

# Reintegration: Disengaging Violent Extremists

## A Systematic Literature Review of Effectiveness of Counter-Terrorism and Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Activities

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Rijnstraat 8  
The Hague  
2515 XP  
+31 (0)70 348 64 86

Martine Zeuthen  
Royal United Services Institute

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# Acronyms

CT	Counter-Terrorism
IOM	International Organization for Migration
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - Development Assistance Committee
P/CVE	Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
PRAC	Prevention, Rehabilitation and After-Care Strategy
PRISM	Proactive Integrated Support Model
RUSI	Royal United Services Institute
SfCG	Search for Common Ground
ToR	Terms of Reference
UK	United Kingdom

# Systematic Review: Introduction

Dutch counter-terrorism (CT) efforts overseas draw on the 2018 – 2022 integrated foreign and security strategy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 2018), which is built on three strategic pillars: prevention, defence and reinforcement. CT efforts in this strategy include measures taken to prevent, pursue, protect and respond to terrorism. CT programmes are designed to address capacity gaps and deliberately counter terrorist actors and methods. Dutch efforts also include interventions designed to address the root causes of extremism, typically known as preventing or countering violent extremism (P/CVE). This is a broad umbrella term to categorise activities that seek to prevent or mitigate VE and factors of VE through non-coercive measures (Chowdhury Fink 2015, 65).

Despite the proliferation of CT and P/CVE interventions, the field has been criticised for being overly reactive, externally imposed, infringing on civil liberties (including the right to privacy), targeting specific communities and increasing risk of stigma (Wolfendale 2007). There are also definitional and conceptual problems (Berger 2016). Practice has remained poorly evidenced, lacking robustness in design or evaluation. The impact of interventions is rarely well described, and the effectiveness of different approaches or programmes remains largely unmeasured (Lum et al. 2006, Mastroe and Szmania 2016). Efforts can be criticised for lacking well-developed theories of change (DuBois and Alem 2017) and for being over-reliant on anecdotal evidence, exposing the field to a range of practical, conceptual and ethical problems (Freese 2014, RUSI 2020).

The question of ‘what is working’ (and what is not) in CT and P/CVE policy and practice is therefore important. Donors supporting overseas CT and P/CVE interventions are under increasing pressure to demonstrate positive outcomes and to represent value for money and accountability to taxpayers. In April 2020, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) commissioned the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) to help fill this evidence gap by providing a systematic review of existing literature to assist the current and future policy decisions of the Government of the Netherlands. This research answers the question: “What is known about the effectiveness of CT and P/CVE interventions in the three areas of most interest for the MFA: 1) youth engagement; 2) reintegration; and 3) capacity building of national government and law enforcement?”

The project involved a systematic review of the relevant literature to collect and synthesise evidence on the conditions for effectiveness for each of the three categories. The techniques applied were systematic in that they relied upon the use of an objective, transparent and rigorous approach for the entire research process in order to minimise bias and ensure reliability (Mallett et al. 2012). However, methods, including search terms and inclusion/exclusion criteria, were tailored to each thematic area. Each paper includes its own methodology section which can be found in the annex.

The research was complemented by a restricted analysis of literature reviews in two pre-identified RELATED areas - security sector reform (SSR) and work with gangs or criminal groups.

## Reintegration: Disengaging Violent Extremists

### 1. Introduction

This report, covering the effectiveness of CT and P/CVE interventions targeting reintegration aimed at disengaging violent extremists, is in six main sections. This introduction lays out those sections according to the Terms of Reference (ToR), as well as offering some key definition of terms. The first main section briefly sets out the process used for discovery, selection and evaluation for this strand of the review and includes a discussion of evidence quality. The second section summarises the included studies, using a simple analytical framework specifying what each intervention set out to do and what evidence it produced (if any) of effectiveness (defined here as the extent to which the intervention met its objectives) and impact (the effect it had on the problem of terrorism or radicalisation). This second

section is a discussion of the included papers against the research questions focussing on effectiveness, what works and what does not work. The third section is a discussion of conditions promoting or hindering success. The fourth presents underlying assumptions and lack thereof. The fifth section identifies knowledge gaps. And the final and sixth section draws conclusions and provides recommendations from the evidence of effectiveness and impact, and lessons learned in relation to reintegration aimed at disengaging violent extremists.

This strand of work focuses on *Reintegration*. As outlined in the methodology, this refers to approaches aimed at disengaging violent extremists. The type of activities mentioned in this category includes support for the reintegration of (former) detainees, members of terrorist groups and ex-combatants. Reintegration can involve vocational training, coaching and psychosocial support, and in-kind or cash support. In the broader literature, the term reintegration most often refers to activities that take place after rehabilitation, focussing on the process post-exit from a prison or rehabilitation centre to promote social and economic reintegration. The ToR informing this review focusses on reintegration; however, this paper includes studies of rehabilitation based on the importance of understanding the effectiveness of rehabilitation activities and evidence informing support to programmes undertaken in prisons and disengagement centres – with the aim to disengage or de-radicalise violent extremists to enable reintegration post-exit.

## Definitions

To be able to frame the discussion in this paper a few definitions are required. These draw upon background literature, rather than the evaluations and studies with evaluation components that are a part of the systematic review.

Some of the key terms used in this review include defection, disengagement, de-radicalisation, rehabilitation, reintegration and (reducing the risk of) recidivism. The terms illustrate a certain perceived order or process of what is needed for an individual to become reintegrated into society starting with defection as the actual physical process of leaving. A large number of studies discuss disengagement and de-radicalisation conceptually, and it is evident that in the more theoretical literature there is a development in the discussion over the past 20 years.

In a broad literature review Schmid argues, that:

In popular understanding, deradicalisation is often assumed to be the same as disengagement from a terrorist group and its ideology. However, the term de-radicalisation refers primarily to a cognitive rejection of certain values, attitudes and views – in other words, a change of mind. While one is inclined to think that de-radicalisation comes first and disengagement – behavioural distancing from the violent terrorist modus operandi – comes afterwards, this is not necessarily so (Schmid 2013, 35).

Horgan and Braddock (2010) argue that:

To date, there is no consensus on what constitutes success in reforming a terrorist, let alone what even constitutes reform in this context. There is, in addition, confusion about whether any kind of rehabilitation is necessarily brought about by “de-radicalisation” (itself a term which has not been adequately conceptualized, let alone defined) as opposed to other interventions for eliciting behaviour change. Recent research suggests that many of those who disengage (or desist) from terrorist activity are not necessarily de-radicalised (as primarily conceived via a change in thinking or beliefs), and that such de-radicalisation is not necessarily a prerequisite for ensuring low risk of recidivism (Horgan and Braddock 2010, 3).

This suggests that the terms used are not necessarily useful in comprehensively understanding the processes associated with leaving violent extremist organisations, as these are diverse and dynamic.

The definitional problems relate to how we understand rehabilitation, and, therefore, what activities should be included in interventions to bring about rehabilitation and reintegration both socially and economically into the community. As

an example (one that is argued in a number of background studies including: RAND 2012 and ICSR 2010), in Muslim majority countries such as Saudi Arabia the focus is clearly on de-radicalisation, where radicalisation is perceived to be the result of a specific interpretation of the Quran that is different from the state sanctioned interpretation. Whereas, for example, in Scandinavian countries, there is less focus on ideology in the process and the measure of success is often conformity to perceived national norms (Bin Hassan 2019).

As a result, in the literature reviewed, there is usually limited clarity around what the objective of the programmes are. One measure of effect has been risk of recidivism, referring to the risk of former violent extremists re-joining violent extremist organisations following a rehabilitation process. However, studies such as Marsden (2015) are more forward looking and discuss the importance of conceptualising effectiveness and assessing this within the specific contexts, highlighting the political nature of these programmes and the importance of a clear policy framework guiding interventions at the national level.

## 2. Discovery, Selection and Evaluation

From the string search (using the strings identified in the Methodology, see Annex B) 1448 records were identified. The vast majority of records were located via Google Scholar (n=750)<sup>1</sup> and ProQuest (n=698). From a review of titles and abstracts and removal of duplicates, 1296 papers were excluded on the grounds of relevance, and the remaining 152 were subject to review for relevance. This identified 68 potentially relevant studies.

In parallel, a handsearching process was undertaken and concluded by June 2020. In the initial search 184 studies were identified, which were reduced to 69 after an in-depth reading. After removing duplicates and merging the string and hand search, as well as conducting an inter-coder reliability exercise, further studies were screened out – leaving 26 papers.

The 26 papers were then reviewed more extensively according to the inclusion/exclusion criteria specified in the Methodology. In this process an additional 11 papers were removed from the FOCUS inventory and moved to the RELATED search, as they did not specifically discuss an intervention but rather focussed on policy and context for interventions. Thus, 15 papers are included in the FOCUS part of this review. Annex A provides a complete overview of all the FOCUS studies.

In assessing the literature meeting the criteria for the review, it is evident that few studies were actual evaluations of interventions. Therefore, not all the studies included in the FOCUS part of this review are focussed only evaluation, but they have evaluation components that were found valuable to include.

In addition to the FOCUS studies which have been included in this review, there is also a RELATED inventory included in Annex D. The primary purpose of the RELATED category is to examine the reintegration space with a different population (i.e., gang and criminal disengagement, rehabilitation and reintegration). However, there are also many additional studies that are relevant and add knowledge to understanding the process of disengagement, which is helpful to establish what programmes need to consider in their design. Thus, most of the studies included in the RELATED review are included on the basis that they fall outside the rigorous parameters of the systematic review, but still add value to the broader comprehension of the problem and process of leaving violent extremist organisations. These include studies that are descriptive in nature rather than evaluations of interventions or intervention components and papers examining issues related to leaving terrorism such as demobilisation and group defection. Group defection is a distinct area of study focussing on political, negotiated processes, rather than an individual process of leaving terrorism behind.

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<sup>1</sup> The actual number was significantly larger and unusable; thus, only up to the first five pages per first string were counted, with 50 hits on each page.

The 15 FOCUS studies covered nine interventions in the Global South and six in the Global North<sup>2</sup>. Seven studies were evaluations including one mid-term self-evaluation; the remaining eight were academic reviews with evaluative perspectives that provide evidence against the research questions informing this review. All of the interventions were implemented by governments or implementing partners, providing support to a government led process (such as Search for Common Ground (SfCG) in Indonesia or Adam Smith International and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Somalia). As such, it is evident that rehabilitation programmes reviewed in this study are predominantly led by governments and placed within a broader national strategy to counter and prevent terrorism. Given that most programmes are run by or with government entities, in accordance with a national policy or strategy, they are often referred to as a national programme, which will be replicated in this review.

The interventions vary in the types of activities included. The below figure provides an overview of the most common components of the programmes offered.

Table 1: Common intervention elements

Types of intervention discussed	Comments based on the FOCUS literature
<i>Rehabilitation process design</i>	
Entry screening	Only undertaken in a limited number of interventions. The aim is to assess individual needs, in order to design a suitable rehabilitation plan. This is primarily done in the interventions that have a case management approach.
<i>Rehabilitation process in prison/disengagement centre</i>	
Civic education	What constitutes value-based education varies, but, in most programmes, this is an integral component.
Religious counselling and education	This element is the most contentious component and not always included.
Vocational training	Aiming to increase likelihood of employment and financial self-sufficiency post-exit. This is a key component of several programmes.
Support to staff	This includes building capacity of staff and creating special teams (such as a risk-screening team in a prison).
<i>Post release/exit</i>	
Aftercare in terms of financial support	In the FOCUS literature focussing on aftercare, this is essential, and most programmes consider this in some way.
Aftercare in terms of psychosocial support and mentorship	Aftercare analysts argue that this is highly important but is rarely undertaken, probably at least partly because of the resources required.
Aftercare in terms of support to families <sup>3</sup>	A few programmes include this in their approaches.
Support to managing security post-exit	In Somali programmes, in particular, this is considered essential. However, this is only described and followed up to a limited degree.

Out of the FOCUS studies, the most relevant and comprehensive studies (as determined through the quality narrative process highlighted in Annex A) include: Cherney’s (2018) study of the Proactive Integrated Support Model (PRISM) model in Australia, Heide and Schuurmans (2016) study of the Dutch approach, Daugherty (2019)’s study of the exit approaches in Norway and Sweden and indeed Marsden’s (2015) assessment amongst probation staff. These studies all suggest that most effective approaches appear to be those integrating all steps including aftercare.

<sup>2</sup> A number of studies reported on the same projects with two studies of the Dutch programme, three studies of the Saudi programme, two studies of the Nigerian programme and two studies of the Australian programme. The report also includes two studies of Somalia (with focus on two different programmes) and one paper studying two programmes (Norway and Sweden).

<sup>3</sup> In some studies, this is not restricted to “aftercare” – some integrate family involvement during interventions with incarcerated inmates, to a) build stronger linkages between practitioners and families/ lay the groundwork for release, and b) start repairing bonds, where necessary, between prisoners and their families.

Studies that were less comprehensive for relevance, such as Eckard (2019), raise similar issues. Often emphasising the importance of institutionalisation – essentially a wider package of well organised, mutually reinforcing programmes such as vocational training, financial support and counselling (i.e., those activities primarily focusing on behavioural, rather than ideological, change) – to complement religious programming and facilitate detainees’ eventual reinsertion into society. This is echoed by Alsubaie (2016), who highlights the value of a centralised, well-coordinated, multi-faceted approach – albeit using different terminology.

Daugherty (2019) cites the importance of addressing “all needs – mental and physical’ of people departing from extremist groups (Daugherty 2019, 254). Additionally, the stipulated outcome of the PRISM model explained by Cherney and Belton (2019) is to “redirect clients away from extremism...and help them transition out of custody. This is achieved through individually tailored intervention plans, the content of which can vary from client to client” (Cherney and Belton 2019, 6).

## Quality of Data

To inform the discussion of what works, it is important – with this particularly challenging area of work and the population involved in the programmes – to discuss the quality of data used in the evaluations and other studies. Most scholars who have conducted primary data collection point out problems with regards to triangulation and caveat their findings with regards to the quality of the data – even when interviews have been conducted, explaining that quality of the data is influenced by factors such as challenges relating to security, language, incentives and the fact that many are incarcerated (see for example Khalil et al. 2019 and Webber et al. 2018).

12 of the studies are based on qualitative methods or mixed methods, including a qualitative component for their analysis and semi-structured interviews when conducting primary data collection, largely because of the sensitive context (Barkindo 2016, Taylor et al. 2019, Howell 2013, Marsden 2015, Cherney 2018, Khalil et al. 2019, Schuurman and Bakker 2016). Five of the studies have quantitative components (Van der Heide and Schuurman 2016, Webber et al 2017, Cherney and Belton 2019, Alsubaie 2016 and Eckard 2014) and an additional three studies use secondary quantitative data provided by the host government (Onapajo and Ozden 2020, Daugherty 2019, Alsubaie 2016). One study is entirely theoretical and based on secondary data (Lankford & Gillespie 2011).

Another methodological challenge highlighted in the literature underlines the challenge of setting up an experimental evaluation design, because of the extensive ethical challenges associated with establishing control groups for this type of individual. One study, conducted by Schuurman and Bakker (2016) evaluating the Dutch approach, specifically discusses the problem of experimental evaluation and the challenges associated with control groups.

However, another study, of the approach in Sri Lanka by Webber et al. (2018), does conduct a comparative analysis between a full treatment group (receiving the full de-radicalisation programme) versus a minimal treatment group (one of the centres only provided recreation, family visitation and mediation services for the duration of assessment). This second group was considered the “minimal treatment condition”, providing the closest approximation of a control group. While there are limitations with the methodology, as noted in the description in Annex A, it offers a rather unusual take that adopts elements of a quasi-experimental approach, and integrates quantitative data relating to psychological factors based on “significance quest theory”. The significance quest theory is a psychological model of extremism, which identifies three general drivers of VE – namely need, narrative and network. “The theory asserts that the need for personal significance—the desire to matter, to ‘be someone,’ and to have meaning in one’s life—is the dominant need that underlies violent extremism” (Kruglanski et al. 2018, 107). This not only provided a set of indicators outside recidivism, but offered opportunities for longitudinal analysis, with 490 “treatment” and 111 “minimal” beneficiaries participating in surveys over a one-year period of rehabilitation. Further surveys were also conducted with 179 former Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and 144 Tamil civilians, residing in communities across the country, to offer a comparative appraisal of attitudes between “mainstream society” and former combatants following rehabilitative programming. The approach may not be replicable in other contexts, given both the level of access researchers received and the peculiarities of post-conflict Sri Lanka following the military defeat of the “Tamil Tigers”,

but it demonstrates alternative methodologies that could be adapted to better understand and measure disengagement and de-radicalisation processes.

