

Effectiveness of Partners and Funding Relations

Desk review for:

Evaluation of the Humanitarian Assistance Policy
of the Netherlands. Funding and diplomacy 2015-2020

HERMA MAJOOR

APRIL 2022

Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Table of contents

Table of contents	ii
Introduction	3
RQ 1.1: What are the relative strengths and weaknesses of various funded humanitarian actors in the delivery of humanitarian assistance?	3
UN Agencies.....	3
ICRC, IFRC and the Red Cross	5
Dutch Relief Alliance	5
RQ 1.2 Have Dutch funded actors in the humanitarian system delivered timely and needs-based humanitarian assistance?	6
UN Agencies.....	6
ICRC, IFRC and the Red Cross	7
DRA	7
UN Agencies.....	8
ICRC, IFRC and Red Cross	9
DRA	10
RQ 1.3 What has been the contribution of Dutch-funded actors to the objective of innovation, localization, and the coordination with broader development goals?	10
UN Agencies.....	14
ICRC, IFRC and Red Cross	15
DRA	16
RQ 2.2 What different types of relations between MFA and recipient organizations emerge from these funding decisions.....	16
RQ 2.3 In what way have the priority themes innovation and localization been promoted within these relations?.....	19
UN Agencies.....	19
ICRC	21
DRA	21
UN Agencies.....	22
ICRC, IFRC and the Red Cross	27
DRA	29
RQ 3.3 How have Dutch diplomatic efforts contributed to innovation and localisation within the humanitarian system?	30
The Grand Bargain.....	30
UN Agencies.....	31
The Grand Bargain.....	31
CBPFs and CERF	33
UN AGENCIES.....	34
ICRC	36
DRA	37
Annex 1: Logframe for innovation in humanitarian assistance (2019).....	38
Annex 2: Acronyms	41

Introduction

IOB has conducted a policy evaluation of the “Humanitarian Assistance Policy of the Netherlands: Funding and Diplomacy 2015-2021”, which is foreseen to be finalised by the end of 2022. The rationale for this evaluation was that humanitarian needs continue to grow over time and continuously demand high levels of funding, while humanitarian crises are increasingly complex. There is a strong interest to learn from past interventions and to further strengthen the targeting of financial and human resources for humanitarian action, and the evaluation taps into this.

The main policy evaluation by IOB explores one overarching research question (RQ):

How and to what extent does Dutch humanitarian policy contribute to achieving humanitarian goals?

Data collection to inform the answer to this question has been done through desk review, country case studies, literature studies and key informant interviews with stakeholders from various backgrounds. This desk review aims to inform the policy evaluation on a number of sub-questions to the main research question (RQ):

RQ 1.1. What are the relative strengths and weaknesses of various funded humanitarian actors in the delivery of humanitarian assistance?

RQ 1.2. Have Dutch funded actors in the humanitarian system delivered timely and needs-based humanitarian assistance?

RQ 1.3 What has been the contribution of Dutch funded actors to the objective of innovation, localization, and the coordination with broader development goals?

RQ 2.2 What different types of relations between MFA and recipient organizations have emerged from funding decision?

RQ 2.3 In what way have the priority themes innovation and localization been promoted within these relations?

RQ 3.3 How have Dutch diplomatic efforts contributed to innovation and localisation within the humanitarian system?

This desk study used a mix of online systematic search and snowballing to find relevant evaluations, documents and academic research between 2015 and 2020 that bring up evidence on effectiveness in humanitarian action. This report reflects the findings from the desk review, categorised along the mentioned sub-questions of the main policy evaluation. The study was commissioned and funded by the Policy and Operations Evaluation department (IOB) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. The findings have been further analysed by IOB under the main evaluation and incorporated in the total body of findings. They have also contributed to the conclusions and recommendations, which will be published as part of the IOB Policy Evaluation report 2015-2021.

RQ 1.1: What are the relative strengths and weaknesses of various funded humanitarian actors in the delivery of humanitarian assistance?

UN Agencies

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) provides unearmarked funding to various UN agencies. One of these is OCHA, and the agency among others uses the funding for its institutional capacities and institutional costs to manage the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and Country Based Pooled Funds (CBPFs), thus benefiting also other MFA partners and humanitarian actors.

UNHCR's strength is perceived as having a responsive and adaptive programming approach,^{1,2} closely working with existing local structures.³ UNHCR's refugee mandate, supported by its lead role in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee's (IASC's) Protection Task Team, has helped mainstreaming and building partnerships, as part of the IASC Protection Policy. With their specific target groups, UNHCR's livelihoods activities and protection advocacy⁴ are deployed to achieve durable solutions.⁵ UNHCR's weakness is identified as its mixed performance in coordinating the protection cluster, due to leadership deficiencies of protection coordinators at the field level.

UNICEF is strong in its ambitions and mandate to address child rights and protection, access to education, water, sanitation and health (WASH), and mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) in crisis-affected contexts, which MFA's reports to be central to its ambitions.⁶ UNICEF is called a bold advocate for women and children's rights,⁷ and avail of operational agility and surge capacity in complex humanitarian emergencies.⁸ On the other hand, intended results are often not achieved and coverage limitations are frequent,⁹ the use of results-based management is seen as limited and evaluations and research often ad hoc.¹⁰ Data management and analysis are not always of sufficient quality for the identification of those most in need.¹¹

WFP's strength is its logistic capacity and effective and efficient implementation at large scale in volatile and complex operational contexts,¹² which often also benefits other actors.¹³ WFP has also invested in the development of private partnerships to improve procurement efficiency and boost its delivery.¹⁴ WFP developed a well-functioning Enterprise Risk Management system and

1 MOPAN (2019). Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). MOPAN 2017-19 Assessments. Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network, February 2019 (amongst others); Hanley, T., Ogwang, K., & Procter, C. (2018). Evaluation of UNHCR prevention and response to SGBV in the refugee population in Lebanon (2016-2018). Evaluation Report, November 2018, ES/2018/05. Evaluation Service United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Genève, Switzerland.

2 Dávila Aquije, D., Jones, S., Otulana, S., Pellens, T. & Seyfert, K. (2017). Evaluation of UNHCR's implementation of three protection strategies: The Global Education Strategy, the Updated SGBV Strategy and the Child Protection Framework. July 2017, Full report, ES/2017/2. Evaluation Service United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Genève, Switzerland.

3 Baker, J., Elawad & I., et al (2018). Independent Evaluation of the UNHCR South Sudanese Refugee Response in White Nile State, Sudan (2013 – 2018). August 2018, Final Evaluation Report, ES/2018/02. Evaluation Service UNHCR, Genève, Switzerland.

4 Frankenberger, T. & Vallet, M. (2018). Evaluation of UNHCR's Livelihoods Strategies and Approaches. Global Report, December 2018, ES/2018/11. Evaluation Service United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Genève, Switzerland.

5 Featherstone, A. (2018). Evaluation of UNHCR's Leadership of the Global Protection Cluster and Field Protection Clusters: 2014-2016. October 2017, ES/2017/04. Evaluation Service United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Genève, Switzerland.

6 Confidential – BEMO UNICEF Education Cannot Wait

7 UNICEF (2019). Evaluation of the Coverage and Quality of the UNICEF Humanitarian Response in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies. January 2019.

8 MOPAN (2017). United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). Institutional Assessment report. Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network, MOPAN 2015-16 Assessments, 2017. 9 Ibid.

10 MOPAN (2017). United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Institutional Assessment report. Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network, MOPAN 2015-16 Assessments, 2017.

11 UNICEF (2019). Evaluation of the Coverage and Quality of the UNICEF Humanitarian Response in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies. January 2019.

12 WFP Executive Board (2020). Management response to the recommendations of the summary report on the strategic evaluation of WFP's capacity to respond to emergencies (2011–2018). Executive Board. First regular session, Rome, 16-17 April 2020.

13 Steets, J., Meier, C., Harmer, A., Stoddard, A. & Spannagel, J. (2018). Evaluation of WFP Policies on Humanitarian Principles and Access in Humanitarian Contexts. Evaluation Report, WFP Office of Evaluation, May 2018, OEV/2016/014.

14 WFP Executive Board (2017). Management Response to the Recommendations of the Summary Evaluation Report – Corporate Partnership Strategy. Executive Board, Annual Session, Rome, 12-16

approach to risk identification, to mitigate fiduciary risk.¹⁵ On the other hand, WFP's ability to achieve an equal and inclusive coverage of vulnerable people in humanitarian context is sometimes perceived as mixed. WFP often has to work in close cooperation with host governments to enable them reaching their coverage, which, coupled with their strong dependence on highly earmarked donor funding represents a risk to operational independence'.¹⁶

ICRC, IFRC and the Red Cross

The Red Cross Movement is part of the world largest humanitarian network of 192 national societies, thousands of community-based branches, and millions of volunteers. The largest component of MFA support to the Movement was ICRC core funding and appeal top-ups. MFA furthermore supports the movement through the NLRC and channelled (partly) earmarked to IFRC coordinated country appeals.

The strength of the Red Cross national societies is their presence in the so-called 'last mile of delivery', especially in specific belligerent front-line locations like those in Afghanistan, Somalia, or Syria.¹⁷ The NLRC also provides the MFA with a platform to engage with domestic disaster response agendas and actors.¹⁸ In some protracted crisis situations, the Red Cross national societies' approach to risk identification, monitoring, management and mitigation has been identified as weak. This is especially the case where regional and country-level leadership are less strong, such as in some Middle Eastern and African regional and country offices.¹⁹

ICRC and IFRC also play a role at the interface of other Dutch priorities, such as between a focus on MHPSS and localisation, by supporting stronger local response to facilitate early access to services.²⁰ They are able to mobilise local staff and volunteers from the communities and can engage experts from experience into the design and approach.²¹ As for ICRC's collaboration in the UN cluster system, it is sharing limited operational information only. ICRC conducts their own needs assessments which, although communicated, remain uncoordinated with the UN.²² Furthermore, ICRC commissions or publishes relatively few independent evaluations, and thus, even though they have a good reputation, they are also perceived to have a weak evidence base.

Dutch Relief Alliance

DRA's strength is that agencies are relatively agile and responsive and create strong bonds with local NGOs providing direct linking into communities²³ and act as agents of localisation and innovation with a relatively short delivery chain, low overheads, and relatively high risk-appetite.²⁴ Furthermore, DRA has a strong grounding in Dutch society and acts as a bridge

June 2017.

15 MOPAN (2019). WFP. Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network, MOPAN 2017-18 Assessments, April 2019.

16 Steets, J., Meier, C., Harmer, A., Stoddard, A. & Spannagel, J. (2018). Evaluation of WFP Policies on Humanitarian Principles and Access in Humanitarian Contexts. Evaluation Report, WFP Office of Evaluation, May 2018, OEV/2016/014.

17 Gomez, M. (2020). Health in the Last Mile. Norwegian Red Cross.

18 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (nd.). Nederlandse Rode Kruis over rapport 'Tweede publieksterugkoppeling nationale actie Nederland helpt Sint-Maarten. 9

19 Giesen, P., Musori, M., Richards, G. (2019). Evaluation of the IFRC Syria Emergency Appeal. Humanitarian Strategy Consult Amsterdam, 22 April 2019.

20 Diplomatic cable BZV (2019.) ICRC/ IFRC: Veel en brede steun voor beoogde Rode Kruis/Halve Maan-resolutie over geestelijke gezondheid. Meer weerstand op 'restoring family links'. 16 juli 2019.

21 Rijks-Intern (2019). Humanitaire hulp - Rode Kruis/Halve Maan - 33e Internationale Conferentie: ook politisering vindt zijn weg naar de van oudsher apolitieke humanitaire conferentie van het Rode Kruis. (2 december 2019).

22 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (2019). Review and Capacity Assessment of Danish Red Cross.

23 ECAS (2018). Summary Report DRA Final evaluation, 2015 – 2017. ECAS Consulting; & various Joint Response Evaluations (SSJR, SJR, AJR, NIJR)

24 International Council of Voluntary Agencies (n.d.). Balancing Risk Appetite and Risk Tolerance in

between policy and wider society (e.g. localisation²⁵ or MHPSS).²⁶ DRA's weakness is found in inconsistencies in data collection and measurement of results.²⁷ Approaches to risk identification, monitoring and mitigation were also left wanting, particularly in Syria.²⁸ DRA collaboration was often limited to working together in the Netherlands in the early stages of the period under review.²⁹ The upcoming DRA evaluation will have to bring out, whether there has been added value for DRA's national NGO partners in working together under the umbrella of DRA beyond its role as a funding channel.³⁰

RQ 1.2 Have Dutch funded actors in the humanitarian system delivered timely and needs-based humanitarian assistance?

Timeliness

UN Agencies

In general, among various UN agencies, delays are observed in delivery, which result from slow or inflexible administrative procedures, lengthy budget approvals,³¹ delays in onward contracting, contractor payments, and fund disbursement.³²

UNICEF acknowledged that it needs to work towards more timely release of terms of reference, calls for tender, contracts and payments.³³ Security and delays in local authority approvals and sanctions were seen as the main reasons.³⁴ WFP is a bulk transporter operating in highly insecure contexts and sometimes extremely poor infrastructure and is thus likely to face distribution delays. WFP faces also administrative blockages that cause delays in delivering food assistance, for instance in obtaining Yemeni government clearances for distributions of food, already prepositioned in the country.³⁵ Some find this to be due to lack of investment in national early warning systems and needs assessment capacities of national institutions.³⁶ Institutional impediments to timely delivery in Jordan and Lebanon³⁷ include a lack of coordination

Humanitarian Operations.

25 Humanity House (nd.). Agenda, Humanitaire Hangijzers: waarom staan lokale hulporganisaties niet aan het roer?

26 Save the Children (2021). Afghaanse kinderen krijgen psychosociale steun door sport en spel. w

27 Various Joint Response Evaluations SJR, NIJR, UJR

28 Humanitarian Strategy Consult (2017). Evaluation of Dutch Relief Alliance Syrian Joint Response – 2. Report, 15 July 2017; RMTTeam (2018). SJR 3 Evaluation Report. Final Report, 22 May 2018; Humanitarian Strategy Consult (2019). Report of Evaluation of Syria Joint Response 4. Humanitarian Strategy Consult, 29 May 2019, Amsterdam; – SJR 2, SJR 3 and SJR 4 evaluations

29 Poole, L. & Willits-King, B. (2016). Mid-term evaluation of DRA. Evaluation report, July 2016, Humanitarian Policy Group.

30 Evaluation of DRA strategic period 2018-2021, is currently conducted

31 Fisher, M. & Stoianova, V. (2015). Global Evaluation of the Common Humanitarian Fund, Country Report: Sudan. UNOCHA, May 2015; Fisher, M. (2015). Evaluation of the Common Humanitarian Fund, Country Report: Somalia. UNOCHA, May 2015; Pottelbergh, G. & Singh, C. (2017). Evaluation of the Dutch Relief Alliance 2015-2017: Final Report. ECAS Consulting, 17 November 2017

32 Stoddard, A., Poole, L., Taylor, G., Willits-King, B. (2017). Efficiency and Inefficiency in Humanitarian Financing. Humanitarian Outcomes.

33 Darcy, J., Durston, S., Ballarin, F., Duncalf, J., Basbug, B., & Buker, H. (2015). An independent evaluation of UNICEF's response to the Syrian refugee crisis in Turkey, 2012-2015. New York: UNICEF.

34 Various DRA, UN and IFRC evaluations

35 WFP (2018). Immediate, Integrated and Sustained Response to Avert Famine in Yemen, Standard Project Report 2018. World Food Programme, Yemen.

36 Diaz, B. & Betts, J. (2017). Regional Synthesis 2013-2017: West and Central Africa Region. Operation Evaluations Series, November 2017, WFP Office of evaluation, OEV/2017/009.

37 Hanley, T., Ogwang, K., & Procter, C. (2018). Evaluation of UNHCR prevention and response to SGBV in the refugee population in Lebanon (2016-2018). Evaluation Report, November 2018, ES/2018/05. Evaluation Service United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Genève, Switzerland.

compounded by unrealistic planning and design.³⁸

UNHCR has also experienced programmatic impediments, for example in its Emergency Response to the influx of Syrian Refugees into Turkey.³⁹ The planning and programming tools were not well-suited to the context, leading to implementation delays. Slow mobilisation of surge capacity caused delays in implementation.⁴⁰

ICRC, IFRC and the Red Cross

IFRC has invested in preparedness capacities at national and community levels for timely delivery.⁴¹ It has developed a toolset for technical and institutional capacity building and organisational development.⁴² The Red Cross' national societies' ability to deliver timely assistance benefits from country-level legislation recognising them as an auxiliary to government disaster response institutions and operations. For instance, in major crises such as in Syria and Turkey, the national societies are mandated by the respective government to coordinate the global humanitarian response at national, regional and local levels.⁴³ This makes the Red Cross flexible to changing needs⁴⁴ and partly responsible for ensuring an operating environment in which other humanitarian partners can timely deliver, including in food and shelter in camp settings.⁴⁵

DRA

When it was just established, faced lengthy MFA approvals of its proposals, including late transfer of funds, delays in provision of supplies.⁴⁶ In Yemen, DRA agencies reported delayed MFA approvals, transaction and communication,⁴⁷ but later, DRA funding allocation decisions have become more streamlined.⁴⁸ Other factors leading to time constraint are DRA's consensus-oriented decision-making model, due to an emphasis on joint local needs assessments between partners and programme design at a time when delivery is a priority need, such as in Syria, when violence caused rapid and large-scale displacement.⁴⁹ Also, in Yemen for instance, lengthy deliberations on collaboration, referrals, planning and procurement processes were identified as

38 Giordano, N, Dunlop, K., Gabay, T. & Sardiwal, D. (2017). Evaluation synthesis of UNHCR's Cash Based Interventions in Jordan. UNHCR Evaluation Service, December 2017, ES/2017/05/ Geneva.

