geographical proximity, Dutch interests (relating to national security and economy) and an estimation of their likelihood to change, including their ability to serve as an example to the region as a whole (Explanatory Memorandum 2014: 17). However, the rationale for selecting each priority country is not documented and it is not clear how the likelihood of transition was estimated.

In pursuing its policy, the Ministry stated that it would apply the following principles:
• effective action through bilateral and multilateral channels;
• a demand-driven approach;
• intelligent conditionality;
• no new structures but a review of existing structures that use existing budgetary instruments;
• effective national and international coordination.

3.2   Central government's involvement in supporting transition

Whereas good governance was dropped from the agenda for aid and trade, the promotion of transition has assumed greater prominence in Dutch foreign policy over time, as can be seen from the dedicated policy objective in the Dutch Foreign Affairs policy article of 'Peace, security and stability'[9] (Explanatory Memorandum 2014). Below, a concise overview is presented of the most relevant actors within the Ministry.

A key actor for the formulation of a response to the Arab uprisings and its implementation is the North Africa and Middle East Department (DAM). DAM has umbrella responsibility for transition expenditures, which includes being involved in allocating budgets to 16 embassies of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and monitoring the results of the funded activities. The embassies, in particular those in priority countries, are responsible for the implementation of policies, including the implementation of the Matra South programme.[10] Matra South is the Dutch programme for democratic transition in the Arab region and consists of the following components: a. civil society initiatives (CSI), b. private sector investments (PSI) programme, c. building the capacity of political organisations (PP),

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[8] Advisory Council on International Affairs. (August) 2011. *Reforms in the Arab Region: Prospects for Democracy and the Rule of Law?* Report no. 75. The Hague: AIV.
[9] The previous policy article combined 'greater security and stability, effective humanitarian assistance and good governance'.
[10] See Matra South brochure published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, together with the MENA Scholarship Programme.

and d. government-to- government cooperation (G2G), including training civil servants and young diplomats. The implementation of the Matra South programme will be described in greater detail in the next chapter.

DAM has an advisory role with regard to the implementation of policies through the multilateral channel. The Multilateral Institutions and Human Rights Department (DMM) provides unearmarked voluntary contributions to multilateral organisations and also, for example, to the work of International Financial Institutions and the United Nations that reaches every corner of the globe, including the Arab region. UN organisations work in support of a variety of development objectives in Arab countries. Examples include expanding food production, environmental protection, support to refugees, promoting democracy, human rights and gender equality, and international health. Support to the implementation of the EU European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) [11] in a number of countries [12] is the responsibility of the Europe Integration Department (DIE).

Reprioritisation of funds within existing central programmes to the Arab region required collaboration between DAM, DMM, the Department for Stabilisation and Humanitarian Aid (DSH), the social development department (DSO) and the Security Policy Department (DVB) to promote gender equality, human rights and stability. Finally, DAM provided substantial transition funds to the Sustainable Economic Development Department (DDE) in support of a PSI programme. However, an effective programme-steering process by DAM was hampered by the fact that a myriad of actors, as described, were involved. Moreover, advice is non-binding and coordination within the Ministry is mostly informal.

The mission network in the Arab region has not changed since 2009, with the exception of the temporary closure of the embassies in Damascus and Libya for political and security reasons (and the transfer of their staff posted from The Hague to Istanbul and Tunis respectively). The number of positions at the embassies decreased between 2009 and 2013. By the end of 2013, there was a total of 84 full-time jobs for staff posted from The Hague (51 in policy and 33 in administrative positions) and 242.5 full-time jobs for local staff (49.7 in policy and 192.8 in administrative positions) involved in implementing policy for the Arab region. DAM had 26 full-time jobs (23 in policy and 3 in administrative positions). However, work in the Arab region has increased rather than decreased, and a small number of staff focus on the actual implementation of support dedicated to transition.

3.3   Connecting outcomes

Neither the policy memorandum 'Transition in the Arab Region', nor the budgets and letters to Parliament contain more detailed definitions of the key concepts of transition, democratisation or, for example, democratic transition. As described under 3.1, policy documents do present the motives for the policy but provide no clear theory or framework

[11]   The ENP is in the first instance a bilateral policy between the EU and each partner country.
[12]   Supporting Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, the Palestinian Territories, Syria and Tunisia.

to underpin this policy. When referring to the policy article 'security and stability', the Ministry expressed its intention as being to support a sustainable transition in the Arab region that leads to:

- democratisation, especially fair and free elections;
- development of the rule of law and protection of human rights, with special attention to gender equality, media freedom (including internet freedom), religious freedom, protection of minorities and LGBT rights;
- economic growth, partly by building the economic infrastructure, including promoting employment.[13]

Based on sessions with staff members in The Hague and embassies in Cairo, Tripoli and Rabat, and supported by the desk study of the Matra South programme and the review of relevant documents and interviews, and interviews, the change process for all the programmes taken together has been depicted graphically (Figure 1). It should be noted that the representation of the change process is a mere articulation of a theory of change through a collective and collaborative process and is not a panacea for supporting democratic and economic transition in the Arab region. The relationship between the programme as a whole and its individual components as illustrated in Figure 1 (see next page).

Although sustainable transitions are determined by domestic factors, the graphic representation clarifies what external support is provided by the Ministry for what purpose, and what support should contribute to if properly implemented in a given situation or context. It also assists reflection on what is plausible, doable and potentially testable. Through its activities, the Ministry also aimed to strengthen relations between the Netherlands and recipient Arab countries.[14] This section will focus on thinking through policy and evidence or what is plausible. The following chapter will concentrate on policy implementation.

[13] See Parliamentary Paper 32623 no. 16 of 25 March 2011 and, for example, the Matra South programme brochure.
[14] See Matra South programme brochure.

Figure 1   *Mapping the pathways in support of the long-term goal of strengthening security and stability by means of promoting transition in the Arab region.*

Agreeing upon long-term outcomes proved to be relatively easy, in part because long-term outcomes are part and parcel of the budget of the Ministry and are generally broad. The long-term objective of security did prompt a discussion as to whose security and stability was at stake, and in the case of Libya the outcome levels clearly first and foremost rested on security and state-building. This finding is in accordance with the literature: Carothers (1999) has pointed out that when a dictator falls, state-building should have the highest priority and elections should follow only after basic authority and institutions have been stabilised (or, in the case of Libya, established). Discussions in Tripoli clearly indicated that the stated objectives (of democratisation, rule of law and economic growth) would not be achieved unless a certain level of security and stability existed in the country. However, state-building has not been an explicit aspect of Dutch foreign policy and assistance in the Arab region.

Box 4 *On local priorities and the importance of presence*

Money is not the issue here. It is about capacity. There is plenty of money and donors do not know what to do. It is all about engaging, involvement and commitment.

We have learned lessons along the way and some of those lessons include the fact that the best models here are where there is permanent in-country presence by the international partner. Some organisations fly in and out … that does not work in Libya.

In Libya we start from scratch, from zero …

Source: Interviews, Field Research in Libya.

The idea of 'supporting transition to strengthen security and stability' (see Figure 1) highlighted the importance of articulating assumptions and conditions, and why it is expected that one set of outcomes will lead to another. It is a common perception that democracies are more stable than authoritarian regimes (as reflected in the thinking that democratic transition will lead to security and stability at the impact level). However, participants in the various sessions were quick to point out that neither democratic transition nor supporting such transition will automatically lead to security and stability, and that they may in fact have a destabilising effect in and beyond countries in transition.

The sessions revealed that informed knowledge about how to produce stated outcomes and impacts was primarily based on activity-level evaluations of Dutch democracy assistance in Central and Eastern Europe[15] and a Programme for Cooperation with emerging markets (PSOM)[16] plus common sense. Less important were academic knowledge about how to

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[15] Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en Beleidsevaluatie. 1999. *Diamonds and Coals. Evaluation of the Matra programme of assistance to Central and Eastern Europe, 1994-1997.* The Hague: IOB.
[16] Triodos Facet BV. 2010. *Final Report Evaluation PSOM/PSI and MMF.* Zeist: Triodos Facet.

support countries in transition and lessons from policy evaluations[17] and/or knowledge of the Arab region. Paying attention to growing socioeconomic imbalances was a key lesson learned which also came up in discussing pathways of change. The IMF has acknowledged that in retrospect it did not place enough emphasis in the past on the need to ensure equal access to economic and employment opportunities in the Arab region (IMF 2014: 94). In the discussions at country level that were instigated for the present evaluation, the importance of education in fostering pluralism in Arab countries was mentioned. This key role for education has also been described by scholars (Campante and Chan 2012, Muasher 2014: 123-141). There is strong evidence that education has an impact on creating economic opportunities for individuals: it leads to increased employability, productivity and higher income potential. It also has considerable nationwide macroeconomic effects. Interestingly, in spite of a challenging internal socio-political environment and conflicts in the Arab region, the Arab priority countries have broadly maintained macroeconomic stability. At the same time, however, their economies are currently not delivering the growth rates needed for a meaningful reduction in unemployment, in particular for women and youth.

With regard to strengthening the rule of law, there is a striking lack of coherent and systematic studies evaluating rule of law interventions in countries in transition. This is especially true in the context of transition where the starting point may be challenging, as is definitely the case in Libya. At the same time, in a country such as Egypt a deep mistrust and lack of faith in the justice sector has developed. A recent literature review concludes that 'the bulk of the research… is constituted of studies of an "observational descriptive" type and design … less well suited to answering questions about the efficacy of particular rule of law reforms or interventions that may have been sponsored either by domestic actors or international donors' (Roseveare 2013: 8). A fundamental problem is that the impact of 'strengthened rule of law' sought to be achieved is extremely complex and there is little clarity on how best to proceed. A more fundamental point is that the rule of law doctrine may mean very different things across varying legal traditions (e.g. common, civil and Islamic law). The rule of law exists in Arab societies as a political touchstone, and differences in the socio-political history of Arab countries shape local understandings and implementation of the rule of law (Mendicoff 2006).

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[17]   For example: IOB. 2011. *Education Matters: Policy review of the Dutch contribution to basic education 1999-2009.* The Hague: IOB.

Box 5   *On the importance of a long-term view*

We are supporting the new principles of the constitution, the constitution has very strong language ...; it gives right to access to information, the right to petition, the right to participate in the legislative process. The constitution is eye-opening, they really set a high bar for themselves.

When you work on supporting constitutional reforms and supporting democratic transitions, most of the work is not glamorous because the impact is not seen right there. When you are supporting democratic processes it sometimes takes ten years to be able to assess whether or not your efforts have results, because you can take a horse to water but you cannot make it drink. You can develop the capacities of the administration of the House of Representatives, you can train Members of Parliament, you can hold meetings, send them to another country etc. etc., but if there is no political will it will remain what it is. So it is a *travail de longue haleine*.

Source: Interviews, Field Research in Morocco.

Finally, transition processes are long-term and non-linear processes, requiring patience and willingness to accept setbacks in addition to conflict and instability. Supporting democratic transition is not at all like supporting an immunisation programme (Kumar 2012). It is impossible to be certain that the creation of a modest bilateral programme for a period of three years (2012-2015) in support of democratic transition and implementing it in a time of rapid change has had any impact on the long-term outcomes stated. This understanding should be reflected in the thinking through of the change process, the policy commitments and the timelines for implementation: they must be long term and adaptive to changing circumstances at country level.

3.4   Conclusions

The sessions with staff in The Hague and at embassies in Cairo, Tripoli and Rabat, combined with the analysis of interview data revealed that the basic assumption was that Arab countries moving away from authoritarian rule can be considered as countries transitioning towards democracy. This assumption proved to be largely illusory and false. The findings also confirm that pathways of change need to be tailored to each individual country's situation (its economy, sociocultural traditions, ethnic composition, political and institutional development). The Arab priority countries differ enormously in these respects and there is no easy fix for supporting their democratic and economic transitions. A one-size-fits-all approach is problematic, as demonstrated by the mismatch between the policy response and reality in Libya. Finally, a policy will only make sense if it can be adhered to for the longer term.

4

The bilateral approach

Evaluation highlights
- Centrally managed funds enabled embassies in Arab countries to adapt their support flexibly.
- The bilateral programme enabled embassies to both maintain and enlarge their networks at country level.
- The majority of projects target priority countries.
- Little support is given to promoting the rule of law. Most of the budget is spent on regional projects or non-priority countries and to support economic growth.
- Much less support is given to governments in transition than to civil society.
- The relevance of capacity building of political parties and organisations is low.
- Individual CSI, G2G and PSI projects are sufficiently effective.

This chapter presents an overview of the Ministry's bilateral portfolio and focuses on the priority countries and the period following the Arab uprisings. It looks into the bilateral instruments and expenditures, including their contribution to the achievement of policy objectives listed earlier. Following a short introduction describing the overall design and budgets of the bilateral programme, each programme component will be analysed in more detail as implemented. This chapter will draw on some of the key findings from the desk study undertaken by Ecorys that is available online. The findings are complemented and supported by IOB field research and the literature review.

4.1   Introduction

In 2011, the Ministry decided to make EUR 7.7 million available by reprioritising funds of existing central programmes towards the Arab region, to enable a rapid response to the Arab uprisings. Existing centrally managed programmes included the fund for human rights, the stability fund, the fund for women's rights and the fund for development, pluralism and participation. Interview findings and field research suggest that especially the centrally managed funds for human rights, women's rights and culture enabled embassy staff in countries to adapt their support flexibly to the changing needs in countries in transition.

It was decided to use two policy instruments for the envisaged transition support to the region: the Matra programme and the Private Sector Investment programme (PSI). These instruments were to address both the political and socioeconomic causes of the unrest in the Arab region. The Matra programme was established in 1993 to support democracy and promote active citizenship in Central and Eastern Europe. This programme had been a relatively cost-effective and successful instrument to support political transition processes and had already included a relatively small portfolio of projects in a number of Arab countries prior to 2009 (IOB 1999). In line with recommendations by the Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV), it was therefore decided to create a similar programme for the Arab region: the Matra[18] South programme (AIV 2011: 13).

[18]   Field research demonstrated that the name of the programme '*matra*' (an acronym of 'maatschappelijke transformatie' in Dutch) means nothing to Arabic speakers, unlike Spain's bilateral programme, which is called '*masar*', the Arabic word for 'path'.

The Matra South programme was to support both state and civil society. It aimed at contributing to the achievement of policy objectives (of economic growth, rule of law and democratisation) through the following six programme components:
1. Support to local civil society initiatives (CSI);
2. Government-to-Government cooperation (G2G);
3. Capacity building of political parties (PP);
4. Training civil servants;
5. Training young diplomats; and
6. The MENA scholarship programme.

To compensate for the start-up time of new efforts in Arab countries an additional component was created and implemented rapidly by DAM. It will be referred to hereafter as 'support to Matra South initiatives (centralised budget)'. Although most countries in the Arab region were eligible for support under this programme, the Ministry decided to focus in particular on Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia.