These studies are examined in more depth in the following sections, according to the research questions laid out in the ToR for this review.

### 3. Evidence of Effectiveness

Before trying to answer the question of what evidence there is for what works and what does not, the challenges of measurement itself must be acknowledged, as these questions are closely interrelated. The inconsistencies present around this topic make it very difficult to highlight clearly evidence of what works and what does not.

#### Methods and Standards of Measuring Effectiveness and Impact

This section discusses both how and what is being measured, as well as the differences in approach to measurement which limit the availability and continuity of evidence. The suggestion that the most effective interventions are those including numerous components highlights the need for considering all parts of a holistic approach collectively and as such effectiveness at different stages is difficult to ascertain. Some of the reviewed studies attempt to assess the components of the rehabilitation process separately but only with limited success. Other programmes do not cover the full range of activities. One programme that seeks to disaggregate components to an extent is the Saudi Prevention, Rehabilitation and After-Care Strategy (PRAC) programme. Some approaches such as PRISM in Australia (Cherney 2018), as well as the Norwegian and Swedish approaches are highly individualised (Daugherty 2019). This creates challenges in isolating components, to further review what aspects of a programme are working under what conditions.

Measuring effectiveness of different programme components has only been done in a small number of studies, such as Khalil et al. (2019) and SfCG (Howell 2013). However, these are rarely linked to an assessment of impact. Historically, the rate of recidivism has been the main measure of impact of disengagement and rehabilitation programmes. Many studies, however, argue that this is not a useful or feasible measure of impact. While some papers provide assessments of recidivism rates, none of the studies provided explanation as to how they have measured this, especially as there is a lack of national databases and any clear baseline (Koehler 2017 cited in Cherney 2020). Recidivism, as a measure, however, is a cross cutting metric that all scholars discuss as problematic. However, they tend to gravitate to it, due to a lack of alternatives. Marsden (2015) suggests alternative indicators – such as no reoffending, engagement in civil society, broader identity and alternative ways of responding to grievance – could be more useful ways of measuring effect (Marsden 2015).

In the literature reviewed, by far the largest amount of data and analysis are generated by studies conducted in prisons and from programmes that are a requirement for rehabilitation post-release – and, as such, are not entirely voluntary in nature. When considering evidence of effectiveness and impact, the requirement for participation must be considered, and these measures must be compared to post-release/exit data. If indeed participation is not entirely voluntary or influenced by incentives, such as seeking early release, the effect of the intervention might be limited over time.

For voluntary interventions, an obvious measure of impact could include if the programme is contributing to increased defection – meaning increasing the number of people who voluntarily leave the organisations because of their knowledge of a rehabilitation programme. While this process is influenced by a number of factors, it could be an element of impact. Only one study included in this review (Khalil et al. 2019) discusses and contributes to an assessment in this area.

#### Evidence on What Works

From the number of interventions described, as outlined above, most address disengagement and de-radicalisation in prison contexts. Twelve of the papers explicitly focus on prisons, and to some extent post-prison aftercare (Barkindo 2016, SfCG 2016, Van der Heide and Schuurman 2016, Marsden 2015, Lankford and Gillespie 2011, Cherney 2018,

Cherney and Belton 2019, Daugherty 2019, Webber et al. 2018, Alsubaie 2016, Eckard 2014, Schuurman and Bakker 2016), two on disengagement centres (Taylor et al. 2019, Khalil et al. 2019), and one is not clear on the location (Onapajo and Ozden 2020). To base knowledge on prison interventions, it is important to consider that if offenders (convicted and pre-trial) are incentivised or required to engage in a programme, this could bias any measures of effect.

These studies of the interventions also produce limited evidence of behaviour post-release, which therefore makes the bigger questions related to reintegration impossible to answer. Secondly, in the Global South, capacity to monitor offenders post-release – let alone data on that process – is almost non-existent in the available literature, with studies flagging capacity gaps and administrative limitations in states like Nigeria (Onapajo and Ozden 2020). A study from Yemen highlighted that, at times, monitoring recidivism is only done at national level; overlooking the fact that some violent extremists might engage outside the country (RAND 2010). Eckard (2014), for instance, references several “graduates” of Yemen’s disengagement programme fighting Coalition forces in Iraq. Other studies highlight that post-release monitoring also raises ethical (privacy) and legal issues. EXIT Sweden, for example, was unable to track participants after they completed or left the disengagement programme, due to the country’s Personal Data Act (Daugherty 2019).

In a study of a programme in Australia discussed by Cherney (2020), the problems of recidivism as a problematic metric are further highlighted. He argues that it is highly understandable that there is a great interest in understanding risk of reoffending (in the cases where the population are convicted offenders), but that it is very difficult to measure. Marsden (2015) points out that absence of recidivism cannot necessarily be attributed to an effective rehabilitation and reintegration intervention, because many other factors can play a role and influence an extremist offender’s reoffending. This, therefore, suggests that rehabilitation and reintegration interventions must have a number of indicators of success that relate to the different aspects of the programme, as well as their relationship with the context within which they are implemented. The complexity of the matter requires careful consideration, to establish what effectiveness can be expected within a given policy and socio-economic context (Marsden 2015). Cherney (2020) explains how these more contextualised indicators of success, rather than purely indicators of recidivism, are explored in the Australian PRISM intervention.

Few studies break down the interventions into activities, such as educational support, vocational training, religious counselling, and aftercare (in terms of both financial support, job creation and physical security). The study of the defector centre in Mogadishu (Khalil et al. 2019), for example, assesses each of the components, but does not measure the effect of the programme as a whole on defection rates and recidivism over time.

Finally, there appears to be a small bias in the measures of effectiveness, as it is found easier to measure demographic factors (such as education, livelihood, etc.) rather than assessing ideological changes, for interventions where this was considered the intended outcome (Van der Heide and Schuurman 2016).

### **Observations from prison-based interventions**

The majority of the literature included in the review focuses on disengagement and de-radicalisation in involuntary contexts, predominantly prisons. Some aspects highlighted in the prisons-focussed literature include physical management in prisons (in particular, isolation or allowing offenders to mix with others) and engagement in, for example, vocational training activities to support economic reintegration post-release. Managing convicted offenders, as well as pre-convicted prisoners, is a key area of debate in the literature. Marsden (2015) states that national policies guiding these processes are often based on political considerations, rather than evidence.

Another key area of discussion relating to measures of effectiveness of programmes are essentially measures of capacity building programmes. Attention to this issue is raised by a study in the RELATED category focussing on specialised prison units (Butler 2017) – with examples from Northern Ireland raising concerns regarding specialised units. This study by Butler (2017) is essentially a capacity building intervention for specialised units that aim to manage violent extremist offenders and the overarching process in prisons to mitigate risk of radicalisation – as well as, in some

contexts, to contribute to disengagement and de-radicalisation prior to release. This study highlights how rehabilitation interventions often include a capacity building focus, with implementors supporting and training governments to lead their own programmes. In terms of measures of effect, as discussed in the capacity building paper, the relationship between capacity building achievements and the overall aim to contribute to rehabilitation must be clearly established. Therefore, the Butler (2017) study is included in RELATED because it is, ultimately, more of a capacity building intervention than a reintegration programme. While it raises some valuable points, it is not providing evidence for the FOCUS category.

### **Observations from studies addressing context and post-exit interventions**

Several studies argue that there is a need to assess effectiveness in relation to the context. An effective programme in Saudi Arabia may not be considered effective in other contexts. Similarly, changes in the environment might also influence effectiveness of the programme. Khalil et al. (2019) note there can be attribution problems with regards to success, if the context is not integrated into the analysis of effectiveness.

Webber et al. (2017) identify positive outcomes in their analysis of disengagement and de-radicalisation programming, but it is unclear whether this translates to other settings, given the specificities of the Sri Lankan experience and the military defeat of the LTTE prior to the process of rehabilitation. Consequently, the motivations and incentives facing former LTTE combatants are significantly different from members of Islamic State or Al Qaeda, for example, because these organisations continue to exist to a greater or lesser extent as operational networks and “promise glory through violence enacted for their cause” (Webber et al. 2017, 14).

### **Case management based interventions**

This area of study, as discussed in the literature, is about the use of case management approaches and is related to a discussion around the use of risk assessments. This approach could add value and is included in the RELATED inventory. However, as there are no clear evaluations of their relevance or effectiveness, they were not included in this FOCUS portion of the review.

Schuurman’s assessment of the Dutch national programme suggests that there is a need to conduct an appraisal of an individual’s risk of recidivism when releasing individuals back into the society (Schuurman and Bakker 2016). Similarly, in the Australian PRISM programme, risk assessment tools such as RADAR<sup>4</sup> are used in the case management approach – these are highly individualised but could possibly help to establish a framework for evaluating success for each individual (Cherney and Belton 2019).

This report finds that, within this debate, there is an attention to the Global South and a focus on physical and financial limitations within the context of specialised units and resource intensive approaches.

### **Evidence on What Does Not Work**

In the literature, there is a very limited focus on what does not work – in part, because of data constraints and possibly due to limited interest in publishing shortcomings. Exceptions include Lankford and Gillespie’s (2011) analysis of Saudi Arabia’s de-radicalisation programme, although this was not a formal evaluation as the authors did not have access to the intervention itself. Based on their psychological knowledge around how indoctrination works, and careful studies of Al Qaeda’s indoctrination approaches and recruitment strategies, the paper argues that the Saudi government’s approach aims essentially to re-indoctrinate; thus, as an intervention seeking to de-radicalise violent extremists, is not effective.

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<sup>4</sup> RADAR is a risk assessment tool (developed and used in Australia). It is a protocol designed to systematically document all aspects of a person and his or her environment. It functions as a basis to structure information to aid decision-making (Van der Heide et al. 2019).

The paper argues that this approach essentially mirrors the process used by violent extremists, who are seeking to indoctrinate. The paper goes on to describe how indoctrination works and discusses that, to counter ideological indoctrination effectively, there is a need to understand indoctrination – which is argued to include four components: isolation, dehumanising, authorisation and training. The paper suggests that, to effectively influence former extremists, this process that Al Qaeda has taken them through to deliberately indoctrinate them must be shared with them, as a way of unpacking what has actually happened (Lankford and Gillespie 2011). Finally, the paper recommends that the programme should expose the individuals to what the VE groups do (with regards to isolation and diminishing morals) when encouraging violence, and it should also include exposure and rehumanising. Therefore, suggesting that this approach is much more likely to be effective, as a way of countering ideological viewpoints (Lankford and Gillespie 2011).

Ultimately, this report finds that there is very little evidence on what works or what does not. This section has focused on the challenges to producing that evidence, in an effort to illustrate why there is little data to highlight for this research question.

## 4. Conditions Promoting or Hindering Success

Due to the lack of enough evidence for each intervention type to truly generalise which conditions support or impede success, this section focuses instead on which conditions were estimated to contribute to or hinder success within each study.

### Intervention Context

Some of the reviewed papers discuss conditions that hinder success explicitly. Marsden (2015) discusses how policies framing the work of probation staff are often based on political context rather than professional judgement, which in her assessment (based on interviews with the staff) can hinder successful reintegration. Several papers highlight the problem regarding a missing policy framework, such as an amnesty policy, due to the politically sensitive nature of rehabilitation. This presents challenges with regards to assessing effectiveness, as well as promotion of defection and disengagement – as countries are hesitant to provide a political space for this conversation to take place.

One paper argues that an obstacle to success in the Dutch programme has been the absence of a whole of government approach. If the different agencies and government actors are not collaborating towards the same objectives with regards to disengagement and rehabilitation, the different parts of the system can work against each other and hinder success (Schuurman and Bakker 2016, Van der Heide and Schuurman 2016).

Another example of where wider contextual and strategic variables influence the success or traction of interventions is analysed by Webber et al. (2017), discussing how the effectiveness attributed to Sri Lanka's disengagement programming was partially linked to the military defeat of the LTTE as an organisation; therefore, leaving former combatants with little alternative to reintegration, due to the high-costs and low-feasibility of further resistance.

In the RELATED studies, Butler (2017) likewise identifies the influence of external variables in conditioning the attitudes of inmates confined to special prison units in Northern Ireland. For instance, “social and political events affected the extent to which prisoners’ families and friends were supportive of extremism, influencing prisoners’ continuing commitment to – and investment in – extremist behaviour.

Also, the appraisal of Nigeria's Operation Safe Corridor by Onapajo and Ozden (2020), highlights the negative consequences that ineffective programmes can have on concurrent peace processes and social trust. They argue that, without integrating recipient communities into the programme, extending training, awareness raising and socioeconomic empowerment, to encourage public buy-in, there is risk of reoccurrence of violence and marginalisation of former combatants.

## Intervention Design

Effectiveness depends on “who”.

An important aspect of the question “what works” must be qualified with a greater clarity, thinking through what works under what conditions and why. As also discussed by Gielen (2017), this requires assessments to consider context, mechanism and outcome – with outcome disaggregated by different beneficiary types – so that it becomes possible to answer, what works for whom? This debate of what works for whom dominates the reintegration literature. The literature highlights the need for clarity on who the intervention is intended for, in order to determine its effect. In other words, there are some programmes for high-level defectors, low-level defectors, victims, etc. Each category is involved in the violent organisation in a different way (Daugherty 2019). Depending on their relationship to the group itself, the disengagement or de-radicalisation intervention must be tailored accordingly – to increase its effect.

Some programmes, such as one in Nigeria, appear to have one approach to low-level defectors and a different one for so called “victims” – which in this study is presented as women and children who have spent time in the Boko Haram controlled areas (Onapajo and Ozden 2020). While the studies have limited evidence with regards to effectiveness, the approach to designing a programme according to the needs of the specific category appears essential. Eckard (2014), for example, argues in her thesis that success or effectiveness for low-level defectors may not apply for high-level defectors, although the literature largely neglects this latter category; therefore, exposing a gap in delineating between different population groups that needs to be addressed. To add to this perspective, Schuurman and Bakker (2016) present evidence that there is a need for an individual assessment of the experience of disengagement, to ascertain effect overall.

Studies from the RELATED category, discussing why individuals join VE groups, highlight the need to consider these dynamics when trying to design a disengagement programme – assuming that there might be a relationship between why people join with why they leave; however, this is not always found to be the case (Horgan 2009). One paper discusses that there is some difference between recruitment in the Global North, as opposed to the Global South. Khalil et al. (2019), studying disengagement from Al Shabaab, highlight the importance of financial incentives in the recruitment of low-level defectors to Al Shabaab – arguing that, for this type of defector, providing support towards livelihood is essential in the process of encouraging defection from Al Shabaab, as poverty and ability to support family are key factors that contributed to their recruitment in the first place.

## Implementation

Closely related to the above discussion of context and design factors promoting success of implementations, careful consideration must be included of how an intervention will prepare individuals for reintegration into the communities following their exit from a rehabilitation centre, prison or military internment camp.

Background studies (RAND 2012, ICSR 2010) found that programmes implemented by government agencies in Muslim majority countries have a greater focus on ideological rehabilitation. These interventions often focus on correcting the individual’s perspective towards a state sanctioned interpretation.<sup>5</sup> It is assumed that this will enable reintegration and reduce the risk of recidivism post-release (RAND 2010). This is in stark contrast to, for example, the Dutch and Australian approaches that are more holistic (i.e., include social, psychological, etc. interventions based on identified needs) and only include ideology in individual plans, if identified as important (Cherney and Belton 2019, Van der Heide and Schuurman 2016).