39 Sule Caglar, A., Conoir, Y., Murray, J., Thomas, V. & Ulkuer, N. (2016). Evaluation of UNHCR's Emergency Response to the influx of Syrian Refugees into Turkey. January 2014 - June 2015, Main report. UNHCR Evaluation Service, ES/2016/03, Geneva.

40 Confidential - UNHCR document and correspondence; MOPAN (2019). Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). MOPAN 2017-18 Assessments. Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network, February 2019.

41 Reid, D. A. (1997). Beyond Conflict: The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 1919-1994. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

42 IFRC (n.d.). National Society Preparedness for Effective Response /

43 Giesen, P., Musori, M., Richards, G. (2019). Evaluation of the IFRC Syria Emergency Appeal. Humanitarian Strategy Consult Amsterdam, 22 April 2019; Giesen, P., Kahyaoğlu, G., Puntman, A. (2021). International Appeal Turkey: MDRTR003 – Turkey Population Movement 2012-2021. Final Evaluation. IFRC And Red Crescent Societies. Humanitarian Strategy Consult, Amsterdam. – Evaluations of the IFRC Syria and Turkey Appeals

44 Patko, D. (2016). Beneficiary Satisfaction Survey and Evaluation Report Istanbul Community Centre Project for Syrian people under temporary protection in Turkey. IFRC and Red Crescent Societies, Regional Office for Europe, August 2016.

45 Giesen, P., Kahyaoğlu, G., Puntman, A. (2021). International Appeal Turkey: MDRTR003 – Turkey Population Movement 2012-2021. Final Evaluation. IFRC And Red Crescent Societies. Humanitarian Strategy Consult, Amsterdam

46 Pottelbergh, G. & Singh, C. (2017). Evaluation of the Dutch Relief Alliance 2015-2017: Final Report. ECAS Consulting.

47 Bagash, T. (2018). Yemen Joint Response 3 under the Dutch Relief Alliance 2017, Final Evaluation. Grassroots, Yemen.

48 Poole, L. & Willitts-King, B. (2016). Mid-term evaluation of the DRA. Evaluation report, July 2016, Humanitarian Policy Group.

49 Humanitarian Strategy Consult (2019). Report of Evaluation of Syria Joint Response 4. Humanitarian Strategy Consult, 29 May 2019, Amsterdam & and NWSJ After Action Review (2020).

causes for delay.⁵⁰ In Syria, UN sanctions hindered timely transfer of funds to Syrian bank accounts, a condition for DRA for registration in Damascus and needed for local procurement.⁵¹

Needs-based assistance

MFA allocations assess partner funding proposals referencing to OCHA-produced annual Global Humanitarian Overview (GHO), which synthesises Humanitarian Needs Overviews (HNO) and Humanitarian Response Plans (HRP), as indicated by the MFA Bemo format. MFA then subjects the outcomes of the GHO/INFORM process to an analysis of a wide spectrum of policy and institutional priorities, including BHOS priorities, ministerial directives, parliamentary interventions, the presence of a diplomatic post and other considerations. Although the GHO and INFORM assessments should ensure that MFA humanitarian support is needs-based, identified needs far outweighing overall global funding. Assessments that go sufficiently in-depth are not yet in place, to ensure the most vulnerable groups are reached with the limited resources.

UN Agencies

OCHA developed mechanisms for CBPF prioritization and allocation processes to target those most in need. They are confronted with barriers, however, such as control and influence of non-state armed groups (e.g., in Somalia) or attempts by both government and opposition forces to influence where aid agencies operate (South Sudan), and the overall complex political and militarized context in Afghanistan.⁵² In Occupied Palestine Territories, the sharp decline in humanitarian funding hampered achieving impartial or needs-based humanitarian assistance.⁵³ In Iraq, the delivery of principled aid required an analysis of trade-offs between the different principles which was complex. Operational decisions had to be taken about the proximity of humanitarian assistance to the military, and the use of military convoys and delivery of services in camps with military presence.⁵⁴

OCHA manages United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) teams to conduct needs assessments in sudden-onset crisis, helping them to operational opportunities to engage at field level.⁵⁵

WFP operations are assessed as mostly designed well to respond to needs.⁵⁶ WFP recognises the importance of interagency collaboration, joint and data driven approaches to needs assessments, complemented by qualitative inquiry and contextual adaptation.⁵⁷ Geographical targeting was found mostly adequate, but in some contexts activity-level targeting was weaker and led to the exclusion of vulnerable populations, such as nomadic peoples and/or people living with HIV and AIDS or those experiencing seasonal variations in food insecurity.⁵⁸ MFA-supported mVAM enables WFP to systematically assess the needs of the most vulnerable

50 Bagash, T. (2018). Yemen Joint Response 3 under the Dutch Relief Alliance 2017, Final Evaluation. Grassroots, Yemen.

51 RMTeam (2018). Evaluation of Dutch Relief Alliance North Iraq Joint Response – 2. Final Evaluation Report, 30 August 2017

52 Featherstone, A., Mowjee, T., Lattimer, C. & Poole, L. (2019). OCHA Evaluation of Country-Based Pooled Funds: Afghanistan – Country Report November 2019; Featherstone, A., Mowjee, T., Lattimer, C. & Poole, L. (2019). OCHA Evaluation of Country-Based Pooled Funds: South Sudan – Country Report November 2019; Featherstone, A., Mowjee, T., Lattimer, C. & Poole, L. (2019). OCHA Evaluation of Country-Based Pooled Funds: Somalia – Country Report November 2019.

53 Featherstone, A., Mowjee, T., Lattimer, C. & Poole, L. (2019). OCHA Evaluation of Country-Based Pooled Funds: Occupied Palestinian Territory – Country Report November 2019

54 Featherstone, A., Mowjee, T., Lattimer, C. & Poole, L. (2019). OCHA Evaluation of Country-Based Pooled Funds: Iraq – Country Report November 2019. f

55 UNDAC (2019). Missions in 2019. United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination. f

56 MOPAN (2019). World Food Programme (WFP). Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network, MOPAN 2017-18 Assessments, April 2019.

57 Hanley, T., Diaz, B., Bizzarri, M., Fisher, M., Frize, J., Gandure, S., Horst, N., Hüls, V., Khogali, H. & Lavell, A. (2020). Strategic Evaluation of WFP's Capacity to Respond to Emergencies. Evaluation Report: Volume 1. WFP Office of Evaluation, January 2020.

58 Diaz, B. & Betts, J. (2017) Regional Synthesis 2013-2017: West and Central Africa Region. Operation Evaluations Series, November 2017, WFP Office of evaluation, OEV/2017/009.

people, in remote and hard to reach areas.⁵⁹ WFP is trialling its accountability to affected populations (AAP) approach as part of improving its targeting based on the IASC's guidelines.⁶⁰

UNHCR's needs assessment focuses on protection needs of various vulnerable groups. The guidance also differentiates between immediate or longer-term needs for multi-year programme design. As the protection cluster coordinator, UNHCR has a particular responsibility to ensure joint needs assessments in this area, which is usually achieved based on its partnership ethos. Needs assessments are administratively linked to registration and benefit from investments in digitalization.⁶¹ A weakness of UNHCR was seen as the agency not being able to consistently promote AAP in the protection cluster.⁶²

UNICEF's works on strengthening AAP and developed a handbook that stresses the importance of participatory needs assessment.⁶³ This was meant to address the observation that UNICEF has not systematically integrated concerns about accountability to affected people into its humanitarian action'. Its needs assessments were sometimes found weak, leading to insufficient clarity on the highest priority needs and inconsistent attention to equity.⁶⁴

ICRC, IFRC and Red Cross

Several national societies, such as the Syrian Arab Red Crescent or the Turkish Red Crescent country level lead country-level coordination systems, including agency registration approval⁶⁵ and as local organisations act as gatekeepers to the system at large.

Biased beneficiary selection remains an important risk and biased programming or a lack of access for independent needs verification is equally challenging for local NGOs, UN agencies,⁶⁶ INGOs and to a lesser extent the IFRC.⁶⁷

Red Cross benefits from access to government census, health and protection data, helpful for needs-assessments, planning and pre-positioning. IFRC provides national societies with technical support including for needs assessments, which are also integrated into its Community Engagement and Accountability training and projects and include promotion of AAP.⁶⁸ Nonetheless, both IFRC and ICRC were found in 2016 to insufficiently integrate AAP into their operational management cycle.⁶⁹

ICRC, guided by its localisation policy, focuses its efforts on developing national societies

59 Robinson, A. & Obrecht, A. (2016). Using mobile voice technology to improve the collection of food security data: WFP's mobile Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping. HIF/ALNAP Case Study. London: ODI/ALNAP.

60 Brusset, E., Posada, S. & Torres, I. (2018). Evaluation of the WFP Humanitarian Protection Policy. Evaluation Report: Volume 1, WFP Office of evaluation, May 2018, OEV/2016/015

61 MOPAN (2019). Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). MOPAN 2017-19 Assessments. Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network, February 2019.

62 Featherstone, A. (2018). Evaluation of UNHCR's Leadership of the Global Protection Cluster and Field Protection Clusters: 2014-2016. October 2017, ES/2017/04. Evaluation Service United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Genève, Switzerland.

63 UNICEF (2020). Accountability to Affected Populations: A handbook for UNICEF and partners. UNICEF, Office of Emergency Programmes, Geneva.

64 UNICEF (2019). Evaluation of the Coverage and Quality of the UNICEF Humanitarian Response in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies

65 Giesen, P., Musori, M., Richards, G. (2019). Evaluation of the IFRC Syria Emergency Appeal. Humanitarian Strategy Consult Amsterdam, 22 April 2019.

66 Hopkins, N., & Beals, E. (2016). How Assad regime controls UN aid intended for Syria's children. The Guardian, 29 August 2016. n

67 Humanitarian Strategy Consult (2017,2018, 2019) - SJR 2, 3 evaluations and NWSJR Cross Border After Action Review. Humanitarian Strategy Consult (2019). IFRC Syria Appeal Evaluation.

68 Giesen, P., Musori, M., Richards, G. (2019). Evaluation of the IFRC Syria Emergency Appeal. Humanitarian Strategy Consult Amsterdam, 22 April 2019 & Giesen, P., Kahyaoglu, G., Puntman, A.

(2021). International Appeal Turkey: MDRTR003 – Turkey Population Movement 2012-2021. Final Evaluation. IFRC And Red Crescent Societies. Humanitarian Strategy Consult, Amsterdam

69 DFID, 2016. International Federation Red Cross and Red Crescent Review. MDR One Page Assessment Summaries.

delivery of assistance and protection capacities. The IFRC complements this with ad-hoc support for strengthening governance and resource management systems through MFA supported Appeals.⁷⁰ Nonetheless, institutional assessments, including strategic, financial and human resource management capacities are sporadic.⁷¹

ICRC delegations collect needs data independently from the UN coordinated system, to ensure the independent nature of planning, budgeting and ultimately its operations. The evidence of ICRC's ability to deliver is therefore largely based on its own needs assessments reported by the ICRC itself.⁷²

DRA

DRA agencies conduct joint needs assessments locally, often together with local partners such as in Syria. DRA focusses on outcomes through surveys, particularly in protracted and other situations where data collection systems have had time to mature.⁷³ A condition for DRA membership is having an ECHO partnership framework agreement.⁷⁴ This requires agencies to conform with a needs-based approach within the HNO. Thus, the agencies' capacity to implement according to needs is often dependent on the access afforded by sufficient funding, local authorities or, in specific cases, UN resolutions for humanitarian access,⁷⁵ similar to other humanitarian actors.

RQ 1.3 What has been the contribution of Dutch-funded actors to the objective of innovation, localization, and the coordination with broader development goals?

Innovation

The use of innovation in humanitarian context is still relatively limited, among others due to the insecurity and volatility of the context, and the fact that trial and error are seen as unethical. Also, often there is a high time pressure, which tends to favour established approaches with less extensive (and thus less time-consuming) need for evidence collection.⁷⁶ Donors were found to require organizations to demonstrate a larger body of evidence to support "innovative" food assistance approaches than "traditional" programs.⁷⁷ Nonetheless, if well implemented, innovation is expected to play an important role in improving effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian support.

The MFA acknowledges that the humanitarian needs remain vast and the gap between needs and challenges continuously increases, as was discussed under the Grand Bargain (GB) (2016). Challenges like using hunger as a weapon of war, access to people in need and safety of humanitarian aid workers are increasing in a rapidly changing world. Humanitarian innovation should help address these through product innovation, testing and scaling up of innovations.

70 Giesen, P., Musori, M., Richards, G. (2019). Evaluation of the IFRC Syria Emergency Appeal. Humanitarian Strategy Consult Amsterdam, 22 April 2019.

71 Howe, K., Stites, E., & Chudacoff, D. (2015). *Breaking the hourglass: Partnerships in remote management settings—The cases of Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan*. Feinstein International Center.

72 ICRC (2020). *Annual Report 2020*, Volume 1. 0

73 Pottelbergh, G. & Singh, C. (2017). *Evaluation of the Dutch Relief Alliance 2015-2017*. Final Report. ECAS Consulting, 17 November 2017; Poole, L. & Willitts-King, B. (2016). *Mid-term evaluation of the Dutch Relief Alliance*. Evaluation report, July 2016, Humanitarian Policy Group; Bagash, T. (2018). *Yemen Joint Response 3 under the Dutch Relief Alliance 2017, Final Evaluation*. Grassroots, Yemen; Humanitarian Strategy Consult (2017, 2018, 2019) SJR3 and SJR4 evaluations

74 Council of the European Union (1996). *Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid*. Official Journal L 163, 02/07/1996 P. 0001 – 0006.

75 United Nations Security Council (2021). Resolution 2585 (2021). S/Res/2585 (2021).

76 Darcy, J., Stobaugh, H., Walker, P., and Maxwell, D. (2013). *The Use of Evidence in Humanitarian Decision Making*. ACAPS Operational Learning Paper.

77 Maxwell, D., J. Parker, and H. Stobaugh. (2012). *What Drives Program Choice in Food Security Crises? Examining the "Response Analysis" Question*. World Development, Special Edition on Impacts of Innovative Food Assistance Instruments, forthcoming.

Already since November 2014, MFA has taken concrete steps to fund and promote humanitarian innovation. And even before that, funds of MFA had contributed to innovation. One of the successful innovations was the development and implementation of WFP’s ‘mobile Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping’, a system that is currently mainstreamed in WFP’s operation to remotely monitor food security,⁷⁸ having led to better, cheaper and more reliable data to inform humanitarian support, leading better targeting at a lower cost.⁷⁹

MFA’s attention towards innovation has increased considerably over the past five years. Before 2015, innovation was mostly seen as beneficial to disaster risk reduction, without it being mentioned as a more general goal,⁸⁰ but in 2015, innovation prominently appears.⁸¹ MFA now aims to support humanitarian innovation to improve timeliness, efficiency, and high-quality delivery. Until mid-2020, innovation was a specific portfolio amongst a total of that, but after that it was included as a part of one out of three portfolios “themes, trends, and strengthening systems”, as innovation is seen as a tool to strengthen systems.

MFA is looking for solutions in a longer-term commitment to strengthening response capacities in three areas:

1. Safe use of digital information
2. New funding solutions to improve timelines (such as impact bonds)
3. Initiatives that are designed to advance learning and knowledge, accountability and transparency, and safety of aid workers.

MFA policy guidance includes that innovation should be demand driven and engage local actors. Sustainability and scalability as part of the initial plan are conditional to funding. The logframe (2019) reflecting planned impact, outcomes and outputs of innovation is included in Annex 1.

Though DSH-HH, as per the Grand Bargain,⁸² puts an emphasis on using innovation to improve effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian support and humanitarian impact, it also looks at acquiring a stronger focus. Innovative financing for instance is deemed to be better placed in and was transferred to DDE, where a task force already exists.

MFA has provided and allocated earmarked funding for innovation to projects and partners. The innovation portfolio contained ten activities by the end of 2019 (2 with UN, 5 with NGOs and one with RC family), and was brought down to seven, which will remain the target number until 2023. The activities and planned allocations for 2019-2023 (as noted in September 2020 in EUR) came to a total of almost 44 million EUR and can be broken down as follows:⁸³

Activity	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	Total
ELRHA/ HIF	1,126,686	4,259,464	2,901,800	1,461,900	250,150	10,000,000
DCHI	245,000	300,000	257,500	42,500		845,000
OCHA Data Centre ⁸⁴	1,190,881	1,200,000	2,100,000	2,100,000		7,490,881
Humanitarian Grand Challenge	2,640,000	3,630,000	330,000			6,600,000
WFP Innovation	1,500,000	1,500,000	1,500,000			4,500,000

⁷⁸ WFP, 2018. Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping Food security analysis at the World Food Programme. November 2018.