The Private Sector Investment programme was established in 2009 and managed by the Sustainable Economic Development Department (DDE) to stimulate sustainable economic growth in countries. It aims to encourage Dutch and foreign entrepreneurs to establish investment projects in countries in a joint venture company with local entrepreneurs. The idea was to encourage investment projects that would not otherwise have been carried out because of the high product and/or market risks. Yemen, the Palestinian Territories, Egypt, and Morocco, were already PSI-eligible countries. However, in order to support transition in Arab countries, DAM requested DDE to create and manage a specific sub-programme under PSI that increased the number of non-ODA eligible countries in the Arab region. As a result, Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Tunisia were added to the list of eligible countries, whereas priority country Libya fell by the wayside and was only added in 2014.[19] As of July 2014, PSI closed for new applications, because of the development of a new instrument called the Dutch Good Growth Fund (DGGF).

Since 2012 onwards, the term 'Matra South programme' has been used to refer to both instruments and all programme components providing support to the process of transition in the Arab region. To finance this support, a total of EUR 45 million[20] covering the years 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 was allocated from the 'Homogene Groep Internationale Samenwerking' (HGIS) resources.[21] Support has been provided to approximately 120 projects implemented in eight countries[22] and also to a number of regional projects (excluding the MENA scholarship programme and the PP programme component). By mid-2014 approximately EUR 41 million had been allocated, as shown in the following budgetary overview:

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[19] Rectification via the Government Gazette by the Minister of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, 28 February 2014, no. DDE-093/2014, with reference to PSI 2014.
[20] 'The Current Situation in North Africa and the Middle East, and More on the Netherlands' Activities in the Arab Region', Parliamentary Papers, House of Representatives 2011, 32 623-40.
[21] A distinction is made within the HGIS between spending that meets the criteria for Official Development Assistance (ODA) and other, non-ODA spending on international policy.
[22] Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, the Palestinian Territories, Morocco, Tunisia and Yemen.

Table 2	Matra South programme allocations to the various programme components (2012-2015)
Matra South programme component	**Budget allocated in mill. EUR (2012-2015)**
PSI programme	14.9
Government-to-Government cooperation	5.2 [23]
Support to local CSI (decentralised budget)	6
Support to Matra South initiatives (centralised budget)	4.4
Training of civil servants	4.5
Training of young diplomats	1.6
Capacity building of political organisations [24]	2
MENA scholarship programme	2.6
Total	**41.2**

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Netherlands Enterprise Agency.

4.2   The portfolio: a description and assessment

Data was collected and analysed at programme, programme component and project level through a review of relevant documentation and interviews and augmented by findings from field research. This section provides a description of the abovementioned programme components and includes an assessment of individual PSI, CSI and G2G projects on the basis of four criteria (relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability). Details regarding the assessment of individual projects are provided in Annex 3 and include corresponding evaluation questions, judgement criteria and indicators. It should be noted that when assessing the implementation of projects, they were assigned a weight to take account of the difficulty of achieving their objectives, given the highly complex and volatile situation of the countries in transition. Full details on the selected projects and the assessment of evaluation criteria are provided in the Ecorys substudy. Annex 4 provides further details on the project selection and lists all the projects that were randomly selected. The programme components to build the capacity of political parties (PP) and provide scholarships and training programmes (for civil servants and young diplomats) were analysed at the programme level only. For this reason a reflection on evaluation findings is provided and not an assessment.

[23]   The desk study found significant levels of underspending at the Netherlands Enterprise Agency. See the section 'Government-to-Government programme'.

[24]   In 2012, the programme was administered by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2013 this responsibility was transferred to the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.

The Private Sector Investment programme

Description: The PSI programme is supported through DDE and implemented by the Netherlands Enterprise Agency (RVO). Projects are funded in the form of hardware (equipment) and/or technical assistance (training, project management). Most of the budget for the Arab region is allocated to the agriculture and industry sectors. The PSI programme is divided into two components: PSI 'Regular', aimed at a long list of developing countries, and PSI 'Plus'. Following the uprisings, a PSI programme was supported by adding few Arab countries, as a result of which PSI 'Regular' included Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia and PSI 'Plus' included Iraq, Yemen and the Palestinian Territories. Interestingly, Libya was only added to the list of PSI 'Regular' list in 2014, after the security situation had been deteriorating for some time.

As a result of their incorporation into the PSI programme, in the aftermath of the uprisings five additional Arab countries became eligible for PSI support. The criteria for project selection remained practically the same as for projects in other countries. The only difference was that now preference was expressed for project proposals focusing on employment of youth and women and in partnership with local businesses owned by young Arabs and female entrepreneurs.

The desk study found that DDE had at its disposal a budget of EUR 29 million[25] for the Arab region (2012-2014) including the contribution of EUR 14.9 by DAM in support of economic growth in Arab countries in transition. Actual PSI expenditures totalled to a little over EUR 14 million by mid-2014. Approximately EUR 6.6 million (30%) was committed to four of the five Arab priority countries between July 2012 and May 2014. Of these allocations to the priority countries, less than 30% was disbursed:

Table 3	Private Sector Investment programme: allocations and disbursements per country		
Country	**Number of projects**	**Budget allocated (in mill. EUR)**	**Amount disbursed (in mill. EUR) 2012 - May 2014**
Egypt	1	0.7	0.3
Jordan	3	1.6	0.2
Morocco	5	3.6	1.1
Tunisia	1	0.7	0.4
Total	**10**	**6.6**	**2**

Source: Matra South desk study.

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[25]   Based on DDE approval of annual plans RVO (2012-2014) and involving both ODA and non-ODA resources.

In total, 10 projects were implemented in the priority countries. The average sum allocated to a project was approximately EUR 670,000 and the amount allocated to individual projects ranged from approximately EUR 380,000 to EUR 750,000. More than half of the total commitments were made to projects in Morocco (54%), followed by Jordan (24%) and Egypt and Tunisia (both 11%). As explained earlier, Morocco and Egypt were already PSI-eligible countries prior to the Arab uprisings, making the transfer of non-ODA funds from DAM to DDE for the purpose of supporting economic growth and transition somewhat unnecessary and questionable.

When the overall budget of EUR 29 million for the Arab region (2012-2014) was taken into consideration the evaluation found that the lion's share of PSI budget allocations (70%) had been committed to projects in non-priority countries (the Palestinian Territories, Yemen, Iraq and Algeria), with the Palestinian Territories receiving the largest share of allocations: 64% (EUR 10 million). It was envisaged that the 28 projects in Arab countries in total would generate 764 basic level jobs, including 550 for women and 531 medium-high-level positions of which 214 would be for women. In total 656 of the employed staff were expected to be younger than 25 years. However, a recent IOB policy review of Dutch support for private sector development during the period 2005-2012 found that there is little information about achieving ultimate objectives, including poverty reduction (IOB 2014).

Assessment: Four projects were selected for the assessment of the Private Sector Investment (PSI) programme. This selection accounts for 40% of the total value of project commitments within PSI, and for 64% of the total disbursements. Individual projects were assessed in terms of their relevance. The desk study found that projects were well-conceived given the local situation and that they were relevant to the problems they were intended to address. The objectives of the projects were clearly defined and the projects were likely to contribute to the solution of the identified problems. Individual projects analysed were assessed as being fairly efficient. All the projects are being managed efficiently and although some have experienced some delays, these have been minor. The likelihood that the businesses would continue was mostly assessed as reasonable. However, the demand for PSI in the priority countries appears to be very low, with only 30% of budgets allocated to the priority countries. It is too early to assess the effectiveness of individual PSI projects in the priority countries that are still in the early phase of implementation. Apart from these projects, individual PSI projects were assessed as being sufficiently effective (Matra South desk study 2014: 35). The following text box contains an example of one of the PSI projects assessed:

Box 6   *Example of a PSI project in Morocco*

This project provides support to a joint venture which planned to establish a state-of-the-art modern greenhouse of 5 ha near Agadir for the cultivation of tomatoes on the vine. Both partners are horticultural growers. The applicant is a large tomato-on-the-vine grower in the Netherlands, who sees an opportunity to provide their customers year-round with tomatoes on the vine for less energy cost. The local partner grows green beans and sweet peppers near Agadir and wishes to diversify production by adding tomatoes. The project is planned to set an example for environmentally-friendly production methods in a modern greenhouse, minimising the carbon footprint of tomato growing.

The joint venture has been established. The new greenhouse has been constructed and 100 employees have been hired and trained. Additionally, a number of jobs have been created for the company's local suppliers. To date, about 500,000 kg of produce has been produced, 70% of which is of good quality. At the start of the production phase the project experienced some quality problems due to fungus but these were resolved. The tomatoes have mostly been sold locally because of the European import quotas and the low prices caused by the surplus of tomatoes on the European market. Consequently the turnover is lower than expected. In the beginning, the project experienced some delay because of the bureaucracy surrounding the permits for the establishment of a joint venture. According to the implementing partners the project is currently on course to achieve its planned results. Nevertheless, turnover is currently lagging behind, due to the low price of tomatoes in Europe. Both the PSI adviser and the Dutch partner have indicated that they are firmly committed to ultimately achieving the stated objectives.

The project has contracted and trained more employees than planned, although the total number of female employees (50) is less than planned. The production of good quality tomatoes on the vine is lagging behind, as is revenue, due to the low prices (and quota) in Europe. At this stage of it is not possible to demonstrate the impact of the project (reducing unemployment among women and youth) and possible spillover effects (in terms of income).

Source: Matra South desk study.

The programme and management costs of PSI (approximately 5% of the budget committed) are considered to be reasonable.

Government-to-Government cooperation

Description: The idea of Government-to-Government cooperation was to provide support to institutional reform and capacity building in the public sector in priority countries and to strengthen government institutions. Government-to-Government project support of short duration (3-12 months) was envisaged between the Dutch government and central governments in relevant countries in the Arab region or between local governments. Projects were to help facilitate economic development,[26] create employment and concomitantly strengthen the Netherlands' position in the countries. RVO was contracted by DAM and bore responsibility for the facilitation of the design and implementation of projects, ranging from advising on the project proposals, finding suitable partners in the Netherlands and administering the implementation of the projects, to collecting and assessing the financial and narrative progress reports. Proposals for G2G projects were to be submitted by government institutions from the Arab priority countries to the Royal Netherlands Embassies or to the International Cooperation and Matchmaking Unit of RVO. All G2G projects required prior approval of DAM. In practice, the promotion of the G2G component in priority countries depended on the staff of embassies. G2G projects turned out to be very diverse and ranged from, for example, the cooperation between ombudsmen and the support to prison management, to assisting with the implementation of a road safety strategy. Most projects offered an exchange of public knowledge, skills and experience through, for example, workshops, technical assistance and institutional analyses.

Approximately EUR 1.3 million has been allocated under the G2G component, and in the course of 2012 and 2013 approximately 60% of these commitments were disbursed to projects. Of the total amount allocated, 69% covers projects in priority countries. One G2G project was implemented in a non-priority country (Iraq):[27] it accounts for 31% of the total commitments.[28] Approximately EUR 890,000 has been allocated to G2G projects in priority countries, of which more than half has been disbursed to G2G projects in Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. The regional project mentioned in the overview below consisted of a fact-finding mission that focused on incubators and ecosystems in Morocco and Tunisia. Egypt has not yet benefited from any G2G project. The average budget allocated to a project is approximately EUR 55,000: individual project allocations range from approximately EUR 13,000 to EUR 275,000. A large number of projects (7) include fact-finding or identification missions; a further six projects focus on issues related to rule of law / human rights (6). In total, 16 projects have been implemented in the priority countries.[29] The table below provides a breakdown of the number of G2G projects and resources allocated and disbursed:

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[26] See introduction to G2G cooperation at http://www.government.nl/issues/matra/matra-south-programme-for- arab-countries.

[27] The project in question focuses on cooperation between the Courts of Audit of the Netherlands and Iraq. Total commitments for this project are EUR 399,679 and total disbursements EUR 319,744.

[28] See desk study: this project of cooperation between the Court of Audit in the Netherlands and the Board of Supreme Audit of Iraq involves technical assistance and has been included under the G2G component for administrative reasons.

[29] Identification/fact-finding missions and follow-up projects have been counted as one project.

Table 4	Overview of the number of G2G projects and expenditures in 2012 and 2013		
Country	Number of projects	Budget allocated (in EUR)	Amount disbursed (in EUR)
Jordan	3	93,764	75,075
Libya	3	313,514	55,925
Morocco	3	264,965	158,245
Tunisia	6	191,718	141,761
Region	1	24,385	19,508
Total	16	888,346	450,514

Source: Matra South desk study.

Whereas the Ministry initially allocated an amount of EUR 5.2 million in support of G2G cooperation (see table in section 4.1), by May 2014 RVO had been able to allocate an amount of only approximately EUR 890,000 to G2G projects.

Assessment: Five projects were selected for the assessment of the G2G programme. This selection accounts for 44% of the total value of project commitments within G2G, and for 60% of the total disbursements. The desk study found that individual projects were relevant in general, with the exception of one project intended to improve road safety in Morocco. It is unclear how this project contributes to the objectives of the Matra South programme. The organisational set-up and under-expenditures of the G2G component have negatively affected the management costs of the G2G programme, which can be considered to be high (almost 30% of the commitments). Programme implementation has been slow for many reasons. The desk study and field research revealed that promoting G2G cooperation requires much time and effort. In the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, the frequent change of ministers and staff, coupled with insecurity in the priority countries, hampered the identification of opportunities for cooperation. At the same time, the type of support G2G provides is limited in terms of time and budgets when compared to the time and budgets of other donor agencies. The interest and capacity of Dutch government institutions to support their counterparts in the Arab region are also limited, with the exception of the G2G project in Libya described in the following text box:

Box 7   *A G2G project in Libya*

Just after the revolution, serious human rights concerns regarding the situation in prisons were raised, among others by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. On 6 March 2012, the Libyan Prime Minister issued a decree establishing a committee specifically tasked to receive and investigate complaints of human rights abuses in detention. The project was to assist in the development of a general vision and mission of the Libyan prison service, including the training of prison staff. As a result, 20 persons have been trained and special security suits have been purchased for prison staff. The project was demand-driven and enjoyed commitment from the Libyan prison service. The Dutch ambassador played a key coordinating role in view of the complex relationship with the Libyan government and with many other donors involved in the justice sector. The Dutch implementing partner was prepared to follow up on project activities, irrespective of the security risks. A follow-up programme is yet to be formulated. A deteriorating security situation in Libya has hampered further cooperation.

Source: IOB field research and Matra South desk study.

Of the individual G2G projects that were part of the sample, three scored 'fairly efficient' and two scored 'unsatisfactory' due to their high costs of project implementation and delays encountered. Factors negatively affecting the effectiveness of individual projects consisted of their inability to bring about reform of any kind or to create a strong and lasting relationship between governments. When comparing programme components it is to be noted that little support has been provided to governments in transition.