The processes of rehabilitation, discussed in the higher-quality studies, consider individual needs and, from a pragmatic and dynamic perspective, seek to bolster critical thinking, re-development of social networks, peer groups, education and life skills – all to contribute to possible reintegration (Marsden 2015). Conclusions across the studies include an acknowledgement that the field has limited empirical evidence, more research is needed, and better frameworks must

<sup>5</sup> The extent of this approach varies between the countries (Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Indonesia in particular).

be developed. At the same time, there is agreement that highly specialised practitioners are the key to success in supporting the individuals towards a reintegration process that works for them in a pragmatic and dynamic way.

One thing to note is that the approaches, which are seemingly most effective (albeit on the basis of limited evidence), are resource intensive and undertaken in contexts where the state often plays a more holistic role across the different intervention areas. Integrated approaches will likely pose other challenges in contexts limited by resources.

## 5. Underpinning Assumptions

None of the papers go into detail about the assumptions underpinning the programmes, but it is possible to derive some assumptions from the stated outcomes and objectives. As an example, if a programme stipulates that it is seeking to counter the ideological views of prisoners, which a number of reviewed programmes (particularly the PRAC programme in Saudi Arabia) do, it must be assumed that ideology is considered as a key obstacle to rehabilitating the individual (Lankford and Gillespie 2011, Eckard 2014, Alsubai 2016). In contrast, a number of the northern European studies (Van der Heide and Schuurman 2016, Daugherty 2019, Bin Hassan 2019) put more emphasis on socio-economic and psycho-social rehabilitation rather than ideological, implicitly assuming that ideology is not always an essential part of rehabilitation – or perhaps an area that the state is uncomfortable engaging with.

Another assumption, touched upon elsewhere in this paper, is more conceptual and relates to the process of disengagement – it assumes that there is a process from disengagement that leads to de-radicalisation, then to rehabilitation, then to reintegration. As Horgan (2009) has argued, the process is not necessarily linear, and this assumed linearity must be challenged in the design of disengagement and rehabilitation interventions. As such, it is essential for practitioners to continue learning from academic analysis and vice versa, as at times learning from doing might be as informative as studies informing the premise for intervention.

## 6. Knowledge Gaps

Based on this assessment of the FOCUS and RELATED literature, it is evident that there are extensive knowledge gaps with regards to the reintegration of disengaged violent extremists. There is significantly more available evidence from prison contexts than from centre-based disengagement programmes, and within disengagement programmes there is only literature available from programmes with so called low-level defectors. The interventions are led by governments, or in some cases directed by governments, and are associated with high-sensitivity. Therefore, there is a tendency for limited external evaluation in the literature, in particular with regards to programmes in the Global South. However, globally there is very limited access to data and willingness to allow for data collection in the programmes, as well as publication of data findings.

To strengthen the evidence base and knowledge gaps, with regard to reintegration, key recommendations based on this assessment include:

- There is a need to acknowledge the limitations of empirical data collection, but still strive towards greater rigour and innovative approaches – to generate more learning and evidence to inform further programming and evaluations.
- There is a tendency to have certain disciplines, such as psychology and political science, leading the field. In conducting future evaluations there is a need for diverse teams and approaches, for assessments to be more comprehensive and cross-disciplinary.
- There is a need to invest in post-exit data collection, but to take a step away from measuring only recidivism and include other reintegration factors – such as economic, social and political reintegration – in relation to the wider context.

- For centre-based disengagement specifically, there is a need to find ways of measuring the relationship between disengagement processes and increased defection rates, as an additional impact measure recognising that disengagement efforts are only one component of a broad terrorism prevention and management approach.
- There is a need for evaluations to be more nuanced and detailed in their assessments of conditions for success, as well as further articulating the assumptions or theory of change underpinning the interventions.
- There is a need for a greater articulation in evaluations about who is being reintegrated, what role they have played in the violent organisation and a consideration of individual rehabilitation needs.
- There is a need for articulation and discussion of the victim category. If victims are also included and identified to be important in reintegration approaches (this is in particular the case in Nigeria in the current literature, but will also be the case in Syria and Iraq in the future), then there is a need to clearly define what success in their reintegration process is aiming for.
- There is a need to invest in greater documentation of what does not work,
- There is a need for considering case management and individual plans, as a way of measuring effectiveness at the individual level.
- There is a need for greater disaggregated analysis of different intervention components, such as the provision of financial and/or material support, provision of psychological support and mentoring, provision of education and/or vocational training to support reintegration.

These evidence gaps could inform where additional emphasis should be placed in future programmes.

Some of these same gaps have also been raised in the RELATED context of disengagement and rehabilitation of gang members and/or delinquents and criminals. A RAND literature review, which focuses on the transferability of evaluation methods from the gang-related to the counter-extremism spaces, indicates that evaluations of gang related interventions are ahead due to multiple factors (Davies et al. 2017). As gang-related research has been around longer and the field has made the switch from theory generation to theory testing over the last 20 years, they have already switched to placing more emphasis on experimental or quasi-experimental forms of measurement (Davies et al. 2017). While this should not devalue qualitative measurement, more empirical analysis is needed to determine what is effective and therefore improve programming focussing on reintegration of violent extremists. This report also emphasises the importance of independent evaluations and measurement of success indicators (Davies et al. 2017). Although, this is potentially easier to accomplish in the gang or criminal disengagement spaces, as there is easier/more readily available access to police statistics on crime activity rates than in many contexts of VE where relative rates of incidence are lower and governments tend to be more defensive of their data. Increased reliance on a wider range of evaluation methods and triangulation of data where possible could help to improve the evidence base for reintegration programming.

Additionally, there are two other reviews which address types of programming from the primary RELATED gang/criminal space. These could be helpful guidance for reintegration programming, with further testing. In the disengagement space, mentorship programmes were tested and found to have positive and statistically significant effectiveness. A Campbell systematic review found a relatively significant number of evaluations which met their criteria for evidence; and, therefore, were able to indicate that this is a method with more potential for positive impact than many other types of intervention used in this space (Tolan et al. 2013). This study also indicates that mentorship programmes are more successful when the mentors are using the programme as a professional development tool, and when emotional support and advocacy elements are included for the mentees. The programmes reviewed in this study included a wide range of activities, as part of highly tailored programming (Tolan et al. 2013). This is in line with the findings from the FOCUS part of this review. Another study by Lipsey and Cullen (2007) emphasises the importance of rehabilitation programming. They reviewed multiple systematic reviews of programming evaluations and indicate positive results for effectiveness of these types of programmes. Whereas, sanction or supervision focused programmes do not show the same positive result, even sometimes contributing to increasing reoffence rates. This requires commitment on the

behalf of governments to putting more resources into correctional strategies, and a reframing of the way that policy makers and practitioners look at the issue of rehabilitation and reintegration.

## 7. Conclusions

In conclusion, the review of the existing literature has underlined how limited the written and available knowledge base to inform good practice is. Authors of the reviewed papers argue that this is because it is a new field; thus, data to inform analysis is hard to access and produce. Also, that many interventions are led by governments, which is associated with a degree of sensitivity. That said, knowledge might be available in a different form, which could be utilised through consultations and experience amongst practitioners.

It is evident that the field is still emerging and developing greater conceptual clarity, but simultaneously that the approaches are highly contextual and political parts of wider national CT strategies. This impacts what success looks like. For example, does it mean: leaving the groups; social, economic and/or political reintegration; or advocating against the group are essential for understanding effectiveness in a specific context? These conceptual challenges and data limitations severely limit what is currently available as evidence.

Therefore, some experiences from related fields, such as literature on gang disengagement might be helpful to utilise. This field is more mature in its evaluative techniques and has moved to testing interventions more robustly. Mentorship particularly appears to be an intervention area with some positive results. However, the design of mentorship interventions is critical and must be tailored according to individual needs. Mentorship could be tested both during incarceration and subsequently during probation and reintegration into society.

Violent extremist organisations keep evolving and so must the responses from a rehabilitation and reintegration perspective. Additionally, there are still significant gaps in the data. As an example, current rehabilitation programmes discussed in the reviewed literature mostly focussed on working with men in violent organisations, it was only in Nigeria that interventions focussing on women and children were discussed to some extent. With the global trends in violent extremist organisations shifting, there will be a future need to also study disengagement of namely women and minors, and consider specific rehabilitation initiatives focussing on these categories.

What literature/evidence is available can inform programmes in designing individual interventions addressing needs and concerns for each individual. It clearly suggests the need for measuring impact in more diverse ways than purely recidivism, including assessing impact in relation to the wider context in the specific setting. Also, the need for designing programmes in such a way that they can measure the effect of programme components separately, as well as together – to understand the relationship between the sum and the parts.

Finally, work in prisons dominates the literature, but can only to some degree be transferred to centre or community contexts. There is a significant need in the literature to be more explicit about the incentives or disincentives associated with joining or not joining rehabilitation efforts, to more comprehensively to establish effectiveness and impact of the interventions.

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# Annex A: List of Interventions

## More-Relevant Evidence

### 1. Reintegrating Terrorists in the Netherlands: Evaluating the Dutch Approach

By Liesbeth Van der Heide and Bart Schuurman

Project and Implementor	The project is a specialised reintegration initiative within the Dutch Probation Service focused on individuals convicted or suspected of involvement in terrorism implemented by 'team TER' (Terrorism, Extremism and Radicalisation) within the Dutch Probation Service (RN) in partnership with the Dutch National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV), the National Support Centre for Extremism and the municipalities of Amsterdam, Den Bosch and Venray.
Intervention Method	<p>Team TER has two primary tasks: assessing and reporting on recidivism risk and suggesting strategies to minimise it, and supervising clients to put these mitigation strategies into practice. This involves building a strong relationship with participating inmates and offering alternatives to extremism through a combination of incentives and prohibitions (e.g., encouraging clients to enrol in vocational training and apply for internships) – opportunities that will strengthen their prospects in the job market following their release and 'provide alternative sources of self-esteem'. Beneficiaries are banned from meeting former associates or accessing extremist content online. The team's 'de-radicalisation' efforts are underpinned by a 'narrative approach', which assumes that engaging clients a discussion about their convictions can create openings for subtly challenging their ideological leanings and worldview. This is described somewhat ambiguously in the study: the aim is not to 'change ideas per se' but to prioritise identity formation, critical thinking and 'focus on a different future perspective... with the hope that someone ends up with a different 'flow'.' Over time, participants may 'begin to question the foundations of views that legitimize and encourage the use of violence'.</p> <p>Importantly, Team TER does not consider behavioural outcomes (disengagement) as contingent on de-radicalisation: they are discrete, albeit overlapping tracks, which feed into the goal of 'recidivism prevention' and are deployed when necessary to fit the needs and specificities of an individual client.</p>
Location	Amsterdam, Den Bosch and Venray in the Kingdom of the Netherlands
Target Population(s)	Individuals convicted or suspected of involvement in terrorism-related criminal offences.
Intended Outcome	Based on improving the reintegration of extremist offenders in the Netherlands by: expanding efforts to reintegrate terrorist prisoners while still in detention, provide better aftercare following their release from custody, and a 'create a central and coordinated approach for dealing with this offender class in the future'.
Quality Assessment of the paper (i.e., Not the intervention)	The study is a result of a 27-month evaluation involving multiple rounds of interviews with team TER staff and partner agencies such as the Dutch police and public prosecution service. However, as the authors acknowledge, recidivism remains a problematic metric for assessing programmatic outcomes, and there appears to be little analysis of beneficiary opinion or personal experiences. Being in a peer reviewed journal the study references the wider academic literature.
Evidence of Effectiveness	It appears team TER seems to have been effective at achieving the goal of minimising terrorism-related recidivism. Of the 189 clients that the team supervised between 2012 and 2018, eight showed terrorism-related recidivism, a far lower rate to comparable trends of other inmates. However, the study acknowledges that only those clients under RN

	supervision were tracked and counted under the recidivism measure, and many of these 189 clients had not yet completed their supervisory periods at the time this research was completed. A prominent theme in this evaluation is that "opportunities for objectively quantifying success through a) standardized assessments of client's terrorism-related recidivism risk or b) tracking their (terrorism-related) recidivism are present but not utilized or only partially so". Team TER's own views also vary in terms of what 'success' looks like and how it should be identified and measured in practice. "In the absence of more objective metrics, the degree to which a client is deemed at risk of recidivism is assessed based on the professional expertise of the RN staff conducting the assessment and supervision", although they do subscribe to fairly similar general principles.
Evidence of Impact	The evaluation concludes that 'team TER's work appears to be successful when judged by the low recidivism-rates among clients who are still on probation or parole - this is a very important qualification, however, as the lack of data on whether clients recidivate after RN stops monitoring them is crucial to ascertaining whether the program is able to achieve longer-term success.'
Lessons Learned	The results suggest that the initiative is based on a sound understanding of how and why individuals may deradicalize or disengage from terrorism behaviourally, but that it continues to face serious challenges in terms of accurately defining success and systematically gathering objective indicators of its attainment. The authors also conclude that behavioural aspects of programming e.g., assistance with sourcing employment or accommodation is both 'more successful and easier to assess' compared to the impact of ideological or theological interventions.

## 2. Conceptualising 'success' with those convicted of terrorism offences: Aims, methods, and barriers to reintegration

By Sarah Marsden

Project and Implementor	The paper explores probation processes for probationers convicted of crimes associated with violent political ideology.
Intervention Method	Pragmatic probation support
Location	UK
Target Population(s)	Probationers convicted of crimes associated with violent political ideology
Intended Outcome	The argument in the article is that the outcome of the intervention is not clear but that the practitioners are managing it pragmatically.
Quality Assessment of the paper (i.e., Not the intervention)	The author based her paper on qualitative interviews with staff and supervisors, they were conducted under high ethical standards. The paper recognises the limitations in terms of not having included direct interviews with probationers themselves and highlights the limitations to the study from that perspective. The paper engages with the existing literature and places itself clearly in the knowledge base. The paper is peer reviewed.
Evidence of Effectiveness	Based on interviews with probation staff the paper has found that in absence of a framework, probation staff are managing in a pragmatic way in their daily work. She argues that the staff in practice are applying a framework which has a focus on de-risking but not in a conventional sense, the focus is on critical thinking, social networks, peer groups, education and life skills all to contribute to a possible reintegration. What this looks like can also be diverse including no reoffending, engagement in civil society, broader identity and finally alternative ways of responding to grievance.
Evidence of Impact	Not presented and deliberately argued that without a framework for success this cannot be established. The paper discusses the lack of policy and legal clarity of what success looks like, if it is attitudes, behaviour, disengagement or de-radicalisation till further clarity has been articulated impact and effectiveness will not be possible to measure.

Lessons Learned	There is an acknowledgement that stigma and policies that can hinder success, this includes for example restrictions of movement and that probationers are not allowed to use electronics. Conditions that promote or hinder success, appears to be relating to the quality of the staff and the guidance and frameworks offered to them.
Comments	It is discussed how legal limitations to the life of probationers such as freedom of movement, no access to electronics and curfews impact their process and the relationship with the probation staff. Conclusions include that the field has limited empirical evidence, needs more research, that useful frameworks are to be established (and has been in follow up articles) but that practitioners find ways pf promoting agency-based processes supporting the probationers towards a reintegration process that works for them in a pragmatic and dynamic way.