⁷⁹ DISI – Development Information Services International, 2015. Review of mVAM programme: novel application of mobile technologies for food security monitoring. August 2015

⁸⁰ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, vergaderjaar 2014-2015. Beleid ten aanzien van ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Brief van de Minister voor Buitenlandse handel en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking.

⁸¹ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, vergaderjaar 2015-2016. Beleid ten aanzien van ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Brief van de Minister voor Buitenlandse handel en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking.

⁸² Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (2018). Investeren in perspectief, Goed voor de wereld, goed voor Nederland. Beleidsnota, May 2018.

⁸³ Draft plan 30 September 2021, intern.

⁸⁴ De Jonge, H (2021). Stand van zakenbrief Covid-19. Kamerbrief, 13 januari 2021.

Accelerator ⁸⁵						
Zero Hunger Lab	400,000	400,000	380,000		30,000	1,210,000
DRA Innovation Fund	3,000,000	2,850,000	2,850,000	450,000		9,150,000
START	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000			3,000,000
ALNAP	50,000					50,000
RVO/ Wings for Aid	500,000	463,775				963,775
Total	11,652,567	15,603,239	11,319,300	4,054,400	280,150	43,809,656

In general, due to the nature of humanitarian interventions, including the short duration activities and risk aversion of donors, only a mere 1 percent of total humanitarian funding is spent on innovation.⁸⁶ As part of this relatively small allocation, the investment into the earlier stages of innovation is many times higher than into the more complex scaling up of innovations. In 2020, it was highlighted that a large number of pilots and innovative initiatives had been launched or implemented by individual signatories and at country or crisis level. Nonetheless, very few were being scaled up, even where there were measurable results.⁸⁷ MFA has identified this as a shortcoming and is very keen and focusing on funding scaling up of innovations, since this has more potential in terms of providing sustainable solutions to existing challenges. Since 2019, besides the requirement of innovations being demand-driven and local actors participating, scaling up of innovations appears as a priority.⁸⁸ Even though this plays into a perceived lack of available resources and capacity to bring humanitarian innovations to scale, up to now there has been a lack of evidence on the ability of taking innovation to scale, and even of clear standards of what it means to scale up innovations.⁸⁹ Most innovation initiatives have not delivered the anticipated transformational change. Innovators experienced scaling, systemic, mindset and capacity constraints⁹⁰ and scaling to the level of transformation proved more problematic than expected.⁹¹

Under the HIF, in 2020 GBP 3.8 million was contributed, whilst from 2021 to 2023 respectively contributions of GBP 2.6, 1.3 and 0.2 million were planned. From the 17 projects currently financed, nine are in WASH, five in protection and three in disaster preparedness and resilience. Twelve are in the phase of recognition, invention or pilot, four in adaptation and one in scale-up. In March 2020, in a steering committee meeting for donors, the Netherlands has indicated that too much time was spent by the HIF on providing guidance to seed projects at the expense of scaling up. Also, the Netherlands brought forward the importance of strategic partnerships with UN partners as potential end users of innovations.

MFA also earmarked support for the NLRC administered Dutch Coalition for Humanitarian Innovation (DCHI) innovation fund, a network of humanitarian organisations, the private sector, government, and academia. DCHI is meant to facilitate the exchange of ideas, the formulation of questions, and definition of creative answers,⁹² though concrete results for the fund have not

85 Confidential - WFP BEMO; WFP Executive Board (2019). Annual performance report for 2018. Executive Board, Annual Session, Rome, 10-14 June 2019.

86 ELRHA (2018). Too though to scale? Challenges to scaling innovation in the humanitarian sector.

87 Metcalfe-Hough, V, Fenton, W, Willitts-King, B and Spencer, A. (2020) Grand Bargain annual independent report. June 2020.

88 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, vergaderjaar 2019-2020. Investeren in Perspectief – Goed voor de Wereld, Goed voor Nederland.

89 United Nations University – Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (2021). Draft Literature Study Innovation in Humanitarian Assistance. Commissioned by IOB, Draft 3 December 2021, unpublished.

90 Wilde, J. & McClure, D. (2021). Humanitarian innovation: The next step for greater impact. The Humanitarian Leader, Working paper 016, July 2021.

91 McClure, D. (2018). Creating more impactful innovation capabilities in the aid sector. The Global Alliance for Humanitarian Innovation (GAHI), 2018, London.; donors including: The Government of Denmark, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Australian Aid and The Department of the International Development (DFID)

92 Policy note: Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, vergaderjaar 2017-2018. Beleid ten aanzien van ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Brief van de Minister voor Buitenlandse handel en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking.

been measured yet or reported on. MFA furthermore funds the DRA Innovation Fund.

Another broad platform that the Netherlands contributes to is the Humanitarian Grand Challenge, a multi-donor fund that has as its goal to “find and accelerate life-saving or life-improving innovations to help the most vulnerable and hardest-to-reach people impacted by humanitarian crises caused by conflict”.⁹³

Though these funds individually may be working well, there is little interlinkage. For instance, in South Sudan, DRA member NGO Plan did not link to UNICEF, also a board member of DCHI, for innovative approaches on education.⁹⁴

Localisation

Localisation is known as Workstream 2 under the GB. MFA is committed to honour the GB target of 25 percent direct funding to local and national responders by 2020. Nonetheless, analysts suggest that prescribing a minimum proportion of funding is insufficient without unpacking the concept⁹⁵ and that humanitarian localisation needs to move beyond implementation only.⁹⁶ It is not always easy to measure the extent to which an organisation is local, but its autonomy in taking decisions is one of the important factors, as is the source of its funding. Some perceive the objective of localisation as instigating a different way of working in delivering humanitarian aid, where international actors should make themselves redundant by building local capacity and enabling local actors to run their own response.⁹⁷

Localisation is perceived as slowly strengthening. In 2019, it was indicated that the GB has helped to drive progress, providing incentives for and facilitating sharing lessons and experiences on implementing a localisation approach. Yet, there had been no system-wide shift in operational practice.⁹⁸ In 2020, it was indicated that gaps remain, such as funding for overhead costs not being adequately passed on to local actors. Also, there are very few funding mechanisms for capacity strengthening and donor response to them is still limited.⁹⁹ Another finding related to localisation has to do with international aid being only 1–2 percent of what people receive in a humanitarian crisis – most of the funding coming from other resources, such as remittances, loans, faith-based flows and community resources. For international aid to be most useful therefore, it should be complementary to such funding flows. It is perceived that the best way to localise the response perspectives would be to shift from one with international resource flows at the core to one where households and affected countries are at the centre of how responses are planned and funded.¹⁰⁰

Before 2015, attention for Dutch support to localisation as part of humanitarian funding was very limited.¹⁰¹ In 2016, localisation goals start to appear more prominently.¹⁰² Since then, the

93 <https://humanitariangrandchallenge.org/about/>

94 Rijks-Intern (2016). Centraal-Afrikaanse Republiek - Noodhulp - Report of field visit. DSH. 16 December 2016

95 HPG, ODI & ICVA (2016). Localisation in Humanitarian Practice. Report, International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), June 2016. e

96 Slim, H. (2021). Localization is Self-Determination. *Frontiers in Political Science*, 3, 80.

97 Schenkenberg, E. (2016) The challenges of localised humanitarian aid in armed conflict. *Emergency Gap Series* 03.

98 Metcalfe-Hough, V. Fenton, W. and Poole, L. (2019). Grand Bargain annual independent report 2019. Executive summary. June 2019.

99 GB Secretariat. (2020). Grand Bargain Annual Meeting 2020. Analysis of gaps, objectives, and identified constituencies as potential agents of change to move forward. 17 June 2020.

100 Willitts-King, B., Bryant, S. and Spencer, H. (2019). Valuing local resources in a humanitarian crisis. HPG Report, October 2019.

101 Policy note: Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, vergaderjaar 2014-2015. 32 605 Nr. 156. Beleid ten aanzien van ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Brief van de Minister voor Buitenlandse handel en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking.

102 Policy note: Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, vergaderjaar 2016-2017. 32 605 Nr. 156. Beleid ten aanzien van ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Brief van de Minister voor Buitenlandse handel en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking.

Netherlands is committed to supporting localisation, but it is limited in its ability to fund local organisations directly and therefore depending on the extent to which international organisations actually transfer power.

In many countries, national and local NGOs (NNGOs) acknowledge that the quality of the various organisations is very different. In Yemen for instance, not all NNGOs are familiar with the humanitarian principles and safety protocols are lacking. Without local capacity building, minimum quality service delivery by NNGOs is seen as difficult.¹⁰³ In Sudan, NNGOs used to be very politicised, which has led to lingering mistrust between NNGOs themselves and with INGOs, hampering cooperation and coordination.¹⁰⁴

The Netherlands also acknowledges that funding is not the only aspect of localisation, but that capacity building is an essential factor in localisation and one that they are willing to support. In summary, under workstream two of the GB, the Netherlands has committed to four specific points:¹⁰⁵

1. Build humanitarian capacity of local/national responders.
2. Provide unearmarked support to foreign NGOs.
3. Support using CBPFs as a channel for funding national responders, by increasing contributions as a proportion of humanitarian assistance.
4. Reduce reporting requirements of national responders by accepting reporting via IATI and by harmonization of donor requirements.

The Netherlands and other donors have made additional Covid-19-related humanitarian funding available. It was found that international aid responses to the Covid-19 pandemic in crisis contexts are accelerating progress in cash assistance, localisation and quality funding, though there may be a challenge in locking in progress after the urgency of the pandemic has passed.¹⁰⁶ One of the reasons is that the focus of improved localisation was found to have remained on improving effective delivery and less so on self-determination and other governance issues.¹⁰⁷ ICRC found themselves better able to defend the localisation agenda and demonstrate the added value of local response under Covid, since travel and other restrictions made it almost impossible for actors from elsewhere to provide support.¹⁰⁸

The triple Nexus

MFA is committed to implement OECD DAC recommendations, encouraging humanitarian partners to adopt a triple Nexus approach, focusing on coordination, programming, and financing. There is some evidence on the triple Nexus approach being embedded in MFA partner assessments or the justification of funding allocations (systematically documented in BeMos). The relevant policy brief¹⁰⁹ includes a selection of humanitarian principles, development (Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)) and foreign trade policy priorities (business opportunities, market access after Brexit and the redesign of trade and investment networks), but lacks a direct linkage to peace (building) objectives.

UN Agencies

103 Diplomatic cable BZV (2017). Jemen - Humanitaire hulp – Report of two-day visit to London: “Yemen is like Syria, but without the cameras” 6 February 2017.

104 Diplomatic cable BZV (2019). Sudan - Humanitaire hulp – Report on humanitarian needs in Sudan. 29 October 2019.

105 The Netherlands (2017). Grand Bargain. Input from the Netherlands, January-December 2016. Version 7 February 2017

106 Metcalfe-Hough, V, Fenton, W, Willitts-King, B and Spencer, A. (2020) Grand Bargain annual independent report. June 2020.

107 Mania, P. (2021). Humanitarian learning under the Covid-19 pandemic; a pathway to localisation? Humanitarian Leadership Academy, 02 August 2021.

108 Rijks-Intern 2020. ICRC - Humanitaire hulp – Report on ICRC and IFRC: “This won’t be your standard response”. 26 March 2020.

109 Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (2018). Investeren in perspectief, Goed voor de wereld, goed voor Nederland. Policy note, May 2018.

Several UN agencies and Member States, including the Netherlands, committed to enabling shared analysis of needs and risks and shared planning between humanitarian and development sectors, to better align humanitarian and development planning tools and interventions.¹¹⁰

Examples of how triple Nexus thinking is conceptualised within the UN system, are the 'New Way of Working' and the associated "Commitment to Action" meeting immediate humanitarian needs while at the same time reducing risk and vulnerability.¹¹¹ Most MFA partners have a dual development and humanitarian mandate and their policy architecture provides for linking their operations to both humanitarian principles and the SDGs.¹¹²

UNHCR links its nexus approach with the Global Compact for Refugees¹¹³ and engages with the SDGs by aligning with national priorities, and contributions to national development and protection policies.¹¹⁴ There is also significant evidence of UNHCR's consistent advocacy for sustainable solutions for persons of concern, including status holders and asylum seekers, in the Netherlands¹¹⁵ and in post-conflict contexts.¹¹⁶

There is some evidence that nexus-thinking in the UN is leading to more effective collaboration and breaking down silos. OCHA is committed to promoting needs analysis across 'the pillars of international intervention' and 'addressing root causes of vulnerabilities and the reinforcing of local capacities.' From 2017, OCHA and UNDP co-chair the Joint Steering Committee for advancing Humanitarian and Development Collaboration.¹¹⁷ OCHA also co-convenes Grand Bargain Workstreams 5, 7, and 8, which include mainstreamed triple Nexus commitments.¹¹⁸ OCHA furthermore reports progress on joint needs assessments with the World Bank and UNDP.¹¹⁹

UNICEF works in partnership with UNDP, UNFPA and UN-Women,¹²⁰ providing an example of the Nexus approach becoming instrumental in breaking down traditional mandate-based silos. WFP's triple Nexus agenda has prompted a review of operational priorities by incorporating SDGs 2 and 17, tackling hunger and malnutrition through partnerships, formalised in WFP's strategic plan and consistently pursued in WFP's Country Strategic Plans.¹²¹

ICRC, IFRC and Red Cross

The IFRC supports national societies to engage with the SDGs in a number of ways, including within its health and care framework.¹²² The IFRC also contributes to Quality Education (SDG 4) through 51 Red Cross-National Societies in collaboration with Ministries of Education, Climate Change (SDG 13) through the Global Climate Change centre in the Netherlands and Peaceful Societies, justice and strong institutions (SDG 16) as auxiliaries to governments in the areas of disaster risk reduction, disaster response and health and social care support.¹²³ ICRC defined humanitarian activities as 'restricted by international humanitarian law and having 'a

110 UNOCHA (n.d.). Agenda for Humanity. Self-Report 2019.

111 World Humanitarian Summit (2016). Commitments to Action.

112 WFP Executive Board (2019). *Annual performance report for 2018*. Executive Board, Annual Session, Rome, 10-14 June 2019

113 UN (2018). *Global Compact on Refugees*. United Nations, New York.

114 UNHCR (2018). *Global Appeal 2018-2019*. UNHCR, Geneva, Switzerland.

115 UNHCR (2020). *Global Report 2019*. UNHCR, Geneva, Switzerland.

116 MOPAN (2019). Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 2017-18 Performance Assessment. MOPAN assessments, February 2019.

117 Agenda for Humanity reports (2017, 2018, 2019).

118 UN (n.d.). The Joint Steering Committee. <https://www.un.org/jsc/content/joint-steering-committee>

119 UNOCHA (n.d.). Agenda for Humanity. Self-Report 2019.

120 UNICEF (2018). Strategic Plan 2018-2021. UNICEF, January 2018.

121 WFP Executive Board (2021). WFP Strategic Plan (2022-2026) (unedited version). First Informal Consultation, 23 July 2021, World Food Programme, Rome, Italy.

122 IFRC (2020). IFRC Health and Care Framework 2030: The IFRC's contribution to healthier, more resilient communities and individuals. IFRC, 27 November 2020.

123 Drummond, J., Khoury, R., Bailey, S., Crawford, N., Fan, L., Milhem, R. & Zyck, A. (2015). An Evaluation of WFP's Regional Response to the Syrian Crisis, 2011-2014. WFP Office of Evaluation, Evaluation Report, April 2015, OEV/2014/19.

humanitarian purpose'.¹²⁴ It engaged with the triple Nexus debate by identifying concrete opportunities for application, often anchored in localisation notions. ICRC identified the tensions between humanitarian principles work and the nexus agenda by indicating that several international humanitarian organisations are perceived by national governments as foreign entities, guided by international political and security agendas, often acting as a substitute or, in some cases, a catalyst, for security interventions by Western-led intergovernmental organisations.¹²⁵ ICRC also makes explicit deep rooted tensions between normative notions such as impartiality and the political agendas of equity and peace,¹²⁶ the mixing of which having grave implications for the safety of humanitarian workers¹²⁷ risking delivery and hence effectiveness of life saving aid.

DRA

Along the lines indicated above, DRA members have different views on the triple Nexus. The agencies that make up the consortium mostly have a development-based organisational culture of partnership and focus on equity and sustainability. Overall, the agencies, although not having a formal mandate, seem at ease with the development and peace discourse and often cite their contributions to the SDGs. The triple Nexus is included in the new DRA strategy, but we have not found further evidence documenting how DRA intends to implement an explicit nexus strategy.

RQ 2.2 What different types of relations between MFA and recipient organizations emerge from these funding decisions

Unearmarked funds

MFA simultaneously maintains two types of relationships with its partners: funding and governance. These two relationships are closely interlinked and coordinated across MFA divisions in The Hague, and Permanent Missions in Geneva, Rome, and New York.

The IOB study on funding decisions¹²⁸ illustrates that:

- 50-60% of the MFA humanitarian budget is non-earmarked,
- 30-40% is allocated to partners for a specific purpose or crisis (partly earmarked),
- 5-10% is earmarked.