Support to local civil society initiatives (CSI)

Description: The Dutch embassies in priority countries have been allocated specific budgets under the Matra South programme to support projects of civil society organisations that can contribute to the overall achievement of policy objectives stated. The embassies are required to submit politically sensitive projects and projects above the threshold of EUR 150,000 to the North Africa and Middle East Department for approval.[30]

The CSI budget is allocated to a wide variety of projects that include support to business development and the protection of human rights, and issues receiving emphasis from local embassies (for example, workers' rights in Egypt). The average amount allocated to a project is approximately EUR 80,000; individual project allocations range from approximately EUR 2,000 to EUR 600,000. Under the CSI component, approximately EUR 3.9 million was allocated and approximately 72% of the total amount allocated for CSI was disbursed in 2012 and 2013. In total, 48 projects have been implemented, with Tunisia having the most projects and Egypt and Morocco the highest budget allocations. The table below provides information about the number of projects, the total fund allocated and the expenditures per country.

[30]   Internal memo DAM-795/2011 to the Minister dated October 3, 2011.

Table 5	Overview of support to civil society: the number of projects in priority countries incl. budget allocations and expenditures		
Country	**Number of projects**	**Budget allocated (in mill. EUR)**	**Amount disbursed (in mill. EUR) 2012-2013**
Egypt	6	1.5	1.2
Jordan	9	0.4	0.2
Libya	9	0.6	0.5
Morocco	7	1	0.5
Tunisia	17	0.4	0.4
Total	**48**	**3.9**	**2.8**

Source: Matra South desk study.

Support to Matra South Initiatives (centralised budget)

Another portfolio consisted of contributions to larger programmes implemented by a mix of multilateral organisations and international NGOs that was managed by DAM. The embassies were often requested to advise on the selection of the projects, but other than that were hardly involved in selecting and overseeing the projects. Approximately EUR 4.4 million was allocated and EUR 3 million was disbursed to projects financed from the centralised Matra South budget. The budget was allocated to seven projects that focus on youth employment and democratisation. The average budget allocated to a project is approximately EUR 600,000; project allocations range between approximately EUR 300,000 and EUR 900,000. The table below provides information about the number of these centrally managed projects, total budget amounts allocated and expenditures.

Table 6	Support to Matra South initiatives (centralised budget): the number of projects in priority countries incl. budget allocations and expenditures		
Country	**Number of projects**	**Budget allocated (in mill. EUR)**	**Amount disbursed (in mill. EUR) 2012-2013**
Egypt	2	1.3	0.8
Jordan	1	0.2	0.1
Tunisia	1	0.9	0.9
Region	3	2	1.2
Total	**7**	**4.4**	**3**

Source: Matra South desk study.

Assessment: Eleven projects[31] were selected for the assessment of Civil Society Initiatives. This selection accounts for 41% of the total value of project commitments within CSI, and for 46% of the total disbursements. On average, the efficiency at project level was found to be satisfactory. The main reason that the CSI projects in particular have been efficiently implemented is that in general, fairly professional organisations submitted proposals and received financial support for implementation. At the same time, some delays in project implementation have to be expected when operating in transition countries, given the prevailing insecurity, political unrest and in-country funding restrictions for civil society organisations. A couple of CSI projects scored a very high relevance due to the fact that in line with findings documented in Chapter 2, their focus was on key actors and factors supporting transition. The following text box provides an example of one such project in Egypt:

Box 8   *Example of a CSI project in Egypt*

This project aims to strengthen practices of democracy, free elections, human rights and accountability. It focuses on mobilising poor communities to become active citizens and claim their civil, political and socio-economic rights in five governorates in Upper Egypt. The project uses a grassroots model, which entails working with and through local Community Based Organisations (CBOs). The project implementation approach whereby use is made of CBOs and community mobilisers has proven to be a very effective way for organising outreach and awareness-raising activities among marginalised community members (women, young people and the illiterate). In the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, local communities' demands for knowledge about political processes and citizens' rights increased tremendously.

[31]   Three projects that are financed from the centralised budget and eight projects that are managed by the embassies.

The activities implemented include:
- Staff trained on issues of socio-political participation and a rights-based approach to development;
- 26 trainers trained, using a curriculum on political participation and socio-economic rights;
- 5 civil society networks are being formed at the governorate level for joint campaigning and lobbying;
- 125 CBOs and NGOs trained on the right-based approach and Integrating democratisation into their work;
- 375 community members trained on civic election observation;
- 15 CBOs organised awareness-raising meetings about the elections, reaching out to 38,000 men and women in phase 1 (more than planned) and to 18,414 people in phase 2;
- 375 young potential future politicians trained (instead of 125);
- 200 (instead of the planned 35) media representatives trained in political and civic issues, context analysis and critical reporting;
- 700 young people trained in democratisation processes, political participation and citizenship.

Realised outputs:
- Capacity of local Egyptian NGOs and CBOs has strengthened in terms of increased understanding of socio-political participation issues and the rights-based approach to development. Furthermore, a beginning has been made in developing CSO networks to foster joint action and knowledge sharing;
- Various awareness-raising events and trainings have strengthened the awareness of communities in the five governorates in Upper Egypt about practising democracy, human rights, active citizenship and political participation;
- Capacity of local media has been strengthened and young people have been trained in political participation.

The project has proved to stimulate active citizenship by empowering local communities and by supporting them to raise their voice and demand accountability of public institutions. The following examples of outcomes were given by the villagers during a focus group discussion:

- Seheyl island villagers proudly explained how their increased knowledge about election laws empowered them to obtain a ballot box on the island and facilitated their increased participation in elections;
- Villagers also managed to convince the local authorities of the need for a ferry service, which resulted in a substantial decrease in costs of local transport and goods purchased from Aswan.

Source: IOB field research in Aswan (Egypt) and Matra South desk study.

The demand-oriented approach is especially reflected in the programme component of CSI. One project which scored less well in terms of the evaluation criteria was a regional project implemented by the International Financial Corporation, aiming to increase the employability of youth.

Support to training of diplomats and civil servants

Description: Under this component, junior diplomats from the priority countries have been trained in the Netherlands on a number of subjects including democratisation, rule of law, human rights and new forms of diplomacy such as economic diplomacy and public diplomacy. The training is given by the Clingendael Institute. Clingendael sends the invitation to the embassies concerned in The Hague, who in turn contact their Ministry for potential candidates. Clingendael may contact the Netherlands Embassy for advice if there are doubts about the experience or suitability of a suggested candidate.

Under the training of young diplomats' component a total of approximately EUR 1.4 million has been committed and by the end of 2013, 74% of the budget had been disbursed. The table below provides an overview of the number of participants per country. In the last training event, participants from Algeria and Yemen also participated. Over half of the participants came from Morocco and Tunisia. The low number of Egyptian participants is partly explained by the late start of government cooperation (this prevented Egyptian participation in the training courses held at the end of 2012) and the application of conditionality in 2013.

Table 7	Overview of the number of participants in the training of young diplomats, per country						
Training	no.	Egypt	Jordan	Morocco	Libya	Tunisia	Other	Total
2012 (1)	-	1	5	2	5	-	13
2013 (2)	3	3	3	4	4	-	17
2013 (3)	4	3	4	-	4	-	15
2013 (4)	-	4	5	4	5	-	18
2014 (5)	4	3	4	2	5	2	20
Total	**11**	**14**	**21**	**12**	**23**	**2**	**83**

Source: Matra South desk study.

Various training courses on public policy, governance and rule of law have been offered in the Netherlands to civil servants from the priority countries. DAM requested RVO to manage this component too, and in turn RVO contracted several training suppliers[32] to develop and deliver the training. The Dutch embassies in the priority countries facilitated the application

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[32] The Hague Academy for Local Governance, the Center for International Legal Cooperation, the Asser institute, Ecorys, The RijksAkademie and Wageningen University.

of participants through the dissemination of information on the courses, and advised on the selection of participants.

The table below provides an overview of the training courses provided and the number of civil servants trained per country in the period 2012-2014. Most participants came from Jordan and Tunisia. As explained earlier, participants from Egypt could not participate in all courses.

Table 8		Overview of the number of participants in the civil servant training, per country				
Training | no.	Egypt	Jordan	Morocco	Libya	Tunisia	Total
Administration of Justice (3)	9	19	14	12	18	72
Legislation (3)	8	22	9	12	18	69
Water policy (2)	4	11	11	11	12	49
Social Affairs and employment (2)	-	15	3	8	11	37
Public Finance Management I	-	3	2	4	3	12
Public Finance Management II	-	5	3	3	2	13
Local governance (2)	5	15	7	8	13	48
Food security	6	6	5	4	5	26
Total	32	96	54	62	82	326

Source: Matra South desk study.

Reflection on evaluation findings: The total amount allocated for the training courses developed (on public finance management, administration of justice, social affairs and employment, water management, legislation, food safety and local governance) amounts to approximately EUR 3 million, of which 54% had been disbursed by the end of 2013. The programme and management costs of the Clingendael diplomat training courses (of EUR 8250 per participant) and training courses (10%) subcontracted by RVO are considered reasonable. Certain training courses were perceived to be more useful than others in terms of their relevance to the local context. For example, the course on water policy was appreciated more by participants from Egypt than from Libya. The course on social affairs and employment was perceived as somewhat unusual for its Dutch approach and lack of context sensitivity. The course on public finance management was perceived as helpful. The training of junior diplomats included follow-up contact with alumni, via, for example, a Facebook page for network activities, discussions and support – including an alumni workshop to be organised in Morocco. The sustainability of the results achieved following training depends to a large extent on the degree to which the training results in changes at the institutional level. However, no information is available, for example, on the extent to which trainees have actually been able to use the skills and knowledge acquired and the perceived benefits at the organisational level.

Capacity building of political parties (PP)
Description: Under this component, Dutch political parties can receive a subsidy by submitting their proposal (or activity plans) for supporting political organisations in the priority countries (in the Arab region as well as Eastern Europe) to the Ministry of Interior and Kingdom relations (BZK).[33] The maximum amount of funding that political parties can apply for is based on their number of seats in Parliament. Following the Law on funding of Political Parties, political parties are completely free in their country selection. Nevertheless they are urged to allocate the subsidy to the priority countries. Every year, EUR 500,000 is allocated to capacity building projects of political organisations[34] amounting to a total budget of EUR 2 million. In 2012, total PP commitments were EUR 480,036 of which 95% was disbursed. The pie chart below shows the breakdown of the total budget allocations in 2012 per political party.

Figure 2   *Share of total allocations per political party (2012)*

Source: Matra South desk study.

Most of the budget went to the Labour Party (PvdA), the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) and the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA). For 2013 (and 2014), no overview could be provided, since from 2013 onwards the political parties received a single allocation to support their programmes in both the Arab region and Eastern Europe. However, given the rules relating to allocation, it is likely that the division of funds between the parties has remained more or less the same, with the exception that since 2013 the Party for the Animals (PvdD) has also requested funding. Even though political parties are completely free in their country selection, various political parties indicated that in practice about 90 to 95% is actually spent in the Arab region.

[33]   In 2012, the programme was managed by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but in 2013 this responsibility was transferred to the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.
[34]   Source: interviews and document, The Dutch House of Representatives (2012), 'Regels inzake de subsidiëring en het toezicht op de financiën van politieke partijen (Wet financiering politieke partijen); tweede nota van wijziging', 32 752, nr. 9

| 55 |

The activities by the various political parties[35] mostly included fact-finding missions and training activities (e.g. campaigning, leadership, presentation skills, etc.) and also the organisation of conferences and regional activities to build the capacity of political parties and of individuals (e.g. journalists, Christians and students). Based on the six activity plans and/or annual reports available, the desk study found that at least four parties are active in Jordan, three in Morocco and two in Tunisia and Egypt, while some regional activities (Lebanon) are also implemented. With regard to Libya, only fact-finding missions have taken place.

Reflection on evaluation findings: Both the literature research and fieldwork point to political sensitivities, as PP aid is perceived as helping certain political parties (Carothers 1999). Support from the PP component lacked a multipartisan approach, and demand varied between countries and also depended on the degree of political development in countries. Moreover, PP did not always focus on actual political parties and support was somewhat fragmented. At times, the emphasis on political ideology was considered problematic and encounters were considered more useful to those providing rather than receiving support:

Box 9   *On capacity building of political parties*

There is little interest from both sides.

It is mostly about organising meetings, conferences and seminars. We [in the Netherlands] learn more than they do.

Source: Interviews, Field Research in Egypt and Morocco.

It is likely that the fragmentation of the PP (capacity building of political organisations) programme among eight different political parties also affects management costs and reduces efficiency.

The MENA scholarship programme
Description: This scholarship programme (2013-2015) offers scholarships for short courses in the Netherlands to professionals who are nationals of the following 10 Arab countries: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Syria[36] and Tunisia. The programme aims to contribute to capacity building within a wide range of governmental, non-governmental and private organisations and institutions. Each year about 140 scholarships are available: these are distributed among the countries and assigned to equal numbers of male and female applicants. In 2013 about EUR 1 million was committed to in total 161 scholarships, including 30 scholarships for applicants from Tunisia and 25 scholarships for applicants from Morocco, but none from Egypt, Jordan and Libya.

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[35] The evaluation team did not have access to all activity plans as not all parties provided the necessary approval for disclosing the required information. Plans/annual reports were available for CDA, VVD, PvdA, PvdD, SGP and CU.

[36] The programme for Syria has been suspended.

Reflection on evaluation findings: The assumption of this scholarship programme is that attending a higher education institution outside the country of origin creates benefits that are different from those created by attending a domestic institution if at all available. By enabling students to receive high quality education in the Netherlands, the MENA scholarship programme may generate numerous benefits not only for individual participants but also for the countries of origin more generally. However, the scholarships offered are basically a one-off of limited duration, and the extent to which Arab countries realise the societal benefits of international study depends on whether scholarship recipients return to live and work in their countries after they complete the educational programme. The programme also offers a wide range of courses covering engineering, law and public administration, mathematics, commerce etc. As discussed in Chapter 3, education matters and potentially meets local needs. However, relatively wealthy Arab countries may have less need of support or be more interested in a different kind of collaboration.

4.3   The bilateral programme at a glance

The desk study revealed that at the beginning of the second quarter of 2014, EUR 36.1 million of programme resources[37] had been committed to support transition in a number of Arab countries, for a total of 120 individual projects.[38] The largest number of projects target priority countries. However, their budget does not exceed EUR 14 million and the lion's share of the budget is allocated either to regional projects or to non-priority countries in support of sustainable economic growth. The amount of budget committed to supporting democratisation is approximately EUR 7.5 million, which is five times as much as the budget committed to projects in the area of promoting rule of law, as demonstrated in the following table:

[37]   Excluding resources utilised for the MENA scholarship programme and the programme for capacity building of political parties.

[38]   Training courses are counted as one project in this overview.

Table 9	Overview of the number of projects and the budget committed (in EUR thousand) to the various policy objectives in Arab countries							
Policy objective	**Democratisation**		**Economic Growth**		**Rule of law**		**Total**	
Country	**Budget allocated**	**No. projects**	**Budget allocated**	**No. projects**	**Budget allocated**	**No. projects**	**Budget allocated**	**No. projects**
Arab region	4.038	13	2.514	6	372	1	6.924	20
Egypt	1.921	4	1.511	5	149	1	3.581	10
Jordan	77	3	2.074	8	243	6	2.394	17
Libya	278	5	24	1	582	7	884	13
Morocco	315	4	4.421	11	96	2	4.832	17
Tunisia	502	20	1.701	5	-	-	2.203	25
Other Arab countries[39]	400	1	14.901	17	-	-	15.301	18
Total	**7.531**	**50**	**27.146**	**53**	**1.442**	**17**	**36.119**	**120**

Source: Matra South desk study.