### 3. Deradicalisation and Disengagement: Exit Programs in Norway and Sweden and Addressing Neo-Nazi Extremism By Casie Daugherty

Project and Implementor	Norway: Project Exit – Leaving Violent Youth Groups (the first parental network was established in 1995 with the help of a unit from Manglerud police department, which formed the basis of subsequent formal programming. This later involved the government-backed Interdisciplinary Advisory Service for Local Action Against Racism and Xenophobia, financial sponsorship from the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Children and the Directorate of Immigration, and was hosted by Adults for Children a non-governmental organisation (NGO)). Exit Sweden (involving Fryshuset, a Swedish NGO, and Kent Lindahl, a former neo-Nazi – and there continued to be ongoing communication with stakeholders in Norway’s EXIT programming).
Intervention Method	In Norway, practitioners relied on parental support networks and proactive 'empowerment conversations' by professionals to tackle youth focused XRW membership. Crucially it did not engage on an ideological level but addressed the wider factors contributing to recruitment and sought to share best practice across frontline stakeholders such as teachers, counsellors, social workers, and police. In contrast, Sweden had to grapple with a more experienced and larger XRW movement and remained rather reactive, working with individuals reaching out for help disengaging. A large proportion of the EXIT leadership were also 'formers', which was described as granting the programme greater access and credibility. The approach revolved around five key steps (motivation, disengagement, settling, reflection, and stabilisation), although these were dynamic and non-linear to reflect the eclectic experiences of each beneficiary. The process was driven by a 'coach' who built a relationship with participants and guided them through each stage. Ancillary services (outside the five steps), including parental support and capacity building schemes were provided where necessary - by 2001 Exit Sweden had supplied resources or conducted lectures on 179 occasions, of which 63% were at institutions of higher education. A second Swedish Exit programme emerged in Motala (in 1999), which engaged marginalised young immigrants and asylum seekers from violent groups, promoting democratic principles and combating racism and marginalisation (and therefore intervening on an ideological level).
Location	Norway and Sweden
Target Population(s)	Norway EXIT: at risk or radicalised young people Sweden EXIT: members of far-right organisations looking to defect/leave Exit Motala: members far-right outfits and marginalised young immigrants and asylum seekers involved in violent groups.
Intended Outcome	Norway: aiding and supporting youth wanting to disengage from extremist groups, supporting parents whose children were involved in far-right groups (including the creation and maintenance of local parental support networks), and developing best practice on how to disseminate information to frontline or key stakeholders and best engage 'at risk' youths.

	Sweden: while the Swedish model shared the same goals of de-radicalisation and disengagement espoused by EXIT Norway, it also sought to facilitate exit from violent groups (rather than proactive outreach) and satisfy the practical, social and emotional needs of its participants.
Quality Assessment of the paper (i.e., Not the intervention)	The study largely relies on secondary sources but uses government data where possible. If information was only available in media reports, these were cross referenced to corroborate the data in 'multiple reliable sources'. However, there were limitations: beneficiary perspectives were almost entirely absent and statistical data was heavily regulated, especially in Sweden. In both cases it was almost impossible to trace (most) participants once they left the programme, constricting the timeframes for assessment.
Evidence of Effectiveness	The Norwegian model was considered a success by the government - while data is limited it does indicate positive outcomes and a disengagement and de-radicalisation rate of 82% (based on participants leaving extreme groups and living 'relatively normal lives'). However, the programme was far less effective when targeting older extremists, a serious problem given Norway's far right fringe has become dominated by adults. Likewise, evaluations of EXIT Sweden are generally positive: 125 of 133 individuals processed (to varying stages) through the programme left far right groups - a 94% success rate. However, the authors highlight five individuals included in this tally who had only been involved in the programme for less than one month, making it 'difficult to truly say that they have completely disengaged and deradicalized' or to determine how far EXIT programming contributed to the process.
Evidence of Impact	While evaluation data suggests that both programmes were 'demonstrably successful in addressing de-radicalisation and disengagement for their targeted populations with high success rates', more information is necessary to understand whether this effectiveness was sustained over time. In 2008 a second review was conducted of EXIT Sweden (10 years after its launch): of approx. 600 individuals engaged, only two were known to have returned to an extreme right-wing movement. However, data is limited due to Sweden's Personal Data Act, making it difficult to trace participants. Similarly, information on what happened to Norwegian EXIT's beneficiaries is 'virtually non-existent'.
Lessons Learned	Study cites the importance of addressing 'al needs – mental and physical' of people departing from extremist groups. 'Empowerment conversations' in Norway appeared particularly effective, helping stakeholders (initially police and then other professionals e.g., social workers and teachers) focus on promoting a positive view of self, and understand and persuade rather than to punish. Many young people were identified as trying to find friendship and belonging, and these discussions provide an opportunity to explore alternatives and encourage 'the reorientation and alternation of behaviour'. There are also significant differences in the structure and process of the Norwegian and Swedish models, due in part to their personnel. The former leveraged professionals alongside family and parental networks. In contrast, the Swedish experience included formers but was hampered by high turnover rates amongst the staff. Referencing a BRA evaluation of the programme in 2001, the study explains 'turnover of this magnitude is not unusual for an organization "established by committed enthusiasts" and that their administrative inexperience is often the cause"'.

#### 4. Evaluating interventions to disengage extremist offenders: a study of the proactive integrated support model (PRISM)

By Adrian Cherney

Project and Implementor	PRISM, a pilot intervention delivered by the Corrective Services of New South Wales, Australia (specifically, a team of psychologists working in partnership with a religious support officer – Muslim Chaplain/Imam – Services and Programs Officers, allied health professionals and other agencies identified for involvement in an individual's intervention plan.
Intervention Method	Launched in 2016, PRISM is an intervention designed to engage prisoners either at risk of radicalisation or convicted of terrorist offences, addressing psychological, social, theological and ideological issues as necessary to redirect the participants away from extremism and help them

	transition out of custody. Engagement begins two years before an inmate’s earliest release date, is entirely voluntary and has no fixed template, allowing its activities to reflect the needs and idiosyncrasies of each participant. Treatment plans can focus on identity conflict, moderating religious views, avoiding extremist associations, encouraging positive family engagement, providing religious mentoring, preparation to help secure work when released, and tackling drug use or mental health issues, alongside providing psychological services, encouraging positive family engagement (to repair relationships and lay the groundwork for a viable support network following an inmate’s release) and cognitive behavioural therapy. Where necessary the ideological component of VE is addressed as part of the intervention plan e.g., promoting a more plural and detailed understanding of Islam for Muslim clients. The promotion of disengagement therefore ‘requires efforts to shift the ways in which Muslim offenders think about and engage with their religion. However, this does not mean that Muslim participants have to abandon some of their key religious beliefs’.
Location	New South Wales, Australia
Target Population(s)	Prison inmates who have a conviction for terrorism offences or have been identified as at risk of radicalisation while incarcerated – the demographic composition is largely Muslim, but this is framed as more circumstance than design.
Intended Outcome	The study describes PRISM as a (voluntary) support service that aims to ‘redirect them away from extremism and help them transition out of custody after completing their sentence. This is achieved through individually tailored intervention plans, the content of which can vary given the needs of offenders.’
Quality Assessment of the paper (i.e., Not the intervention)	The methodology is primarily ethnographic, drawing on ‘knowledgeable informants’ from 55 interviews with programme staff and clients, and integrating elements of process evaluation given its examination of PRISM’s design, content and implementation, as well as staff and client interactions and responses to the intervention. However, for a clear insight into impact the authors explicitly cite the need for data aggregation and opportunities to track participants over time – the information only captures PRISM’s early operations over a relatively short time-frame and does not provide longitudinal assessments of progress. Due to the heterogeneity in composition, duration, and levels of intensity between each treatment plan, the authors also concede it is difficult to ‘untangle the relative influence of different components of the intervention on an offender’s disengagement’.
Evidence of Effectiveness	PRISM’s clients reported a range of beneficial outcomes from participating in the scheme, from increasing participant’s own understanding of their radicalisation through to helping them cope with their time in custody and better preparing for their release.’
Evidence of Impact	Given the study was conducted relatively early into PRISM’s roll-out a longer-term assessment of impact is not available.
Lessons Learned	It is important to ensure each support plan is tailored to the needs and motivations of individual clients. This was particularly relevant in NSW where correctional authorities identified a split between older ‘Al Qaeda’ prisoners that tend to be more ideological, and a younger IS cohort seen as impulsive, with little religious understanding and greater engagement in petty crime – requiring different approaches and priorities.

### 5. Evaluating Case-Managed Approaches to Counter and Violent Extremism: An Example of the Proactive Integrated Support Model (PRISM) Intervention

By Adrian Cherney and Emma Belton

Project and Implementor	Proactive Integrated Support Model (PRISM), a pilot intervention delivered by the Corrective Services of New South Wales, Australia.
Intervention Method	See description of PRISM above.

Location	New South Wales, Australia
Target Population(s)	See description of PRISM above.
Intended Outcome	See description of PRISM above.
Quality Assessment of the paper (i.e., Not the intervention)	<p>This article draws on Cherney’s initial assessment of PRISM but forms part of a second, larger evaluation study by providing data on the background of clients and their changes over time in relation to their intervention goals. The authors draw on ‘RADAR need and risk assessment’ case notes compiled by programme staff to quantitatively measure the impact of PRISM across various indicators of disengagement (a reported change, no change and unsure of change). While not specific to PRISM, RADAR is a ‘CVE tool developed by a team of Australian researchers to assess client risks and needs across several domains and helps guide the development of intervention goals.’ Using the case notes, Cherney and Belton tracked and coded progress (or a lack thereof) against several criteria including: any reported notes on a change in attitude/beliefs or identification of reintegration goals; improvements in psychological coping skills; moderation of extremist beliefs; rejection of extremist groups; identification of the influence of negative associates; actions involving distancing from associates; recognition of seriousness of offense; acceptance and working toward pro-social activities. The selection of these criteria was based on both the wider disengagement literature and from interviews with 38 PRISM staff.</p> <p>Case notes do not necessarily provide good data for quantitative analysis as they may be subjective or biased, but different PRISM stakeholders contributed to each set of notes so this could mitigate such risks. Despite providing a rich source of information spanning numerous client engagements, the content and quality also varied. The PRISM cohort was relatively small, increasing the risk of overinflating ‘success’, although the coding process remained ‘conservative and statistically valid’. More broadly, the results could be considered ‘throughputs’ rather than outcomes, however the authors argue their metrics capture both behavioural and cognitive indicators of disengagement as manifested during different periods of client participation. It also excludes recidivism rates given the narrow timeframes used in the study.</p>
Evidence of Effectiveness	The analysis suggests that length of engagement appears to correlate with disengagement (change) i.e., ‘the more often a person is engaged in PRISM over time the more likely they are to display attitudes and behaviours associated with disengagement’ (the authors caveat this does not test for, or imply, causation). While the study did not focus on recidivism, arguing the time-frames were too short to measure accurately/effectively, 8 of 14 PRISM clients included in the assessment were released on parole, with none having committed an extremist related act (although they did commit a few predictable minor parole violations). Over time, the analysis does indicate participants in PRISM are demonstrating change in relation to the indicators of disengagement developed by the authors, but further evidence of effectiveness is limited.
Evidence of Impact	Recidivism rates and longer-term impact was not captured in the study
Lessons Learned	The study acknowledges that as PRISM is an in-custody programme it remains unclear whether the same benefits and outcomes could be produced by other ‘case-managed interventions run in the community’.

## 6. Reintegrating jihadist extremists: evaluating a Dutch initiative, 2013–2014

By Bart Schuurman and Edwin Bakker

Project and Implementor	Reintegration led by Dutch National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) and the Dutch Probation Service (RN).
Intervention Method	The programme sought to focus on both disengagement and de-radicalisation, although they were often referenced as ‘detaching’ clients from extremist ideas and social circles. Disengagement was

	<p>conducted with RN assistance in finding participants work, schooling, income, housing, dealing with psychological problems and reconciliation with family members. In relation to de-radicalisation, NCTV relied on what Braddock (2014) termed a ‘talking cure’ e.g., discussing client’s convictions and interjecting alternative, non-extremist religious interpretations to encourage a moderation of views over time. This was led by intervention coaches – external consultants with expertise and experience talking to jihadists and capable of building up a trusting relationship.</p>
Location	Netherlands
Target Population(s)	<p>Participants fell into two categories: detainees either serving prison sentences for terrorism related offenses or individuals suspected by the Dutch authorities of involvement in such activities who were about to be released on parole. It also included clients released on probation. As the study states, all participants ‘adhered to an extremist interpretation of Islam commonly designed as Salafi Jihadism’.</p>
Intended Outcome	<p>This programme was designed to 'improve efforts made to reintegrate terrorist prisoners while still in detention; provide better aftercare upon their release; create a central and coordinated approach for dealing with this offender class in the future'. Implicitly, the programme reflected and internalised distinctions between disengagement and de-radicalisation - the majority of the project staff's efforts were focused on 'practical, social and cognitive aspects of disengagement, such as helping their clients find housing, assisting their re-entry into family life and giving them a renewed sense of purpose through work or educational pursuits'. As the study highlights, 'only when RN staff deemed such reintegration efforts to have shown sufficient progress, did they consider using cognitive interventions to initiate a de-radicalisation process'. The programme also sought to expand the government’s capacity to monitor offenders following their release or during suspected provisional detention (through the imposition of mandatory oversight by the RN); and strengthening prevention focused elements of the government’s ‘counterterrorism tool kit’.</p> <p>More specifically, success was seen as a ‘client who did not re-offend and who abided by the conditions for parole or probation’. This primarily focused on disengagement, with de-radicalisation acting as an additional, reinforcing component.</p>
Quality Assessment of the paper (i.e., Not the intervention)	<p>The study draws on primary data collected from RN employees and programme stakeholders, although no interviews were conducted with clients themselves, restricting any understanding of their experience or perspective. Crucially, as control-groups were not available (or potentially even ethical in this case) the authors had to rely on RN and NCTV staff's perception of the effectiveness of the measures taken rather than any objective or clear-cut empirical metrics. As the authors conclude: 'Without a control group of extremists and terrorists who are subjected only to “regular” reintegration oversight by RN, researchers will be hard put to assess if and to what degree particular interventions are effective at reducing the likeliness of recidivism.' Long term analysis was also constrained given the project was essentially still in its early phases when the evaluation was concluded. Nevertheless, the study offers a useful insight into the programme’s underlying assumptions and process of delivery.</p>
Evidence of Effectiveness	<p>During the period of study, it remained unclear how many external consultants – or intervention coaches – were conducting interventions, leading to difficulties assessing their efficacy, and even lead to allegations of fraud in the media. Nevertheless, the underlying assumptions framing the process were ‘assessed to be sound’. In study’s impact evaluation of the programme, it was not possible to conclusively answer how far the first goal (reducing recidivism among extremist and terrorist offenders) had been achieved. RN employees interviewed for this project were supervising the reintegration of five clients – two were unsuccessful as they left to fight in Syria, tentative progress has been made with the remaining three, but 'reaching a more conclusive verdict on the program’s effectiveness will require continued monitoring'. However, the study described the reintegration project as showing ‘promise’ in several areas of design and implementation, including an intensive one-on-one approach, allowing them to tailor their work to an individual’s particular needs and build trust, which ‘on paper’ increased the likeliness of identifying a deceptive behaviour. Yet various</p>

	factors undercut the project's organisational implementation and effectiveness. This included various capacity issues and inadequate managerial support, alongside an 'imperfect working relationship between the project's RN employees and other stakeholders in the reintegration process, such as municipal governments and, above all, public prosecutors'. As the authors summarise, it was 'too early to conclusively assess the project's efficacy' when this study was conducted. None of the clients had yet completed the reintegration process or fully progressed through the cognitive interventions intended to bring about de-radicalisation'.
Evidence of Impact	The study concedes it is unclear what a reasonable baseline success ratio looks like in relation to recidivism as some participants did travel to Syria but the recidivism rate among 'regular' detainees in the Netherlands is around 50%. It appears to be too early in the process to comprehensively assess impact.
Lessons Learned	Cooperation was a significant problem in the programme's delivery. As a multidimensional intervention involving numerous stakeholders, a lack of communication and coordination between, for example, the RN and municipal authorities, disrupted reintegration efforts. External variables such as new legislation also inhibited the process e.g., the passage of the Regulation on Sanctions for the Suppression of Terrorism retracted participants' ability to accomplish basic tasks like opening a bank account once they were released.