MFA is among the five donors providing the highest percentage of non-earmarked and partially earmarked funding.¹²⁹ The preference for non-earmarked funding implies, that MFA relationships with humanitarian partners are dominated by a hands-off approach and based on a degree of trust. Interviews with partners indicate that the relationships between MFA and partners are not solely determined by the type of funding. Other factors include the length of the partner relationship, and partners' mandate.

MFA allocates non-earmarked funding to many partners (incl. ICRC, NLRC, WFP, UNHCR, OCHA, and UNICEF).¹³⁰ Interviewed partners presented a clear preference for this type of

124 ICRC (2019). Annual Report 2018, Volume 1. International Committee of the Red Cross, May 2019, Geneva, Switzerland; ICRC (2018). Annual Report 2017, Volume 1. International Committee of the Red Cross, June 2018, Geneva, Switzerland; ICRC (2020) Annual report 2019, Volume 1. International Committee of the Red Cross, June 2020, Geneva, Switzerland.

125 IFRC (2018). IFRC Annual Report 2017.

126 DuBois, M. (2020). The Triple Nexus: Threat or Opportunity for Humanitarian Principles. Berlin: Centre for Humanitarian Action.

127 ALNAP (2018). The State of the Humanitarian System. ALNAP Study. London: ALNAP/ODI.

128 Confidential - IOB (2021). Document on decision-making.

129 Metcalfe-Hough, V., Fenton, W., Willitts-King, B., & Spencer, A. (2021). The Grand Bargain at five years: an independent review. HPG commissioned report. London: ODI. w

130 Letters to the Dutch Parliament: Ploumen, E. (2015). Besteding humanitaire hulp 2014 en overzicht planning 2015. Kamerbrief, 23 februari 2015; Ploumen, E. (2016). Besteding humanitaire hulp 2015 en indicatieve planning 2016. Kamerbrief, 25 januari 2016; Ploumen, E. (2017, 25 januari). Besteding humanitaire hulp 2016 en indicatieve planning 2017; Kamerbrief, 25 januari 2017; Kaag, S. (2018). Planning intensiveringsmiddelen humanitaire hulp 2018 en korte terugblik op 2017. Kamerbrief, 21 februari 2018; Kaag, S. (2020). Humanitaire Hulp en Diplomatie 2019 – 2020.

funding, as it offers flexibility for programming, allowing partners to set their own priorities.¹³¹ Non-earmarked funding also enables partners to better respond to needs in case of new crisis or of sudden changes in existing ones. Contributing to operational reserve funds, non-earmarked funds are seen to allow for pre-positioning of human resources, humanitarian infrastructure, goods and services. Additionally, these funds offer short internal approval lines within the partners' decision-making processes contributing to timely delivery of aid. Non-earmarked funding lessens the administrative burden and management costs, suggesting efficiency gains associated with the hands-off approach. Partners allocate non-earmarked funding to internal conferences and human resource development, and other initiatives that contribute to institutional development, specialisation, and capacity development of humanitarian actors.¹³² There is only limited evidence to validate the assumption however, that non-earmarked predictable funding to a core number of organisations enhances specialisation and necessary scale.

There are challenges to non-earmarked funding, for instance in tracing non-earmarked funds and ensuring visibility of results.¹³³ Activities implemented with non-earmarked funding are not specifically reported to or systematically monitored by the MFA, other than through evaluations, annual reports, partner presentations or incidental visits by MFA staff.¹³⁴ This makes demonstrating or measuring the attribution of MFA funding to specific results more difficult.¹³⁵

A lack of systematic monitoring increases the risk to a level higher than required by the volatile nature of the operational context.¹³⁶ The MFA is strengthening risks identification as part of the decision-making process¹³⁷ but, given a lack of joint ownership and the disincentives to reporting, this may expose the policy (and those responsible for it) to risks that ultimately reside with the MFA.¹³⁸

Consistent use of good reporting standards and timely publication of financial data is seen as contributing to solving the above challenges. Aid organisations made some progress by enhancing transparency and quality of reporting, but donors have not always sufficiently clarified what they require in terms of visibility and transparency.¹³⁹

Partially earmarked funds

Kamerbrief, 3 maart 2020; Kaag, S. (2021). *Humanitaire Hulp en Diplomatie 2021*. Kamerbrief, 19 februari 2021.

¹³¹ Stoddard, A. (2017). *International Humanitarian Financing: Review and Comparative Assessment of Instruments (Updated Edition)*. Humanitarian Outcomes, March 2017; Healy, S., & Tiller, S. (2014). *Where is everyone? Responding to emergencies in the most difficult places*. London: Médecins Sans Frontières.

¹³² Stoddard, A. (2017). *International Humanitarian Financing: Review and Comparative Assessment of Instruments (Updated Edition)*. Humanitarian Outcomes, March 2017; Confidential - NRK Blok allocation 2018-2021; Confidential - BEMO IFRC contribution 2020-2021; Confidential - BEMO IFRC 2020-2021

¹³³ FAO, DI and NRC (2020). *Catalogue of quality funding practices to the humanitarian response: A reference tool for policymakers and practitioners to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of programming*. Report, July 2020). Rome, FAO; Metcalfe-Hough, V., Poole, L., Bailey, S., & Belanger, J. (2018). *Grand Bargain annual independent report 2018*. HPG. London: ODI.; Stoddard, A. (2017). *International Humanitarian Financing: Review and Comparative Assessment of Instruments (Updated Edition)*. Humanitarian Outcomes, March 2017

¹³⁴ Confidential - MFA (2016)

¹³⁵ *CERF Annual Results Report 2020* edition. Geneva, Switzerland.

¹³⁶ International Council of Voluntary Agencies (n.d.). *Balancing Risk Appetite and Risk Tolerance in Humanitarian Operations*.

¹³⁷ Confidential - BEMO on Covid-19

¹³⁸ Report Algemene Rekenkamer (2020). *Resultaten verantwoordingsonderzoek 2019. Buitenlandse Handel en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (XVII). Rapportage bij het jaarverslag, 2020*.

¹³⁹ Metcalfe-Hough, V., Fenton, W., Willitts-King, B., & Spencer, A. (2021). *The Grand Bargain at five years: an independent review*. HPG commissioned report. London: ODI.

MFA provides partially earmarked funds to all three types of partners examined in this study (UN agencies, ICRC, and DRA). Examples of partially earmarked funding include crisis specific funding, pooled funds such as CERF and CBPF, and block grants.

Partially earmarked funding effectively contributes to coordinated, flexible, timely and need-based response.¹⁴⁰ CBPFs are effective in supporting coordination of partners best positioned at country level to respond to sector-specific needs (e.g. shelter, protection, health etc.).¹⁴¹ The CBPFs also show signs of furthering MFA policy priorities such as the growing proportion of funding to local organisations, three quarters of which is allocated directly.¹⁴² Evaluations commissioned by the CERF¹⁴³ confirm that the fund has enabled benefitting agencies to respond timely to needs at scale.¹⁴⁴

MFA allocates block grants to DRA and the Netherlands Red Cross, although with different conditions attached.¹⁴⁵ The level of flexibility afforded by the DRA and NLRC block grant facilitated timely delivery.¹⁴⁶

There are also disadvantages though. Recent studies illustrate that the effectiveness of UN pooled funds is determined by their proportionality, whereby a sufficiently large size is required to ensure reliable delivery and disbursements. Analysis estimates that to be effective (particularly in achieving Grand Bargain commitments), these funds should represent 15% of total funding.¹⁴⁷ With a decline in the overall contributions received in 2020, the UN pooled funds currently account for 6.1% of public contributions in humanitarian emergencies,¹⁴⁸ well below this threshold.

Earmarked funding

Earmarked allocations are considered in relation to specific needs and based on specific MFA strategic and political interests. Earmarked allocations include targeted contributions to specific projects.

Earmarked funds allow for assessing the attribution of MFA support to the results, strengthening transparency and visibility. Nonetheless, earmarked funds are not recommended under the Grand Bargain and provide less flexibility and create challenges for effective responses. All partners as well as MFA respondents see this type of funding as 'problematic'. DSH activity overviews show that there are quite a number of earmarked allocations but of relatively small size, especially compared to UN core funding, suggesting higher management costs. Partners and literature confirm that earmarked funding increases the management burden.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁰ Girling, F., Urquhart, A. & Fernandez, S. (2021). Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2021. Development Initiatives Poverty Research Ltd, England.

¹⁴¹ Stoddard, A., Poole, L., Taylor, G., Willits-King, B. (2017). Efficiency and Inefficiency in Humanitarian Financing. Humanitarian Outcomes.

¹⁴² Girling, F., Urquhart, A. & Fernandez, S. (2021). Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2021. Development Initiatives Poverty Research Ltd, England

¹⁴³ OCHA (2019). CERF Annual Results Report, 2019 edition. Geneva, Switzerland; OCHA (2020). Anticipatory Humanitarian Action – Pilot: 2020 Monsoon floods in Bangladesh. Version 26 June 2020.

¹⁴⁴ For example, in 2020 in Bangladesh people were reached earlier, faster and at half the cost of regular response, and in a more empowering way.; OCHA (2019). CERF Annual Results Report, 2019 edition. Geneva, Switzerland

¹⁴⁵ The NLRC is subjected to a financial threshold of €400,000 for the NLRC channeling the funding to national societies through the IFRC appeals system. DRA received block grants for Joint Responses that are flexible with the limit of the 25% budget deviations.

¹⁴⁶ Pottelbergh, G. & Singh, C. (2017). *Evaluation of the Dutch Relief Alliance 2015-2017*. ECAS Consulting, 17 November 2017

¹⁴⁷ Stoddard, A. (2017). *International Humanitarian Financing: Review and Comparative Assessment of Instruments (Updated Edition)*. Humanitarian Outcomes, March 2017

¹⁴⁸ Girling, F., Urquhart, A. & Fernandez, S. (2021). *Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2021*. Development Initiatives Poverty Research Ltd, England.

¹⁴⁹ Confidential - MFA Netherlands (2019); Stoddard, A., Poole, L., Taylor, G., Willits-King, B. (2017).

RQ 2.3 In what way have the priority themes innovation and localization been promoted within these relations?

Innovation

During the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) of 2016, both innovation and localisation were important agenda items, agreed to be essential to work towards better quality humanitarian assistance. Nonetheless, initial progress was slow, and it was only in June 2017 that real steps were taken. In 2017, under localisation, 73 percent of signatories had invested in national actors' capacity, 51 percent had assessed and addressed legal and technical barriers to funding local and national responders and 34 percent had increased funding, mainly by contributions to pooled funds. There was little progress reported on innovation.¹⁵⁰

Specifically for innovation, for the period 2015-2020, MFA made available 10 million EUR.¹⁵¹ Later, for 2019, 2020 and 2021, the Netherlands had allocated respectively 13, 15 and 15 million EUR (out of a total budget for humanitarian assistance of 380, 370 and 370 million EUR).¹⁵² On a parallel trail, for both localisation and innovation, attention is supposed to be paid by organisations that are funded by the Netherlands.

UN Agencies

WFP has invested heavily in innovation,¹⁵³ thus supported by communication with and funding from the Netherlands, especially for scaling up. Under the Scale-up Enablement portfolio of their Innovation Accelerator, a gradually increasing number of successful innovations are taken to scale. Worth to mention are the use of e-vouchers (in situations where cash is not suitable), blockchain technology and biometric registration. WFP has included various innovative steps to improve their humanitarian programmes, among others to improve the link between local production and national school feeding programmes, crop monitoring systems in disaster risk management programmes, and affordable agricultural insurance for subsistence farmers.¹⁵⁴

An innovation, where WFP was a frontrunner and which had been adopted before the GB by many humanitarian actors, was replacing in-kind with cash-based transfers.¹⁵⁵ One of the innovative methods currently used by WFP is gathering satellite images for information verification from areas that are inaccessible, as well as to assess where vulnerable people are located and how many people are in need, so as to fine-tune their assistance.¹⁵⁶ Mobile telephone data are used to understand household hunger and vulnerability patterns. Similar to the UN-wide Global Pulse initiative,¹⁵⁷ the data are used for estimating food-based household expenditures and for identifying households for assistance based on mobile phone network data.¹⁵⁸

WFP however also acknowledges that privacy and data protection are essential and is very strict

Efficiency and Inefficiency in Humanitarian Financing. Humanitarian Outcomes.

¹⁵⁰ Derzshi-Horvath, A, Steets, J and Ruppert, L. (2017). *Independent Grand Bargain Report*. Executive Summary. 8 June 2017.

¹⁵¹ Letter to parliament: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (2014), Brief Aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. *Betreft Innovatie van humanitaire hulp*. 18 november 2014.

¹⁵² Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (2019). 3. R: Humanitaire hulp (overzicht cijfers, MHPSS, Grand Bargain, FFD)

¹⁵³ WFP 2020. Innovation Accelerator. The year in review.

¹⁵⁴ Rijks-Intern (2019). VN - WFP - Humanitaire hulp – Report on WFP's concept notes on Cuba, Caribisch gebied, Djibouti, Irak, Niger en Sierra Leone. 8 May 2019.

¹⁵⁵ Rijks-Intern, 16 November 2015. VN - WFP - Humanitaire hulp – Report on innovation in humanitarian assistance

¹⁵⁶ Rijks-Intern (2017). VN - WFP - Humanitaire hulp – Report on innovation, data and technology in humanitarian action. 11 January 2017.

¹⁵⁷ UN Secretary-General's initiative on big data and artificial intelligence for development, humanitarian action, and peace. <https://www.unglobalpulse.org/>

¹⁵⁸ United Nations (2015). Global Pulse Information sheet; <https://www.unglobalpulse.org/>

in their behaviour around beneficiary data.¹⁵⁹ This is an issue of gradually growing proportions, since humanitarian organisations collect and share more and more data. Responsible handling of this data is important but has not received much attention yet. It is not yet fully ensured that organisations do no harm with the transfer and use of personal and other forms of sensitive data. Current practices of organisations and data requests from some donors/ states may risk harming already vulnerable populations even further. UN OCHA Center for Humanitarian Data conducted a conference on Data Responsibility in Humanitarian Action to discuss these topics.¹⁶⁰

Unearmarked funding was seen by respondents as potentially having led to innovation, although the nature of such funding makes defining a direct link between funding and innovation difficult. A Swiss evaluation of ICRC however found, that even though most respondents believed that unearmarked funding is the best approach to encourage innovation, in reality the most innovative projects had been specifically funded.¹⁶¹

UNHCR is the co-convener of the GB workstream “Reduce duplication and management costs”. In this light, UNHCR and WFP co-lead the UN Business Innovations Group,¹⁶² which works on improving cost-efficiency through expanding collaborative activities, joint actions and cost savings within UN agencies.¹⁶³

UNHCR developed cash-based assistance and protection and its registration systems are increasingly digitalised, strengthening the basis for more efficient oversight and effective analysis.¹⁶⁴ An example of their innovative cash-based assistance is the Common Cash Facility for refugees in Jordan, which was assessed as a secure and efficient cash transfer approach.¹⁶⁵ This cash approach is coupled with UNHCR’s Innovative Cash Delivery Mechanism Assessment Tool (2016) that helps humanitarians to assess the adequacy of cash delivery mechanisms.¹⁶⁶ UNHCR increasingly uses and scales up biometrics and data-driven technology to improve efficiency of refugee assistance.¹⁶⁷ Further innovations, with a strong focus on the needs of the target group and based on feedback collected from the field,¹⁶⁸ are self-help kiosks, call centers and legal aid booths and outreach apps, even though this requires a lot of UNHCR’s scarce resources and expertise.¹⁶⁹ Another example are innovative partnerships with local organisations in Ethiopia having led to integration of refugees in local society, which was praised by many participants of the Global refugee Forum 2019.¹⁷⁰

UNHCR’s Innovation Service collaborates with a range of stakeholders, from UN partners, private sector, and academia to NGOs. UNHCR is part of the Global Humanitarian Lab that

¹⁵⁹ Rijks-Intern (2017). VN - WFP - Humanitaire hulp - Humanitaire hulp – Report on innovation, data and technology in humanitarian action. 11 January 2017.

¹⁶⁰ Rijks-Intern (2019). Humanitaire hulp - Strengthening responsible use of sensitive data in humanitarian situations - the beginning of an important conversation at Wilton Park. 26 May 2019.

¹⁶¹ Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (2017). Independent Evaluation of the Swiss Contribution to the ICRC Headquarters. June 2017.

¹⁶² UNHCR – UN High Commissioner for Refugees (2019) ‘*Webinar summary note: what is the UN Business Innovations Group in the Grand Bargain to reduce management cost?*’. 28 November. IASC.

¹⁶³ Metcalfe-Hough, V, Fenton, W, Willitts-King, B and Spencer, A. (2020) Grand Bargain annual independent report. June 2020.

¹⁶⁴ Ravesloot, B., Langworthy, M., Cuellar, & Kaelin, J. (2019). *Midterm Evaluation of UNHCR’s Cash-based Interventions* (CBI) Capacity Building Approach. Evaluation Report, April 2019, ES/2019/02. Evaluation Service UNHCR, Genève, Switzerland.

¹⁶⁵ Gilert, H and Austin, L. UNHCR (2017). Review of the common cash facility approach in Jordan. October 2017

¹⁶⁶ UNHCR. (2016). Cash Delivery Mechanism Assessment Tool.