If the budget resources for the programme in support of political parties are included, then in total EUR 9.5 million has been spent on activities focusing on strengthening democratic processes. Projects in other Arab countries (Iraq, the Palestinian Territories and Yemen) account for 15% of the number of projects and 45% of the total budget. When analysing the type of projects it was found that capacity building of individuals and organisations featured most prominently, followed by projects on vocational training, awareness raising, lobby and advocacy, as well as conferences and seminars; few research and cultural activities featured in the projects.

The information available to analyse management costs for each bilateral programme component proved to be limited. Many different stakeholders are involved in implementing the programme, which raises doubts about the efficiency of the programme's organisational set-up and complicates the streamlining of the implementation of programmes. DAM is responsible for policy formulation and overall management of the Matra South programme. The management capacity is limited to one coordinator. The day-to-day management and implementation of many of the components has been contracted out to a plethora of external implementing agencies. The Dutch embassies in the priority countries are also involved, either in a facilitating and advisory role (e.g. as is the case for the G2G programme, the MENA scholarship programme and the training of civil servants) or by directly providing bilateral support (e.g. CSI component). In general, the embassies run thin on staffing for the implementation of the Matra South programme. The implementation of many programme components depends not only on local level interest but also on the capacity of embassies to promote, support and manage the programme content. Based on workload and performance, it does not make sense for embassies to be required to submit projects above the threshold of EUR 150,000 for headquarters' approval.

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39   Iraq, the Palestinian Territories and Yemen.

4.4 Conclusions

The bilateral programme has offered timely and flexible funding in support of a range of projects by key actors in countries in transition including youth, women, journalists and, for example, trade unions. The programme has enabled embassies to maintain and enlarge their networks at country level and gather knowledge effectively. However, the bilateral programme has provided little support to governments in transition and has mainly supported non-state actors. Balancing support for state and non-state actors in a purposeful way deserves attention. The amount of budget committed to promoting rule of law in countries in transition is small by comparison with the budgets supporting other policy objectives. From a programme perspective, findings indicate that a) the relevance of the programme for capacity building of political parties and organisations is low; b) the PSI programme does not sufficiently target priority countries and c) the efficiency of the Government-to-Government programme is poor.

On average, the selected projects (CSI, G2G and PSI) were given a satisfactory to very satisfactory score for effectiveness, indicating that they are likely to reach their planned outputs and objectives. However, it should be taken into account that this average score is based on the scores assigned to thirteen of the twenty sample projects, of which only six have ended. For the other seven projects, scores were assigned based on the available information and an assessment of the likelihood that the planned results will be achieved. On average, the sustainability of the selected projects (CSI, G2G and PSI) was found to be satisfactory too. Again, it was difficult to assess this criterion, because most of the projects selected are still ongoing. Whether the results achieved prove lasting also largely depends, however, on the external context in which projects are implemented and the trained people work. Given the volatile environment in many of the countries, the sustainability of the results achieved cannot be guaranteed.

Fragmentation of financial support is a concern, both in terms of the programme as a whole (including its organisation) and within individual programme components. This makes it harder to achieve significant results. It was therefore not possible to measure the attainment of programme and policy objectives beyond the level of projects.

5

The multilateral approach

Evaluation highlights
- Multilateral expenditures increased in the Arab priority countries.
- Not all multilateral programmes explicitly aim to foster democracy and rule of law.
- EU response in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings: too little, too slow.
- Dutch multilateral contributions made support to transition in Arab countries appear larger.

The Ministry's investment in the multilateral system is significant, and the Ministry also considered its multilateral cooperation to play a role in responding to the Arab uprisings. This chapter will provide an overview of the EU response and subsequently the UN response to the Arab uprisings, given the substantial Dutch investments in the multilateral channels shown[40] below:

Dutch contribution/period	Organisation/programme
EUR 200 million / 2011-2013	European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) with a total budget of EUR 4 billion
EUR 40 million / 2011-2013	New financial EU resources, of which EUR 800 million can be allocated to Southern neighbouring countries
EUR 290 million / 2011-2013 [41]	Loans to the Southern neighbouring region through the European Investment Bank totalling EUR 5.8 billion
Allocation not specified [42]	World Bank, African Development Bank, International Monetary Fund, European Investment Bank
General contribution, allocation not specified	UNDP,[43] OHCHR, WFP, UNICEF, FAO, UNHCR, etc.
Mediterranean Dialogue and partnership for security, furthering G8 decisions and the US-EU agreements promoting reforms in the wider Middle East	NATO (Libya)

It will focus on EU and UN support aimed at Dutch priority countries both prior to and after the Arab uprisings. The flow of financial resources will be examined, including the objectives of programmes.

As discussed in Chapter 1, this evaluation focuses on bilateral support and no evaluation research scrutinised individual EU and UN programmes or projects. The next chapter will discuss the application of policy principles that include conditionality or the more-for-more principle which was also intended to play a key role in the EU response towards individual countries.

[40] See the letter to the House of Representatives (Parliamentary Paper 32 623, no. 40) of 24 June 2011 on the Netherlands' activities in the Arab region.
[41] For Egypt, for example, EUR 449 million was reserved, of which EUR 22 million was the Netherlands' contribution (2011-2013).
[42] By way of illustration, IBRD/IDA operations for 2013 amounted to USD 585.4 million in Egypt, USD 183.5 million in Algeria and USD 593.2 million in Morocco. International financial institutions focused in the first instance on Tunisia (World Bank USD 1.5 billion, African Development Bank USD 500 million) and Egypt (World Bank USD 4.5 billion, IMF USD 20 billion).
[43] UNDP plays a role in the UN coordination of efforts and has drawn up a Strategy of Response to Transformative Change Championed by Youth in the Arab Region. It focuses on improving governance and economic development (especially on creating jobs for young people).

5.1   The EU response to the Arab uprisings

After the Council adopted its Conclusions on Democracy Support in the EU's External Relations in 2009, the EU expressed its intention to increase its efforts to support democracy. The EU democracy support activities are based on Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union: 'The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law'.[44] The EU considers democracy to be the political system that through proper mechanisms best allows people to enjoy their civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights.[45]

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was developed in 2004 with the overall objective of creating a friendly neighbours programme and strengthening the prosperity, stability and security of all concerned, given the enlargement of the EU. The ENP is chiefly a bilateral policy between the EU and each partner country and has become the main vehicle for EU funding in Arab countries. It is complemented by other regional and multilateral cooperation initiatives formerly known as the Barcelona Process. Within the ENP the EU offers 16[46] countries, nine of which are Arab countries, 'a privileged relationship, building upon a mutual commitment to common values (democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development)' (EU website).[47] The ENP covers a broad range of issues: from employment and social policy, trade, industrial and competition policy, to agriculture and rural development, climate change and environment. These include energy security, transport, research and innovation, as well as support to health, education, culture and youth. Fourteen countries have formalised their contact with the EU in Association Agreements (AAs): the exceptions are Syria and Libya, where either ratification or negotiations are pending. The European Commission provides financial support in grant form to partners; the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development complement this support through loans.

The EU has mobilised a range of financial instruments to support the process of transition in Arab partner countries but the bulk of the funding has been provided by the ENP Instrument (ENPI). The EU response to the Arab uprisings also included new financial resources made available from the end of 2011 and provided through the ENPI by means of the SPRING programme (Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth) and regional cooperation programmes. EU Delegations were also expected to work closely with partner governments, EU Member States and international stakeholders to identify and support initiatives for support under the SPRING programme.

[44]   See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:FULL&from=en.
[45]   See http://eeas.europa.eu/democracy_support/index_en.htm.
[46]   Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestinian Territories, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine.
[47]   See http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/about-us/index_en.htm (last consulted on January 10, 2015).

The following table provides an overview of the resources committed to each Arab country under the ENPI both prior to and after the Arab uprisings. It shows not only the amounts committed under the ENPI, but also the actual disbursements to the Arab countries prioritised by the Netherlands, i.e. Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. There are notable differences between what has been committed and what has actually been disbursed in the priority countries, especially since the Arab uprisings.

Table 10	EU financial support to Arab countries incl. amounts committed under ENPI (in EUR million) for all Arab countries, and actual disbursements to the Dutch priority countries					
Country	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total
Algeria Amount committed	35.6	59	58	74	30	**256.6**
Egypt Amount committed	140	192	92	250	47	**721**
Actual disbursements	151	106.2	39.1	93.2	28.2	**417.7**
Jordan Amount committed	68	70	116	120[48]	88[49]	**462**
Actual disbursements	49	92	76.3	91.6	96	**404.9**
Lebanon Amount committed	43	44	33	92[50]	76	**288**
Libya Amount committed	0	12	10	25	30	**77**
Actual disbursements			8	2.9	7.7	**18.6**
Morocco Amount committed	145	158.9	166.6	207	334.9	**1012.4**
Actual disbursements	220.7	170.1	151.5	110.1	84.1	**736.5**
Palestinian Territories Amount committed	352.6	367.9	413.7	224	313.7	**1671.9**
Syria Amount committed	40	50	10	48.4	170	**318.4**

[48] Not including special measures to support Syrian refugees in Jordan: EUR 20.85 million committed in 2013 and EUR 51.6 million in 2013; those commitments are included in the figures for Syria.
[49] Ditto.
[50] Not including special measures to support Syrian refugees in Lebanon: EUR 15 million committed in 2012 and EUR 67 million in 2013: these are included in the figures for Syria.

Tunisia Amount committed	77	77	180	130	135	**599**
Actual disbursements	74.4	68.5	114.3	145.2	80.3	**482.7**
Total commitments	901.2	1030.8	1079.3	1170.4	1224.6	**5406.3**
Regional/interregional cooperation South	99*	99.4	104.6	114.2*	118.2	**535,4**
Grand Total commitments	**1000.2**	**1130.2**	**1183.9**	**1284.6**	**1342.8**	**5941.7**[51]

Excluding amounts for the European Parliament (EP) preparatory actions (EUR 2 million in 2009 and EUR 1.5 million in 2012).

Source: European Commission http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/2014/stats/statistical_annex_2014.pdf (as on January 10, 2015).

In the case of Egypt, for example, in 2012 an amount of EUR 150 million was programmed, an amount of EUR 250 million committed and an amount of EUR 93.2 million was disbursed under the ENPI (including Neighbourhood Investment Facility payments). EU financial support to Egypt and Libya experienced extreme underutilisation; Jordan and Tunisia fared somewhat better. In Morocco, expenditures exceeded commitments prior to the Arab uprising, with reported under-expenditures as of 2012. In all priority countries the total expenditures are lower than the amounts committed over the period of five years from 2009 to 2013. Moreover, the ENPI expenditures recorded in the five priority countries also include country interregional Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) payments.

The inaccessibility, bureaucratic slowness and inflexibility of EU instruments was lamented by numerous interviewees and did not enable a rapid or pragmatic response of any kind in Arab countries in transition:

Box 10   *On EU support in Arab countries in transition*

If we would have been able to react more quickly with some of our instruments…
It would have been much better … at least to have some part of the neighbourhood programme which could react faster … I mean a month, not three years because you are always behind the curve. We are too slow, we are just too slow. There is no simple way out, the EU is what it is. We have a lot more to satisfy … Parliament is more powerful.

Every country is so different. How can you apply these things across the board.
I know they do it, with good intentions. By the time you get through the bureaucracy it has changed again… You have to swim in this turbulent sea, act pragmatically.

Source: Interviews Field Research.

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[51]   Excluding ENPI cross-border cooperation.

At the same time, the objectives of the EU bilateral programme prior to and after 2011 remained more or less the same, as demonstrated below. When comparing the five countries of Dutch focus, only in the case of Jordan was a substantial amount of actual expenditures (34.1%) spent on supporting the country's reforms to democracy, human rights, media and justice in the period 2011-2013.

The pie charts below, comparing expenditures prior to and after the Arab uprisings and corresponding objectives, show that most EU assistance in Egypt was oriented towards sustainable development and not directly towards promoting democracy and the rule of law:

Figure 3   *Comparing EU financial support to Egypt prior to and after the Arab uprisings*

What EU financial support to Egypt was actually spent on prior to the Arab uprisings (2007-2010):

- Support for reforms to democracy, human rights and justice is 6.7%
- Developing competitiveness and productivity of the Egyptian economy is 44.8%
- Ensuring sustainability of the development process with better management of human and natural resources is 48.9%

What EU financial support to Egypt was actually spent on after the Arab uprisings (2011-2013):

- Support for reforms to democracy, human rights and justice is 0%
- Developing competitiveness and productivity of the Egyptian economy is 43.1%
- Support for socioeconomic reform and sustainable development is 56.9%

In Morocco, the bilateral programme objectives in the period 2007-2010 remained similar to those in 2011-2013. The pie charts below show that social sector expenditures remained important throughout these years, expenditures for institutional support increased and there was a slight increase in expenditures oriented towards governance and human rights (from 1.1 % prior to 2011 to 7.8% post 2011):

Figure 4   *Comparing EU financial support to Morocco prior to and after the Arab uprisings*

What EU financial support to Morocco was actually spent on prior to the Arab uprisings (2007-2010):

- Social sector is 44.6%
- Governance, human rights is 1.1%
- Institutional support is 12.5%
- Economic sector is 35.1%
- Environmental sector is 6.7%

What EU financial support to Morocco was actually spent on after the Arab uprisings (2011-2013):

- Social sector is 33.9%
- Governance, human rights is 7.8%
- Institutional support is 43.6%
- Economic sector is 10.3%
- Environmental sector is 6.4%

Relations between the EU and Libya improved as of 2007-8 and initially EU assistance was rendered to the Benghazi Action Plan on HIV/Aids. In 2010 the EU committed funds to migration and an EU Delegation was opened in November 2011. A revised National Indicative Programme 2011-2013 was signed on 30 August 2012. Analysis of actual expenditures revealed notable differences again between what was programmed, what was committed and what was disbursed. In the case of Libya, for example, in 2012 an amount of EUR 25 million was programmed, an amount of EUR 25 million was committed and an amount of EUR 2.9 million was disbursed.

In Libya, during the period 2011-2013, actual expenditures were oriented towards support to the transition process (37%), improving the quality of human capital (29%), increasing the sustainability of economic and social development (16.7%) and jointly addressing the challenge of managing migration (16.7%). Libya received some EU aid through a number of other instruments, including SPRING allocations and support under thematic instruments, of which humanitarian aid was the largest in 2011 (EUR 80.5 million). In Tunisia, the objectives of governance and justice as well as of employment and social protection utilised far fewer resources than planned and the lion's share of resources actually contributed to business competitiveness (industry and services).

The issues of not adapting the priorities for EU financial assistance to changing realities on the ground and doing little to promote democracy have been raised in a number of evaluation reports and by a number of researchers (EC 2011, EC 2013, Lehne 2014 and Bicchi 2014).