## Less-Relevant Evidence

### 7. De-Radicalising Prisoners in Nigeria: Developing a Basic Prison Based De-Radicalisation Programme By Barkindo, A.

Project and Implementor	Pilot de-radicalisation and disengagement programme was developed and implemented in Kuje medium security prison by The Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA) and the Nigerian Prison Service (NPS)
Intervention Method	The prison-based pilot intervention comprised four stages: engagement, risk assessment, needs assessment and interventions/response such motivational interviewing, vocational training/work experience, educational and cultural activities, art therapy, sport, religious discussion, and psychological and counselling sessions. This was delivered to a diverse cohort of prisoners: while the majority of which were considered 'low level', it also featured various 'highly radicalised, influential and powerful' individuals exercising a degree of charismatic leadership.
Location	Kuje, Nigeria
Target Population(s)	Convicted and pre-trial prisoners
Intended Outcome	The programme focuses on de-radicalisation with the ONSA describing the goal as changing the 'beliefs, views, values and attitudes of the violent extremist prisoners (de-radicalisation) rather than changing their behaviour (disengagement from violence)'. The priority is therefore transforming extremist beliefs 'as well as ensuring that prisoners renounced the use of violence to achieve their objectives'.
Quality Assessment of the paper (i.e., Not the intervention)	The quality of this study is limited. Although insights were provided by review sessions with members of the Treatment Team and Treatment Management Team, and alleged members of Boko Haram, the authors were themselves involved in the project's inception and initial implementation, introducing a potential bias. Importantly, the analytical timeframes were also rather narrow, meaning little evidence was collected of outcome-level effects. The results that were collated are almost exclusively anecdotal. Generally, the article serves as a descriptive account of the project's development and its various modalities and activities, rather than an evaluation. It is not possible to generalise findings based on this study.
Evidence of Effectiveness	The results were described as positive with anecdotal examples of constructive dialogue and gradual buy in from participants; however, the findings were caveated by the preliminary nature of the

	programme, and there was no 'real' feedback from the judiciary or enumerated impact on sentencing and prison terms.
Evidence of Impact	Limited evidence at this level, partly as the analysis was conducted in the early stages of a pilot intervention.
Comments	The pilot intervention is integrated in the wider CT strategy, acknowledging that there are various components to the work against VE in Nigeria.

8. The Cost of Defection: The Consequences of Quitting Al Shabaab  
By Christian Taylor, Tanner Semmelrock and Alexandra McDermott

Project and Implementor	Bay Ministry of Disarmament, Rehabilitation and Reintegration
Intervention Method	The process of disengagement includes religious rehabilitation, vocational training, trauma counselling and post-exit financial reintegration support.
Location	Baidoa, Somalia
Target Population(s)	Low level defectors
Intended Outcome	Not stated in paper, however in broad terms the intended outcome of the intervention appears to be de-radicalisation and disengagement. The authors describe the facilities as 'Disarmament, Rehabilitation and Reintegration' centres, which are administered under the umbrella of the Somali National Programme for the Treatment and Handling of Disengaging Combatants. The article elaborates: 'we suspect the term rehabilitation is used instead of demobilisation [when substituting DDR with DRR] because the program is aimed at rehabilitating individual disengaged combatants of Al-Shabaab rather than a mass group demobilisation agenda'.
Quality Assessment of the paper (i.e., Not the intervention)	The paper is set out to study defection from Al-Shabaab in Somalia rather than a particular intervention, although the site of the research is a defection centre. It outlines operations conducted by a facility run by IOM and the Bay Ministry for DRR, however, the findings are largely based on the incentive structures encouraging or dissuading defection, rather than the specific outcomes of DRR interventions. These are referenced anecdotally in interviewee discussions but primarily in relation to a lack of security once the course is complete. While the quality and rigour of the study is high, it offers a limited assessment of intervention effectiveness and impact.
Evidence of Effectiveness	The authors provide important insights into wider contextual and environmental variables that condition both defection and 'successful' reintegration - specifically issues of personal security - however there is relatively little evaluation of Somalia's disengagement programming in terms of either process or outcome. The main features are described, alongside broad, anecdotal evidence for its performance, but there remains a clear gap in relation to detailed programmatic assessment
Evidence of Impact	Limited evidence available at this level (it is not the focus of the paper).
Lessons Learned	Thirty-two disengaged Al-Shabaab combatants were interviewed about their motivations, grievances, needs, and challenges in relation to the recruitment, defection, and post-defection phases. The paper focuses on post-defection challenges, where they found the primary concern to be lack of personal security. As per feedback from participants suggest the four-month mix of 'religious and ideological re-education, trauma counselling and technical training in electrical work, masonry, carpentry and mechanics' is beneficial, as is a \$1,500 lump-sum upon completing the course, but there are major concerns regarding the personal safety of graduates once they leave the centre. State level programming conducted by the South West administration also remains relatively insular, with little complementary investment or support from the federal government.

Comments	While the study is not an evaluation of the programme, it highlights numerous important issues for strengthening knowledge about why individuals join and leave Al Shabaab, how they perceive the process of rehabilitation as well as the exit process towards reintegration.
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9. Mid-Term Evaluation: Reducing Recidivism: A Process for Effective Disengagement of High Risk Prisoners in Indonesia  
By Search for Common Ground (SfCG)

Project and Implementor	Reducing Recidivism: A Process for Effective Disengagement of High-Risk Prisoners in Indonesia implemented by Search for Common Ground and funded by the New Zealand Agency for International Development (NZAID)
Intervention Method	The intervention is essentially a capacity building intervention of personnel in the Directorate General of Corrections (DGC) as well as some direct delivery of vocational training.
Location	LP Tangerang, LP Cipinang and LP Cirebon in Indonesia
Target Population(s)	Various strands of the intervention focused on discrete audiences. A 'train the trainer' approach was conducted to support SfCG's partners including the Directorate General of Corrections and the Technical Implementation Unit, allowing them to then conduct future training/capacity building with 'high risk' prisoners. Violent extremist offenders – those inmates convicted of terrorist offences – were also considered important beneficiaries of the intervention as they would receive conflict management training and life skills training from DGC staff. The evaluation mentions that 55 beneficiaries were engaged with the programme but if there was any shortage in numbers, the shortage was mitigated with the inclusion of other 'non-terrorist' inmates (e.g., those convicted of drug offences etc).
Intended Outcome	The intervention focused on three main objectives to reduce recidivism rates of 'high risk' individuals convicted of terror offences: 1) build the capacity of personnel in the Directorate General of Corrections (DGC) so they could deliver conflict management training (CMT) and life skills training (LST) to prisoners, 2) strengthen the CMT and skillsets of participants so they are better prepared for reintegration following their release, 3) encouraging dialogue between DGC stakeholders to encourage further policies promoting CMT and LST. It therefore relies on a cascading model that assumes strengthening the capacity of DGC staff will allow them to better train high risk prisons (using CMT and LST) and ensure they are prepared for reintegration into society upon their release. Consequently, the overarching goal of the project is to 'reduce the rate of recidivism among high-risk prisoners in Indonesia'. The study defines disengagement in this context as renouncing terrorist activity, not necessarily changing their ideological belief.
Quality Assessment of the paper (i.e., Not the intervention)	The paper is an internal, midterm evaluation and its results are drawn from the preliminary stages of the intervention, introducing relatively narrow timeframes that limit analytical insights. While it includes primary data, the study is not peer reviewed and does not reference existing academic literature.
Evidence of Effectiveness	The mid-term evaluation described the delivery of the disengagement programme as a 'success' and 'well on its way to achieving the expected outcomes', highlighting both prisoners and DGC staff were 'satisfied' with the progress made so far. Examples of effectiveness ascribed to the training include the unprecedented formation of diverse prayer groups and a greater willingness to engage with other inmates and staff. Of the three objectives listed in the study, SfCG describes the strongest outcomes in relation to improving prisoners' prospects of reintegration upon release due to behavioural changes, the learning of new life skills and better anger management.
Evidence of Impact	The study is constrained by the mid-term nature of its content - outcomes and longer-term impact are difficult to identify and the assessment largely relies on examples of 'promising'

	<p>stories. Given the programme primarily focused on capacity building both DGC staff and high-risk prisoners, the metrics do not include a wider appraisal of recidivism rates, making it difficult to monitor its longer-term impact or outcomes.</p>
Lessons Learned	<p>Some of the lessons outlined in the evaluation includes increasing receptivity of prisoners to converse with prison official and other inmates and encouraging greater diversity in prayer sessions. Issues with attendance were also highlighted: informal prison leaders had to approve participation and drop-outs increased if the training coincided with prayer recitals or other religious obligations. A few high-risk prisoners questioned why only specific categories of offender were included in the trainings.</p> <p>Stakeholders (both DGC and prisoners) also thought scheme was too short, especially in relation to vocational training, and some of the training content was 'intangible'. The study recommended additional opportunities for hands on learning and tuition in basic financial planning. Age should likewise be appreciated: older inmates were not always able or inclined to participate in training exercises, especially when led by a younger facilitator, indicating the importance of tailoring courses to better meet the needs, interests and expectations of their audience.</p> <p>The evaluation also briefly references previous training schemes, which identify patriotic or nationalistic content as unpalatable and ineffective in relation to 'religious' extremists. This is not an explicit feature of SfCG's intervention, but it does cite these shortcomings as important lessons for future programming.</p>
Comments	<p>It is important to highlight that the intervention is conducted by an NGO to support the government of Indonesia who is ultimately responsible for the CT programme in the country including wider disengagement and de-radicalisation strategy.</p>

10. Rehabilitating Terrorists Through Counter Indoctrination: Lessons Learned from The Saudi Arabian Program  
By Adam Lankford and Katherine Gillespie

Project and Implementor	The study is a psychological review of how indoctrination work with a look to the Saudi programme implemented by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Intervention Method	The Saudi programme is essentially to indoctrinate VEOs with what the Kingdom sanctions as the 'right' interpretation of the Coran.
Location	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Target Population(s)	Violent Extremist offenders
Intended Outcome	The intended outcome with the Saudi intervention is to change the VEO's ideological position to what the Kingdom understands as the correct position.
Quality Assessment of the paper (i.e., Not the intervention)	There is a substantial review of literature and a structure to the article, discussing AQ as well as how psychology works. It is however less clear when the paper is debating the Saudi programme specifically and highlighting where that evidence has come from. To an extent it is more contextual and highlighting how indoctrination work and therefore in a more ideal perspective arguing how de-indoctrination should work.
Evidence of Effectiveness	The paper argues essentially that the Saudi approach is not effective, because it is not taking into account how indoctrination works. The paper argues that there is so little information about the Saudi programme but that does not mean that it cannot be discussed how indoctrination work in order to think about how to revert indoctrination. It goes over 4 key aspects of indoctrination including isolation, dehumanising, authorization and training. It argues how these 4 components must be understood to be reverted. However, the paper in the end recommends how the best approach is not to indoctrinate, as that is just what VE groups does, and there are tendencies in the Saudi programme to do that. Rather the

	programme should expose the individuals to what the VE groups do with regards to isolation and diminishing morals when encouraging violence, and it should also include exposure and rehumanising.
Evidence of Impact	None
Lessons Learned	The lesson the paper is seeking to establish is that to measure the effect of an 'counter' indoctrination intervention, there is a need to understand how indoctrination works in the first place.
Comments	It is a bit unclear when the paper is discussing an ideal situation and the Saudi programme specifically but there is a thorough analysis of how AQ indoctrinates which is useful as well.

### 11. Non-Military Approach Against Terrorism in Nigeria: Deradicalization Strategies and Challenges in Countering Boko Haram

By Hakeem Onapajo and Kemal Ozden

Project and Implementor	Operation Safe Corridor involving 13 key government agencies (including the Office of the National Security Adviser, the Nigerian Prisons Service, Nigerian Police Force, Department of Security Services, Nigerian Immigration Service, National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, National Emergency Management Agency, National Identity Management Commission, Armed Forces, National Orientation Agency, National Youth Service Corp, National Directorate of Employment and the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps).
Intervention Method	<p>The first incarnation in 2013 under the 'National Security Corridor' had three strands tackling high, medium and low risk defectors. For the latter categories, responses primarily focused on disengagement, rehabilitation and reintegration, although the study suggests there was little impact by 2015. The psychologist leading the programme claimed 22 women and girls were undergoing rehabilitation after voluntarily surrendering, while 305 victims of terrorism had benefited from the scheme and 47 former militants were enrolled.</p> <p>Its successor, Operation Safe Corridor was designed as a multi-sector approach involving 13 government agencies to deradicalize, rehabilitate and reintegrate, and divides defectors between high and low risk categories. The strategy specifically prioritises and engages 'repentant insurgents', delivering a 52-week intensive course based on de-radicalisation therapies, vocational training, basic education, and religious re-education to expedite reintegration processes. It has some similarities to the Niger Delta amnesty programme introduced in 2009, although it only provided a small stipend to graduates to help facilitate their integration, which is dismissed as unlikely to 'last them for a month'. While most of the 'de-radicalisation camps' engage male ex-combatants, the Bulumkutu Rehabilitation Centre (BRC) in Maidugari focuses on women and children, working with 1,300 individuals, in theory, over 8-12 weeks, to facilitate and rehabilitation using vocational training (or basic education for minors), psychosocial therapies and religious programming, before 'handing them over...to their families or village heads' with 'some money' to cater for their return.</p>
Location	Nigeria
Target Population(s)	Primarily 'low risk' members of Boko Haram, and victims of terrorism e.g., women and children 'either captured in the Boko Haram camps or rescued from the group's formerly controlled communities'.
Intended Outcome	The focus is on deradicalizing, rehabilitating and reintegrating defectors. Referencing the wider literature on de-radicalisation and disengagement, Onapajo and Ozden suggest: 'the aim of Nigeria's de-radicalisation program is the total transformation of repentant extremists. The program aims to reintegrate them into society after some rehabilitation exercises in the de-radicalisation camps.'
Quality Assessment of the paper	The study largely relies on secondary literature (media reports, government documents from the Office of the National Security Advisor, and institutional reports from International Crisis Group, Mercy Corps, Amnesty International, International Alert, RAND and Human Rights Watch, alongside relevant journal articles and monographs) to support its claims, and there is no testimony or analysis

(i.e., Not the intervention)	from the 'beneficiaries' themselves. Available data is also limited: government statistics are unreliable at best and Nigeria's weak national identification systems makes it almost impossible to track or monitor graduates once they have left the centres.
Evidence of Effectiveness	While the study acknowledges the government's claims that this process is a success, Onapajo and Ozden are more measured in their conclusions, describing the ambiguity of the results given the difficulties of tracking graduates. In 2018, 254 ex-combatants were 'reintegrated'; in 2019, 132 inmates of BRC were released; and records show that 1803 people have been engaged and 'graduated' in 2016 and 2017. They conclude 'with the enormous problems bedevilling the program, it can be safely argued that much positive outcomes may not be expected and there is a risk of escalating the conflict'.
Evidence of Impact	Limited evidence at the impact level, in part because there still appears to be significant distrust over the process from members of Boko Haram and those communities receiving defectors. The wider inability to track graduates also leaves the sustainability and mid to long term outcomes of these programmes largely unknown.
Lessons Learned	The authors warn of the dangers associated with an unsuccessful de-radicalisation campaign, as it may accelerate recidivism and erode buy in to any future peace process. Similarly, wider challenges potentially impede programme effectiveness such as the hostility ex-combatants experience in their host communities (particularly the ostracism of women and children formerly affiliated with Boko-Haram), and the lack of trust the public has many of state bodies running the programme. The study also recommends paying more attention to recipient communities in the reintegration process, offering psycho-social therapies, religious education and socioeconomic empowerment programmes to those areas 'non-receptive to extremist ideologies.' Reinsertion schemes should also be strengthened, as Onapajo and Ozden conclude, 'the purpose of the program is defeated if there is no successful reintegration after both the former combatants and victims of the terrorist group have undergone processes of de-radicalisation at various camps'.