¹⁶⁷ UNHCR (2018). Grand Bargain Self-Report (January-December 2017)

¹⁶⁸ Rijks-Intern (2019). VN - UNHCR - Humanitaire hulp – Report Agenda Standing Committee, 8 July 2019.

¹⁶⁹ Rijks-Intern (2019). VN - UNHCR - Humanitaire hulp - Jordanië-Libanon: Report on cash assistance for refugees. 19 April 2019.

¹⁷⁰ Diplomatic cable BZV (2019). VN - UNHCR - Humanitaire hulp - Scen setter Global Refugee Forum 17-18 december 2019. 11 december 2019.

works to scale up collective innovation in humanitarian interventions by funding and steering. UNHCR also collaborates with the Global Alliance on Humanitarian Innovation, which seeks to solve systemic blocks to innovation.¹⁷¹ This includes for instance the limited knowledge and skills to bring innovations to scale among humanitarian actors, as well as their lack of hands-on capability to support innovations. Moreover, evaluation of impact of innovations is sporadic¹⁷²

In terms of finance, UNHCR tries to close their funding gap by innovative ways of fundraising, such as through the 'connecting worlds app'.¹⁷³

The Netherlands supported the OCHA Centre for Humanitarian Data in The Hague to collect and analyse data on a worldwide scale, with the aim to increase impact and efficiency of future humanitarian support. The centre also contributed to IATI awareness and use. Through this engagement, the Netherlands not only supported innovation, but this helped also honouring its fourth commitment under the GB Workstream 2.

Regarding pooled funds, OCHA sees innovation potential in strengthening the funding of local actors, in priorities that are not sufficiently addressed yet (including targeting women and girls and people living with disabilities), and in assessing whether CERF can be used in a multi-year manner.¹⁷⁴

An innovative model across UN agencies is partnership Prospects, where five agencies work together in eight countries¹⁷⁵ to ensure better protection and access to education and employment for refugees.¹⁷⁶

ICRC

ICRC is active in the area of innovative financing.¹⁷⁷ The Dutch Government has supported Humanitarian Impact Bonds to facilitate the organisation in terms of long-term programming for rehabilitation centers. Through its long-term nature, this initiative was meant to contribute to the Nexus goals, but the success of the bonds has been limited¹⁷⁸ ICRC, together with other Dutch partners, is also a partner in the Global Humanitarian Lab,¹⁷⁹ which is a platform for innovation.¹⁸⁰

DRA

MFA is the only direct DRA donor, which may have contributed to the consortium's strong engagement with MFA priority policy themes.¹⁸¹ Interviews indicate frequent formal and informal interactions with the Dutch Relief Alliance Committee and with individual DRA member organisations. This does not imply automatic acceptance of all MFA's suggestions, as most DRA

171 McClure, D. (2018). Creating more impactful innovation capabilities in the aid sector. The Global Alliance for Humanitarian Innovation, 2018, London.

172 Elrha. (2018) 'Too Tough to Scale? Challenges to Scaling Innovation in the Humanitarian Sector.' Elrha: London.

173 Rijks-Intern (2020). VN - UNHCR - Humanitaire hulp - Oproep UNHCR aan EU: Solidariteit met vluchtelingen buiten Europa mag niet ten koste gaan van die aan de grenzen - Verslag UNHCR 77e Standing Committee. 19 maart 2020.

174 Rijks-Intern (2019). VN - OCHA - Humanitaire hulp - Report OCHA Donor Support Group 20/21 June. 15 July 2019.

175 UNHCR, UNICEF, ILO, IFC and World Bank work together in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Sudan

176 Diplomatic cable BZV (2019). VN - UNHCR - 17-18 December Global Refugee Forum: Programme and possible pledges. 28 November 2019.

177 Rijks-Intern (2018). Report on Red Cross movement. 13 July 2018.

178 Policy Note to Parliament. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, vergaderjaar 2017-2018. Beleid ten aanzien van ontwikkelingsamenwerking. Brief van de Minister voor Buitenlandse handel en Ontwikkelingsamenwerking.


179 Partners among others include Handicap International, ICRC, OCHA, Terres des Hommes, UNHCR and WFP.

180 Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (2017). Independent Evaluation of the Swiss Contribution to the ICRC Headquarters. June 2017.

181 DRA (2017). Dutch Relief Alliance Strategy 2018-2021: Accountability. Innovation. Collaboration. Localization.; Dutch Relief Alliance (2021). Dutch Relief Alliance 2022-2026 Strategy. July 2021. /

agencies are also part of wider international networks, where alternative priorities can be set by other donors. Furthermore, the DRA is an alliance of multiple organisations, each with different priorities and capacities, and different levels of implementation of MFA priority themes.

The chart shows DRA's spending on innovation, anticipation and MHPSS. Innovation has a substantial specified budget line. Interviews however confirmed that beyond and above funding, indirect modalities such as unearmarked funding and door dialogues are of key importance to promote priority themes such as innovation, including with DRA.



Localisation

UN Agencies

In terms of achieving GB goals, multilateral funding through pooled resources appears more effective in advancing common global causes. Overall, multilateral channels are less politicised, more demand-driven, and more selective in terms of poverty criteria. Bilateral channels (where the channels public sector, non-governmental, and public-private partnerships are distinguished) come out as more politicised, more focused on governance criteria, having slightly lower administrative costs and being much more fragmented. It is not clear though, what the best proportional allocation between bilateral and multilateral would be.¹⁸²

Pooled funding mechanisms are seen and used as a suitable alternative to channel funds to local responders. Nonetheless, CBPFs have their limitations in terms of working in hard-to-reach areas, where only a few local organisations and ICRC can go. The Netherlands supports OCHA, who manages the CBPFs and the CERF. OCHA is an important partner, since the organisation is responsible for the coordination of international humanitarian support and as such, has an important role in localisation.¹⁸³ Nonetheless, leadership weaknesses, particularly in-country and at cluster level, have also been identified as potentially contributing to exclusion of local actors.¹⁸⁴

One of the country-based humanitarian funds funded by the Netherlands are CBPFs. The Netherlands is an important donor to the CBPFs, for example, in 2017, the Netherlands was the second largest donor¹⁸⁵ and in 2021 the third. In 2021, the Netherlands channelled 14 percent of the humanitarian budget and half of the country-specific contributions through CBPFs.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸² Gulrajani, N. (2016). Bilateral versus multilateral aid channels. Strategic choices for donors. ODI, March 2016.

¹⁸³ Rijks-Intern (2021). VN - OCHA - Humanitaire hulp - Beleidsdialoog met UNOCHA: Uitdagingen noodhulpcoördinatie tijdens en na Covid (en post- Lowcock). 15 maart 2021.

¹⁸⁴ Konyndyk, J., Saez, P., & Worden, R. (2020). Inclusive coordination: Building an area-based humanitarian coordination model. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development.

¹⁸⁵ OCHA (2017). Famine response. Humanitarian pooled funds.

¹⁸⁶ Rijks-Intern 2021. Humanitaire hulp - VN Country Based Pooled Funds (CBPFs): bijdragen is een

CBPFs have gradually increased their operational footprint, developed their institutional donor base,¹⁸⁷ and established themselves as a sizeable humanitarian funding tool.¹⁸⁸ OCHA in Dialogue with NGOs works on increasing the participation of NNGOs in decision-making processes.¹⁸⁹ The consultative decision-making processes¹⁹⁰ and inclusion of national and international NGOs), donors, and UN agencies, makes CBPFs uniquely positioned to analyse risk. Nonetheless, it was found that insufficient effort was invested into identifying evolving risks and improving mitigation measures. Local partners are found important but also often seen as a financial risk within a CBPF. Capacity building for local partners to improve their internal systems and reporting is found essential in this regard, to equip all partners with full accountability.¹⁹¹ On the other hand, OCHA does not feel the main responsible for such a task, which is coupled with large risks.¹⁹²

The Netherlands has funded the global evaluation of the CBPFs in 2019.¹⁹³ The evaluation saw CBPFs as having strengthened the humanitarian system, supported response, and enabled donors to meet GB commitments including on localisation. The evaluation found that this has led to a larger funding base: while CBPFs continue to rely mainly on traditional OECD-DAC donors, they have grown significantly, from \$578 million from 19 donors in 2015 to \$950 million from 34 donors in 2018. It was confirmed that CBPFs have achieved a balance between significantly increasing funding to NNGOs and maintaining a focus on funding 'best-placed partners', also since NNGOs have appeared to be often the best placed partners. Funds have also promoted localization through greater NNGO representation in governance and decision-making fora and some capacity strengthening. NNGOs are members of the SSHF Advisory Board and Strategic Review Committees at cluster level that select projects for funding. Achievements were variable across the various funds though. As for funding, it was noted that CBPFs are short-term by design and due to the needs-driven and competitive nature of the funds, sometime unpredictable. It is seen as a challenge therefore CBPFs cannot address the long-term financing needs of NNGOs nor the longer-term tailored complementary support that is required.¹⁹⁴

In their Humanitarian Readiness and Response Plans to appeal for funding of CBPF, OCHA brings out localisation as a priority response activity and in the planning under various sectors.¹⁹⁵ OCHA has appeared capable to make sure that the allocated money is spent¹⁹⁶ and their reporting is adequate.¹⁹⁷ OCHA, in their strategic vision, aims to continuously expand collaboration with local partners, not only through providing capacity building but also to allow the international partners to benefit from local expertise.¹⁹⁸ CBPF grant processes incentivise UN agencies and INGOs to work in partnership with local responders.¹⁹⁹ CBPFs avail of a gradually

strategische keuze. 17 augustus 2021.

187 OCHA (2018). Supporting UN OCHA's Country Based Pooled Funds Section (CBPF Section) in developing the minimum human resources standard for the Humanitarian Funding Units (HFUs), defining margins by taking into consideration the size of the Funds, contextual complexity, scope of work and tasks and the capacity of the country office. June 2018.

188 In 2015 the 3.51 percent of HRPs was funded through CBPFs (as per UN OCHA's Business Intelligence website), in 2016 6.3 percent and in 2017 5.23 percent

189 OCHA, OXFAM (2016). CBPF – NGO Dialogue Platform 2016 in review.

190 Using multi-stakeholder Advisory Boards and Humanitarian Coordinators

191 Rackley, E.; OCHA (2016). Financial Risk Tolerance and Country Based Pooled Funds

192 Key informant interviews, case study South Sudan

193 OCHA (2019). Global Evaluation of Country Based Pooled Funds (CBPFs). Project Proposal, January 2019.

194 OCHA (2019). Evaluation of Country-Based Pooled Funds. Global Synthesis Report. November 2019

195 OCHA (2020). Northwest Syria Humanitarian Readiness and Response Plan. As of 21 February 2020

196 For example, in 2019, only 0.01 percent was unspent of the EUR 34,174,000 that MFA had allocated

197 BuZa DSH (2020) - 4000002626 - UNOCHA - CBPF - F rapportage 2019 en Evaluatie. 15 april 2020.

198 OCHA (2014). Vision Paper: OCHA Country-Based Pooled Funds (CBPFs) and beyond.

199 For example, the Turkey Humanitarian Fund, in its cross-border operations into Syria. OCHA,

increasing pool of funds, and a growing part of funding ends up with local organisations. In 2016 23 percent of overall CBPF funding was allocated to local organisations,²⁰⁰ whereas in 2019 it was 26 percent²⁰¹ and in 2020 34 percent. Proportions are variable though: in Somalia, Syria and South Sudan 40 percent of funds were allocated to local organisations, whereas in Sudan, this was only 9 percent.²⁰²

When CBPFs grow in size, they are found to face limitations. A widespread practice in most countries to meet these challenges is by increasing the size of the grants for low-risk partners (INGOs and UN Agencies). The second solution has been to strengthen risk management functions and allowing expansion of the pool of partners putting in place tighter compliance and monitoring measures. The latter would be more conducive for localisation. In the meantime, the OCHA CBPF Section has taken significant steps to accommodate higher growth capacity by putting in place a robust risk management framework that allows for the expansion of the implementing partners base and potentially an increase of the average grant size.²⁰³

The Netherlands contributes to CHF²⁰⁴ in Sudan, South Sudan, Yemen, Syria, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria,²⁰⁵ through the UNDP-managed Multi-partner Trust Fund Office (MPTFO).²⁰⁶ Additional funds were provided as part of the Covid response.²⁰⁷ Also in 2020, EUR 7.1 million was provided to the Syria Cross Border Humanitarian Fund (SCHF). The SCHF was established in 2014 after UNSCR resolutions 2139 and 2165 had been launched. In 2018, 51 percent of the support under the SCHF was provided by local organisations. In 2019, 71 percent of the funds were allocated to NNGOs and INGOs together.²⁰⁸

The support to the CHFs aligns with outcome 2 under the DSH-HH logframe, which stipulates that “Humanitarian needs met through national/ local response interventions”, measured by the proportion of funding for local actors.²⁰⁹ Besides the quantitative proportion though, contribution to equal partnerships and local capacity building is not yet necessarily sufficient and it is not measured under the logframe.

The Netherlands also provides funding to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), the United Nations’ global humanitarian emergency fund. The CERF facilitates providing flexible unearmarked humanitarian funding directly to UN agencies, with the aim to strengthen collective and strategic humanitarian response. CERF grants are implemented in close partnership with local and international NGOs, host governments and Red Cross/Red Crescent societies.

2016. Country-Based Pooled Funds and the Grand Bargain. Fact Sheet

200 OCHA, 2016. Country-Based Pooled Funds and the Grand Bargain. Fact Sheet.

201 Mania, P. (2021). Humanitarian learning under the Covid-19 pandemic; a pathway to localisation? Humanitarian Leadership Academy, 02 August 2021.

202 Rijks-Intern 2021. Humanitaire hulp - UN Country Based Pooled Funds (CBPFs): contributing is a strategic choice. 17 August 2021.

203 OCHA (2018). Supporting UN OCHA’s Country Based Pooled Funds Section (CBPF Section) in developing the minimum human resources standard for the Humanitarian Funding Units (HFUs), defining margins by taking into consideration the size of the Funds, contextual complexity, scope of work and tasks and the capacity of the country office. June 2018

204 For CHFs (with mechanisms of funding and implementation equal to the CBPF and thus since 2015 harmonized under CBPFs), UNDP has been the Managing Agent, administering grants to international and national NGOs. and UNDP’s MPTFO is the Administrative Agent responsible for receiving, administering, disbursing donor funds to UN agencies. There is a joint OCHA-UNDP Technical Secretariat to manage the fund on a day-to-day basis. OCHA (2015). Global Guidelines for Country-based Pooled Funds, Frequently Asked Questions. OCHA is foreseen to take over the position as Managing Agent for all funds though.

205 BuZa (2019). 4000002651_UNDP_MPTFO_CBPF_DRC_Sudan_Zuid Sudan.

206 Standard Administrative Arrangement between the Netherlands and the UNDP MPTFO, 2019.

207 Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (2020). BEMO Corona. Covid-19: Contribution to the Syria Cross Border Humanitarian Fund (SCHF) for aggravated needs due to Covid-19

208 Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (2019). Activity Appraisal Document Lumpsum. Contribution to Syria Cross Border Fund 2020.

209 Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (2019). Activity Appraisal Document Lumpsum. Contribution to the Nigeria and Syria Humanitarian Funds 2020

Through UN networks, in general more than half of sub-granted CERF funds go to local frontline responders.²¹⁰ In 2017, with USD 57.7 million, the Netherlands was the largest donor to CERF, after Sweden.²¹¹

CERF is assessed mostly positively; its management system functions well, and data management and analysis allow OCHA in an increasing manner to report reliably on results.²¹² External evaluations in South-Sudan and Syria also painted a positive picture.²¹³ Interviews during the case study in South Sudan brought out that the implementation speed of CERF is considerably higher than the CBPF (South Sudan Humanitarian Fund).

In a large-scale or unexpected crisis, the contribution of UN organisations is found indispensable, since they are the only organisations that can make available food and medicines at short notice and at large scale,²¹⁴ which was confirmed by multiple stakeholders from various backgrounds. The cooperation with local partners takes place mostly at the end of the chain. There is, however, also ample criticism. In Yemen, for instance, NNGOs find that the UN insufficiently coordinates and consults with NGOs and is often perceived as lacking neutrality.²¹⁵ ICRC finds that it works more efficiently and has a much stronger emphasis on local partnership, but that donors prefer to channel funds through the UN in acute crises because they think it is more cost-efficient – even though these funds ultimately often (at least partly) end up at local red cross societies.²¹⁶

Multi-year funding, also done by the Netherlands, has allowed receiving UN organisations gains in terms of efficiency and planning, and achieving longer-term goals. They often do not, however, pass on the long-term gain to their local partners.²¹⁷ UN agencies for instance tend to have six-months or one-year agreements with their local implementing partners, preventing them from equally benefitting and leaving the partners with the impression that the relation is only operational.

Over the years, the UN cluster system has been perceived as often favouring INGOs and the more established local organisations,²¹⁸ and Community Based Organisations are still found to be largely excluded.²¹⁹ Though NNGOs are engaged in humanitarian delivery, distributions at community levels, and awareness raising activities, strategic engagement is often limited.^{220,221}

When looking at the period of Covid crisis, at the beginning of June, approximately 4 percent of international humanitarian funding for the Covid-19 emergency (through GHRP and other appeals) has been allocated to national governments. Though this is more than before, the vast

210 UN CERF (2016). CERF and the Grand Bargain Briefing Note – May 2016

211 OCHA (2017). Famine response. Humanitarian pooled funds.

212 Rijks-Intern (2016). VN - OCHA - Humanitaire hulp – Report CERF Advisory Group, 26-27 Oktober 2016. 10 November 2016.