5.2   The UN response to the Arab uprisings

A series of both controversial and influential UN reports[52] on the Arab region between 2001 and 2005 highlighted a number of potential drivers of instability, including the lack of freedom of speech and democratic participation. The Arab Human Development Reports continued to discuss challenges to human security in the Arab countries and argued that governments pursued state security instead, with the result that the region experienced personal insecurity and 'the world's highest levels of unemployment, deep and contentious patterns of exclusion, and, ultimately, strong calls from within for reform' (Arab Human Development Report 2009: v).[53] Interestingly, governance used to be part and parcel of UNDP's regional programme for Arab states, including the Programme on Governance for the Arab Region (POGAR). This programme rested on three pillars: a) rule of law; b) parliaments; and c) knowledge management. It also engaged Arab governments on the topic of anti-corruption at a regional scale (UNDP Evaluation Office 2013). Similar to the early bilateral Matra support in Arab countries, UNDP terminated its regional Programme on Governance in the Arab Region (POGAR) in 2009, even though it had generated a number of specialised projects.

[52] The UNDP Arab Human Development Reports 2002-2005 were subtitled *Creating Opportunities for Future Generations, Building a Knowledge Society, Towards Freedom in the Arab World and Towards the Rise of Women in the Arab World.*

[53] According to Amat Al Alim Alsoswa, then Assistant Secretary-General and Assistant Administrator, Regional Director, Regional Bureau for Arab States, United Nations Development Programme.

Considering the unearmarked voluntary contributions[54] (mentioned above) by the Ministry to UN agencies, an analysis of the UN system response to the Arab uprisings has to take into account the multiplicity of the UN agencies involved, as well as the various focus areas and different programme objectives. UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, UNFPA, ILO and UNHCR are key recipients in the context of the Arab uprisings and each agency has its own particular added value. At country level, UN Country Teams representing the in-country agencies formulate a United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) together with governments, as a collective multi-year programme of work. UNDAF documents covering the priority countries[55] demonstrate that prior to 2011 the areas of focus represented country-level development challenges and the Millennium Declaration of 2000.

The following overview provides insight into the expenditures (2009-2013) by a large number of UN agencies in the Arab priority countries:

Table 11	Expenditures of a number of UN[56] agencies in Arab priority countries in 2009-2013 in USD thousand						
Country	**UN organisation**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**	**Total expenditures**
Libya	UNDP	4.376	4.416	656	12.858	11.145	**33.450**
	UNWOMEN	0	0	12	1	0	**12**
	DPA	n.a.	n.a.	13.929	38.883	47.051	**99.863**
	UNSMIL	n.a.	n.a.	9.517	44.737	44.737	**98.991**
	UNHCR	4.057	2.701	10.907	12.657	6.720	**37.043**
	UNICEF	n.a	n.a.	n.a.	7	2.476	**2.483**
	WHO	531	414	1.247	5.009	2.458	**9.659**
	UNFPA	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	751	699	**1.450**
	FAO	903	1.114	917	703	1.143	**4.781**
	WFP	n.a.	n.a.	7.075	557	n.a.	**7.632**
	Total	**9.867**	**8.645**	**44.259**	**116.164**	**116.430**	**295.364**

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[54] The unearmarked financial contribution to specialised UN agencies will amount to approximately EUR 461 million in 2015 in total (UNDP receives EUR 41 million, UNFPA EUR 42 million, UNICEF EUR 50 million, WFP EUR 40 million and UNHCR EUR 33 million). Response by the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation to questions asked during discussions on the budget, 19 November 2014.

[55] There is no UNDAF document covering Libya.

[56] For the purpose of comparison: IOB was informed that UNDP data on 2009 may differ from data shown on the IATI site and UNHCR expenditures are based on UN System Accounting Standards (UNSAS).

Country	UN organisation	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total expenditures
Egypt	UNDP	75.343	51.857	71.358	75.067	51.585	**325.210**
	UNWOMEN	0	9	943	3.571	4.300	**8.823**
	UNHCR	7.906	10.618	19.343	20.664	37.651	**96.181**
	ILO	n.a.	1.714	1.879	4.497	7.056	**15.146**
	UNICEF	10.549	7.019	7.953	6.251	8.206	**39.979**
	FAO	4.344	2.613	1.930	967	1.587	**11.441**
	WFP	5.350	9.349	10.262	10.821	12.496	**48.279**
	WHO	5.934	1.758	3.240	2.332	5.416	**18.681**
	UNFPA	3.128	3.220	3.534	2.970	2.391	**15.243**
	Total	**112.553**	**88.159**	**120.443**	**127.140**	**130.688**	**578.984**
Jordan	UNDP	6.564	3.411	4.075	6.096	9.761	**29.907**
	UNWOMEN	7.223	8.621	2.106	3.383	3.258	**24.592**
	UNRWA	103.949	114.824	111.237	133.154	136.977	**600.141**
	UNHCR	40.765	30.895	27.204	85.759	234.034	**418.657**
	ILO	n.a.	1.730	1.856	3.387	3.398	**10.371**
	UNICEF	7.388	7.630	6.471	11.896	98.335	**131.719**
	FAO	173	337	377	174	48	**1.109**
	WFP	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	2.227	1.044	**3.272**
	WHO	5.669	1.659	2.265	3.183	9.819	**22.595**
	UNFPA	785	1.513	1.067	1.885	4.204	**9.454**
	Total	**172.516**	**170.620**	**156.659**	**251.144**	**500.878**	**1.251.817**
Morocco	UNDP	15.877	11.597	12.831	14.078	11.670	**66.053**
	UNWOMEN	3.614	3.804	1.803	3.333	2.565	**15.119**
	UNHCR	1.577	1.736	2.147	2.194	2.188	**9.841**
	ILO	n.a.	708	929	654	1.276	**3.567**
	UNICEF	4.624	3.996	4.526	3.400	4.137	**20.683**
	WFP	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	98	26	**124**
	FAO	949	834	962	229	219	**3.193**

Country	UN organisation	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total expenditures
	WHO	2.214	1.158	1.543	791	1.597	**7.303**
	UNFPA	3.068	2.819	2.597	2.272	1.535	**12.290**
	Total	**31.923**	**26.652**	**27.338**	**27.049**	**25.212**	**138.174**
Tunisia	UNDP	1.986	1.496	3.369	8.456	19.260	**34.568**
	UNWOMEN	0	0	408	503	361	**1.271**
	DPA	n.a.	n.a.	68	135	113	**316**
	UNHCR	648	984	35.650	11.969	8.200	**57.452**
	ILO	n.a.	199	362	1.388	358	**2.307**
	FAO	604	521	290	649	930	**2.994**
	UNICEF	1.362	1.146	3.415	1.623	1.635	**9.181**
	WFP	n.a.	n.a.	401	845	586	**1.833**
	WHO	1.565	743	1.863	1.238	1.356	**6.765**
	UNFPA	684	573	948	739	636	**3.580**
	Total	**6.849**	**5.662**	**46.774**	**27.545**	**33.436**	**120.266**
Grand total		**333.708**	**299.738**	**395.473**	**549.042**	**806.644**	**2.384.605**

Note: the totals have been calculated from the exact values, not from the rounded values shown in the table.

In general, total UN expenditures increased in the Arab priority countries following the Arab uprisings, with Morocco and Tunisia receiving more support in 2011 than in 2013. However, not all expenditures were directed at supporting good governance and not all agencies have a corresponding mandate. For this reason, UNDP efforts in the Arab region were analysed in more detail.

Table 12	Detailed breakdown of UNDP expenditures in Arab priority countries in 2009-2013 by objectives, in USD thousand						
Country	**UNDP objectives**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**	**Total expenditures**
Libya	**Democratic governance**	511	181	319	12.223	10.312	**23.545**
	Environment & sustainable development	2.391	3.866	165	218	297	**6.936**
	Poverty reduction & MDG achievement	1.379	368	137	356	363	**2.604**
	Other development activities	96	0	35	61	173	**366**
	Total	**4.376**	**4.416**	**656**	**12.858**	**11.145**	**33.450**
Egypt	**Democratic governance**	6.257	7.836	5.660	5.689	5.327	**30.769**
	Environment & sustainable development	3.577	2.567	2.508	2.674	3.311	**14.636**
	Poverty reduction & MDG achievement	62.862	39.742	60.998	53.226	33.711	**250.538**
	Crisis prevention & recovery	2.573	1.713	1.600	1.827	1.030	**8.742**
	Other development activities	75	0	592	11.651	8.206	**20.524**
	Total	**75.343**	**51.857**	**71.358**	**75.067**	**51.585**	**325.210**
Jordan	**Democratic governance**	860	649	1.306	2.099	2.590	**7.504**
	Environment & sustainable development	464	331	1.068	2.141	4.713	**8.716**
	Poverty reduction & MDG achievement	779	811	708	998	1.506	**4.802**
	Crisis prevention & recovery	4.147	1.511	818	715	764	**7.955**
	Other development activities	314	109	175	142	189	**929**
	Total	**6.564**	**3.411**	**4.075**	**6.096**	**9.761**	**29.907**

Country	UNDP objectives	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total expenditures
Tunisia	**Democratic governance**	447	437	123	2.726	10.940	**14.674**
	Environment & sustainable development	796	859	873	2.146	3.304	**7.977**
	Poverty reduction & MDG achievement	100	0	9	30	9	**147**
	Other development activities	644	200	2.365	3.554	5.007	**11.770**
	Total	**1.986**	**1.496**	**3.369**	**8.456**	**19.260**	**34.568**
Morocco	**Democratic governance**	8.794	11.585	12.647	13.732	10.195	**56.953**
	Environment & sustainable development	5.775	0	0	68	349	**6.192**
	Poverty reduction & MDG achievement	962	0	0	92	531	**1.586**
	Other development activities	346	12	184	185	595	**1.322**
	Total	**15.877**	**11.597**	**12.831**	**14.078**	**11.670**	**66.053**
Grand total							**489.188**

Note: the totals have been calculated from the exact values, not from the rounded values shown in the table.

The UNDP's 'Democratic governance' expenditures 2009-2013 show that the expenditures during this period were substantial, especially in Morocco, with little spent on other objectives. Expenditures on democratic governance increased after 2011 in Libya, Jordan and Tunisia. Throughout the period, expenditures generally increased in Libya, Jordan and Tunisia, whereas Morocco and Egypt remained somewhat similar and decreased in 2013 in comparison to earlier years. In Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia, most programmes focus on other goals and not so much on democratic governance. With the exception of Egypt, the expenditures covering support to democratic governance increased in the Arab priority countries after 2011. In the period 2009-2013, UNDP expenditures on democratic governance amounted to 27% of UNDP's total expenditures in the Arab priority countries.

5.3   Conclusions

Multilateral aid, particularly when delivered through the EU or the UN, potentially allows for the efficient pooling of financial resources. Particularly in the face of budgetary constraints, it potentially allows individual donors to still make a significant contribution by pooling resources with others. Especially when the UN works on an agenda for democratisation, this also suggests that democratisation matters worldwide and is not exclusively the concern of EU Member States or of a particular country such as the Netherlands. However, because of its elaborate programme planning cycles, multilateral aid does require time to adjust to changes on the ground. The EU response in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings has been especially criticised for using instruments which lack flexibility in country-specific situations where change is ongoing.

In the period under review, multilateral expenditures increased in the Arab priority countries. However, four years after the Arab uprisings the number of multilateral programmes that explicitly aim at sustainable transitions in the Arab priority countries, and especially support democratisation and the development of rule of law, remain few. Listing Dutch investments in the multilateral channel made support to transition in Arab countries appear much more substantial than is actually the case at the level of individual countries and programmes. Not all multilateral organisations and programmes can be assumed to automatically support the implementation of Dutch policy objectives.

6

Diplomacy and principles

Evaluation highlights
- Diplomacy is an important instrument to support transition.
- Delivering aid bilaterally or multilaterally is a key decision.
- Conditionality does not work.
- Coordination is limited.
- Some existing bilateral instruments have worked better than others.
- A prerequisite for success is demand for change.

This chapter will shed light on the role of diplomacy in supporting the bilateral programme of democratic transition and the application of the policy principles stated as underpinning the Dutch contribution to transition in the Arab region.

6.1 The role of diplomacy

Diplomacy is the act of dealing with other nations, usually through negotiation and discussion. Most diplomacy occurs behind the scenes, as officials often meet privately to discuss key issues. Diplomacy involves meetings and sending diplomatic messages, as well as making public statements unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally about the relationship between countries. Research on the role of diplomacy in supporting democratic transition is limited. Trying to understand and monitor processes of change, assessing reactions in-country, gauging the temperature and comparing notes are part and parcel of diplomacy. To gain more insight into the use of diplomacy to promote democracy, rule of law and economic growth in the five Arab priority countries, the content of diplomatic cables was analysed.

Diplomatic messages are a source of information and provide insight into topics of special interest and the implementation of policies at country level. Besides a fine-grained qualitative analysis of 403 diplomatic cables described briefly in Chapter 1 (see also Annex 6) an experimental pilot study was carried out with automated text-mining.[57] This study included the entire collection of diplomatic messages related to the five priority countries (Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, and Jordan) through topic modelling[58] and compared the number of documents discussing democratic transition. Figure 5 shows that the Arab uprisings and political turmoil were reflected from the end of 2010 by an increase in references to the issue of democratic transition in line with the political flux in the priority countries:

| 75 |

[57] The word basket used for coding was: demonstration, union, unrest, protest, violence, revolution, social movement, democracy, reform, political parties, Muslim brotherhood, change, transition, democratisation, crisis.
[58] Topic modelling provides a suite of algorithms to reveal hidden thematic structure in large collections of texts.

Figure 5 *Insight into the number of diplomatic messages on 'democratic transition' in priority countries (2009-2013)*

The qualitative MaxQDA analysis of diplomatic cables confirms a special interest in human rights and gender equality already prior to the Arab uprisings. Aside from reporting on events, messages discuss bilateral and multilateral diplomacy in relation to political pluriformity, the monitoring of elections and promotion of human rights. Diplomatic efforts to monitor and promote freedom of religion focus on Egypt, and related messages show a substantial increase in 2011. Post 2011, diplomatic messages also increasingly report on LGBT rights, considered sensitive in practically all Arab countries. Besides bilateral diplomacy in the area of human rights, both diplomatic messages and field research also demonstrate the importance of coalition building and multilateral EU diplomacy, especially in the area of human rights.

Diplomatic responses range from expressing concern about repeated use of excessive force against demonstrators and human rights abuses, civil society space, and the destruction of churches, to condemning acts of terrorism both bilaterally and multilaterally. Multilateral responses consisted of joint declarations by UN member states as well as EU statements at the level of the Human Rights Council.[59] Post 2011, the issue of security gains prominence in diplomatic cables. Messages also display growing attention to bilateral opportunities for collaboration in priority areas, given the launch of the Matra South programme. Diplomatic messages show a high and sustained political interest in Morocco in comparison to the other Arab priority countries, with visits by a number of Dutch ministers from various ministries. Visits by the Minister of Foreign Affairs focused on Jordan and Egypt, with visits to Libya and Tunisia taking place after the uprisings.