## 12. Deradicalizing Detained Terrorists

By David Webber, Marina Chernikova, Arie Kruglanski, Michele Gelfand, Malkanthi Hettiarachchi, Rohan Gunaratna, Marc-Andre Lafreniere, Jocelyn Belanger

Project and Implementor	Government run 'Sri Lanka Rehabilitation Programme'
Intervention Method	The programme is largely based on the Singaporean model that goes beyond 'ideological argumentation' and emphasises the 'psychological empowerment of detainees', strengthening their capabilities through vocational and educational schemes and facilitating their transition back into society. Launched in 2008, the programme tries to apply 'best practice' to the Sri Lankan context, developing a rehabilitation curriculum composed of seven different programs: educational, vocational, psychological, spiritual, recreational, cultural/family, and community. Those participants under the age of 18 received formal education in residential schools and adults were offered classes in mathematics, reading, and writing in Tamil, English, and Sinhala. Vocational training was also provided on the basis of local labour markets and regionally appropriate skill-sets such as agriculture, carpentry, masonry, plumbing, wiring, welding, lathe machine, motor mechanics, tailoring, beauty culture, and the garment industry. This was supplemented with psychosocial rehabilitation conducted by clinical psychologists and mental health workers to train staff in counselling. Alongside programmes including theatre, drama, dance, music, bibliotherapy and creative writing, group of successful individuals from the Tamil community in Sri Lanka—including businesspeople, athletes, and regional movie stars— were integrated as mentors and engaged in social and cultural events.
Location	Sri Lanka
Target Population(s)	Former members of the LTTE, although it is unclear whether this is a voluntary scheme. It was initially launched in a prison environment, as the study describes: "After the LTTE's defeat in May 2009,

	surrendered LTTE members were detained in government-run rehabilitation facilities. Rehabilitation was operational as early in the conflict as 1998. These earlier efforts took place in prison environments but changed in 2008 when the first rehabilitation facility was opened (Hettiarachchi, 2015). As the number of detainees increased, the number of facilities increased to accommodate this demand”.
Intended Outcome	The primary aim is rehabilitation and reintegration, emphasising the ‘psychological empowerment of detainees’, the need to strengthen their capabilities through vocational and educational schemes, and the importance of facilitating their transition back into society.
Quality Assessment of the paper (i.e., Not the intervention)	Alongside interviewees with state authorities and local staff, and the observations of the research team, the study draws on personal testimonies from detainees (both male and female), providing a valuable insight in their perspectives and experiences. While the authors describe ‘wide reaching access to the detention centres’ and affirm they have no-affiliation with the Sri Lankan state, there are nevertheless questions over how far inmates were comfortable disclosing sensitive information within the confines of the centres themselves. Conclusions are qualified by the possibility of participants ‘down-adjusting their responses, but the authors argue this would not disproportionately occur among prisoners in the full-treatment group and account for the pronounced reduction within this condition relative to the minimal-treatment group.’ Regardless, the comparative analysis between minimal and treatment groups is erudite and benefits from a long time span, providing a longitudinal assessment of attitudes and behaviours during participants’ internment and release, and contrasting these dynamics to the wider outlook of the Tamil community.
Evidence of Effectiveness	Drawing on significance quest theory and the use of a treatment vs control group (receiving the minimal treatment necessary) the study's results point to the success of the Sri Lankan rehabilitation programme: beneficiaries receiving full rehabilitation reported increasingly lower extremism across one year and showed greater reduction than those only receiving minimal treatment.
Evidence of Impact	In a follow up study with a comparative sub-set of former extremists, the authors also found the beneficiaries of the de-radicalisation scheme were significantly less extreme than Tamils residing in the community that never belonged to the LTTE community. Similarly, whereas there were no differences between community members with and without LTTE connections, former LTTE that retained these connections were significantly more extreme than those who did not, underscoring the importance of personal networks.
Lessons Learned	The utility of a survey methodology is demonstrated in the study, providing an alternative approach that mitigates the shortfalls and practical constraints associated with recidivism rates. The wider applicability of these seemingly positive outcomes remains unknown due to the contextual specificities of the Sri Lankan experience, as the LTTE was defeated militarily prior to any process of rehabilitation. Consequently, the motivations and incentives facing former LTTE combatants are significantly different from members of Islamic State or Al Qaeda, which continue to exist to a greater or lesser extent as operational networks and ‘promise glory through violence enacted for their cause’.

### 13. Deradicalisation and Disengagement in Somalia: Evidence from a Rehabilitation Programme for Former Members of Al Shabaab

By James Khalil, Rory Brown, Chris Chant, Peter Olowo and Nick Wood

Project and Implementor	Support to the national rehabilitation programme in Somalia including the Serendi Rehabilitation Centre run in partnership with the Adam Smit International (ASI)
Intervention Method	Alongside education, the centre offers vocational training informed by livelihood mapping and the demands of local labour markets. This is primarily designed to mitigate and offset the attraction of Shabaab's financial rewards and salaries - seemingly an important factor in insurgent recruitment patterns. The centre also facilitates 'reconnection activities', non-specialised psychological support' and 'civic, political and religious education' (CPR) led by Serendi imams.
Location	Serendi Rehabilitation Centre, Somalia

Target Population(s)	'Low risk' Al Shabaab defectors
Intended Outcome	Support the disengagement, de-radicalisation and reintegration of low risk former members of Al Shabaab
Quality Assessment of the paper (i.e., Not the intervention)	This is a high-quality peer reviewed study that clearly positions itself in relation to the wider literature on de-radicalisation, disengagement and militancy in Somalia. Convening 129 face to face interviews with former and current Serendi residents, the authors offer a crucial insight into the motivations, experiences and views of former combatants. Nevertheless, the findings should be qualified– it is possible some of the information may be misleading or false, as the authors highlight participants could themselves be misinformed, using the interview to discredit others, wanting to be viewed favourably by the interviewer, fearful of any perceived repercussions, aggrandising their own role, or conditioned by a 'process of unwitting self-deception'. While interview questions were deliberately sequenced to help identify inconsistencies in responses, the triangulation and verification of claims were often not possible given these events occurred in remote parts of Somalia under Al-Shabaab control, and as the enquiries often focused on personal perceptions rather than 'factual' information. Research into community reintegration exclusively focused on those now living in Mogadishu - so this may not reflect outcomes from across the Somali periphery/hinterland.
Evidence of Effectiveness	<p>The study disaggregates its review of effectiveness along several programmatic strands, such as the internal experience within the centres (e.g., capacity building and vocational training), how far participants 'de-radicalise', how their rehabilitation and reintegration progressed and so on.</p> <p>In terms of the internal functionality and performance of Serendi, 91% of exiting residents claimed to be satisfied with recreational facilities, (Oct 2016-Sept 2017) compared to only 60% interviewed between April and September 2016. A package of human rights training was delivered to staff to ensure overall levels of compliance were heightened, and residents have received a twice-yearly human rights course through their personal development curriculum since mid-2016. Assessment and reintegration processes have also improved: previously, exit was largely contingent on whether the skillsets of specific beneficiaries matched existing livelihood opportunities in the community. It is now increasingly determined by wider criteria relating to their personal rehabilitation. Education classes cover standard school subjects, and 82% of participating residents (9 out of 11) passed their final exams in May 2018.</p> <p>The impact of 'de-radicalisation' efforts in partnerships with imams leading CPR was revealed through a 'March 2017 study with randomly selected residents that identified six individuals who were initially supportive of Al-Shabaab when they entered the centre, but who subsequently reversed this sympathy during residency'. However, the authors acknowledge that the typically 'low risk' characteristics of residents make it is unlikely those with a strong ideological affiliation with Al Shabaab would be accepted into the centre. These measures also seemingly 'drive positive attitudinal change regarding the FGS, the Somali National Army (SNA), the international community, democratic principles, the illegitimacy of violence, and other such topics'. Certain participants from the sample of 37 interviewed in March 2017 reported experiencing positive attitudinal change at Serendi regarding these themes, although attitudinal change may have also derived from input by external stakeholders such as 'visiting family members'.</p> <p>The personal security of defectors outside the centre remained a concern and had major implications for economic reintegration as 'employment prospects are comparatively good in certain insecure parts of Mogadishu, including Bakara Market'. Social integration was highly dependent on family linkages, and the historical experience of recipient communities (e.g., whether they were victimised by Al Shabaab). Nevertheless 'most former Serendi residents reported that they had not experienced hostility or stigma after exiting the centre, although of course this may be the case partly because</p>

	they returned to the relative anonymity of Mogadishu'. Economic reintegration is not only about obtaining work, but also the 'adequacy of earnings' - many did not feel they were receiving sufficient compensation (but needs to be contextualised within Somalia's chronic unemployment rate). None of the 27 respondents reported earning an income using skills acquired through the vocational training provided at Serendi – although does not necessarily reflect the quality of training – often resulted from a lack of capital e.g., affording start up equipment.
Evidence of Impact	Some of the 'evidence of effectiveness' may factor into impact but otherwise little coverage about this.
Lessons Learned	Much of the progress exhibited by this intervention was potentially amplified by the conducive environment provided at Serendi rather than the content of programmes themselves - highlighting the importance of developing a receptive and comfortable setting to help strengthen any ongoing training schemes.

14. Countering Terrorism in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: An Examination of the Prevention, Rehabilitation and After-Care Strategy (PRAC) Strategy  
By Bandar Alsubaie

Project and Implementor	PRAC, overseen by the Saudi Ministry of Internal Affairs and run in partnership with the Ministries of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Da'wah and Guidance; Education; Higher Education; Culture and Information; Labour; and Social Affairs
Intervention Method	<p>PRAC includes various elements. Counselling (both individual and group sessions) is provided for prisoners convicted of terrorism, alongside discussion sessions with clerics to debate and rebut extremist theological interpretations. Building a 'rapport' with participants, these stakeholders explain how and why inmates deviated from 'proper' Islam – an approach that assumes the primacy of ideological motivation in radicalisation and recruitment.</p> <p>In relation to rehabilitation, prisoners are transferred to the Mohammed bin Naif Centre for Care and Counselling (MBNCCC) after completion of sentence and become a 'beneficiary'. The Centre is managed by the MOI, and involves academics, subject matter experts and religious scholars in its rehabilitative and reintegrative goals, leading various programmes such as "knowledge introduction", general training programs, "cultural" and sports programs, art therapy, vocational training, and lectures on the fundamentals of Islam to clarify inconsistencies in the AQ ideology. - Over 40 private companies are also involved in training schemes that aim to create better employment opportunities for those "beneficiaries" soon to be released.</p> <p>In relation to aftercare, the "beneficiary" is released into the custody of his family - this is described as a critical component of positive reintegration. There are three main programmes: focusing directly on the "beneficiary", addressing the well-being of the families, and safeguard the "beneficiary" from re-joining Al Qaeda. This includes the provision of health care services, social and educational services, alongside financial and employment support if required.</p>
Location	Saudi Arabia
Target Population(s)	Prisoners convicted on terrorism offences. The wider strategy also includes community outreach as a component of its 'prevention' activities.
Intended Outcome	Counselling, rehabilitation, and after-care components of the strategy reduce terrorism by addressing beliefs; supporting beneficiaries in positively participating in society; and working families to mitigate any regression or re-recruitment. However, the key component remains de-radicalisation, or, more specifically, replacing VE ideology with a Saudi government sanctioned interpretation.
Quality Assessment of the paper	The study not only included a relatively comprehensive literature review but interviews with key stakeholders such as senior policy-makers, counterterrorism specialists, and those involved in implementing the strategy. This mixed methodology, built on a sequential explanatory design –

(i.e., Not the intervention)	<p>follow-up explanations model and provides a relatively good basis for understanding why is the PRAC strategy and its various components are effective. However, there are limitations, for instance there almost no inclusion of beneficiary views and perspectives, and the quantitative data is provided by the Saudi state with little transparency or opportunity to corroborate and verify those figures.</p>
Evidence of Effectiveness	<p>Since 2005, over 15,000 one-on-one counselling and discussion sessions have been conducted. Less than 3% either refused or did not benefit from these sessions, although it is unclear what metrics were used to assess this 'benefit'. 1,826 prisoners engaged in group sessions (from over 50 nationalities) had participated with a 96% passing rate.</p> <p>MBNCCC claimed to have a 15% recidivism rate, which was defined slightly differently in Saudi Arabia as 'the violation of any condition of release', including technical violations. Authorities claim this provides a much lower threshold, but also concede that external variables can influence the behaviour and attitude of graduates. They also point, anecdotally, to examples of families reporting any regression in participants after they have been released, highlighting families' cooperation and buy in to the process.</p>
Evidence of Impact	<p>The study claims that PRAC has shown promise. For instance, it officials emphasise that 'it would be very difficult to use neglect (by the MOI) as a justification for reengaging in terrorism – the motivation to seek revenge/justice is just not there', alluding to the comforts, trust building and investment allocated to each participant. Similarly, working with families to continually monitor graduates 'strives to eliminate any cause that could hinder a safe re-entry back into society' and pre-emptively address any issues, and the MOI tries to create an environment conducive to positive social associations to ensure any behavioural and cognitive shift in the beneficiaries is sustainable after the course concludes.</p> <p>Officials referenced in the study also claim the availability of PRAC and a clear exit route, encourages families to advocate members of Al Qaeda to return. The author maintains that this does not replace any prosecution, but it does offer a process of rehabilitation and support following the completion of an offender's prison sentence.</p> <p>More broadly, there has been a decrease in terrorist recruitment that correlates with PRAC's launch. This is attributed to various factors, but the study suggests the intervention addressed several possible threats that contribute directly and indirectly to terrorism. This includes focusing on deradicalizing individual participants, leading in part to a low recidivism rate, and providing various services and support 'that serve to eliminate criminogenic factors that may push those released back into the arms of the ever-waiting terrorist group' (e.g., financial support for marriage, assistance with employment, health care and education, social counselling and so on).</p>
Lessons Learned	<p>Persistent themes emerging from the qualitative interviews conducted for this study included the importance of trust, comprehensiveness, early intervention, individualisation and adaptation. In relation to trust, the MBNCCC underscored the importance of families as 'cornerstones' of the programme, and the need to build relationships with participants to open lines of communication. Stakeholders also attributed the 'success' of PRAC to its centralisation and coordination across different ministries to create a holistic approach. MBNCCC likewise emphasise the value of an individualised approach to maximise the benefits of each beneficiary given the diverse process of radicalisation each participant has experienced.</p>

15. Prison-based deradicalization for terrorist detainees: an analysis of programmatic religious re-education and systematic institutionalization and their impact on achieving deradicalization  
By Theresa Eckard