213 Rijks-Intern (2016). VN - OCHA - Humanitaire hulp - Verslag CERF Adviesgroep, 21-22 maart 2016. 30 maart 2016.

214 Diplomatic cable BZV (2018). Jemen - VN - OCHA - Humanitaire hulp – Report: Briefing Lise Grande (OCHA) to donors - Amman 9 augustus jl. 15 augustus 2018.

215 Rijks-Intern (2016). Jemen - Humanitaire hulp – Report NGOs and UN leadership in Yemen. 9 June 2016.

216 Rijks-Intern (2016). ICRC - Humanitaire hulp – report Donor Support Group 2016: 28 June 2016.

217 Cabot Venton, C and Sida, L. (2017). The Value for Money of Multi-Year Humanitarian Funding: Emerging Findings. May 2017

218 Stoddard, A., Harmer, A., Haver, K., Salamons, D. & Wheeler, V. (2007). *Cluster approach evaluation*. ODI.

219 Mahmood, J. (2020). *The trust deficit in humanitarian action – does going local address it?* Speech at Ireland Fordham University Lecture. IFRC, 7 February 2020.

220 UNICEF (2019). A review of UNICEF's Approach to Localization in Humanitarian Action, Executive Summary. Working Paper, Humanitarian Policy Section of Emergency Programmes. July 2019.

221 Dávila Aquije, D., Jones, S., Otulana, S., Pellens, & T., Seyfert, K. (2017). Evaluation of UNHCR's implementation of three protection strategies: The Global Education Strategy, the Updated SGBV Strategy and the Child Protection Framework. July 2017, Full report, ES/2017/2. Evaluation Service United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Genève, Switzerland.

bulk of humanitarian funding (73 percent as of 2 June) – was still being channelled in the traditional way, namely to UN agencies.²²² Through these agencies, part of the funds reaches local organisations, but less so achieved in terms of leadership and capacity building of local organisations.²²³ The focus remained on improving effective delivery²²⁴ with little attention to self-determination and other governance issues.

WFP is putting an increasing emphasis on localisation, which has a prominent place in the corporate WFP Strategic Plan 2017-2021.²²⁵ It has a vast outreach and presence and strives to use its cash-based programme and various joint initiatives to enhance local partnership. Capacity building of local partners is an important part of WFP's country strategic plans. It is translated into country capacity strengthening at country level, an approach which enables WFP to finetune the approach to the local context and its organisations. Community based organisations often play an important role in design of activities, selection of beneficiaries and interventions with a livelihood training and/or community asset component. Also, between 2017 and 2019, WFP and IFRC have implemented a joint initiative on country capacity strengthening for civil society.²²⁶

With their strong role in logistics on a worldwide scale but also in the various countries with humanitarian context, WFP facilitates the work of many international actors as well as local partners.²²⁷ Their storage and transport of humanitarian goods as well as UNHAS flights bringing people to affected locations makes humanitarian support possible where it is needed.

UNHCR reported in their self-report,²²⁸ that in 2017 out of 1.5 billion USD, 46 percent had been allocated to 826 local and national partners (up from 15 percent in 2015), which was the highest funding allocations ever made by UNHCR to local and national partners. To improve localisation of their response, UNHCR establishes localisation task forces in certain crisis situations.²²⁹ In 2019, UNHCR had worked with 199 partners from authorities, 194 INGOs and 666 NNGOs, which was the highest number of local partners ever.²³⁰ Though this is a good result, there were also observations of NGO partners about complex UNHCR administrative procedures making cooperation difficult.²³¹ Moreover, it is observed that UNHCR reports on numbers of local partners but does not always provide clarity on the proportion of funding that goes to these partners,²³² and whether it is sufficient for them to cover their overhead.²³³

As part of their increased efforts towards localisation, UNHCR, together with the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), had developed operational guidance on enhancing complementary capacities strengthening and webinars were held on improving capacity of national NGOs. Together with the ICVA, UNHCR established a Community Outreach and

²²² Figures from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Financial Tracking Service (OCHA FTS)

²²³ Aly, H. (2020) 'This global pandemic could transform humanitarianism forever. Here's how'. The New Humanitarian, 8 June.

²²⁴ Mania, P. (2021). *Humanitarian learning under the Covid-19 pandemic; a pathway to localisation?* Humanitarian Leadership Academy, 02 August 2021.

²²⁵ WFP, January 2018. WFP and the Grand Bargain

²²⁶ WFP (2019). *WFP capacity strengthening supports nations to end hunger*. Beyond the Annual Performance. Report 2018 Series. November 2019

²²⁷ Rijks-Intern (2019). VN - WFP - Waar staan de noodhulpgoederen van de VN klaar? PV Rome bezoekt UNHRD in Brindisi, Italië. 14 maart 2019.

²²⁸ UNHCR (2018). Grand Bargain Self-Report (January-December 2017)

²²⁹ Rijks-Intern (2020). Bangladesh - VN - UNHCR - Humanitaire hulp - *JRP Rohingya Crisis*. 5 March 2020.

²³⁰ Rijks-Intern (2020). VN - UNHCR - Humanitaire hulp - Report UNHCR 77e Standing Committee. 19 March 2020.

²³¹ Rijks-Intern (2019). VN - UNHCR - Humanitaire hulp - UNHCR Standing Committee: 15 March 2019.

²³² Rijks-Intern (2020). VN - UNHCR - Humanitaire hulp - Verslag 78ste UNHCR Standing Committee. 13 July 2020.

²³³ Rijks-Intern (2021). VN - UNHCR - Humanitaire hulp - Verslag 80ste Standing Committee: regional updates. 31 March 2021

Communications Fund, for NNGOs to receive funds for community-led activities to prevent and raise awareness on SEAH.²³⁴

The UNHCR Partner Portal was expanded with engagement of UNICEF, WFP and OCHA, enabling the pool of registered NGO partners to almost double from its 2015 level. The portal provides UN agencies and local Civil Society Organisations, with a simple platform for interacting and partnering with one another.²³⁵ Nonetheless, as for most other UN Agencies, DFID reported that it is essential for UNHCR to work more and better with partners in humanitarian response.²³⁶

The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework highlights the key principle of partnership including with governments, civil society and local NGOs. UNHCR, the IFRC and ICVA have created a reference group with NGO networks from all regions to ensure that refugees' and local stakeholders' voices are heard, and their views reflected.²³⁷

UNICEF in 2018 contributed to localisation through country preparedness plans in collaboration with national actors and signing multiyear partnerships with CSOs. 36 percent of all humanitarian funding received in 2018 was transferred to national and sub-national CSOs. At cluster level, the UNICEF-led Child Protection Area of Responsibility supported the development of a localization coordination conceptual framework. Moreover, UNICEF enhanced capacity building around preparedness, response and coordination, targeting sub-national and national responders.²³⁸ Nonetheless, in evaluations, observations by implementing partners about lack of strategic engagement often come up and scope for improvement was seen in the way in which UNICEF works in partnership with others, including beyond the UN system.²³⁹

ICRC, IFRC and the Red Cross

ICRC receives considerable unearmarked funding from the Netherlands and pushes for greater donor engagement in the GB, but at the same time, there are observations about their transparency in reporting of impact.²⁴⁰ Their results-based management is seen as weak, and the processes and tools used as falling short of what is truly needed to identify, monitor, and manage against programmatic and organizational outcomes. Thus, it is difficult for the Netherlands to get an estimate on what has been achieved in various areas of interest.²⁴¹

National societies of the Red Cross and Red Crescent are part of the global governance platforms of the movement and branches are governed by local communities.²⁴² ICRC continuously contributes to strengthening the role and capacities of these national societies.²⁴³ Thus, Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement are frontrunners in the field of localization, sometimes seen as the "insurance policy of multi-lateral humanitarian support", because of their continuous presence, "first in, never out",²⁴⁴ i.e., the partners are permanent instead of transitory actors.²⁴⁵ IFRC perceives that local response is their basis, and international input will only be used if it has added value; they see localisation not only in terms of financial support as per the

234 Rijks-Intern (2021). VN - UNHCR - Humanitaire hulp - Beleidsdialoog UNHCR: ruimte voor een groeiend partnerschap. 26 August 2021.

235 UNICEF (2019). Grand Bargain Self-Report (January-December 2018).

236 DFID, 2016. UNHCR. MDR One Page Assessment Summaries.

237 UNHCR (2018). Grand Bargain Self-Report (January-December 2017)

238 UNICEF (2019). Grand Bargain Self-Report (January-December 2018)

239 DFID, 2016. UNICEF. MDR One Page Assessment Summaries.

240 Rijks-Intern (2017). ICRC - Humanitaire hulp - ICRC en donoren houden elkaar aan Grand Bargain. 6 February 2017.

241 Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (2017). Independent Evaluation of the Swiss Contribution to the ICRC Headquarters. June 2017.

242 IFRC (2015). Guide to the auxiliary role of Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies – Africa. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Africa Regional Office, November 2015.

243 ICRC (2018). Grand Bargain Self-Report (January-December 2017)

244 Rijks-Intern (2020). IFRC - Humanitaire hulp – Report on One hundred years IFRC: 18 December 2020.

245 ICRC 2016, Protracted conflict and humanitarian action: some recent ICRC experiences. International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva.

GB but also coordination, and find the human coordinators responsible for pursuing this.²⁴⁶ This was confirmed during the evaluation team's field mission to South Sudan, and red cross volunteers were essential to access hard-to reach areas.

As for supporting institutional development of local partners, ICRC, guided by its localisation policy, focuses its efforts on developing national societies delivery of assistance and protection capacities. The IFRC complements this with ad-hoc support for strengthening governance and resource management systems through MFA supported Appeals.²⁴⁷

IFRC, together with Switzerland, is co-convener of GB workstream 2 on localisation and extended particular efforts in moving the workstream from dialogue on definitions to actioning the commitments.²⁴⁸

An important advantage of ICRC is that it can work in hard-to-reach and conflict-ridden areas, where others often cannot go.²⁴⁹ Since a process of localisation is also ongoing within parties to conflicts, ICRC finds it important to operate at local level, to be able to provide suitable support.²⁵⁰ Funding to other agencies is sometimes even implemented through Red Cross and Red Crescent due to their good access and strong presence. In Syria, 60 percent of the humanitarian support goes through Red Crescent, and 20 percent of UNICEF's support is also delivered through National Societies.

Many other donors do not provide unearmarked funding to IFRC, but instead fund national societies. The Netherlands has provided funding to IFRC, namely one million EUR for South Sudan in 2018, two million Covid funding in 2019 and 2 million unearmarked funding in 2020/2021; nonetheless, the block allocation to the Dutch Red Cross is much larger at almost 100 million EUR between 2015 and 2020. Thus, IFRC is struggling with 85 percent of their funding being earmarked to societies, hampering their flexibility of response and allocation to national societies.²⁵¹ The lack of sufficient funding contributes to their weak position, as it hampers them to play their own role.²⁵² Donors do see the importance of a stronger collaboration within the Movement and urge ICRC and IFRC to work on this, with emphasis on the leading role for ICRC.²⁵³

ICRC can initialize support quickly in various types of disasters and communicates with almost all parties in conflict situations. The internal setup of ICRC working with Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and participating national societies has allowed strong and suitable support at local level through combined complementary expertise, local knowledge and privileged dialogue with armed groups and ensure access to conflict-affected countries. Still, the level of complementarity appeared to be influenced by the type of crisis and stage of humanitarian response, as well as the provision of finance.

ICRC sees itself in need of more unearmarked funding, especially activities related to pre-crisis investment and prevention, and to address needs of people in protracted and/or non-media-covered crises.²⁵⁴ The Netherlands is among the top-ten countries in terms of non-earmarked and loosely earmarked funds with a proportion of 85% of total ICRC funding in 2019 and 74% in

246 Rijks-Intern (2016). Humanitaire hulp - Lokalisering: report on Localization: niet slechts een financiële kwestie maar vereist voornamelijk een cultuuromslag. 9 December 2016.

247 Giesen, P., Musori, M., Richards, G. (2019). Evaluation of the IFRC Syria Emergency Appeal. Humanitarian Strategy Consult Amsterdam, 22 April 2019.

248 Metcalfe-Hough, V. Fenton, W. and Poole, L. (2019). Grand Bargain annual independent report 2019. Executive summary. June 2019.

249 Rijks-Intern (2021). Humanitaire hulp - VN Country Based Pooled Funds (CBPFs): contributing is a strategic choice. 17 August 2021.

250 Rijks-Intern (2017). Libië - ICRC - Humanitaire hulp – report on ICRC in Libya. 13 July 2017.

251 Rijks-Intern (2019). IFRC - Humanitaire hulp – Report on national societies 30 October 2019.

252 Rijks-Intern (2018). De Rode Kruis/Rode Halve Maan beweging: report on ICRC, IFRC en de Nationale Verenigingen. 13 July 2018.

253 Rijks-Intern (2017). IFRC - Humanitaire hulp – Report Improving collaboration within the Red Cross movement. 2 May 2017.

254 ICRC, 2020. Unearmarked funding. Allocation of flexible contributions to the ICRC in 2019. Geneva, 14 September 2020. For Donor Support Group.

2020, but for many other countries, the proportional unearmarked contribution remains much lower. Such limited availability of flexible financial resources is also seen as a barrier to localisation.²⁵⁵

Furthermore, it was observed that national societies often mutually and bilaterally collaborate, side-lining the IFRC and creating the risks of overlaps or gaps in capacity building. It is easier for ICRC to attract funding because it has the lead within the Movement for violence and armed conflict, whereas IFRC has the lead for humanitarian impact of natural disasters. As a result, ICRC often operates independently.

Ensuring a balanced cooperation with national organisations can have limitations, as was the case in Syria. The Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) views itself as a distinct institution with independent decision-making powers,²⁵⁶ but is also closely linked to the Syrian government, having a powerful role in humanitarian support coordination. In 2016, the Movement (ICRC, IFRC and SARC) was poorly coordinated,²⁵⁷ which allowed the SARC to a position which was too powerful.²⁵⁸

Required due diligence is often a barrier for local organisations. ICRC's 2017 commitment on resource mobilisation is supporting the national components to acquire improved means to mobilise funding.²⁵⁹ Though localisation is anchored in the approach of ICRC, the organisation was found insufficiently transparent in demonstrating its performance.²⁶⁰

In 2017, ICRC organised an internal workshop for stocktaking and identifying areas to progress better on localisation. Thereupon, ICRC and IFRC established the National Society Investment Alliance, a joint investment fund to provide multi-year financing and support for National Society development. Nonetheless, the organisation does not track its allocations in a way that allows tracking the trend in spending on localisation.²⁶¹

DRA

DRA is seen as an important partner and channel for MFA to support local organisations. The DRA started its engagement with the Dutch Government officially on 25 April 2015 with a budget of 120 million EUR for three years.²⁶² The extent to which DRA partners work with local partners was made part of the Results Based Financing in 2018.²⁶³ DRA is seen as implementing their programmes well. Still, even if internal and external coordination and cooperation with organisations like OCHA have improved since 2015, there is scope for more strengthening. As it is, coordination still often takes place through the various members' Dutch headquarters instead of directly with local organisations in the field. The DRA structures perceived as most active in the Netherlands and their visibility as a coalition in various countries is less prominent.²⁶⁴

DRA partners work with local organisations at implementation level, and sometimes support them even remotely.²⁶⁵ Some DRA members include their local partners during planning and rely

255 ICRC, 2021. Unearmarked funding. Allocation of flexible contributions to the ICRC in 2020. Geneva, 28 July 2021. For Donor Support Group.

256 British Red Cross, (n.d.). National humanitarian action in Syria

257 Diplomatic cable BZV (2016). Syrië - Humanitaire hulp -SARC. 21 September 2016.

258 Schenkenberg, E (2016). The challenges of localised humanitarian aid in armed conflict. Emergency Gap Series 03. November 2016.

259 Austin, L and Chessex, S. (2018). The case for complementarity. Working together within the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in armed conflict and other situations of violence. British Red Cross. November 2018

260 DFID, 2016. International Committee red Cross Review. MDR One Page Assessment Summaries.

261 ICRC (2018). Grand Bargain Self-Report (January-December 2017)

262 Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken. (5 oktober 2016) Brief betreft Verzoek inzake beschikbare middelen voor de Dutch Relief Alliance in 2017

263 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, vergaderjaar 2017-2018. Beleid ten aanzien van ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Brief van de Minister voor Buitenlandse handel en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking.

264 Various internal email communications

265 Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken. 2.9 Stabilisatie-inzet en humanitaire inzet in Irak

on them for collecting monitoring and evaluation data, and DRA agencies have formed a localisation-working group. DRA also included local partners in the Response Task Force, planning workshops, joint responses, and as part of cross border operations to overcome administrative and security-constrained access.²⁶⁶ DRA also plays a role in coordinating NNGOs and networks. In Sudan, DRA, with OCHA, has facilitated a platform for NNGOs, to help address the mutual mistrust. This helped NNGOs unite and speak with one voice to the international community.²⁶⁷

RQ 3.3 How have Dutch diplomatic efforts contributed to innovation and localisation within the humanitarian system?