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[59]   http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un_geneva/press_corner/all_news/news/2013/hrc_en.htm.

Box 11   *On diplomacy*

I always try to combine our position with other EU positions. For instance, a document criticising Egypt for oppressing demonstrations was signed by other EU countries, Japan and the United States. Acting together is preferable.

Source: Interviews Field Research.

In the literature, multilateral diplomacy is often considered more rewarding for finding and formulating solutions to global challenges which are transnational in nature and include issues of human rights and security.

Diplomatic messages also provide anecdotal information on the Matra South programme, the relevance of its components from a country-level perspective and discussions about individual project proposals. Regarding the application of policy principles, diplomatic messages discuss issues related to conditionality and coordination at country level. The practical application of conditionality is most often discussed. Most problematic are considered to be the absence of a unified stand among EU Member States because of their varied political and economic interests and perspectives, and the lack of donor leverage due to huge sums offered by the Gulf countries. Strong local resentment to the application of conditionality are recorded in Egypt and Tunisia in particular. Coordination among donors and international financial institutions in Arab priority countries is still developing, with the exception of Egypt, where donor coordination was already in place prior to the Arab uprisings.[60] Efforts to coordinate donors are greatest in the area of human rights and are linked to diplomacy.

As discussed in Chapter 3, the Ministry stated that it would apply a number of principles in pursuing its policy response to the Arab uprisings. The application of policy principles will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

6.2   Policy principles in practice

This section will reflect on the application of principles in the context of supporting transition in the Arab region. The Ministry's overarching principles driving policy implementation consisted of:
- effective action through bilateral and multilateral channels;
- a demand-driven approach;
- intelligent conditionality, based on policy objectives;
- no new structures but a review of existing structures using existing budgetary instruments;
- effective national and international coordination.

[60]   A Donor Assistance Group (DAG) for Egypt was launched in the late 1990s as an initiative of the then UN Resident Coordinator. It still exists.

Bilateral and multilateral channels

No single aid instrument can cover the broad range of policy objectives in support of transition in all Arab countries. The Dutch policy objectives include democratisation, development of the rule of law and protection of human rights, and economic growth. Whether financial aid in support of these objectives is delivered bilaterally or multilaterally is a key decision. Bilateral aid was more clearly oriented towards Dutch policy objectives and has the potential to serve specific national interests in a way that multilateral aid cannot. Dutch bilateral aid also proved to be rapid and flexible in its support to emerging opportunities in priority countries (see Chapter 4). In contrast, the EU response with its elaborate programme planning cycles took longer to adjust to changes in the Arab countries studied (see Chapter 5).

On the other hand, when the UN works on an agenda for democratisation, this suggests that democracy matters worldwide and is not exclusively the problem of a particular country and an interested donor country. Multilateral aid also potentially allows for the efficient pooling of financial resources. Particularly in the face of budgetary constraints, it allows individual donors to still make a significant contribution through combining resources with others. However, democracy assistance is not necessarily a significant and visible part of the assistance provided by the EU and the UN, as demonstrated in Chapter 5. A policy which introduces bilateral and multilateral channels for supporting democratic transition in the Arab countries has to discuss and consider the balance between bilateral and multilateral aid. It also needs to take into consideration the focus and performance of multilateral programmes at country level.

A demand-driven approach

As described earlier, the demand-oriented approach is especially reflected in the programme component of supporting CSI. Staff at embassies are in the best position to judge local actors and factors and assess individual proposals and requests for support. Evaluation findings demonstrate that in general, embassy staff managed to identify actors and proposals for CSI support which oftentimes corresponded with the actors of change identified in Chapter 2. Notably, bilateral support was pro-actively extended to strengthen the trade union movement and investigative journalism in Egypt, support youth and the rise of civil society in Libya, and support both transparency and human rights in Morocco. Other Matra South programme components, for example the training of civil servants and G2G assistance,[61] were less demand-driven, as discussed in Chapter 4, and initiated either by the Ministry or the RVO.

Conditionality

Since the beginning of the Arab uprisings the Ministry has strongly advocated the importance of the application of conditionality. A central concept of both bilateral and EU aid has been the idea of providing more political and financial support to those Arab countries that implement more reforms and become more democratic, and providing less political and financial support to those countries that are making less progress towards

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[61]   Collaboration between Ombudsmen and Courts of Audit.

democracy. However, no strategy or policy has been developed on how to deal with a transition government or de facto government and the Ministry has never defined or elaborated the idea of an intelligent or smart application of conditionality.

An example of the mismatch between the aspirations related to conditionality and the actual implementation of conditionality in practice is provided by Egypt, where it proved cumbersome and not particularly effective to cancel and resume the Dutch exit strategy of development projects.[62] One cannot also simply hold individual government officials accountable for a change of behaviour of governments. Moreover, strategic, economic and other interests of bilateral donors and EU Member States compete with the objective of supporting the development of democratic governance and consistent application of conditionality. Furthermore, it is not easy to accurately monitor progress or regression in the process of change. Nor should one overestimate the leverage of foreign assistance, and especially of bilateral assistance. The incentives for recipient governments may be too small given the assistance received from other parties, especially from the Gulf States.

Box 12   *On conditionality*

More for more is dead, more for more is not being applied ... there has been little conditionality. Egypt reacts very badly to negative conditionality. They say 'why conditions? You should help us'. The problem is that the EU is not consistent.

I do not think it works here very well... they receive 4 billion USD on a three-month basis from Saudi Arabia: cash for oil... where is the carrot?

I do not think it would work here because you need someone who is in control of things to attach a condition. What people sometimes overlook is that a programme may not generate gains but losses. Holding the ground, not letting things slip further is difficult enough ... The biggest risk here is that people do not feel that good things are happening, the disillusionment.

Source: Interviews, Field Research in Egypt and Libya.

Finally, the concept of conditionality has also not changed the way in which either the Netherlands or the EU spends its money in, for example, Tunisia, which – unlike Egypt or Algeria – seems to be persevering in its transition towards democratic governance. It should also be noted that EU membership of neighbouring Arab countries is not on the cards and EU leverage over Arab countries is significantly lower than over Central and Eastern European countries where the application of conditionality also proved problematic. A regression analysis of data from 36 countries has indicated that the effects of conditionality 'become weaker and inconsistent if the EU offers less than membership or association'.[63] If a

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[62] Dutch cooperation with the Egyptian government was effectively suspended on 15 August 2013 after the violent actions of the Egyptian army. This cooperation was resumed at the end of October 2013.

[63] Schimmelfennig, Frank and Hanno Scholtz. 2008. 'EU Democracy Promoting in the European Neighbourhood'. In: *European Union Politics*, pp. 189-190.

government does not want to reform, it will not change its mind simply because more or less assistance is offered. The imposition of reforms may even create resentment, but long-lasting political reform needs strong ownership. The literature on democratic transitions and conditionality suggests that donors have very little influence on initiating policy reform. Foreign assistance can at best support democratic transition, as it needs local commitment.

Existing instruments

A number of existing bilateral instruments, particularly the human rights fund and the fund for advancing women, proved helpful in the provision of rapid and flexible assistance in a number of priority countries following the Arab uprisings. The stability fund proved of less value and importance. Evaluation findings show that there is no 'one size fits all' for supporting Arab countries in transition. Some bilateral instruments used earlier in Central and Eastern European countries proved helpful in Arab priority countries and include support to CSI. At the same time, the demand for the existing PSI programme in the Arab priority countries turned out to be very low, as detailed in Chapter 4.

Coordination

All donors, including Arab donors,[64] are increasingly recognising the importance of coordinating their support. In the priority countries, in-country donor coordination and leadership varies. Donor agencies in countries such as Egypt have a strong history of coordinating development assistance, but this is not the case in the other Arab priority countries.

Box 13   *On coordination*

Following the revolution there was a rush of organisations to Libya but they do not know what to do, there is a lack of coordination, lack of understanding.

Source: Interviews, Field Research in Libya.

Often, donors share information and collaborate on one or more specific programmes or projects. At the same time, donor coordination is critically dependent on individual staff members from different donor agencies. Over time, individual staff members of the Dutch embassy in Cairo played key roles in the coordination of efforts to promote human rights and advance the status of women. Given the current limited size of in-country bilateral assistance and the limited human resources available at that embassy, coordination is mostly informal and not necessarily organised around supporting transition and reform.

[64]   Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are three of the largest official donors in the Gulf.

6.3   Conclusions

Evaluation findings indicate that democracy, human rights and security become key topics when engaging diplomatically with Arab countries in transition. Understanding the processes of change, assessing the reactions in-country and comparing notes become part and parcel of diplomacy and clearly aim to complement financial assistance and support the implementation of the Ministry's policy objectives. Diplomacy is an important undertaking for countries in transition and in the Arab region, given the prevailing political strife, violent conflict and insecurity. Coalition building and multilateral diplomacy have proved to be important to further the implementation of Dutch policy objectives in Arab priority countries, especially in the area of human rights.

Looking back at the application of principles, this evaluation provides a reality check. Whether support to democratisation, the rule of law and economic growth are delivered bilaterally or multilaterally is a key decision: a decision that should be based on the strategies and performance of multilateral organisations at country level and on how the funding is actually used. Getting the mix of bilateral and multilateral aid right also entails acknowledging that bilateral aid has the potential to nurture bilateral relations. Supporting demand for change is essential and has worked well in conjunction with efforts to support civil society. Conditionality has not worked and has proved to be truly problematic when supporting Arab countries in transition. Coordination among donors at country level is limited and mostly informal.

The implementation of support to Arab countries in the aftermath of the Arab uprising is anything but easy, given the volatile and rapidly changing context. Studies show that good implementation – especially of democracy assistance – is difficult (Carothers 1999: 218). Evaluating the contribution of Dutch support to achieving Dutch policy objectives four years after the Arab uprisings has also been difficult.

Annexes

Annex 1   About IOB

Objectives
The remit of the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) is to increase insight into the implementation and effects of Dutch foreign policy. IOB meets the need for the independent evaluation of policy and operations in all the policy fields of the Homogenous Budget for International Cooperation (HGIS). IOB also advises on the planning and implementation of evaluations that are the responsibility of policy departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and embassies of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Its evaluations enable the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation to account to Parliament for policy and the allocation of resources. In addition, the evaluations aim to derive lessons for the future. To this end, efforts are made to incorporate the findings of evaluations into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' policy cycle. Evaluation reports are used to provide targeted feedback, with a view to improving the formulation and implementation of policy. Insight into the outcomes of implemented policies allows policymakers to devise measures that are more effective and focused.

Organisation and quality assurance
IOB has a staff of experienced evaluators and its own budget. When carrying out evaluations it calls on assistance from external experts with specialised knowledge of the topic under investigation. To monitor the quality of its evaluations IOB sets up a reference group for each evaluation, which includes not only external experts but also interested parties from within the Ministry and other stakeholders.

Programming of evaluations
IOB consults with the policy departments to draw up a Ministry-wide evaluation programme. This rolling multi-annual programme is adjusted annually and included in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Ministry's budget. IOB bears final responsibility for the programming of evaluations in development cooperation and advises on the programming of foreign policy evaluations. The themes for evaluation are arrived at in response to requests from Parliament and from the Ministry, or are selected because they are issues of societal concern. IOB actively coordinates its evaluation programming with that of other donors and development organisations.

Approach and methodology
Initially IOB's activities took the form of separate project evaluations for the Minister for Development Cooperation. Since 1985, evaluations have become more comprehensive, covering sectors, themes and countries. Moreover, since then, IOB's reports have been submitted to Parliament, thus entering the public domain. The review of foreign policy and a reorganisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1996 resulted in IOB's remit being extended to cover the entire foreign policy of the Dutch government. In recent years it has extended its partnerships with similar departments in other countries, for instance through

joint evaluations and evaluative activities undertaken under the auspices of the OECD-DAC Network on Development Evaluation.

IOB has continuously expanded its methodological repertoire. More emphasis is now given to robust impact evaluations implemented through an approach in which both quantitative and qualitative methods are applied. lOB also undertakes policy reviews as a type of evaluation. Finally, it conducts systematic reviews of available evaluative and research material relating to priority policy areas.

Annex 2 Abridged Terms of Reference for this evaluation

1. Motivation and goal of the evaluation

This evaluation was included in the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the associated evaluation programme as an ongoing impact study of 'democratic transition in the Arab region (Matra South)'. The Matra South programme started in 2012, and is structured along the lines of the Matra programme for Central and Eastern Europe. The evaluation is timed to coincide with the process of deciding on the possible extension of the Matra South programme, which runs from 2012 to 2015. The evaluation will enable the government to account to Parliament for the policy it has pursued and possible lessons that have been learned in the process. To enable the evaluation to take account of as much Dutch policy implementation as possible, – at DAM's request – the IOB evaluation report is to be completed in the first quarter of 2015.

The evaluation should provide insight into the design and implementation of the Netherlands' foreign policy in the Arab region, focusing specifically on the goal of promoting transition. It covers the period from 2009 to 2013, covering the two years preceding and the two years following the wave of protests that swept through various countries in the region. That is not say that the Arab uprisings had no pre-history, or that no attention was paid to supporting transition in the region before this period (Fernández and Youngs 2005: 15-16).

Since early 2011, however, the Arab region has been the scene of mass protests, socioeconomic unrest and political instability. The Dutch government responded to these developments by setting itself the goal of supporting reforms in the region. The Netherlands pursued this goal through financial, political and diplomatic efforts, both multilaterally and bilaterally. European cooperation through, for example, the European Neighbourhood Policy, is part of the Netherlands' foreign policy in the region.

2. Regional policy emphases: Dutch policy in the Arab region

The Netherlands' policy on the Arab region and specific Arab countries is outlined in:
- the budgets and annual reports of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with a policy agenda and a large number of thematic policy objectives;
- letters to the House of Representatives in which policy on the Arab region and/or Arab countries is elaborated and specified in detail;
- letters to the House of Representatives which focus on the Arab region and/or specific Arab countries.

The policy is also shaped using input from the Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV), debates in the House of Representatives, questions in Parliament and motions submitted by Members of Parliament. Syria, Egypt and Tunisia in particular have been the subject of specific letters to the House of Representatives.

The specific regional policy examined by this evaluation is set out in the following policy documents:

- Memorandum on 'Transition in the Arab Region', annex to Parliamentary Papers, House of Representatives 2011, 32 623, no. 16;
- 'The Situation in the Arab Region', Parliamentary Papers, House of Representatives 2011, 32 623, no. 2;
- Report on the Foreign Affairs Council, Parliamentary Papers, House of Representatives 2011, 21 501-02, no. 1031;
- Report on the European Council (DIE-332/11 of 15 March 2011);
- 'The Current Situation in North Africa and the Middle East, and More on the Netherlands' Activities in the Arab Region', Parliamentary Papers, House of Representatives 2011, 32 623-40;
- 'The Current Situation in the Countries of the Arab Region', in response to a request from the Permanent Committee on Foreign Affairs, with a response to the Amnesty International report Year of Rebellion: The State of Human Rights in the Middle East and North Africa, Parliamentary Papers, House of Representatives 2012, 32 623 no. 58; and
- 'Developments in the Arab Region', Parliamentary Papers, House of Representatives 2013, 32 623, no. 88.