Project and Implementor	Prevention, Rehabilitation and After-Care Strategy (PRAC) overseen by the Saudi Ministry of Internal Affairs and run in partnership with the Ministries of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Da'wah and Guidance; Education; Higher Education; Culture and Information; Labour; and Social Affairs. Yemen, Indonesia, Iraq and the US.
Intervention Method	<p>From its start in 2004, the Saudi programme has grown to become more institutionalised with the creation of an organisational state structure to implement and run the programme, which the author argues led to a 'robust religious re-education program to convince detainees to abandon the radical ideology and violence'. It also features rehabilitation and aftercare elements ensure 'monitoring by security forces and parole-like reporting requirements, financial support for detainees after release, and ongoing contact with both the individual and his family'. Following the completion of their prison sentence, participants are transferred to a Care Rehabilitation Centre that further facilitates rehabilitation and prepares the detainee for reintegration back into society. Here detainees are exposed to various forms of therapy, alongside the counselling they were already receiving, such as entertainment, participation in sports, and activities to help "ease prisoners into non-violent behaviour and a normal life". Nine rehabilitation centres were established, along with 'special facilities for housing families and meeting visitors, high-tech classrooms, and libraries for reading and studying'.</p> <p>Yemen: designed to offer a series of religious dialogues between prisoners, who were suspected al-Qaeda members, and religious clerics in order to re-educate the detainees on Islamic teachings. After a series of dialogue sessions, participants who 'renounced violence and signed a pledge to not conduct terrorist attacks within Yemen were released through an amnesty programme'.</p> <p>Indonesia: bottom up programme using reformed jihadists to deradicalize other incarcerated terrorists. Involves three central tenets that recognize the importance of establishing trust, the role of incentives, and the role of influence, although it Program has yet to evolve to incorporate formal de-radicalisation processes, which would create a formalized system of assessments.</p> <p>Western Europe: Britain and France (two examples given) prioritise a 'security first' approach, meaning there is no systematised prison-based de-radicalisation programme available. Rehabilitative efforts are largely led by 'local Muslim outreach programs developed by mosques and imams', and these tend to be limited and only accessible following an inmate's release. Consequently, while these strategies are referenced in the study they do not focus on specific interventions.</p> <p>US: Focusing on denazification of prisons of war (POWs) throughout and following the Second World War, the US gradually started re-educating detainees: promoting 'the democratic way of life', the capacity of 'goodness' in the German people, and footage and images of the Holocaust and other Nazi atrocities against civilians. Each POW camp adopted its own approach loosely based on shared principles and a cross-cutting framework. This subsequently developed into a 'rushed' rehabilitation programme following the conclusion of the war and demand for repatriation, featuring lectures on democratic values, discussion group and counselling to hep German POWs become 'self reliant citizens'.</p> <p>The US also conducted a rehabilitation programme in Iraq following the 2003 invasion, which was loosely modelled on the Saudi template. It addressed prisoners' psychological, physical and material needs and worked to 'influence the detainee's ideological position'. Inmates were screened by a cleric, social worker and teacher, and subsequently segregated based on their sectarian identity, education and socioeconomic background. To gain cooperation, various incentives were offered throughout the intervention including education opportunities and provisions for family visits. In 2007, an Islamic Discussion programme (IDP) was introduced, supplemented by vocational training, art and sport initiatives, and civic education (focusing on human rights, women's rights and non-Muslim's rights in Islam). The lack of education across the prison population was identified as a significant challenge for eventual reintegration, and investment was prioritised for basic tuition and capacity building courses</p>

	in heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems, agriculture, barbershop services, carpentry and so on.
Location	Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Indonesia and the US (including operations in Iraq). Western Europe was referenced but as a broad approach rather than a specific programme.
Target Population(s)	Prisoners convicted of terrorist attacks or suspected to be at risk of radicalisation. For the US programme, German POWs were the primary targets, specifically those deemed to be 'anti-Nazi'.
Intended Outcome	<p>The Saudi approach attempts to attack the appeal of jihadist ideology by presenting alternative versions of Islam.</p> <p>Yemen: goal was to convince terrorist prisoners that using violence to wage jihad was not a correct interpretation of Islam. The de-radicalisation programme had very limited objectives: the detainee would recognise the sovereignty and Islamic legitimacy of the Yemeni government and that the 'detainees abstain from committing violent acts', particularly against Westerners and Western interests within Yemen.</p> <p>US: improve employment prospects for those prisoners reintegrating into society, and, through IDPs, increase detainees' understanding of scripture, provide a safe space for discussion and reflection, and prevent the continued motivation and religious justification for terrorist activities.</p>
Quality Assessment of the paper (i.e., Not the intervention)	<p>Using qualitative data and thick description, the study tries to assess the success of programmes in relation to three proxies: level of institutionalisation, level of religious re-education, level of funding/resources on the basis that the higher the level of component, the more likely it will lead to increased effectiveness of a de-radicalisation programme. Eckard justifies these criteria with reference to the wider literature, claiming that high levels of religious education is necessary (but not sufficient) to achieve de-radicalisation, it needs to be complemented with high levels of institutionalisation – essentially a wider package of well organised, mutually reinforcing programmes such as vocational training, financial support and counselling (i.e., those activities primarily focusing on behavioural rather than ideological change) – to facilitate detainees' eventual reinsertion into society. However, these measures are rather generic do not necessarily reflect the personal experiences (successful or otherwise) of individual participants. It also assumes the primacy of ideological commitment and religious radicalisation in driving VE recruitment, which may not always be the case.</p> <p>Moreover, the study depends exclusively on secondary literature for data and results - raising similar problems to other studies that focus on Saudi Arabia: official data lacks transparency and replicability, and it is subsequently difficult to triangulate these quantitative and, to a lesser degree, qualitative findings. Secondly, the institutionalisation, funding levels and degree of religious re-education may not serve as accurate proxies, distorting comparative analysis. Likewise, as the author concedes, 'it is difficult to pinpoint a simple causal mechanism for de-radicalisation. Complex causality is present due to multiple intervening variables that impact the effectiveness of de-radicalisation programmes.'</p> <p>Overall, the case studies offer useful description of individual programmes and a broad analysis of their structural cohesion and funding levels. However, it does not provide detailed insight into the outcomes of these programmes and therefore remains somewhat limited.</p>
Evidence of Effectiveness	As of 2010; approximately 3000 prisoners participated in the de-radicalisation scheme in Saudi Arabia, of which about 1,400 renounced their extremist beliefs and have been released, with a remaining 1,000 still incarcerated. 35 have re-joined various violent groups. Consequently, the Saudi government claims a 80 to 90 percent success rate given recidivism only amounts to rate 1 to 2 percent - however it is difficult to corroborate these figures and they coincide with other structural and social factors - such as "the Saudi population's increasing rejection of Al-Qaeda and its methods" – that make it challenging to clearly ascribe attribution. As highlighted in the paper, critics argue the "program's real effect has not

	<p>been to change individual attitudes towards religious extremism, but simply to use a combination of pressure and generous financial inducements to persuade individuals to renounce the use of violence inside the kingdom, while ensuring they will be unable to export it elsewhere”. The study also indicates that the vast majority of beneficiaries included on the programme are 'minor offenders' likely opposed to violence in the first place, and Riyadh acknowledged the ‘program has little impact on hard-core jihadists, most of whom have opted to remain in high-security prisons rather than make compromises with what they consider an apostate regime’.</p> <p>Other iterations largely failed due, in part, to poor societal buy-in, organisation and resourcing, and Western Europe generally lacks any clear prison based de-radicalisation programme. Yemen’s intervention appeared to lack aftercare and tracking capabilities, and despite receiving acclaim for ‘successfully’ graduating 364 of an estimated 910 prisoners, some participants were later found fighting Coalition Forces in Iraq. Eckard describes a revival in 2009, backed by the US, which made little progress as the population was ‘largely apathetic to, or in some cases, supportive of al-Qaeda’, a context generally considered detrimental to de-radicalisation efforts. The study claims that Yemeni officials only provided for a religious re-education component without any commensurate attention to aftercare or transitional services, leaving any changes in attitude or behaviour ‘short-lived’.</p> <p>Indonesia yields more inconsistent results and remains somewhat ad hoc in its approach, lacking a coherent overarching strategy.</p> <p>In the US, it was difficult to determine any consistent metrics of success given each POW camp’s programme differed. Following the need to repatriate prisoners, around 20,000 German detainees were processed through the re-education course. However, any effectiveness was constrained by the need to operate in secrecy as it violated the Geneva Convention of 1929, a reality that also disrupted monitoring and evaluation. The focus was also on those individuals screened as ‘anti-Nazi’, meaning those prioritised by the programme were arguably those least in need of it. While the paper cites various critics, who claim the intervention achieved very little, polling of participants reveal 75% ‘gained an appreciation for the value of democracy and looked favourably on the United States’. However, efforts to reintegrate prisoners back into Germany were more mixed as many were proscribed from entering the labour force due to Denazification legislation.</p> <p>No clear results were specified for US programming in Iraq.</p>
Evidence of Impact	<p>It is worth noting that Eckard’s focus on institutionalisation overlaps with similar conclusions drawn by Alsubaie’s study. Although the terminology is different, the latter specifically highlights the importance of a centralised, well-coordinated, multi-faceted approach.</p>
Lessons Learned	<p>The study argues that religious re-education is a necessary element of de-radicalisation, but it is insufficient for successful long-term integration. In this context high levels of institutionalisation – a proxy indicator for the volume and cohesion of ‘disengagement’ or behaviour-focused activities such as vocational training, education, and financial support – is required to facilitate and sustain positive outcomes.</p>

## Annex B: Methodology

The overall objective of this research project is to conduct a literature review across a range of studies to collect and synthesise evidence on the (conditions for) effectiveness in three separate areas: 1) *youth engagement*; 2) *reintegration*; and 3) *capacity building of national government and law enforcement*.

Each of these categories approach CT and P/CVE from a different angle:

- **Youth engagement (*aimed at dealing with recruitment*)**: this category includes the establishment of youth groups, providing education/training, and counter narrative approaches.
- **Reintegration (*aimed at disengaging violent extremists*)**: this category includes support for the reintegration of (former) detainees, members of terrorist groups and ex-combatants. Reintegration can involve vocational training, coaching and psychosocial support, and in-kind or cash support.
- **Capacity building of national government and law enforcement (*aimed at containment of VE*)**: this category includes training of policy makers (both local and national) and security personnel (police, prison, border) in subjects ranging from terrorist profiling to community policing.

## Research Questions

There are five key sub-research questions:

- *What evidence is there on what works (effectiveness)?*

Effectiveness is assessed at different levels. At the activity or project level, the question explored is “how well did the activity (described in the literature) achieve its objectives?” Analytically, effectiveness is defined using the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) criteria for international development evaluations: the extent to which the intervention achieved, or is expected to achieve, its objectives and its results, including any differential results across groups. This involves taking account of the relative importance of the objectives or results (OECD).

By this definition, an activity might be effective on its own terms but not achieve impact-level change, i.e., not be able to demonstrate an ‘impact’ or positive change on levels of VE. In fact, many of the studies reviewed in this report do not evaluate success at this level, either because the intervention is still ongoing, because design flaws in the intervention prevent impact assessment or because the study simply does not address impact. This also reflects the challenge in proving causation and attribution, with the lack of short, manageable causal chains making it challenging to exclude rival explanations for a specific trend or effect (Lindekilde 2012). Intended outcomes in P/CVE are sometimes said to involve “nothing happening”, for example, the absence of radicalisation and recruitment. Assessing the mechanics of interventions is therefore problematic as any metric relies on an imperfect set of proxies to “prove a negative”, particularly as ethical constraints in complex and challenging contexts usually preclude any comparison between treatment and control groups.

- *What evidence is there on what does not work?*

Assessing what does not work is as difficult as assessing what works, but is rarely invested in to the same extent. At the activity or project level, studies concluding that the intervention failed to produce the desired results are regarded as

“ineffective.” However, the evaluations included in the review provided limited information about ineffectiveness. As a result, the authors tried to identify areas of omission or shortfalls in the interventions.

- *What conditions promote or hinder success?*

Given the importance of context in CT and P/CVE interventions, a more appropriate question is “what circumstances tend to make programmes ineffective.” These include: 1) intervention context; 2) intervention design (for example, timeframe, resources available, scale and scope, beneficiaries and whether the intervention is standalone or part of a wider package of interventions); 3) implementation (who is the implementing organisation or was there a specific interlocutor that was effective?).

Given the lack of substantial evidence of effectiveness and impact gathered in this study, it is largely not possible to identify any generalisable evidence of conditions promoting and hindering success. It is only possible to identify what conditions correlated with or were estimated to contribute to the achievement of results.

- *What are the assumptions underpinning each of the three intervention areas, and what evidence is available to support or counter these assumptions?*

This question involves diagnosing the underlying assumptions or theories of change that underpin the three categories of CT and P/CVE programmes. This, however, is rarely discussed in the documents included in this study and the apparent lack of an explicit theory of change approach across all interventions suggests that assumptions were not articulated fully in the interventions themselves. Instead, the authors attempted to infer assumptions. The answering of this question therefore inevitably involves a degree of subjectivity.

- *What knowledge gaps are there regarding CT and P/CVE activities?*

This question explores areas where there are knowledge gaps in CT and P/CVE programmes. In particular, the review highlights areas of programming in which there are insufficient data at present to draw any concrete findings. The identification of gaps is, however, useful, as it reflects the need for more evidence on certain assumptions or suggests potential effective as well as ineffective approaches that are worth testing further.

## Methodological Approach

Each thematic category is treated as a separate work stream and led by a key author, with the same techniques applied across each work stream. Three separate systematic literature reviews are carried out for the three separate work streams (FOCUS). Systematic reviews rely upon the use of an objective, transparent and rigorous approach for the entire research process, in order to minimise bias and ensure future replicability (Mallett et al 2012).

Accompanying the systematic reviews, the study includes a RELATED literature search on the basis that there is likely insufficient material available to answer all of the above questions.

For each of the three work streams, two search categories are included:

1. A systematic review of studies and evaluations of programmes focussed on CT and P/CVE, i.e., activities directly aimed at countering or preventing terrorism and VE (FOCUS).
2. A review of existing literature reviews (systematic and otherwise) in related areas such as SSR, community policing, interventions with ex-combatants or gang members (RELATED).<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> See also Dandurand (2015) who also discusses similarities between P/CVE programming and programmes focusing on gang violence.

Due to time and available resources, the RELATED category is not systematic but is confined to existing literature reviews (systematic and otherwise), supplemented by a small number of studies that were discovered in the FOCUS systematic searching but were subsequently screened out on relevance grounds.

Two separate inventories were created for each work stream, which can be found in Annex C and D. In the case of the youth engagement and reintegration themes, the need to consider related literature is less relevant because of the volume of data gathered in the focus area. The paper exploring the capacity building of national governments and law enforcement draws more on the related literature in the analysis.

There are four stages to the literature review. These are outlined in detail below. The stages are consistent across all three thematic areas, with tailored approaches adopted where relevant.

## 1. Development of Criteria for Inclusion/Exclusion and Search Terms

As part of the literature review for this project, the team designed a set of inclusion/exclusion criteria that ensure adequate coverage in its data-collection.

Table 1: Inclusion/exclusion criteria for reintegration

	<b>Inclusion</b>	<b>Exclusion</b>
<b>Date</b>	Papers since 2001	Pre-2001 material
<b>Language</b>	English	Papers in all other languages
<b>Population</b>	(Former) detainees incarcerated on terrorism charges, (former) members of terrorist groups.	
<b>Geographical locations</b>	Any/ all	None
<b>Interventions</b>	Psychosocial support, Mentoring, Religious counselling, Education, Vocational training, Coaching, Job training and placement, Trauma counselling, Entrepreneurship, Financial support, Material support, After care, (or combination of above)	
<b>Study design</b>	Any peer-reviewed study (theoretical, empirical, qualitative, quantitative) <u>and</u> literature reviews/systematic reviews <u>and</u> evaluations of projects or programmes, whether independent or internal	Opinion pieces/op-eds, generic critiques of policy (e.g., of the United Kingdom's (UK) Prevent strategy), workshop and conference reports, policy briefs.
<b>Medium of publication</b>	Scholarly journal, thinktank/research institute report, NGO report, government publication, PhD thesis	Blogs, opinion pieces, newspaper articles, books.
<b>Relevance</b>	Counter-terrorism, countering/preventing violent extremism/ radicalisation/ recruitment / dis-engagement /de-radicalisation	

This phase involved identifying keywords for searches according to each thematic area. The research question is broken down into population, intervention and outcome to identify appropriate search terms and how they should be combined into search strings.

Table 2: Keywords

<b>Keywords 1 (outcome)</b>	PVE/CVE/ counter-radicalisation/prevent/countering terrorism/CT/violenceprevention/containment/disengagement/deradicalisation/ rehabilitation/reintegration/recidivism/prison/defection demobilisation/disarmament/ /reintegrating combatants/
<b>Keywords 2 (intervention)</b>	vocational training, psychosocial support, mentorship, religious counselling, education, coaching, job training, financial support, material support
<b>Keywords 3 (population)</b>	(Former) detainees, members of terrorist groups, ex-combatants.
<b>Logical operators</b>	and/or

### Search strings

Search terms are unique to the strand of work.

The following search strings were identified for the searches. They aimed to capture as many interventions and studies as possible and hence include a variety of synonyms.

They were tested for two weeks.

The search string will be composed of the main keywords in relation to the population, intervention and outcome specified above.

The following search strings have identified for the searches. They will be tested and finalised.

Search Strings FOCUSED:

- 1) rehabilitation OR reintegration OR disengagement OR deradicalisation AND CVE OR CT OR terrorism AND evaluation OR assessment OR review OR study
- 2) rehabilitation OR reintegration OR disengagement OR deradicalisation AND prison AND CVE OR CT OR terrorism AND evaluation OR assessment OR review OR study
- 3) rehabilitation OR reintegration OR disengagement OR deradicalisation AND defection center AND CVE OR CT OR terrorism AND evaluation OR assessment OR review OR study

## 2. Literature Search and Division

Each strand involved an independent document search process, following the same systematic steps. The identification of potential sources was related to the three FOCUS categories in CT and P/CVE interventions and conducted through academic databases and library catalogues. These include:

- Google Scholar
- Applied Social Sciences Index and Abstracts (ASSIA)
- Criminal Justice Database
- Digital National Security Archive
- European Sources Online
- International Bibliography of Social Sciences (IBSS)
- ProQuest Central
- Scopus
- Web of Science

We decided to restrict the fields of research to criminology, political science, law, management, development studies, psychology, anthropology, sociology, social sciences, public administration, etc.