Innovation

The Grand Bargain

Innovation is a key priority of the Grand Bargain (GB), and even before the WHS in 2016, the Netherlands together with the UK organized a large meeting to promote the importance of humanitarian innovation and encourage for it to be high on the agenda of the WHS.²⁶⁸ The MFA sees their role in innovation not only as funder, but also as convener (linking various actors and activities to maximise Dutch input) and in advocacy (participating at various levels such as UN boards, the World Economic Forum High Level Group Humanitarian Investment and OESO-DAC meetings).²⁶⁹ Since the capacity at DSH-HH has to cover many priorities, the focus for innovation is on larger funds, platforms and initiatives.

For 2018, MFA aimed at putting innovation high at the humanitarian agenda through consequent implementation of the GB, the use of and making available humanitarian data, and intensifying cooperation with the private sector and developing new financing instruments.²⁷⁰ In 2019, diplomatic efforts were mostly aimed at making humanitarian support more efficient and effective, with innovation as one of the avenues to achieve this.²⁷¹

The Netherlands has identified the need for better monitoring of innovation. The solution is seen in terms of a better documentation and sharing of lessons learned as condition to funding, and clear agreements on M&E with partners to generate evidence and best practices. Alternatively, there are opportunities for innovative data collection, that can enable humanitarian organisations to work more effectively, faster and with a stronger focus on the most vulnerable people. MFA has also acknowledged the importance of monitoring the progress of innovation (and localisation) under the GB and has funded an organisation to do this.²⁷²

Coordination has been acknowledged as core to achieving effective innovation, which includes achieving consensus about the most important humanitarian challenges that must be addressed. The Netherlands supports developing and maintaining a network of donors for coherence of input to innovation and uses its influence on innovative initiatives for promoting constructive collaboration (i.e., collaborative gap analyses and referral systems). Through the network of

266 DRA (2018). Putting local actors at the heart of humanitarian responses. The Dutch Relief Alliance Guidance note on Localisation. Dutch Relief Alliance.

267 Diplomatic cable BZV (2019). Sudan - Humanitaire hulp – report on humanitarian needs in Sudan 29 October 2019.

268 Rijks-Intern (2015). VN - Humanitaire hulp – Report on NL and UK position on innovation and the Humanitarian Summit 2016. 22 July 2015.

269 Rijks-Intern (2019). OESO - DAC - 15 mei – draft report presidency priorities – Total Official Support for Sustainable Development - en humanitaire hulp: “It’s all about the nexus”. 20 May 2019.

270 Policy Note: Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, vergaderjaar 2017-2018. Beleid ten aanzien van ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Brief van de Minister voor Buitenlandse handel en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking.

271 Policy Note: Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, vergaderjaar 2019-2020. Investeren in Perspectief – Goed voor de Wereld, Goed voor Nederland.

272 Development Initiatives Poverty Research Ltd (2018). Concept note for 6 months addendum to existing grant 29448 from Netherlands. June 2018.

partners, and though DCHI, discussions are facilitated, and lessons learned shared. The GB is seen as currently the best working platform between humanitarian donors and organisations.

Innovative humanitarian support is increasingly mentioned as a way to anticipate climate change, in order to better protect vulnerable groups against climate-related conflict and instability.²⁷³ Furthermore, the Covid crisis has had a positive effect on innovative approaches, such as digitisation of support and remote methods. Though virtual assistance brings considerations around quality and standards of support, it was also a way for stakeholders to continue their work to a considerable extent.²⁷⁴

UN Agencies

The topic of innovation is often discussed at executive board meetings and other meetings with UN agencies and even though a causal relation cannot be evidenced in this evaluation, it looks like the agencies make a considerable effort to honour this GB priority.

When the new Executive Director started in January 2018, she highlighted pursuing innovation as an important point of attention for UNICEF.²⁷⁵ The director brought out innovation as a priority for UNICEF, among others to be supported by the UNICEF Innovation Fund, that provides seed funding for innovations in humanitarian and development context.²⁷⁶

With WFP, besides bringing innovation up in the Executive Board meetings, the Netherlands has had bilateral meetings with the Director Innovation and Change Management and the Director Innovation Accelerator. In its 'Private-sector partnerships and fundraising strategy (2020–2025)', innovation is one of the three pillars.²⁷⁷ Minister Kaag had a direct communication with WFP on the importance of a number of points, which included innovation (to facilitate the work of humanitarian partners while increasing efficiency) localisation (local actors should be given the tools to play a greater role in response planning and delivery).²⁷⁸

For UNHCR, in relation to the Global Refugee Compact, Minister Kaag had brought forward the opportunities of technology, to promote entrepreneurship in relation to refugees and include private sector partners and encourage them to innovate.²⁷⁹ The Compact is expected to contribute to innovations in among others the area of education, livelihoods and 'solutions',²⁸⁰ though at the same time it is acknowledged that instant solutions are not available for the assistance to the continuously increasing number of refugees.²⁸¹

Localisation

The Grand Bargain

Minister Kaag has been Eminent Person of the GB from June 2019 until June 2021. She has put emphasis on localization as a key priority in the GB in her letter to the GB signatories in May 2020, and it has come up as a key theme in GB Annual Meeting in June 2020. A call has taken place between DSH and Switzerland as co-convenor of the GB localization workstream to build on its work.

Regarding commitment 4 under GB Workstream 2, the Netherlands works continuously to

273 Rijks-Intern (2019). ICRC - Klimaat – report on ICRC and climate change. 18 October 2019.

274 Rijks-Intern (2020). ICRC - Humanitaire hulp – ICRC and Humanitarian Diplomacy. 21 July 2020.

275 Rijks-Intern (2018). VN - UNICEF - Ontwikkelingssamenwerking –guidance UNICEF Executive Council. 17 July 2018.

276 Rijks-Intern (2018). VN - UNICEF - Ontwikkelingssamenwerking – report UNICEF Executive Council 24 September 2018.

277 Rijks-Intern (2019). VN - WFP - Report WFP Executive Board (18-21 November 2019) 25 November 2019

278 Ministry of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation (2020). Letter from Minister Kaag to WFP Executive Director David Beasley. 19 May 2020.

279 Rijks-Intern (2019). VN - UNHCR - Humanitaire hulp – visit HC Grandi in NLs 7 June 2019.

280 Rijks-Intern (2019). VN - UNHCR - Humanitaire hulp – report on Global Refugee Forum in. 28 March 2019.

281 Diplomatic cable BZV (2019). VN - UNHCR - Humanitaire hulp - Scen setter Global Refugee Forum 17-18 December 2019. 11 December 2019.

improve the humanitarian reporting standard in IATI and support other organisations in making the change to IATI reporting. Attention is also drawn to this as part of its co-leadership of the GB workstream "Greater Transparency".²⁸² Under this workstream, the Netherlands and the World Bank have developed a Transparency Dashboard, outlining when donors and humanitarian organisations need to report in IATI. At the onset, this has met with skepticism from UNHCR and IFRC. Follow-up analysis has been conducted on how local organisations can publish data in IATI for a more complete data-flow picture, which can contribute to the transparency of financing flows to local organisations. In May 2019, over 1,000 international and national organisations published their development and humanitarian spending to IATI.²⁸³

Dutch diplomacy is aimed at enabling support according to humanitarian principles (including access and protection) and at respecting humanitarian law of war, but also includes many more topics that are relevant to localisation.²⁸⁴ Minister Kaag has brought out on multiple occasions the lack of an upward trend in flexible and predictable unearmarked funding, as well as that too little progress is being made on passing flexibility of financing along to partners within the system. Quality (unearmarked and multi-year) funding is identified as the key enabler to facilitate more localised and participatory responses.²⁸⁵ ICRC acknowledged a slight increase in the percentage of the flexible funding in 2018, but doubted whether this was a reverse in trend,²⁸⁶ and many humanitarian organisations still perceive they have insufficient access to such funding.

Low tolerance of the risks inherent in more localised responses was brought out as a challenging to achieving the GB goals.²⁸⁷ The 2020 GP Annual Gap Analysis²⁸⁸ also demonstrated that risk was still not adequately shared between donors / intermediaries and local actors.

In GB meetings, the Netherlands has underlined that working in fragile contexts implies taking risks, including the risk that funding goes into the wrong hands. Risks need to be more broadly distributed though, and not left with only the local responders. The Netherlands' approach to take its share of the risks by providing the majority of funding unearmarked, does provide partners with more flexibility but in the end leaves most of the risk with them.

In the communication, openness and transparency is encouraged without affecting funding, to facilitate working together to address risks. In 2019, MFA started a discussion with ICRC about risk in the context of the GB. They developed a "think-piece" to understand how risk-sharing is related to the GB and localisation.²⁸⁹ In April 2020, an MFA and ICRC co-led conference took place with 45 stakeholders from states, humanitarian organisations including local organisations and the private sector. Since 2020, the Netherlands has officially acknowledged that risk sharing is important to strengthen the role of local governmental and non-governmental actors, and it has been included in Dutch humanitarian policy in 2022.²⁹⁰

After humanitarian funding has phased out, for instance when stability has increased as was perceived to be the case in Iraq in 2019, the Netherlands still provides different forms of support,

282 The Netherlands (2017). Grand Bargain. Input from the Netherlands, January-December 2016. Version 7 February 2017

283 <https://iatistandard.org/en/about/iati-history/>

284 Letter to parliament: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (2020). Brief aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. Betreft Humanitaire Hulp en Diplomatie 2019 – 2020. 3 maart 2020.

285 Metcalfe-Hough, V, Fenton, W, Willitts-King, B and Spencer, A. (2020) Grand Bargain annual independent report. June 2020.

286 ICRC (2019). Grand Bargain Annual Meeting 2019: ICRC Statement

287 Metcalfe-Hough, V, Fenton, W, Willitts-King, B and Spencer, A. (2020) Grand Bargain annual independent report. June 2020.

288 GB Secretariat. (2020). Grand Bargain Annual Meeting 2020. Analysis of gaps, objectives, and identified constituencies as potential agents of change to move forward. 17 June 2020.

289 Metcalfe-Hough, V. (2020). The future of the Grand Bargain. A new ambition? Briefing note. June 2020.

290 Letter to parliament: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (25 februari 2022). Brief aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. Investeren in Perspectief – Goed voor de Wereld, Goed voor Nederland.

such as financial support to IDPs among others through Partnership Prospects²⁹¹ and by continuing diplomatic efforts. Since funding to international NGOs and UN agencies no longer takes place, a strong role is possible for local organisations.

SEAH is another important priority area of the Netherlands and other donors. The incidence of SEAH is still high and addressing it is not mainstreamed. It appears that the Netherlands' partners' complaint mechanisms are not functioning well especially in terms of access to complaint systems, confidential and independent investigations, and tailored support for survivors.²⁹² Also by 2021, the IASC concluded that, even though there had been progress, the pace had not been steady and setting targets and monitoring had been insufficient.²⁹³

CBPFs and CERF

The CBPFs provide an opportunity for risk sharing between UN, the Dutch Government and others, and also a mechanism to strengthen localisation. The Netherlands, being one of the larger donors to CBPFs, has the right to participation on Advisory Boards at country level, which happens in the Syria, Syria Cross-Border, Yemen, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia and the Nigeria Humanitarian Fund. The CBPFs are seen as good instruments by MFA to implement Dutch priorities of not only localisation, but also flexible financing, risk management, stronger humanitarian leadership and capacity building of partners, which are all strongly intertwined with localisation.²⁹⁴ The Netherlands is also part of the Pooled Fund Working Group, which meets twice a year in Geneva and New York for strategic discussions. Some key informants²⁹⁵ identified Dutch funding to OCHA as a gateway for system-wide MFA policy influencing, but documented evidence is lacking.

The Netherlands also participates in yearly donor-only meetings for CBPFs, where observations are shared and various topics are discussed, such as accountability, performance, and risk management,²⁹⁶ transparency, fraud, and SEAH.²⁹⁷ The Netherlands participates furthermore in the OCHA Donor Support Group (ODSG), which is a regular accountability meeting between OCHA and donors. OCHA updates the donors on progress, on issues as they arise among others on compliance, oversight, fraud, and SEAH.²⁹⁸ These types of meetings have the potential to lead to an overall better performance of the CBPFs including on localisation and help the Netherlands to a platform to share their concerns. One of the topics brought up by the Netherlands is that localisation should go beyond capacity building and should be about transferring ownership of the response. Capacity building should also go both ways and bring out what we can learn from local responders.²⁹⁹ Starting July 2021 for one year, the Netherlands has led the ODSG. The Netherlands has used this position to strengthen the collaboration between OCHA and donors and help include current challenges into the multi-annual strategy that OCHA is producing. This has provided space for contributing to the adequate uptake of the Dutch priorities, though hard results have yet to emerge.³⁰⁰ Innovative financing was also one of the key topics.³⁰¹

291 Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken. 3.8 Stabilisatie-inzet en humanitaire inzet in Irak.

292 Rijks-Intern (2020). Wake-up call humanitarian accountability: coördinatie gaat goed, klachtenbehandeling moet heel veel beter. 13 oktober 2020.

293 UNFPA 2021. IASC External Review. Global Report on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and Sexual Harassment. Geneva, December 2021.

294 Rijks-Intern 2021. Humanitaire hulp - VN Country Based Pooled Funds (CBPFs): contributing is a strategic choice. 17 August 2021.

295 Key Informant Interviews from Effectiveness Study Phase 1

296 Agenda. Donor-only Meeting on CBPF Accountability, Performance and Risk management. Dublin, 2-3 November 2016.

297 Confidential Summary Note for the File (2019). Donor-only CBPF Accountability Meeting. UN Secretariat, 25 November 2019, New York

298 OCHA CBPF (2020). Pooled Fund Donor Accountability Meeting. Summary Note. 11 June 2020

299 Brief Report on CBPF-meeting at SIDA, Stockholm on 31 August and 1 September 2017

300 Rijks-Intern (2021). VN - OCHA – report on the new Emergency Relief Coordinator, NLs new chairman of OCHA Donor Support Group. 6 July 2021.

301 Rijks-Intern (2021). VN - OCHA - Start of ODSG-chairmanship in Geneva: 21 July 2021.

In July 2021, the Netherlands co-hosted OCHA's event to present their result reporting. The importance of unearmarked (multi-annual) funding was made clear, however, many donors shy away from unearmarked funding because they fear lack of visibility and acknowledgement. The Netherlands is one of the few exceptions, and as co-host of this event was praised for this.³⁰²

The Netherlands is one of the largest donors to the CERF and raises awareness to attract funding by other donors. In 2018, MFA promised to continue its diplomatic efforts to attract more countries to the CERF.³⁰³ Apart from the considerable funding to the CERF, the leadership of the Director DSH of the CERF Advisory Group (CERF AG) also provides the Netherlands preferential access to OCHA and the potential to emphasise the Dutch priorities in relation to the CERF. One of the topics that the Netherlands underlines is the alignment between the OSDG and the CERF AG on topics like localisation and AAP.³⁰⁴ With the new leadership of Martin Griffiths, OCHA has introduced a stronger focus on these topics as well as on SEAH, and the donors indicated that these topics must be included prominently into the new strategic plan. Agreeing on the viewpoint of the Netherlands, OCHA's strategy is working towards indicating how unearmarked multi-annual funding finds its way to local responders, and making localisation go beyond funding and have it include local leadership, partnership, and transfer of responsibilities.³⁰⁵

Anticipating humanitarian support³⁰⁶ is a subject that increasingly gains attention, and OCHA aims at including this into the CBPFs and CERF. Though questions remain on the reliability of prognoses, the Dutch policy is to include such anticipating support into the funding, if it works to the benefit of localisation, that is when local responders are fully integrated, and donors require additional investment into the capacity of such responders.³⁰⁷ This is additionally important, since local response capacity to disasters is crucial to anticipation.³⁰⁸

UN Agencies

The Netherlands is a member of the executive board of the UN agencies which it funds and participates in the regular meetings. One of these are UNICEF executive board meetings (three times per year), where Dutch priorities are brought forward when it comes to strategic plans, UN reform and the adherence to the GB. The Netherlands has encouraged proposals for innovative financing and brought up low risk appetite and localisation on various occasions.³⁰⁹ When the new Executive Director started in January 2018, she highlighted pursuing localisation as an important point of attention for UNICEF.³¹⁰

After having acted as an observer for one year,³¹¹ the Netherlands became again part of the Executive Board of WFP. In the executive board meetings of WFP, the Netherlands' participants have brought out various priorities. This includes calling upon WFP and donors to cooperate

302 Rijks-Intern (2021). VN - OCHA – Reporting on results of OCHA's unearmarked contributions: CERF and CBPF, crucial to make the little money available go further. 12 juli 2021.

303 Policy Note: Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, vergaderjaar 2017-2018. Beleid ten aanzien van ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Brief van de Minister voor Buitenlandse handel en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking.

304 Rijks-Intern (2021). VN - OCHA - Eerste kennismaking met "Relief Chief" Griffiths onderstreept goede samenwerking en toont potentie voor vervolgstappen (22July 2021).