In addition, various policy letters on human rights and the modernisation of Dutch diplomacy refer to policy dilemmas in the Arab region. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a democratic and stable neighbouring region (and Egypt, Libya, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia in particular) serves the Netherlands' interests in the fields of security, trade, energy supplies and combating illegal migration. The government states that it seeks especially to invest in countries where there is the greatest likelihood of change and which can act as an example to the region as a whole (Explanatory Memorandum 2014: 17).

Referring to the policy article 'security and stability', the government aims to support a sustainable transition in the Arab region that leads to:

- democratisation, especially fair and free elections;
- development of the rule of law and protection of human rights, with special attention to gender equality, media freedom (including internet freedom), religious freedom, protection of minorities and LGBT rights;
- economic growth, partly by building the economic infrastructure, including promoting employment.

In pursuing this policy, the government applies the following principles:

- effective action through bilateral and multilateral channels;
- a demand-driven approach;
- intelligent conditionality, based on the three policy objectives listed above;
- no new structures but a review of existing structures using existing budgetary instruments;
- effective national and international coordination.

3. Structure of the evaluation

The main question to be addressed in the evaluation is as follows: How has the Netherlands contributed to promoting democratic transition in the Arab region?

The following 10 questions serve as guidelines in evaluating the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of this contribution and are presented in an evaluation matrix which also explains data collection methods:

Evaluation criteria	Evaluation questions	Findings and sources
Context: period from January 2009 - December 2013		**Description of problem - context**
The main question addressed in the evaluation is as follows: **How has the Netherlands' foreign policy contributed to promoting democratic transition in the Arab region?** The main considerations for this evaluation are: a) The Arab region has changed radically in a short time and is in transition. Since the start of 2011 a number of Arab countries have been the scene of mass protests, socioeconomic unrest and political instability. b) Changes have been made to the Netherlands' foreign policy in response to the changing situation in the region. As a consequence it is desirable, from a political, diplomatic and financial perspective, to evaluate the policy and its implementation. The evaluation programme for 2010 to 2015 included an evaluation of democratic transition in the Arab region. 1. What problems or other factors underlie Dutch policy on transition in the Arab region? 2. In developing the policy, was attention given to theoretical and practical insights relating to democratic transition?		Assessment of policy theory (mini-sessions with staff in The Hague / embassies in the case study countries) and policy reconstruction (parliamentary papers, AIV reports, policy documents, general dossiers, internal Ministry communications), literature study on democratisation, scholarly literature and evaluations, interviews with key actors and stakeholders. Indices (Bertelsmann Foundation, Freedom House, Reporters Without Borders, Transparency International, etc.), Arabstats, Arab Human Development Reports, review of documents (internet research, Ministry, embassies). Appropriate use of tables and graphs. Overview of main programmes and expenditures.
I. Relevance		
3. To what extent have the policy priorities (democratisation, strengthening the rule of law and protecting human rights, economic growth) been made operational through feasible measures and appropriate instruments to promote transition in the Arab region? 4. How relevant were these measures to the priorities? To what extent are they a logical extension of Dutch policy, its stated ambitions and the specific context in Arab countries? Did they take the following factors into account? · Did the Netherlands work with national and local partners and take account of their priorities? · Did the Netherlands cooperate with other international actors and, in doing so, devote attention to the complementarity of their political, diplomatic and financial efforts?		Parliamentary Papers, policy documents, national strategies, policy documents of other actors in the region/countries (strategies and interventions), general dossiers and dossiers on individual activities, literature study, supplementary document study of Matra South, evaluations and academic literature. Country case studies on Morocco, Egypt and Libya: tapping local knowledge sources, interviews with key actors and stakeholders.

Evaluation criteria	Evaluation questions	Findings and sources
II. Efficiency and **III. Effectiveness** - Did the Netherlands operate in a timely and efficient way? How effective was the Netherlands in achieving results through interventions in the region?		
II. Efficiency		
5. How timely was the Netherlands' use of its instruments and how much synergy was there between them? 6. How did the Netherlands work with other partners and actors at national and international level? 7. What financial, political and diplomatic resources were deployed to implement policy in the period covered by this evaluation?		Supplementary document study of Matra South, country case studies of Morocco, Egypt and Libya: tapping local knowledge sources, interviews with key actors and stakeholders, document study, overviews of expenditure, annual plans, annual reports, Multi-annual Strategic Plans.
III. Effectiveness		
8. What were the effects of policy implementation? 9. To what extent was the proposed policy actually implemented? 10. To what extent did policy implementation contribute to transition in selected priority countries?		Supplementary document study of Matra South, country case studies of Morocco, Egypt and Libya: tapping local knowledge sources, interviews with key actors and stakeholders, document study.
Lessons learned and concerns: what lessons can the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs learn from the evaluation for future policy formulation and implementation?		
Main findings Concerns	• What are the main strong points of the policy formulated for the Arab region and its implementation? • What are the main weak points of the policy formulated for the Arab region and its implementation? • What lessons can be learned (from both positive and negative findings) for the formulation and implementation of future Dutch policy on the Arab region/countries?	Available supplementary study on Matra South, findings of literature study, findings of country case studies on Morocco, Egypt and Libya (comparison: actors/added value of NL, coherence of instruments, needs of country/ region, effects of conditionality), evaluation reports, document study, interviews with key actors and stakeholders, sharing and discussing findings.

The evaluation will involve a policy reconstruction and an assessment with the regional department concerned (DAM). It will focus on the main themes listed above and will be conducted through three country case studies: Egypt, Libya and Morocco. These countries have been chosen on the basis of their relevance for policy, the scope they offer to study themes in relation to each other, the scale of the resources deployed and their different political, historical and institutional perspectives in the light of transition. This evaluation should assess the formulation and implementation of Dutch policy from the perspective of the local context and in the light of the political, diplomatic and financial efforts of other actors and donors referred to in the policy documents, including the EU.

In addition, two supplementary studies will be conducted: a document study of the Matra South programme and a literature study of support for democratisation. Relevant evaluations by the IOB and others, scholarly and scientific literature, longitudinal opinion surveys in Arab countries and relevant database statistics and indexes will also be used, together with available information on policy implementation.

Annex 3 Assessment of individual CSI, PSI and G2G projects

Civil Society Initiatives programme: assessment of individual projects

Evaluation questions	Judgement criteria	Indicators
Relevance		
1 Was the project well-conceived given the situation? Is it still relevant to the original problem it was intended to address? *(weight 50%)*	• The main needs and demands are adequately identified and addressed given the specific governance and politico-economic context; • The project has been aligned and harmonised with those of the recipient partners and other development partners.	• Existence of good quality needs assessment; • Degree of ownership of intervention as evidenced by active involvement of the beneficiary in formulation, implementation etc.; • The assumptions of the ToC of the project are realistic (given the complexity and volatility of the environment) and sound; • Positive synergy with effects of other initiatives.
2 To what extent does the project contribute to the objectives of the related Matra South component and to those of the programme as a whole? *(weight 50%)*	• The project complies with the objectives of the related Matra South component and to those of the programme as a whole.	Match with objectives Matra South programme (component).
Effectiveness		
1 To what extent have the project's short- and/or long-term objectives been achieved or are likely to be achieved? What are the reasons for the state of achievement? What supports and barriers have affected achievement? Are there unanticipated positive or negative consequences? Why did they arise? *(weight 50%)*	• Level of attainment of outputs (compared to estimates) and their contribution to attaining the intended project effects; • Level of attainment of project outcomes that have been achieved (compared to the estimates).	• Evidence of achievements and contribution; • Evidence of unanticipated positive or negative consequences.
2 To what extent has the project contributed to the achievement of the objectives of the related component of the Matra South programme and to those of the programme as a whole? *(weight 50%)*	Actual or likely contribution of the specific project outcomes to the objectives of the Matra South programme and the related component.	Evidence of project contribution to the programme-specific impacts.

Evaluation questions	Judgement criteria	Indicators
Efficiency		
1 To what extent has the project been delivered in a timely and cost-effective manner? Do the results achieved – in qualitative and quantitative terms – justify the resources spent?	• Extent to which the activities have been implemented according to the time schedule *(weight 40%)*; • The costs of service, including management costs are reasonable in relation to the type of project, the outputs and realised achievements *(weight 40%)*; • The implementation and management arrangements contribute to the realisation of the project objectives *(weight 20%)*.	• Time planning: actual versus planned if changes occur they are substantiated; • Comparison of unit costs (per beneficiary/participant/client with costs of similar projects); • Comparison of project resources consumed in achievement of outcomes with interventions with similar goals in light of the degree of outcome achievement and context; • Quality and adequateness of project planning, management (administrative, financial and human resources) and M&E.
Sustainability		
1 What is the likelihood that the achievements of the project will be sustained and/or processes of change will be continued after the withdrawal of support? Is there an enabling environment that supports ongoing positive impacts? Will impacts continue to be realised? To what extent is the project implementing appropriate strategies to help ensure sustainability? Is an exit strategy an integrated part of the project? To what extent does the project contribute to the development of partners' capacity, enabling sustainable delivery after the project?	• Organisational or institutional sustainability *(weight 50%)*; • The degree of absorption of the achievements by the local organisations/ institutions; • Extent to which changes observed / results achieved are likely to persist. Financial continuity: *(weight 30%)* • Availability of financial resources needed to ensure political sustainability *(weight 20%)*; • Existence of political basis for the project theme and continuity of approach.	• Existence of a sustainable strategy, including exit strategy; • Required organisational/ institutional capacity in place (structures, staff, expertise, etc.) exists / has been developed. • Comparison of the financial resources needed to ensure the continuity of the results to the financial capacity of local structures. • Degree of coherence between the project approach and policies of the countries (national and sub-national levels)? • Degree of effective collaboration with other stakeholders (e.g. government and other actors at national and sub-national levels).

Private Sector Investment programme: assessment of individual projects

Evaluation questions	Judgement criteria	Indicators
Relevance		
Was the project well-conceived given the situation? Is it still relevant to the original problem it was intended to address? *(weight 50%)*	• Needs (innovative business opportunities) are adequately identified and addressed given the specific politico-economic context.	• Existence of good quality and realistic business plan (given the complexity and volatility of the environment); • Degree of ownership of intervention as evidenced by active involvement of the local counterpart in formulation, implementation etc.; • The assumptions of the ToC of the project are realistic (given the complexity and volatility of the environment) and sound.
To what extent does the project contribute to the objectives of the related Matra South component and to those of the programme as a whole? *(weight 50%)*	• The project complies with the objectives of the related Matra South component and to those of the programme as a whole.	Alignment of project with objectives of Matra South programme (or component) (incl. contribution to youth employment and female entrepreneurship).
Effectiveness		
1 To what extent have the project's short- and/or long-term objectives been achieved or are likely to be achieved? What are the reasons for the state of achievement? What supports and barriers have affected achievement? Are there unanticipated positive or negative consequences? Why did they arise? *(weight 50%)*	• Level of attainment of outputs (compared to estimates) and their actual or likely contribution to attaining the intended project outcomes.	• Evidence of achievements (e.g. established business, annual turnover, number of (direct/indirect/youth/female) net (additional) jobs as well as project suppliers/outgrowers, numbers of high-level and low-level employees / suppliers/ outgrowers trained, percentage of total project inputs/raw materials from local suppliers etc.); • Evidence of unanticipated positive or negative consequences.
2 To what extent has the project contributed to the achievement of the objectives of the related component of the Matra South programme and to those of the programme as a whole? *(weight 50%)*	Actual or likely contribution of the specific project outcomes to the objectives of the Matra South programme and the related component (sustainable economic growth).	Evidence of actual or likely project (or project spin-off) contribution to sustainable economic growth (e.g. expansion and catalysing effect of (innovative) business(es), improved job opportunities for local population / suppliers / outgrowers and increased local attention for corporate social responsibility, gender and environmental business policies).

Evaluation questions	Judgement criteria	Indicators
Efficiency		
To what extent has the project been delivered in a timely and cost-effective manner? Do the results achieved – in qualitative and quantitative terms – justify the resources spent?	• Extent to which the activities have been implemented according to the time schedule *(weight 40%)*; • The costs of service, including management costs are reasonable in relation to the type of project, the outputs and realised achievements *(weight 40%)*; • The implementation and management arrangements contributeto the realisation of the project objectives *(weight 20%)*.	• Time planning: actual versus planned: if changes occur they are substantiated; • Comparison of unit costs (per job created/ suppliers/ outgrowers) with costs of similar projects; • Comparison of project resources consumed in achievement of outcomes with interventions with similar goals in light of the degree of outcome achievement and context; • Quality and adequateness of PSI project management and M&E.
Sustainability		
• What is the likelihood the achievements of the project will be sustained and/or processes of change be continued after the withdrawal of support? Is there an enabling environment that supports ongoing positive impacts? Will impacts continue to be realised? • To what extent is the project implementing appropriate strategies to help ensure sustainability? Is an exit strategy an integrated part of the project design? To what extent does the project contribute to the development of partners' capacity, enabling sustainable delivery after the project?	Organisational or institutional sustainability *(weight 50%)* • The degree of absorption of the achievements by the local organisations/ institutions; • Extent to which changes observed/ results achieved are likely to persist. Financial continuity *(weight 50%)*; • Availability of financial resources needed to ensure continuity.	• Required organisational capacity in place (staff, expertise, technology etc.) and commitment exists; • Trends/trajectory of earlier comparable projects; • Financial prospects of business(es).

Government-to-Government cooperation programme: assessment of individual projects

Evaluation questions	Judgement criteria	Indicators
Relevance		
1 Was the project well-conceived given the situation? Is it still relevant to the original problem it was intended to address? *(weight 50%)*	• The main needs and demands are adequately identified and addressed given the specific governance and politico-economic context; • The project has been aligned and harmonised with efforts of the recipient partners and other development partners.	• Existence of good quality needs assessment / involvement of beneficiary in formulation; • Degree of ownership of intervention, as evidenced by active involvement of the beneficiary in implementation etc.; • The assumptions of the ToC of the project are realistic (given the complexity and volatility of the environment) and sound; • Positive synergy with effects of other initiatives.
2 To what extent does the project contribute to the objectives of the related Matra South component and to those of the programme as a whole? *(weight 50%)*	• The project complies with the objectives of the related Matra South component and to those of the programme as a whole.	Alignment with objectives of Matra South programme (or component)
Effectiveness		
1 To what extent have the project's short- and/or long-term objectives been achieved or are likely to be achieved? What are the reasons for the state of achievement? What supports and barriers have affected achievement? Are there unanticipated positive or negative consequences? Why did they arise? *(weight 50%)*	• Level of attainment of outputs (compared to estimates) and their contribution to attaining the intended project effects; • Level of attainment of project outcomes that have been achieved (compared to the estimates).	• Evidence of achievements and contribution (e.g. capacity development, policy improvement); • Evidence of unanticipated positive or negative consequences.
2 To what extent has the project contributed to the achievement of the objectives of the related component of the Matra South programme and to those of the programme as a whole? *(weight 50%)*	Actual or likely contribution of the specific project outcomes to the objectives of the Matra South programme and the related component.	• Evidence of project contribution to the programme-specific impacts.