We also adopted a systematic approach across all three strands to hand searching. Hand searching was conducted on the following websites:

- Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD): <https://www.isdglobal.org/>
- International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT): <https://icct.nl/>
- Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), CVE working group: <https://www.thegctf.org/Working-Groups/Countering-Violent-Extremism>
- United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism: <https://www.un.org/en/counterterrorism/>
- RAND Corporation: <https://www.rand.org/topics/counterterrorism.html>
- Radicalisation Awareness Network, including Communications and Narratives Working Group (RAN C&N): [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/about-ran/ran-c-and-n](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-c-and-n)
- Royal United Services Institute (RUSI): <https://rusi.org/publications>
- Resolve Network: <https://www.resolve.net.org/research/publications>
- NATO Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara <http://www.coedat.nato.int> ; Defence Against Terrorism Review: <http://www.coedat.nato.int/datr/volumes.html>
- Europol: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents> plus Advisory Group on Online Terrorist Propaganda, & EU Internet Referral Unit
- Tech Against Terrorism: <https://www.techagainstterrorism.org/research/>
- VoxPol: <https://www.voxpol.eu/>
- Tony Blair Institute: <https://institute.global/>
- The Commonwealth, Counter-Extremism Unit: <https://thecommonwealth.org/countering-violent-extremism>
- Against Violent Extremism (AVE) Network: <http://www.againstviolentextremism.org/projects>
- International Civil Society Action Network: <https://icanpeacework.org/>
- TSAS – Canadian network for research on Terrorism, Security and Society: <https://www.tsas.ca/>
- Impact Europe: <http://www.impact.itti.com.pl/index#/home>
- Search for Common Ground: <https://www.sfcg.org/>
- CT-MORSE – Counter-Terrorism Monitoring, Reporting and Support Mechanism: <http://ct-morse.eu/activities/publications/>
- DEMOS: <https://demos.co.uk/research-area/casm/>
- Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF): <https://www.dcaf.ch/resources?type=publications>
- Global Centre on Cooperative Security: <https://www.globalcenter.org/publications/>
- Terrorist Research and Analysis Consortium (TRAC) <https://www.trackingterrorism.org/publishing-center>
- International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR): <https://icsr.info/publications/reports/>
- Department for International Development, Research for Development: <https://www.gov.uk/research-for-development-outputs>
- European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR): <https://ecpr.eu/>
- GCERF – Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCTF inspired body): <https://www.gcerf.org/>
- Institute for International Justice (GCTF inspired body): <https://theijj.org/>

- UNDP Regional Addis Ababa and Amman (PVE Hub): [https://www.africa.undp.org/content/rba/en/home/about\\_us/regional-hub.html](https://www.africa.undp.org/content/rba/en/home/about_us/regional-hub.html)
- The African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT/CAERT): <https://caert.org.dz/>
- International Crisis Group (ICG): <https://www.crisisgroup.org/>
- United States Institute for Peace (USIP): <https://www.usip.org/>
- Overseas Development Institute (ODI): <https://www.odi.org/>
- OSCE (Transnational Threats Department/ODHIR): <https://www.osce.org/odihr>
- CTED (specifically publications from Global Research Network (GRN)): <https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/focus-areas/research>;
- UNICRI: <http://www.unicri.it/>
- Hedayah: <https://www.hedayahcenter.org/>
- ISS Africa: <https://issafrica.org/>
- ICPVTR: <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/research/icpvtr/>
- International Alert: <https://www.international-alert.org/>
- UNICEF: <https://www.unicef.org.uk/>
- EU: DEVCO, EEAS or at the Council Secretariat of CT-Coordinator Gilles de Kerchhove: [https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/international-cooperation-and-development\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/international-cooperation-and-development_en)
- ACCORD
- Humanitarian Dialogue: <https://www.hdcentre.org/>

This stage also involved collecting documents for the RELATED areas, using existing literature reviews through Campbell Collaboration and 3ie (International Initiative for Impact Evaluation).

### 3. Literature Screening

Screening of the documents took place during the third phase. This comprised 1) elimination of duplicates, 2) elimination of irrelevant studies based on title and/or abstract. Of the remaining studies, eligibility was decided on the basis of the inclusion/exclusion criteria (see above). This stage of the screening was led by the work stream leader and, to ensure consistent screening, an inter-coder reliability exercise was conducted.

Studies that passed both screening stages were classified, and a classification chart was created for the FOCUS category, which includes the following information:

- Study Location (e.g., country where programming took place)
- Type of Study (e.g., peer reviewed study, literature/systematic review, evaluation of intervention)
- Summary
- Quality Assessment
- The relevance of the paper and importance for the research question

An annexed inventory was also created which includes:

- Title
- Author
- Publication Date
- Publication Issue

### 4. Literature Analysis and Writing

The final phase focused on analysing the studies. Three types of analysis were conducted.

Firstly, we diagnosed common assumptions – whether articulated or implicit, what evidence informed these, and the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of different interventions at the project or programme level.

Secondly, we observed and noted the methodological approach, providing a narrative quality assessment of the bias (internal validity) and generalisability (external validity) of the paper. From the outset of the research, we noted an inherent contradiction between the information required to conduct a systematic review and the way peer reviewed journal articles and even evaluations are written in this field. Much of the research in this field is multi-disciplinary and includes quantitative and qualitative methodologies. Quality appraisal techniques lack consensus and are still undeveloped.

We, therefore, discussed at length a suitable quality appraisal approach. The decision was taken that quality would be defined according to the robustness of research or evaluation methodology. We assessed that knowing how strong the research or evaluation methodology (whether the study is theoretical, qualitative or quantitative) of a particular paper is facilitates our analytical process and essentially defines how much ‘weight’ to attribute to the conclusions of the paper. We stress that there is no preference in this study for theoretical, qualitative or quantitative research or evaluation studies. Quality is assessed on the methodological rigour, rather than the choice of approach.

In this study, quality is not an inclusion or exclusion criterion. We also decided against a quality scoring process, in line with good practice in the field. Using quality scores has been identified to be problematic. Instead, it is preferable to consider individual aspects of methodological quality in the quality assessment and synthesis. Where appropriate, the potential impact that methodological quality had on the findings of the included studies should be considered (Centre for Reviews and Dissemination 2008). Therefore, we conducted a narrative assessment of the methodological approach and provided comments on bias and on generalisability. We also noted the relevance of the paper to our study – how far the study answers the research questions relevant to each theme. Quality assurance was overseen by the Team Leader.

Thirdly, the analysis compared findings on programme effectiveness or ineffectiveness across the intervention field to assess generalisability. We adopted a tiered analytical assessment looking at multiple levels:

**Programmatic:** how far did the activity/project or programme (described in the literature) achieve its set goals or objectives.

Unpacking this further: the extent to which the intervention achieved, or is expected to achieve, its objectives and results – including any differential results across groups. This involved taking account of the relative importance of the objectives or results (OECD).

**Impact:** For those activities that were successful programmatically, do they usually or sometimes help to solve the problem of VE?

It is acknowledged that the analytical assessment of effectiveness was a judgement made through examination of the evidence. This impact assessment is based on the expertise of the research team, and therefore incurs some level of subjectivity.

## Annex C: FOCUS Inventory

Author	Publication Date	Title	Publication Issue
Alsubaie, Bandar	2016	Countering Terrorism in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: An Examination of the Prevention, Rehabilitation and After-Care Strategy (PRAC)	PhD Dissertation, University of New Haven
Barkindo, Atta and Bryans, Shane	2016	De-Radicalising Prisoners in Nigeria: Developing a Basic Prison Based De-Radicalisation Programme	Journal for Deradicalization, 7
Cherney, Adrian	2020	Evaluating interventions to disengage extremist offenders: a study of the proactive integrated support model (PRISM)	Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 12(1)
Cherney, Adrian and Belton, Emma	2019	Evaluating Case-Managed Approaches to Counter Radicalization and Violent Extremism: An Example of the Proactive Integrated Support Model (PRISM) Intervention	Studies in Conflict and Terrorism
Daugherty, Casie	2019	Deradicalisation and Disengagement: Exit Programs in Norway and Sweden and Addressing Neo-Nazi Extremism	Journal for Deradicalization, 21
Eckard, Theresa	2014	Prison-based deradicalization for terrorist detainees: an analysis of programmatic religious re-education and systematic institutionalization and their impact on achieving deradicalization	PhD Thesis, Northern Illinois University
Khalil, James et al.	2018	Deradicalization and Disengagement in Somalia: Evidence from a Rehabilitation Programme for Former Members of Al Shabaab	Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Whitehall Report
Lankford, Adam and Gillespie, Katherine	2011	Rehabilitating Terrorists Through Counter Indoctrination: Lessons Learned From The Saudi Arabian Program	International Criminal Justice Review, 21(2): 118-133
Marsden, Sarah V.	2015	Conceptualising 'success' with those convicted of terrorism offences: Aims, methods, and barriers to reintegration	Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 7(2): 143-165
Onapajo, Hakeem and Ozden, Kemal	2020	Non-Military Approach Against Terrorism in Nigeria: Deradicalization Strategies and Challenges in Countering Boko Haram	Security Journal, 33: 476-492
Schuurman, Bart and Bakker, Edwin	2015	Reintegrating jihadist extremists: evaluating a Dutch initiative, 2013–2014	Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 8(1): 66-85
Search for Common Ground	2013	Mid-Term Evaluation: Reducing Recidivism: A Process for Effective Disengagement of High Risk Prisoners in Indonesia	New Zealand's International Aid and Development Agency and

			Search for Common Ground
Taylor, Christian, Semmelrock, Tanner and McDermott, Alexandra	2019	The Cost of Defection: The Consequences of Quitting Al Shabaab	International Journal of Conflict and Violence, 13
Van der Heide, Liesbeth and Schuurman, Bart	2018	Reintegrating Terrorists in the Netherlands: Evaluating the Dutch Approach	Journal for Deradicalization, 17
Webber, David et al.	2017	Deradicalizing Detained Terrorists	Political Psychology, 20

## Annex D: RELATED Inventory

Author	Publication Date	Title	Publication Issue
Banholzer, Lilli	2014	When do disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes succeed?	German Development Institute
Bastug, Mehmet F. and Evlek, Ugur K.	2016	Individual Disengagement and Deradicalization Pilot Program in Turkey: Methods and Outcomes	Journal for Deradicalization, 8
Cherney, Adrian	2016	Designing and implementing programmes to tackle radicalization and violent extremism: lessons from criminology	Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, 9(1-3): 82-94
Davey, Jacob, Tuck, Henry and Amarasingam, Amarnath	2019	An imprecise science: Assessing interventions for the prevention, disengagement and de-radicalisation of left and right-wing extremists	Institute for Strategic Dialogue
Davies, Matthew, Richard Warnes, and Joanna Hofman	2017	Exploring the transferability and applicability of gang evaluation methodologies to counter-violent radicalisation	RAND
Decker, Scott H., Pyrooz, David C. abd Moule, Richard K.	2014	Disengagement From Gangs as Role Transitions	Journal of Research on Adolescence, 24(2): 268-283
Farringer, Alison J., Duriez, Stephanie A., Manchak, Sarah M. and Sullivan, Carrie C.	2019	Adherence to “What Works”: Examining Trends across 14 Years of Correctional Program Assessment	Corrections: 1-19
Hyatt, Jordan M. and Barnes, Geoffrey C.	2014	An Experimental Evaluation of the Impact of Intensive Supervision on the Recidivism of High-Risk Probationers	Crime and Delinquency, 63(1): 3-38
Jolliffe, Darrick et al.	2017	Systematic review of early risk factors for life-course-persistent, adolescence-limited, and late-onset offenders in prospective longitudinal studies	Aggression and Violent Behavior, 33: 15-23
Lively, Ian	2014	Measuring Intermediate Outcomes of Liberia's Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Program	Defence and Peace Economics, 25(2): 139-162
Lipsey, Mark W. and Cullen, Francis T.	2007	The Effectiveness of Correctional Rehabilitation: A Review of Systematic Reviews	Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 3(1): 297-320

Lovins, Lori Brusman and Latessa, Edward J.	2018	One State's Use of Program Evaluation to Improve Correctional Practices	Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 34(1): 81 – 96
Lowenkamp, Christopher T., Latessa, Edward J. and Smith, Paula	2006	Does Correctional Program Quality Really Matter? The Impact of Adhering to the Principles of Effective Intervention	Criminology and Public Policy, 5(3): 575-594
Lum, Cynthia, Kennedy, Leslie W. and Sherley, Alison J.	2006	The Effectiveness of Counter-Terrorism Strategies	Campbell Systematic Review Summary, 2(1): 1-50
O'Neal, Eryn Nicole, Decker, Scott H., Moule, Richard K. and Pyrooz, David C.	2016	Girls, Gangs, and Getting Out: Gender Differences and Similarities in Leaving the Gang	Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice, 14(1): 43-60
Özerdem, Alpaslan and Podder, Sukanya	2011	Disarming Youth Combatants: Mitigating Youth Radicalization and Violent Extremism	Journal of Strategic Security, 4(4): 63-80
Richardson, Cara, Cameron, Paul A. and Berlouis, Katherine M.	2017	The Role of Sport in Deradicalisation and Crime Diversion	Journal for Deradicalization, 13
Schaefer, Lacey and Little, Simon	2019	A quasi-experimental evaluation of the "environmental corrections" model of probation and parole	Journal of Experimental Criminology
Schmid, Alex P.	2013	Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review	International Centre for Counter-Terrorism
Tolan, Patrick, David Henry, Michael Schoeny, Arin Bass, Peter Lovegrove, and Emily Nichols	2013	Mentoring interventions to affect juvenile delinquency and associated problems: A systematic review	Campbell Systematic Reviews
Visher, Christy A. and Travis, Jeremy	2003	Transitions from Prison to Community: Understanding Individual Pathways	Annual Review of Sociology, 29(1): 89-113
Windisch, Steven, Simi, Pete, Sott L, Gina and McNeel, Hillary	2016	Disengagement from Ideologically-Based and Violent Organizations: A Systematic Review of the Literature	Journal for Deradicalization, 9: 1-38
Sukabdi, Z. A.	2015	Terrorism in Indonesia: A Review on Rehabilitation and Deradicalization	Journal of Terrorism Research, 6(2)

Neumann, Peter		Prisons and Terrorism Radicalisation and De-radicalisation in 15 Countries	International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR)
Rabasa, Angel, Pettyjohn, Stacie L., Ghez, Jeremy J. and Boucek, Christopher	2010	Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists	RAND Corporation
Ehiane, Stanley	2019	Deradicalisation and Disengagement of the Extremist Group in Africa: The Nigerian Experience	Journal of African Foreign Affairs, 6(2)
Horgan, John and Braddock, Kurt	2010	Rehabilitating the Terrorists? Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalization Programs	Terrorism and Political Violence, 22(2): 267-291,
Clubb, Gordon and Tapley, Marina	2018	Conceptualising De-Radicalisation and Former Combatant Reintegration in Nigeria	Third World Quarterly, 39(11)
Cherney, Adrian	2018	The Release and Community Supervision of Radicalised Offenders: Issues and Challenges that Can Influence Reintegration	Terrorism and Political Violence
Barrelle, Kate	2014	Pro-integration: disengagement from and life after extremism	Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 7(2): 129–142
Bin Hassan, Ahmad Saiful Rijal	2019	Denmark's Deradicalisation Programme for Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters	Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, 11(3)
Boucek, Christopher	2008	Counter-Terrorism from Within: Assessing Saudi Arabia's Religious Rehabilitation and Disengagement Programme	The RUSI Journal, 153(6): 60-65
Butler, Michelle	2017	Using Specialised Prison Units to Manage Violent Extremists: Lessons from Northern Ireland	Terrorism and Political Violence, 32(3): 539-557
Chalmers, Ian	2017	Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia: Bringing Back the Jihadists	Asian Studies Review, 41(3)