305 Rijks-Intern (2021). VN - OCHA - 'More action, less abstraction; koers UNOCHA centraal bij kick-off Nederlands voorzitterschap Donor Support Group. 24 September 2021.

306 Anticipatory humanitarian actions are actions taken in anticipation of a crisis, either before the shock or at least before substantial humanitarian needs have manifested themselves, which are intended to mitigate the impact of the crisis or improve the response.

307 Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (2020). Memo. Concept note en voorstel NL-beleidslijn ten aanzien van anticiperende humanitaire hulp. 24 maart 2020.

308 PowerPoint Presentatie NL WS DSH (nd). Anticiperende humanitaire hulp. Het vergroten van de humanitaire reikwijdte voor het verkleinen van humanitaire noden?

309 Rijks-Intern (2021).VN - UNICEF - Ontwikkelingssamenwerking - Guidance Uitvoerende Raad SRS UNICEF d.d. 7 September -10 September 2021

310 Rijks-Intern (2018). VN - UNICEF - Ontwikkelingssamenwerking - UNICEF Executive Council 17 July 2018.

311 Within its donor group, the Netherlands participates 11 out of 12 years in the Executive Board.

actively to increase the proportion of flexible multi-annual funding and to encourage WFP to include the GB priorities, such as localisation, innovation, and the nexus, prominently into its multi-annual strategic plans.³¹² One of the recurring questions of the Netherlands is also, how WFP includes its local partners into the design and implementation of the Country Strategic Plans.³¹³ WFP does move increasingly to implementing their programmes with local authorities as a main stakeholder.³¹⁴ In its strategies, WFP aims at an increasing engagement of local actors coupled with investment into their capacity and resilience.³¹⁵ Though WFP has reached 25% funding to local organisations, they understand this proportion as also to include in-kind transfers to implementing partners, and that proportion has not changed much since the GB.³¹⁶ There is little external evidence about other areas of engagement under localisation.

SEAH is also a topic that is often brought up, and where the Netherlands has had a leading role, especially in terms of creating a safe organizational culture and decisions about and budget for the Ethics Office and the Ombudsman,³¹⁷ and in developing recommendations.³¹⁸ WFP's progress in improving this situation however has been limited and slow.³¹⁹ The reporting of abuse of power and SEAH are high, which is ascribed to the internal culture. WFP has been reluctant in sharing information with donors,³²⁰ but improvement was seen when WFP decided to share the results of their internal audit with the Executive Board, which they previously did not. Nonetheless, the audit still showed ample scope for improvement.³²¹

One example of acting at a more local level, though this is not per se acknowledged as localisation, is WFP's incremental investment in local procurement of food, a process in which often local community-based organisations are engaged.³²² Though this is welcomed by donors, it also requires strict monitoring, as is illustrated by **UNHCR's** struggle with issues of fraud and corruption,³²³ including in the tendering and procurement of goods through local parties.³²⁴

Though the Netherlands is an important donor to the UNHCR, and one of the few that provides continuous unearmarked funds, they perceive the dialogues to not always contribute to policy influencing, even though usually it is observed that Dutch priorities receive sufficient attention.³²⁵ Still, UNHCR sees the Netherlands as much more than a financial donor, including as a sounding board for political and institutional developments.³²⁶

In May 2021, the Netherlands was leading the Refugee Donor Group of UNHCR,³²⁷ providing a

312 Rijks-Intern (2021). VN - WFP - Report Executive Board 2021 - terugblik op 2020, een jaar van verdere groei en aandacht voor de werkcultuur. 2 July 2021.

313 Rijks-Intern (2019). VN - WFP - Humanitaire hulp - WFP presenteert concept notes landenplannen Eswatini, Angola, Jordanië en Mali. 24 April 2019.

314 Rijks-Intern (2019). VN - WFP - Humanitaire hulp - WFP presenteert concept notes landenplannen Cuba, Caribisch gebied, Djibouti, Irak, Niger en Sierra Leone. 8 May 2019.

315 Rijks-Intern (2020). VN - WFP - Executive Board November 2020: 27 November 2020.

316 Trocaire, nd. On the road to 2020 Grand Bargain Commitment to support National and Local Responders

317 Rijks-Intern (2019). VN - WFP – Additional means for Ethics Office and Ombudsman. 24 June 2019.

318 Rijks-Intern (2020). VN - WFP - WFP Board virtueel in tijden van Covid-19 – Mondiale logistieke ondersteuning van het VN Covid-19 GHRP. 30 april 2020.

319 Diplomatic cable BZV (2019). VN - WFP - WFP and SEA. 8 January 2019.

320 Rijks-Intern (2019). VN - WFP 11 Januari 2019.

321 Rijks-Intern (2020). VN - WFP - WFP report on audit 7 Februari 2020.

322 Rijks-Intern (2019). VN - WFP - WFP Executive Board (18-21 November 2019): 25 November 2019

323 Diplomatic cable BZV (2018). Uganda - VN - UNHCR - Humanitaire hulp - 4 December 2018.

324 Diplomatic cable BZV (2018). Uganda - VN - UNHCR - Humanitaire hulp - audit Uganda. 14 December 2018.

325 Rijks-Intern (2021). VN - UNHCR - Humanitaire hulp – policy dialogue with UNHCR: 26 August 2021.

326 Rijks-Intern (2017). VN - UNHCR - Humanitaire hulp – policy dialogue with UNHCR.: 30 Maart 2017.

327 Rijks-Intern (2021). Ethiopië - VN - UNHCR - Migratie – Report visit refugeecamp in Tigray. 3

platform for bringing to the fore priorities in relation to refugee assistance. In general, the Netherlands is praised for their proactive participation in the meetings and contribution to the issue.³²⁸ In meetings, the Netherlands brings up the importance for UNHCR to cooperate better with local authorities and NNGOs; even though many local partners are reached, the cooperation is not optimal yet in terms of quality and procedures.³²⁹ Also in Standing Committee meetings³³⁰ and policy dialogues,³³¹ the Netherlands asks attention for strengthening localisation.

UNHCR, like WFP, also invests in more local procurement of food and sanitation items, which will benefit the local economy,³³² and has the potential to benefit local decision-making, though it is not (yet) clear to what extent local organisations are engaged.

As for SEAH, the Netherlands continuously attracts attention to its importance.³³³ UNHCR has a zero-tolerance policy and is pro-active in addressing the issue.³³⁴ Though the number of reported cases had increased, this was seen as a result of the increased transparency, encouraging people to come forward.³³⁵ UNHCR has strengthened their collaboration with local partners and other UN agencies to improve protection and raise awareness on SEAH. The Netherlands has proposed to make SEAH a regular topic in the yearly ExCom, to intensify the discussion and make it a structural part of the policy dialogue with UNHCR.³³⁶

ICRC

ICRC perceives humanitarian diplomacy by the Netherlands and other donors as essential to address basic causes, whilst ICRC and others provide humanitarian support.³³⁷ In general, humanitarian diplomacy is seen as an appropriate approach to help anticipate to and prevent humanitarian crises.³³⁸

In May 1998, the Netherlands facilitated the first meeting of the donor support group (DSG) between the **ICRC** and its ten largest donors,³³⁹ and these meetings still take place once every six months. The meetings cover not only ICRC appeals and impact, and cost effectiveness, but also coordination between the ICRC and its donors, and donor requirements. The Netherlands can discuss its policy and priorities here, including in terms of localisation. Relevant topics have been assessment and definition of needs and priorities, promotion of local ownership and ICRC involvement during periods of transition and in peace-building activities.³⁴⁰ The Netherlands is also a member of the Donor Advisory Group of the **IFRC**, which meets twice a year. The meetings allow the Netherlands and other donors to share views and advise the IFRC on policy and programming and are seen as an opportunity to discuss IFRC's role in helping to put affected communities at the heart of the GB commitment particularly on localization.³⁴¹ In these meetings, the Netherlands is seen as having a leadership role on achieving the GB.³⁴² The Netherlands often draws attention to risk management and sharing as part of the GB. This

Juni 2021.

328 Rijks-Intern (2018). VN - UNHCR - Humanitaire hulp - 9 Juli 2018.

329 Rijks-Intern (2019). VN - UNHCR - Humanitaire hulp - UNHCR Standing Committee: 15 March 2019.

330 Rijks-Intern (2020). VN - UNHCR - Humanitaire hulp - Verslag 78ste UNHCR Standing Committee. 13 Juli 2020.

331 Rijks-Intern (2021). VN - UNHCR - Humanitaire hulp - Beleidsdialoog UNHCR: ruimte voor een groeiend partnerschap. 26 August 2021.

332 Rijks-Intern (2020). VN - UNHCR - Humanitaire hulp - Herziene Covid Appeal UNHCR 27 March, 1 April 2020.

333 Rijks-Intern (2019). VN - UNHCR - Humanitaire hulp - HC Grandi visit to NL. 7 June 2019.

334 Rijks-Intern (2018). VN - UNHCR - Humanitaire hulp - 72e Standing Committee 3 Juli 2018.

335 Rijks-Intern (2018). VN - UNHCR - UNHCR (SEA/SH) 28 July 2018.

336 Rijks-Intern (2019). VN - UNHCR - Humanitaire hulp - Standing Committee; SEA-SH en GRF. 26 September 2019.

337 Rijks-Intern (2020). ICRC - Humanitaire hulp – Humanitarian Diplomacy. 21 Juli 2020.

338 Rijks-Intern (2021). IFRC - Humanitaire hulp - Visit SG IFRC Chapagain. 16 September 2021.

339 <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/icrc-donor-support-group>

340 <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/icrc-donor-support-group>

341 <https://oldmedia.ifrc.org/ifrc/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Donor-Advisory-Group.pdf>

342 Rijks-Intern (2020). ICRC - Humanitaire hulp - ICRC DSG Annual Meeting 2020: 11 June 2020.

includes the need for a discussion within a broader group of stakeholders to achieve a collective approach,³⁴³ as well as the responsibility of donors. In various meetings, the Netherlands was also able to include MHPSS as a point of attention,³⁴⁴ and this priority has translated into the promise for additional funding. The Netherlands aims to also include GB related topics into the MFA's trade agenda.³⁴⁵

Some donors, such as the UK, require ICRC to provide certain information as a condition to funding that they are unable to give, thus making them unable to accept that funding. The Netherlands does not have such conditions, it does require inclusion of a paragraph on SEAH though.³⁴⁶

DRA

MFA has brought home to DRA the importance of localisation and the necessity of achieving the GB's goal of 25 percent in each meeting, including the need to reflect it in their long-term planning.³⁴⁷

DRA echoes the Dutch priorities in their meetings, for instance when they briefed the Council on Humanitarian Aid and Food Aid (COHAFA), where they drew attention to the importance of unearmarked increased collaborative humanitarian multi-year funding, and the need for more support and funding tools for local and national responders.³⁴⁸

If needed, like in North Yemen, Dutch diplomacy helps DRA to improve access and avoiding the choice of discontinuing support.³⁴⁹ Here, diplomacy by the Netherlands and others is aimed to not only protection of civilians and IHL and economic measures, but also unlimited access.

343 Diplomatic cable BZV (2019). ICRC - Humanitaire hulp - ICRC Donor Support Group 1 March 2019.

344 Rijks-Intern (2020). ICRC - Humanitaire hulp - ICRC DSG Annual Meeting 2020: 11 June 2020.

345 Diplomatic cable BZV (2019). ICRC - Humanitaire hulp – report conversation of the minister with - president ICRC Peter Maurer. 18 June 2019.

346 Diplomatic cable BZV (2019). ICRC - Humanitaire hulp – report conversation of the minister with - president ICRC Peter Maurer. 18 June 2019.

347 Dutch Relief Alliance (DRA) (4 July 2016). CEO meeting - Draft Minutes

348 Dutch Relief Alliance (2018). DRA presentation for COHAFA. 12 October 2018.

349 Diplomatic cable BZV (2020). Jemen - Humanitaire hulp – Situation (Northern) Yemen 20 January 2020.

Annex 1: Logframe for innovation in humanitarian assistance (2019)

Impact		
More lives saved, dignity restored, and preparedness enhanced		
Long-term outcome		
Outcome	Indicator(s)	Explanatory note
1.1 Humanitarian response system is strengthened (improved efficiency and effectiveness) through innovation	1.1.1 Extent to which scaled innovations improve efficiency or effectiveness of aid (qualitative)	<p>NL aims to fund innovations that transform the way humanitarian aid is delivered to increase efficiency and effectiveness of aid. Innovations must demonstrate their added value in comparison to status quo.</p> <p>1.1.1: scale is 'significant improvement of efficiency/ effectiveness', 'some improvement of efficiency/ effectiveness', 'no improvement of efficiency/ effectiveness'. This indicator is qualitative and will be reflected upon across portfolio (rather than per project).</p> <p>Best indicator to monitor this outcome would be the perception of beneficiaries of improvement of aid. The Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS) indicator measuring this is: 'Communities and people affected by crisis identify improvements to the assistance and protection they receive over time'. This is not reported on by partners currently. Dialogue with partners on this are ongoing.</p> <p>Verification: case studies/ partner reports</p>
Intermediate outcomes		
Outcome	Indicator(s)	Explanatory note
1.2 More innovations reach scale	1.2.1 # of innovations, supported with Dutch funds, that have reached scale.	<p>The aim is for 10% of the total funded innovations to reach scale. The scaling process can be quite lengthy, so these results can take years. However, as NL is supporting innovations at various stages of the innovation process, some projects – if successful – should reach scale in the coming three years.</p> <p>Verification: partner reports</p>
1.3 Increased knowledge on what works in humanitarian aid		<p>This outcome will be monitored through proxy indicators (indicators 1.2.1, 1.3.1).</p> <p>Verification: partner reports/ publications</p>
1.4 More uptake of innovations by humanitarian partners	1.4.1 % of funding allocated for innovation in the response by crisis response	<p>1.3.1: this is currently included only in the grant agreement with the Dutch Relief Alliance (DRA). Hence, this indicator would require additional questions in time of reporting from other partners.</p>

	1.4.2 partners. # of instances of adoption/ adaptation of Dutch funded innovations by other organisations.	1.3.2: as of now, only HIF and HGC will conduct retrospective analysis on their funded innovations. Discussions with other partners on this are ongoing. This indicator will include instances where Dutch partners adopt innovative practices that are not necessarily funded in the innovation process by NL. Verification: partner reports
Outputs		
Output	Indicator(s)	Explanatory note
1.1 Innovations are supported (via partners) and advance in the innovation process	1.4.3 # of innovations supported (aggregated by stage in the innovation process); 1.4.4 % of innovations that have advanced in the innovation process.	1.1.1: number of innovations supported will be – in case of funds – calculated based on the percentage of Dutch funding to the total budget. Data will be disaggregated by stage of the innovation process. 1.1.2: as a % of the number calculated above. The indicators should be interpreted by the learnings produced by partners (output 1.2). Verification: partner reports
1.2 Funding provided to partners that develop tools and guidance to inform innovation processes in the humanitarian sector	1.4.5 # of research papers/ guidance notes developed and shared to inform sector learning on innovation management (including M&E of humanitarian innovation).	Will reflect on uptake of these papers/ tools where possible. Verification: partner reports/ publications
1.3 Constructive collaboration is convened (e.g. collaborative gap analysis, informal referral system in place, leveraging expertise of other initiatives);	1.4.6 Constructive partnerships/ collaboration convened (qualitative)	These include partnerships between donors and innovation initiatives. Examples of constructive partnerships/collaboration can include joint gap analysis; exchange of expertise; referral of innovation between funds. Constructive collaboration and partnership between donors can include joint statements for policy influencing, funding partnerships, lessons learned exchange etc.
1.4 Increased engagement of non-traditional actors	1.4.7 Extent to which non-traditional actors are involved in innovation	Non-traditional actors include private sector, affected populations and local and national humanitarian actors. Learnings on how to engage these actors are of particular interest (covered by output 1.2).

	projects	Verification: partner reports
1.5 Importance of innovation is advocated at various levels and forums.	1.4.8 # of external advocacy efforts (speeches/events) to advocate (the sector) for innovation of processes, systems and techniques in order to enhance efficiency, effectiveness and transparency.	

Annex 2: Acronyms

AAP	Accountability to Affected Populations
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
CHF	Country Humanitarian Fund
COHAFA	Council on Humanitarian Aid and Food Aid
CERF	Centralised Emergency Response Fund
CERF AG	Centralised Emergency Response Fund Advisory Group
DCHI	Dutch Coalition for Humanitarian Innovation
DSH-HH	Afdeling Humanitaire Hulp van de directie Stabilisering en Humanitaire Hulp
DDE	Directie Duurzame Economische Ontwikkeling
GB	Grand Bargain
HIF	Humanitarian Innovation Fund
IATI	International Aid Transparency Initiative
ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MHPSS	Mental Health and Psychosocial Support
INGO	International Non-governmental Organization
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NNGO	Local and/or national Non-governmental Organization
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODSG	OCHA Donor Support Group
OECD-DAC	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/ Development Assistance Committee
RC	Red Cross
RVO	Rijksdienst voor Ondernemend Nederland
SCHF	Syria Cross-border Humanitarian Fund
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SEAH	Safeguarding against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and Sexual Harassment
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	United Nations World Food Programme
WHS	World Humanitarian Summit