Evaluation questions	Judgement criteria	Indicators
Efficiency		
1 To what extent has the project been delivered in a timely and cost-effective manner? Do the results achieved – in qualitative and quantitative terms – justify the resources spent?	• Extent to which the activities have been implemented according to the time schedule; *(weight 40%)* • The costs of service, including management costs are reasonable in relation to the type of project, the outputs and realised achievements; *(weight 40%)* • The implementation and management arrangements contribute to the realisation of the project objectives. *(weight 20%)*	• Time planning: actual versus planned: if changes occur they are substantiated; • Comparison of project resources consumed in achievement of outputs/ outcomes with interventions with similar goals in light of the degree of outcome achievement and context; • Quality and adequateness of project planning, management and M&E.
Sustainability		
1 What is the likelihood the achievements of the project will be sustained and/or processes of change be continued after the withdrawal of support? Is there an enabling environment that supports ongoing positive impacts? Will impacts continue to be realised? To what extent is the project implementing appropriate strategies to help ensure sustainability? Is an exit strategy an integrated part of the project design? To what extent does the project contribute to the development of partners' capacity, enabling sustainable delivery after the project?	Organisational or institutional sustainability: *(weight 50%)* • The degree of absorption of the achievements by the local organisations/ institutions; • Extent to which changes observed/results achieved are likely to persist. Political sustainability: *(weight 50%)* • existence of political basis for the project theme and approach.	• The level of integration of the project in local structures and processes; • Required organisational/ institutional capacity in place (staff, expertise, etc.) exists/ has been developed; • Existence of a sustainable strategy, including exit strategy. • Degree of coherence between the project approach and policies of the countries (national and sub-national levels); • Degree of effective collaboration with other stakeholders (e.g. other government actors, other actors at national and sub-national levels).

Annex 4   Selection of projects (bilateral aid)

Selection projects under Civil Society Initiatives (CSI): Of the 55 projects, 11 (three financed from the centralised budget and eight managed by the embassies) were selected. The centralised budget projects were selected on the basis of a minimum disbursement rate (as a percentage of total commitments) of 50%. The embassy projects were selected on the basis of a monetary threshold of a minimum total project allocation of EUR 15,000 and a minimum disbursement rate (as a percentage of total commitments) of 50%. The number of projects selected per country was based on the relative weight of each country in terms of that country's share in total disbursements. The following projects were randomly selected:

Country	Description	Implementation period	Total amount allocated	Total amount disbursed (2012-2013)
Centralised budget (in EUR million)				
Egypt	Oxfam/Novib and Better Life/democratisation*	2012-2014	1,320,471	821,379
Region: Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt	IFC professional education	2012-2015	800,000	800,000
Region	Anna Lindh Foundation	2012-2014	300,000	200,000
Decentralised budget (in EUR million)				
Egypt	Poverty eradication through employment	2012-2014	129,066	104,893
Egypt	Advocating and promoting Workers' rights (APWR), Contract party: El Mahrousa Center for Socioeconomic Development (MCSD)	2012-2013	299,008	299,008
Egypt	Entrepreneurship Education Programme, by the District	2013-2014	267,204	141,054
Tunisia	Research into Salafism in the Arab region	2013-2014	45,378	43,253
Jordan	Visions centre – conference on the role of citizenship in promoting the rule of law	01/11/2012-28/02/2013	25,858	23,921
Libya	Youth forum about Transitional Justice in Benghazi, Tobruk and Sebha	2013	50,000	40,000

Country	Description	Implementation period	Total amount allocated	Total amount disbursed (2012-2013)
Morocco	*Confédération Générale des Entreprises du Maroc:* small and medium enterprise monitoring project	2013-2014	100,000	80,000
Morocco	CETIA – *Centre Technique des Industries Agroalimentaires:* co-financing the establishment of a laboratory for quality control of food	2012-2013	77,678	77,677
Total in EUR			**3,414,663**	**2,631,185**

* This project is a combination of two projects registered individually by the Ministry of Foreign that cover a first and a second phase of a single project; for this reason, the evaluators decided to present them as one project.

The above selection accounts for 41% of the total value of project allocations within the CSI component, and for 46% of the total disbursements.

Selection of projects under Private Sector Investment (PSI): Based on the relative weight of each country in terms of their share in total disbursements, the four projects randomly selected had disbursement rates higher than zero and together represented at least 45% of total disbursements:

Country	Description	Implementation period	Total amount allocated	Total amount disbursed (2012 - May 2014)
Morocco	Pilot Carbon Footprint Project	2012-2015	750,000	337,500
Morocco	Fighting the housing deficit with modular construction solutions in Morocco	2013-2015	721,100	324,495
Tunisia	Desert Joy, the tomato with taste from Tunisia	2012-2015	748,250	433,985
Jordan	Breeding of disease-tolerant vegetable seed	2013-2016	482,150	192,861
Total in EUR			**2,701,500**	**1,288,841**

The above selection accounts for 40% of the total value of project allocations within the PSI component, and for 64% of the total disbursements.

Selection projects under Government-to-Government (G2G): Five projects were selected from the 16 projects implemented under the G2G component. The selected projects had to be in a mature state of implementation, be significant in monetary terms and together represent at least 50% of total 2012-2013 disbursements. A monetary threshold of a minimum total project allocation of EUR 20,000 was applied and a minimum disbursement rate (as a percentage of total commitments) of 50%. Based on this strategy the following projects were randomly selected:

Country	Description	Implementation period	Total amount allocated	Total amount disbursed (2012 - May 2014)
Morocco	Improving Road Safety in Morocco	2013-2014	146,000	58,400
Morocco	*Conseil national des droits de l'Homme:* Human Rights and prisons	2013	95,599	76,479
Tunisia	Training eight government officials of the Ministry of Regional Development	2012	66,000	54,680
Jordan	Collaboration between Dutch and Jordanian ombudsmen	2012-2013	65,186	63,822
Libya	Mission DJI/NHC on prison management	2012	20,000	18,148
Total in EUR			**392,785**	**271,529**

The above selection accounts for 44% of the total value of project commitments within the G2G component, and for 60% of the total disbursements.

Annex 5   Resources

IOB field research

Egypt/Cairo (57 respondents)

- African Development Bank
- Arab Network for Media Support
- Art + Culture
- Better Life
- Brookings
- Center for Social and Economic Research
- Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs
- Egyptian Social Democratic Party
- Election monitor
- Embassy of Spain
- Embassy of Switzerland
- Embassy of the United States of America
- EU Delegation
- EU Parliament's Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) group
- Free Egyptians Party
- International Crisis Group
- Judge
- Lawyer
- Mahrousa Center for Socioeconomic Development
- Ministry in charge of International Organizations
- Ministry of international cooperation
- Ministry of Manpower and Immigration
- National Council for Women, Ombudsman's Office
- Nazra
- Nour party
- OxfamNovib
- Royal Netherlands Embassy
- Signet L.L.C.
- The Egyptian-Dutch Business Club
- The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights
- Trainees
- UNDP
- World Bank
- World Food Programme
- Youngsters
- Focus Group Discussions Aswan and Nubian Island Sahel: Oxfam Better Life incl. participants representing local media and civil society organisations involved in election monitoring, training, amplifying local voice

Libya/Tripoli (32 respondents)

- Arete Foundation for Arts & Culture
- British Embassy
- Detention centres, Ministry of Justice
- Election monitor
- EU Delegation
- General National Congress
- Haskoning Libya
- International Management Group
- International Organization for Migration
- International Republican Institute
- Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Libyan Youth Movement
- Maan Nabneeha Movement
- Mayadin newspaper
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Royal Netherlands Embassy
- Spark Libya
- Trainees
- Tripoli FM
- UNDP
- UNESCO
- University of Tripoli
- Voice of Libyan Women
- Zagrit Seed Cooperation

Morocco/Rabat (45 respondents)

- *Ambassade de Suisse*
- *Association des Femmes Chefs d'Entreprises du Maroc*
- *Association des Lauréat de l'Institut Supérieur de l'Administration*
- *Association pour la promotion de l'éducation et de la formation à l'étranger*
- *Confédération Générale des Entreprises du Maroc*
- *Conseil des affaires Marocain-Néerlandais*
- *Entrepreneur*
- February 20 movement
- *Institut Néerlandais au Maroc – NIMAR*
- Journalists
- *Banque Africaine de Développement*
- *Chambre des représentants du parlement*
- *Commission des Affaires Etrangères*
- *Coopération espagnole*
- *Coopération Universitaire Nationale et Internationale*
- *Délégation de l'Union Européenne*
- *Centre Technique des industries agroalimentaire et la Fédération Nationale de l'Agroalimentaire*
- *Organisation Marocain des droits de l'homme et l'association justice Adela*

- *Parti d'Istiqlal*
- Royal Netherlands Embassy
- Trainees
- Transparency Maroc
- UNDP
- USAID
- Westminster Foundation
- World Bank
- Focus Group Discussion El Jadida: *Association des Femmes chefs d'Entreprises du Maroc* (AFEM)

The EU and its Southern Neighbourhood, Brussels (6 respondents)
- Directorate General for development and cooperation – EuropeAid, European Commission
- Division, Directorate North Africa, Middle East and Arabian Peninsula, EDEO
- European Commission, European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (Bilateral South)
- European External Action Service *(Afrique du Nord, Moyen Orient, Péninsule Arabique, Iran et Iraq)*
- European Parliament
- Permanent Mission of the Netherlands
- Seminar Clingendael EU Southern Neighbourhood

The Hague (15 respondents)
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DAM, DDE, DMM, DIE, BPZ and DSO)
- Foundation Max van der Stoel

Substudies
Literature review
- Roel Meijer
- Laila al-Zwaini

Matra South Programme review (Ecorys)
- Sylvia I. Bergh
- Lydeke Schakel
- Lorijn de Boer
- Anja Willemsen

The Ecorys study interviewed 42 persons in total.

Experimental pilot study with automated text-mining
- Anna Alberts

Editor
- Joy Burrough

Annex 6 Code systems used (interviews and diplomatic cables)

Fine-grained narrative analysis content of semi-structured IOB interviews in Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Brussels and The Hague (2014):

Code system			Number of codes	Description
Free coding			98	reference to text of special interest to researcher
Image of the Netherlands			143	illustrates image of NL in Arab countries
Use existing funds				refers to utilisation of existing funds in response to Arab uprisings
	stability fund and fund political pluriformity		7	refers to local perceptions about funds
	funds for gender, culture and human rights		19	refers to local perceptions about funds
Transition 2009-2013			227	refers to perceived changes prior to and after 2011 in Arab region
	local priorities		121	refers to perceptions about local priorities
	actors		177	refers to actors promoting or hindering change
	factors		272	refers to factors promoting or hindering change
Security & stability			67	reference to policy article incl. local perception actors/factors of change
	friends		36	as perceived in country
	foes		36	as perceived in country
Corruption			97	refers to perceptions about corruption
Democratic transition				reference to policy objective
	democratisation		109	thematic focus of Ministry's policy
	rule of law		40	thematic focus of Ministry's policy
	protection of human rights		115	elaboration of thematic focus
Modalities				to illustrate meaning of modalities in local context
	multilateral		21	views about multilateral channel
		NATO	8	perceptions about NATO
		IFI	36	perceptions about IFIs

Code system			Number of codes	Description
		UN	67	perceptions about UN
		EU	197	perceptions about EU
	bilateral		173	views about Dutch bilateral interventions
Matra South programme			55	illustrates policy implementation at country level
	PP		18	views about PP component
	CSI		35	views about CSI component
	G2G		22	views about G2G component
	scholarships		12	views about scholarship programme
	training		48	views about training programmes
Private Sector				Illustrates policy implementation at country level
	economic growth, employment		79	refers to thematic focus of Ministry's policy
	PSI		37	views about PSI programme
Principles				as expressed in Ministry's policy
	conditionality		100	views about application of conditionality
	coordination		47	views about international coordination and cooperation
	demand-driven		27	refers to requests by and proposals from local or national partners
	effectiveness		12	views about results achieved
		what works	78	refers to perceptions regarding effective interventions
		what does not work	90	refers to perceptions regarding ineffective interventions
Total			**2726**	

Fine-grained narrative analysis of content of diplomatic correspondence from embassies in priority countries of Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan and Libya (2009-2013):

Code system			Number of codes	Description
Free coding			28	reference to text of special interest to researcher
Image of the Netherlands			66	illustrates image of NL in Arab countries
Security & stability			34	reference to policy article
Democratic transition			11	reference to policy objective
	democratisation		7	thematic focus of letter to Ministry's policy
		free & fair elections	21	elaboration of thematic focus
		other	49	in relation to democratisation
	rule of law		43	thematic focus of letter to Ministry's policy
	protection of human Rights			elaboration of thematic focus
		media freedom incl. internet	33	refers to aspect on human rights agenda
		rights of women	66	refers to aspect on human rights agenda
		freedom of religion	36	refers to aspect on human rights agenda
		LGBT rights	10	refers to aspect on human rights agenda
		minority rights	6	refers to aspect on human rights agenda
		other	132	refers to human rights in general or other human rights
Type of intervention				to differentiate between three types of intervention
	financial		85	refers to use of financial means
	diplomatic		180	refers to interventions by Dutch government officials
	political		49	refers to interventions by political leadership

Code system			Number of codes	Description
Modalities				to differentiate between bilateral and multilateral cooperation in Arab region
	multilateral		3	between Arab country and number of organisations incl. the Netherlands
		NATO	4	by means of NATO incl. the Netherlands
		IFI	7	by means of IFI incl. the Netherlands
		UN	14	by means of UN incl. the Netherlands
		EU	116	by means of EU incl. the Netherlands
	bilateral		155	between Arab country and the Netherlands
Principles				as expressed in Ministry's policy
	conditionality		25	refers to application of conditionality
	coordination		60	refers to international coordination and cooperation
	demand-driven		36	refers to requests by and proposals from local or national partners
	effectiveness		20	refers to results achieved
Migration	Morocco		8	refers to ENP dimension
Trade	Egypt		14	refers to ENP dimension
Total			**1318**	

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This report presents the findings of an evaluation of the response of the Dutch government to the Arab uprisings and its support to: a) democratisation; b) development of the rule of law and protection of human rights; and c) economic growth. The Ministry and its embassies offered timely and flexible funding in support of a range of projects implemented by key actors in countries in transition, including youth, women, journalists and trade unions. However, less support was provided to governments in transition than to civil society.

The lion's share of financial resources was used to support economic growth. Far fewer resources were spent on promoting the rule of law.

Fragmentation and targeting of bilateral support are a concern, and not all multilateral efforts explicitly aim to foster democracy. Conditionality does not work and demand for change is essential.

The policy response needs to take advantage of a growing evidence base of lessons learned in the area of democracy assistance and should apply a country-level perspective. Promoting transition is a long-term process.

Findings show that the implementation of support to Arab countries in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings is far from easy because of the volatile context.

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